


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THE
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OF THE
WAR.

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CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.	PAGE	CHAPTER XIX.	PAGE
THE FLYING SERVICES	1	ECONOMIC REACTIONS.....	207
CHAPTER II.		CHAPTER XX.	
THE FLEET AND THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN.....	11	THE DESTRUCTION OF THE TURKISH ARMENIANS	217
CHAPTER III.		CHAPTER XXI.	
THE LANDING IN GALLIPOLI	23	THE FAILURE OF THE SUBMARINE BLOCKADE	225
<i>Appendix</i>	375	CHAPTER XXII.	
CHAPTER IV.		THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS.....	238
THE FRONTAL ATTACKS ON ACHI BABA.....	33	CHAPTER XXIII.	
<i>Appendix</i>	377	THE FALL OF THE RUSSIAN FORTRESSES.....	245
CHAPTER V.		CHAPTER XXIV.	
THE GERMAN RECOVERY OF GALICIA: RECAPTURE OF PRZEMYSL.....	47	THE ESCAPE OF THE RUSSIAN ARMIES.....	257
CHAPTER VI.		CHAPTER XXV.	
THE AUSTRO-GERMAN RECOVERY OF LEMBERG	59	THE VICTORY OF LOS.....	269
CHAPTER VII.		CHAPTER XXVI.	
THE FALL OF WARSAW.....	65	THE FRENCH ADVANCE IN CHAMPAGNE	279
CHAPTER VIII.		CHAPTER XXVII.	
THE SECOND SIX MONTHS—A SYNOPSIS.....	87	PENSIONS AND ALLOWANCES	289
CHAPTER IX.		CHAPTER XXVIII.	
THE FINANCE OF THE WAR	97	THE RED CROSS.....	297
CHAPTER X.		CHAPTER XXIX.	
LABOUR IN THE WAR	105	GERMAN INTRIGUES IN AMERICA	311
CHAPTER XI.		CHAPTER XXX.	
THE TREND OF GERMAN POLICY	117	IRELAND AND THE WAR	321
CHAPTER XII.		CHAPTER XXXI.	
RUSSIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS	129	HOME POLITICS IN THE SUMMER OF 1915.....	333
CHAPTER XIII.		CHAPTER XXXII.	
THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN	39	THE LAW AND THE COURTS	338
CHAPTER XIV.		CHAPTER XXXIII.	
STRATEGY AND POLITICS	151	THE MESOPOTAMIAN EXPEDITION	343
CHAPTER XV.		CHAPTER XXXIV.	
GUNS AND MUNITIONS IN THE WAR	161	THE BATTLE OF SUEVA BAY AND ANZAC	353
CHAPTER XVI.		<i>Appendix</i>	378 384
THE CASUALTIES	175	RETROSPECT.....	373
CHAPTER XVII.			
OPTIMISTS AND PESSIMISTS	16		
CHAPTER XVIII.			
THE CITIZEN ARMY	193		

INDEX TO PORTRAITS.

ALEXIEFF, General, 75.
 AMADE, General d', 26.
 ASKWITH, Sir George, 107.
 ASQUITH, Mr., 336.

BAILLOUD, General, 353.
 BALFOUR, Lord, 207.
 BALLIN, Herr, 213.
 BELOW, General Otto von, 83.
 BERNSTORFF, Count, 312.
 BIRDWOOD, General, 363.
 BOUE DE LAPEYRÈRE, 353.
 BOY-ED, Captain, 313.
 BUCKMASTER, Sir Stanley, 339.

DUMBA, Dr., 312.

EICHHORN, General von, 83.
 EVERT, General, 261.

GALLWITZ, General von, 79.
 GOREMYKIN, M., 130.
 GOUTCHKOFF, M., 130.

HAMILTON, Sir Ian, 26, 353, 357.

JOFFRE, General, 96.

LEOPOLD, Prince, of Bavaria, 71.
 LINSINGEN, General von, 67.
 LLOYD GEORGE, Mr., 105, 113, 188.

MACASSEY, Mr., K.C., 207.
 MACKENSEN, General, 84.
 MAHON, General, 367.
 MAUDHUY, General, 96.
 MILUKOFF, M., 131.

PAGET, General Sir Arthur, 86.
 PAPEN, Captain von, 313.

RATHENAU, Dr. Emil, 213.
 READING, Lord, 341.
 ROBECK, Admiral de, 353, 357.
 RODZIANKO, M., 131.
 RUNCIMAN, Mr., 113.

SCHOLZ, General von, 81.

TALAAAT BEY, 219.

WARNEFORD, V.C., Lieut. R. A. J., 7.
 WOYRSCH, General von, 71.

YANUSHKEVITCH, General, 263.

INDEX TO MAPS AND DIAGRAMS.

ARMENIAN MASSACRES, 218.

BALTIC COAST OF RUSSIA, 234.
 BRITISH 18-POUNDER FIELD GUN (diagram), 172.

CARPATHIAN PASSES, communications of, 49.
 CHAMPAINE, the battlefield in, 280.
 CONSTANTINOPLE, the approaches from the Dardanelles, 16-17.

DUNAJEC, the retreat from, 61.

GALLIOLI, the Peninsula, 356.
 " the landing beaches, 27.
 " the attacks on Achi Baba, 39, 43.
 " Suvla Bay and Anzac, 369, 370.
 GERMAN 15-POUNDER FIELD GUN (diagram), 169.

ITALY, operations on Austrian frontiers, 142, 145, 147.

Loos, operations round, 270.

MESOPOTAMIAN CAMPAIGN, 340.

PRZEMYSL, operations near, 53.

RUSSIA, operations in, 69, 71, 205.
 RUSSIAN RETREAT, The, 82, 250, 266.

SHIPPING LOSSES IN SUBMARINE BLOCKADE (diagram), 231.



Mr. Asquith inspecting the Royal Flying Corps.

[Record Press.]

HISTORY OF THE WAR.

CHAPTER I.

THE FLYING SERVICES.

THE NAVAL AIR SERVICE—OPERATIONS ON THE BELGIAN COAST—AEROPLANES V. MINES—THE KITE BALLOON—LIEUTENANT WARNEFORD'S EXPLOIT—THE ROYAL FLYING CORPS—THE NEW GERMAN AEROPLANES.

A CURRENT narrative of the work of the Flying Services in the war must err on the side of reticence, for even in describing past events it is easy to disclose facts that might be of service to the enemy. It would not, however, be just to two of the hardest working services in the war to defer notice of their achievement, even though such notice can hardly do more than gather up the facts set forth in the official *communiqués*.

As a branch of the Senior Service, the work of the Royal Naval Air Service must of course have precedence. The Naval Air Service was obviously intended to co-operate with the fleet, and the fact that its co-operation has had no particular effect on the course of the war at sea is primarily due to the fact that the fleet has had very little to do except police work, the German navy having elected to intern itself in the vicinity of the Kiel Canal, and merely to send out occasional fast cruisers and small patrol boats, which have been faithfully dealt with by our own surface boats intended for that purpose. Owing to the war taking this particular course, the Royal Naval Air Service was deprived of the prime reason for


its existence, but in spite of that it has done an enormous amount of very hard work.

In an earlier chapter of this history (Vol. I., Chapter XXVII.) the major actions of the Royal Naval Air Service have been dealt with up to Christmas of 1914, these including the raids on Düsseldorf, Cologne and Friederichshafen by shore-going naval aeroplanes, and the raids on Cuxhaven and the surrounding district by seaplanes. On January 10th, there was what practically amounted to an aerial battle in the neighbourhood of Dunkirk, disclosed in an Admiralty *communiqué* stating that twelve or thirteen German aeroplanes appeared over Dunkirk and dropped bombs. British naval aeroplanes, with French and Belgian machines, promptly attacked the Germans, one of which was brought down just over the Belgian frontier, pilot and passenger being captured. On this same day one of the most gallant actions of the war was performed by Squadron-Commander R. B. Davies, R.N. He and Flight-Lieutenant Peirse, each alone on an aeroplane, made a raid on Zeebrugge, and dropped twenty-seven bombs on two submarines in the harbour. One submarine was damaged, and there



The remains of Zeppelin L3, which was wrecked and burnt on the Danish island of Fanoe.

[Central News.]



A giant aeroplane built for the Russian army.

[Record Press.]



French aeroplanes ready to start out on a reconna'ssance.

[Photographic Service of the French Armies.]

were many casualties among the crews of the guns on the mole. On his way to Zeebrugge, Commander Davies was wounded in the thigh, but, despite his wound, continued his flight, dropped his bombs, and returned. For this action he and Lieutenant Peirse received well-merited D.S.O.'s.

On February 12th, combined aeroplane and seaplane operations were carried out along the Belgian coast, and bombs were dropped on Bruges, Zeebrugge, Blankenberghe, and Ostend, the intention being to prevent the development at those points of submarine bases by the enemy. Thirty-four naval aeroplanes and seaplanes took part in this raid, and great damage was done to the railway station at Ostend and to the Grand Hotel, which was being used as the German Headquarters. The railway was damaged at Blankenberghe, and the electric power station at Zeebrugge was also damaged. Various German mine-sweeping vessels at the latter port were also hit. This particular operation was carried out under the most unpleasant conditions, for there were several snowstorms during the day, through which the pilots had to fly. Also, the low clouds compelled the pilots to fly lower than they would otherwise have done, and thus exposed them to extra risk from gun-fire. Happily, only two machines were damaged in this raid, although a number of the pilots had somewhat extraordinary adventures. One of them so completely lost his way in a cloud that his entire sense of orientation disappeared—he literally did not know whether his head pointed up or down, and he only came to the conclusion that he was upside down by his revolver falling out of its holster, and various loose things on the floor of the machine disappearing overboard. He had the good sense to leave his machine alone, and finally it came out under the cloud, nose first, only a few hundred feet above the sea, whereupon he persuaded it to resume its normal position, and continued his flight.

Lest the Germans should receive the impression that the aforementioned raid was a grand finale to naval operations against the Belgian coast, it was followed promptly, on February 16th, by a still bigger raid, in which

forty aeroplanes and seaplanes took part. These machines dropped bombs on the heavy batteries protecting the harbour of Ostend, and on various gun positions at Middlekirke, on the locks at Zeebrugge, and on barges outside Blankenberghe. Unfortunately, three young officers were lost in this raid. By way of causing a diversion of German attention, a detachment of French aeroplanes, acting in co-operation, made a vigorous attack on the aerodrome at Ghistelles, which kept a good many German aircraft busily employed when they might have been interfering to some extent with the navy's operations.

In issuing this news, the Secretary of the Admiralty was moved to remark that instructions are always issued to confine attacks to points of military importance, and every effort is made by the flying officers to avoid dropping bombs on any residential portions of the towns. The point should be noted, because whenever an air raid by the Allied forces is carried out the German *communiqués* on the subject invariably state that no damage of military importance has been done, and that a number of civilians, chiefly women and children, have been killed, which of course bears a strong family resemblance to our own announcements on the same subject.


SEAPLANE CARRIERS.

On February 20th, the Secretary of the Admiralty announced that the special aeroplane ship *Ark Royal*, which was known before the war to be under construction for the express purpose of transporting and handling aeroplanes, was in attendance on the fleet at the Dardanelles, carrying a number of aeroplanes and seaplanes belonging to the Naval Wing. At the same time, various published information from the Dardanelles showed that the seaplanes taken there by the *Ark Royal* were doing quite good work. Since the Cuxhaven raid nothing had been heard of the flotilla of seaplane-carrying ships which took part in that raid. But it was not by any means idle during the spring and summer. Its work had been of a strictly routine nature, and therefore people were no more likely to hear of its performances than they were to hear of any one individual squadron of the



Some of the bombs which were carried by the wrecked Zeppelin L3.

[Central News.]



Views, taken from a French aeroplane, of a stretch of the Dardanelles coast and Turkish town.

[Wyndham, Paris (C.N).]

Royal Flying Corps. It had done nothing sensational, but a large amount of very useful and steady work, keeping up constant patrols at sea wherever the fleet needed it. One very useful part of its work was hunting for mines. The ordinary submarine mine must not be too far below the surface, otherwise of course it would miss the hull of any vessel passing directly over it; and it is found that, given moderately calm weather, it is possible for aircraft to spot mines from above when they could not possibly be seen from a ship unless it was practically alongside them. Therefore, seaplanes from the carrying ships have on many occasions flown over mine-fields and have spotted the positions of the mines, so that the attendant mine-sweepers have been able to destroy them with comparative safety. This, of course, is a purely supplementary use of aircraft; but, provided enough mines can be spotted and destroyed, it is an undoubtedly valuable work. It also was made known officially that seaplanes from ships were used with good effect in the final destruction of the German cruiser *Königsberg*, which hid itself up an East African river early in the war, and could not be satisfactorily located until it had been there nearly a year. Then a seaplane carrier was sent out, and the aeroplane from that ship quickly located the *Königsberg*, and by signalling the results of the fire from the attendant warships enabled them to destroy the vessel.

Various other seaplane-carrying ships were used in different parts of the world; but though it did not please the authorities to specify their operations, it is permissible to say that, although the use of aeroplanes from ships at sea was practically a new thing evolved during the course of the war itself, the work done was much better than anyone had any right to expect, and the casualties were surprisingly few. It is true that before the war some mild attempts were made at dropping aeroplanes overboard from ships by means of a derrick, and letting them get off the water on their own account, but no experiments of a really important kind had been carried out, and consequently all the work done by the aeroplane-carrying ships had to be done as circumstances permitted, and without any of the mechanical aids which will come into use when there is time to develop this particular branch of the Service.

On March 24th, a particularly striking action was announced. Squadron-Commander Ivor Courtney and Flight-Lieutenant Rosher attacked the Cockerill Ship-yard at Antwerp, which was being used by the Germans for the construction of submarines. At that time five submarines were observed on the launching slips, and eight bombs were dropped on them. It was found out afterwards, from Belgians who were in the Cockerill Yard at the time, that a very considerable amount of damage was done to the submarines, and that a number of German soldiers were killed and wounded, owing to the fact that when the first bomb was dropped the soldiers promptly rushed out into the open to shoot at the aeroplanes, whereas the men working on the submarines naturally took cover in the workshops. On April 1st, similar raids were made on submarines under construction at Hoboken, and on submarines moored at Zeebrugge, by Flight-Lieutenant Andreae and Flight-Lieutenant J. P. Wilson. Both officers started in the moonlight in the early morning, reaching their objective at dawn. On the 1st May, it was announced that the position of the big German gun which had bombarded Dunkirk, with a range of about twenty miles, had been verified by air scouts, and had been attacked in the evening by bombs from aeroplanes.

Whether these bombs did any material damage to the gun is not known, but it is certain that that particular gun ceased its operations for quite a considerable period.

KITE BALLOONS.


About this time it became publicly known that the Naval Air Service had formed a special section to deal with the operations of kite balloons. These curious implements had been largely used by the German army ever since the beginning of the war, and had also been adopted by the French and Belgians. But it was not until after considerable opposition that those in the British Services who believed in these balloons succeeded in bringing them into use. The kite balloon consists of a long sausage-shaped envelope with an air bag at one end, and it is so balanced that the air bag end sits lower in the air than the other end, giving the whole thing rather the aspect of an enormous pistol pointing at the clouds. It is impossible here to go into the precise points of design which causes these balloons to operate as they do, but it may be stated that instead of swinging backwards and forwards in the air with every gust, and spinning round at the same time as an ordinary captive spherical balloon does, the kite balloon remains steadily head to wind, and is so arranged that a gust has a tendency to lift it like a kite, at the same time that it tries to blow it back, with the result that it remains almost stationary in the air and always pointing practically in the same direction, so that it affords a very steady observation post either for controlling artillery fire or watching distant roads and railways.

These kite balloons soon proved their high value when put into regular use. A good many of them were used at the Dardanelles, and many more were sent to France, where they have been received with enthusiasm by those portions of the army with which they have had to co-operate, thus fully justifying the faith of those who urged that, as they were largely used by the German army after many years of experience, they must necessarily be of some military value. One of these balloons was directly responsible for the sinking of a large Turkish transport in the Sea of Marmora by a British battleship on the opposite side of the Gallipoli Peninsula, which was unable to see anything of the mark at which it was firing.

An Admiralty *communiqué* of May 8th disclosed one of the most unexpected incidents of the war. Some few days before, the German *communiqué* had stated that a German airship had fought several British submarines in the North Sea, and had sunk one of them. The British Admiralty, in issuing its corrected version of the facts, stated that the submarine had returned uninjured, and reported that she had damaged the airship by gun-fire and had driven her off. The idea of a battle between an airship and a submarine, two of the newest weapons of warfare, and two as far distant from one another as one could imagine any two weapons to be, is really of considerable interest. Those who have reason to know what did happen state that the submarine on coming to the surface was spotted by the airship, which endeavoured to drop bombs on her. Before she had succeeded in scoring a hit the submarine had got its gun on deck, and had succeeded in hitting the airship. Unfortunately, about the same time various German destroyers appeared, and the submarine was forced to submerge, but not before she had seen the airship coming down towards the water, very much down by the head. In confirmation of this, there was published in Holland within a few days' time



At a Belgian aeroplane camp, showing officers watching one of their airmen pursuing a German aeroplane.
[Newspaper Illustrations.]



Sending up one of the French war kites, to which a camera is attached.

[Central News.]

a rumour that some Dutch fishermen had seen a Zeppelin airship wrecked in the North Sea.

LIEUTENANT WARNEFORD'S EXPLOIT.

On May 17th, the Admiralty announced a Zeppelin attack at Ramsgate, which was chased off by aeroplanes from Eastchurch and Westgate. When this airship reached the Belgian coast she was attacked by eight naval aeroplanes from Dunkirk. Three of these machines got quite close to her, and Flight-Commander Bigsworth dropped four bombs from a height of only two hundred feet above the airship. A column of smoke was seen to come out of one of her compartments, and the airship then rose to a height of about 11,000 feet and appeared to be severely damaged. It was learned later that although the bombs hit the airship they apparently either passed straight through without exploding, or else exploded in the middle of the hydrogen, which, having no air mixed with it, did not catch fire. The column of smoke mentioned in the Admiralty *communiqué* seems to have come from the engines, and not from anything burning on the airship, for undoubtedly if there had been any fire on board one or other of the gas bags would have ignited and the whole thing would have come down. However, not long afterwards, the Naval Air Service had its compensation, for on June 7th, Flight-Lieutenants Wilson and Mills, starting out very early in the morning, attacked the airship shed at Evere, north of Brussels, at 2-30 a.m., and destroyed it utterly. Flight-Lieutenant Wilson, who arrived there first, dropped a large bomb on the shed, which apparently did considerable damage to the Zeppelin inside, without however setting fire to it. A few seconds afterwards Lieutenant Mills came along, and dropped several smaller bombs, one or other of which set fire to the gas released by the previous explosion, and so the whole ship and its shed and part of its crew were effectually abolished. On the same morning, Flight Sub-Lieutenant Warneford, who had gone out to look for another airship shed, and had apparently not reached his objective, met while in the air a Zeppelin which was returning from another raid on Ramsgate. He dropped six bombs on the airship. The force of the explosion turned the pilot's aeroplane upside down, and apparently stopped his engine, so that he was forced to land. However, before the local German troops were able to arrest him, he had succeeded in getting his machine going again, and returned safely to his base. For this service Mr. Warneford was given the V.C., and the other two officers D.S. Crosses. It may be pointed out that if an airship is destroyed in its shed a greater amount of damage is done than if it is destroyed while in the air, for in the former case the material in the shed and the means of sheltering another

airship are destroyed at the same time, whereas in the alternative only the ship itself is damaged. Moreover, as in the case just mentioned, it may fall on friendly property, and do a considerable amount of damage which was not intended by those who attacked it. The airship struck by Lieutenant Warneford fell on a convent and killed some of the inmates. Mr. Warneford was most unfortunately killed on June 17th, while demonstrating at a French aerodrome with an American journalist as his passenger.

A later feat of the Naval Air Service at the moment of writing was the destruction of another Zeppelin off Ostend, on August 10th. This airship had been carrying out a raid on the British coast, and had apparently been damaged by a lucky shot from an anti-aircraft gun. It was discovered at daylight being towed into Ostend after having come down on the water, whereupon it was attacked

by a British aeroplane and still further damaged, its destruction being ultimately completed by a mixed force of British and French aircraft.

THE ROYAL FLYING CORPS.

When one comes to describe the work of the Royal Flying Corps one is faced by rather a difficult problem, namely, that the military authorities in this country are very chary of giving any official information, and that, whatever may be the feelings of individual officers, there is a convention in the army which decrees that it is bad form for any officer's name to appear in print, except in an official list of D.S.O.'s or other honours. It is doubtless a thoroughly salutary custom, as it prevents an officer from wasting time in advertising himself when he ought to be working for the benefit of the army as a whole. Even as a corps, the Royal Flying Corps dislikes being praised, possibly because, before the corps had distinguished itself in any particular way, a Minister of State was so indiscreet as to call it "the Corps d'Elite

of the British Army," a title which obviously is the sole property of the Brigade of Guards; and doubtless the collective humility of the R.F.C. was a kind of silent protest against any suggestion that it wishes to usurp the Guards' prerogative.

When aircraft were first thought of seriously as implements of war it was prophesied that by enabling any individual commanding officer to "see behind the hill," or to "penetrate the fog of war," the end of any war would thus be hastened, because the information gathered by air scouts would precipitate a general and decisive action. What has actually happened is that each commander is so well able to watch the movements of the enemy commander that it is exceedingly difficult to concentrate troops for a surprise attack without that concentration being seen. The natural result is that a



Lieutenant R. A. J. Warneford, V.C.

[Central Press.]



French soldiers cutting up the framework of a captured German airship.

[Underwood & Underwood.]

corresponding concentration takes place on the opposite side, a particularly ferocious action is fought, an enormous casualty list is piled up, and things remain exactly as they were before. Even when one force is actually outnumbered, aircraft may delay the decision of events by enabling that force to escape annihilation. It may be remembered that right at the beginning of the war the little British Expeditionary Force was warned by its air scouts that it was opposed by a German army outnumbering it by at least three to one, and advancing at a speed which had never been contemplated even in the best military books. Without this warning the British force would undoubtedly have stood and fought, and would almost equally certainly have been annihilated by sheer weight of artillery, even without the three to one disadvantage in men. Even the minute force of British aircraft attached to the army at that period had thus a very decided effect on the course of events.

As the Anglo-French army grew stronger, and threatened in turn to outflank the German right, the British aircraft, which did practically the whole of the work for the Allied armies on the far west front, were able to keep an exact account of every German move. At this period the French aircraft were busily occupied on the eastern French frontier, where a heavy German blow was expected. Unfortunately, from the Allies' point of view, the German air service was numerous, exceedingly well equipped, beautifully organised, and very keen on its work, except when that work involved personal encounters with British aviators.

It was in this personal ascendancy, first noted by Sir John French after about three months of war, that the

Royal Flying Corps scored throughout the campaign. The German air scouting has been excellent, but its value has been diminished by the fact that the British aviators have on every occasion been the attackers, and in very few instances have the Germans remained to fight.

During one period, roughly from the beginning of May until midway through July, German aeroplanes were scarcely ever seen over the British lines. It scarcely seems likely that this scarcity of German aeroplanes was due to any falling off in the supply of machines, for the German aircraft factories are so numerous and well organised that their output must of necessity be greatly in excess of the English output, and probably is equal to the French and British output combined. It is, therefore, very probable that the bulk of the German aeroplanes—and especially all the best German pilots—were sent over to the Eastern front, where aeroplane reconnaissance must have been of the greatest importance in following the movements of the rapidly retreating Russian armies, and indicating to the German commanders where they might strike with the greatest effect. The Russian front is of such extraordinary length, and so much of the country is so absolutely unsuited to the use of aircraft, that great numbers of aeroplanes must have been necessary to replace those broken up, and an enormous number of pilots must also have been necessary in order to keep properly in touch with every movement of the Russian armies. It seems, therefore, that the absence of German aircraft, out of which some writers seemed to extract the conclusion that the Royal Flying Corps had beaten the German aviators out of the air, was really accounted for in quite another way.

THE NEW GERMAN AEROPLANES.

Towards the end of July, German aircraft of newer types began to appear, few in number, but exceedingly unpleasant in their habits. It may be inferred that having sent all their ordinarily effective machines to the Russian front, the Germans were experimenting on the Western front with their latest machines and picked pilots. The new machines belong to one of three general types.

One is an exceedingly large biplane, which has two bodies projecting aft instead of the one commonly seen, and an engine in front of each of these bodies, and a third engine between them. In the middle, in front of this third engine, is the seat for the pilot, and in front of him is seated a gunner, who is reputed to have control of a gun considerably larger than the ordinary machine-gun. This gun commands the air in front of the machine, and upwards and downwards. In each of the bodies, and seated behind the wings, is another machine-gunner, who is thus able to fire backwards and upwards, and so protect the machine from attacks by faster aircraft chasing it. When all three engines are opened out at once, this machine is said to have enormous speed, but it is also able to fly very slowly, and owing to the armament it carries it is a very awkward opponent.

The second type of machine is one with a single body, which would appear to the uninitiated very similar to the ordinary tractor biplane commonly seen in this country, but it has two engines, one on each side of the body, and the place usually occupied by the engine is taken by a man with a machine-gun. Behind him is seated the pilot, and behind him again is a third man, also with a machine-gun, to protect the machine against

attacks from the rear. This type of machine is said to be terrifically fast, and to be able to climb very rapidly, so that it is comparatively safe from being chased, and is able to defend itself if anything very fast does happen to meet it.

The third type is an ordinary tractor biplane, but with a 200-H.P. engine in front, carrying three men, stationed as in the second type of machine mentioned. This also is a fast machine, but not quite so terrible an opponent as either of the other two. One machine of this type was brought down by the French aviator Gilbert just before he unfortunately landed in Switzerland by accident.

It has been made known in the House of Commons, and also quite publicly on many occasions, that for some time after these new types of German aircraft appeared, the Royal Flying Corps had nothing capable of approaching their speed or rate of climb, except some of our very fastest single-seat scouting machines; but it is highly probable that by this time we may once more have proof that, slow as we may be in this country, we eventually succeed in catching up with our opponents. At any rate, one may be quite sure that, given machines which are as good or nearly as good as those made in Germany, the pilots of the Royal Flying Corps are quite competent to beat the German pilots, man for man.

The only regrettable thing is that the high authorities who were responsible for the equipment of the Royal Flying Corps before the war did not see their way to take the advice of the senior officers of the R.F.C. itself, who, at various meetings of societies concerned with aviation, pointed out the importance of big fighting aeroplanes and, generally, of adequate equipment for the Royal Flying Corps.



French peasants inspecting a British aeroplane which has descended near their village.

[L.N.A.]



Pre-Dreadnought battleships in the Dardanelles.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



The crew of a British battleship cheering another warship which had done good work at the Dardanelles under heavy fire.

[Sport and General.]



A scene in the Dardanelles in peace time.

[Topical Press.]

CHAPTER II.

THE FLEET AND THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN.

CRITICISMS OF THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN—A SOUND STRATEGIC IDEA, BUT MARRED IN THE EXECUTION—THE FAILURE OF THE NAVAL ATTEMPTS TO FORCE THE DARDANELLES—THE ATTACK OF MARCH 18—SUBSEQUENT NAVAL LOSSES.


SOME account has already been given in the chapter on Balkan politics of the arguments for and against the campaign in the Dardanelles. In the whole of our history there is no military operation about which, at any rate in its earlier stages, such widely-divergent views have been held as about this. To the excessive and quite unreasonable optimism that prevailed in the early stages of the campaign there succeeded a feeling of despondency, equally unreasonable, which found no condemnation of it too strong. There were those who thought, and even wrote, of it as though it were a modern parallel to the Sicilian Expedition of Athens. Athens, a sea-power, at war with the great military State of Sparta, was under no compulsion to undertake the expedition against Syracuse, which led to her downfall; and this campaign against Turkey came similarly to be regarded as a gratuitous doubling of a task which was already grave enough. Why, it was asked, should this country, already committed to a continental war on a scale wholly without precedent in our history, have embarked on a second enterprise against a Power of great military strength and repute, which, however, had shown in the Egyptian campaign that it was not capable of doing us much injury? To do nothing at all against Turkey, it was urged, was to disappoint the hopes of Germany in dragging her into the war; whereas even a successful campaign, unless victory were easy and immediate, might by diverting our energies enable her to win in the more decisive field. Was it not a violation of the first

principle of the strategic art which counsels victory in the main area of war as the one thing that matters? Such were the thoughts that possessed many minds as the campaign grew in magnitude and news came of heavy losses without decisive result.

Only the result could resolve these doubts, and it is not seemly for history indulging in prophecy, the most gratuitous form of error, to anticipate the event. But the gloomier views about the Dardanelles campaign which were cultivated towards the last quarter of the first year of the war were certainly much less than just to the intelligence of those who planned it. So far was it from being an excrescence on the war that if we had had before the war to select an area in which the chief sea-power, with only a moderate-sized army, might find the most natural and suitable employment for its energies in a European war, the Dardanelles would have been the most promising choice.


THE REASONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN.

An earlier chapter, discussing a precedent for the employment of a British army as a contingent, though under separate command, on the Continent of Europe, could find no later precedent than Minden, where a British contingent of some 7,000 or 8,000 men, in an Allied force of 36,000, fought under the over-command of Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick. Close as was the connection in the great war between this country and its Continental Allies against Napoleon, it supplied no example of British



H.M.S. Majestic, sunk in the Dardanelles.

[Central News.]



H.M.S. Goliath, sunk in the Dardanelles.

[Record Press.]

military co-operation like that between Sir John French and General Joffre. Pitt's idea was to limit the military partnership to attacks on the enemy's colonies, or at any rate to strictly subsidiary operations. A second model adopted after his death was the Peninsula campaigns of Wellington, and to this model the campaign in the Dardanelles approximated much more closely than that in Flanders. It was a more or less independent military operation of our own, separable from the rest of the European campaign, and it seemed possible to carry it to a successful conclusion by the employment of an army larger indeed than we should have dreamt of employing a century ago, but still such as a great Power, whose right arm was its fleet, could command without breaking with its strictly naval traditions in war. In other than a purely geographical sense a campaign in the Dardanelles might be regarded as a Peninsula War, and had we been free at the outset of the war to choose a field for the co-operation of our great fleet and a comparatively small army, the Gallipoli Peninsula would have been in direct accord with the main precedents of English history. We were not so free; for the war in the West developed into a struggle for the Straits, the possession of which was vital, not only for the successful prosecution of the war on land, but also for the naval defence of the country and of its over-sea communications. That, however, does not alter the fact that the Gallipoli campaign, so far from being an excrescence on our general military policy, was really a return to an old model, and had very solid precedent in its favour. But there were stronger reasons in its favour than precedent. Our chief service to the cause of the Allies—and the only one which was much in their thoughts before the war—was our keeping of the seas open. France enjoyed the full advantage of this service, but not Russia after the entry of Turkey into the war. Although allied with a Power whose supremacy at sea was unquestioned, Russia, owing to her geographical position, with the Baltic and the Black Sea both closed, became virtually a blockaded country. The only service that our naval power could render her (apart from keeping open the

route to Archangel in summer) was to free either the Baltic or the Black Sea; and of the two operations the opening of the Black Sea was the easier. It was the more incumbent on us to do what was possible, as it was largely due to our past policy that Russia had been deprived of access to the Mediterranean. Loyalty to Russia, therefore, and the duty of placing our sea-power at her service, persuaded us to this new Peninsula War. And the course of her campaigns reinforced this persuasion. It was obvious that unless Russia could put and keep her millions in the field, the Allies could hardly expect to win outright. The effect of the closing of the Dardanelles by Turkey was that Russia could not use her millions to advantage; that is to say, it transferred the superiority in numbers definitely


from the side of the Allies to that of the Germans. Except locally, Russia was always outnumbered; and it seems probable that she never had more than two million men in the field. In the critical campaigns for Warsaw in the summer of 1915, the superiority of the combined Austro-German forces may have been as three to two, and that not merely locally but over the whole front. It was not that Russia had not the men, but that she could not equip them; and she could not equip them because, owing to the closing of the Baltic and the Black Sea, British sea-power could not avail her. So far from being a rival to the campaign in Flanders, this campaign in Gallipoli was a corollary of it, the necessary condition of its



The Majestic sinking after being torpedoed by an enemy submarine.
[Central News.]

success. For without the Russian millions the chances of the Allies in the West carrying the huge German fortress of Belgium were very small.

Lastly, the idea of a campaign in the Dardanelles fitted in with the development of Russian strategy. Her whole aim had been to throw the weight of the campaign against Austria, in the hope that by overthrowing her she might transfer the war from the eastern frontiers of Germany to the south-eastern and southern, and enlist on the side of the Allies the non-Germanic elements of Austria. A campaign for the forcing of the Straits had this further advantage, that if successful it was likely to bring Roumania and Bulgaria into the war, and so



Church service on board H.M.S. Queen Elizabeth in the Dardanelles, under the muzzles of her 15-inch guns. [Central News.]



Mine-sweepers at work in the Dardanelles.

[Central News.]

raise up an impassable barrier between Germany and the East. The war, it must be remembered, was in its origin Balkanic; a struggle for the creation of a great Germanic Confederation stretching from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf. Constantinople lost, this ambition was defeated and the war was lost. Further, Buda Pest and Vienna were likely to fall with Constantinople, and without Austria the invasion of Germany was a matter of months only. Such were the hopes which in February not only fascinated but seemed almost within the grasp of the Allies; for at this time it must be remembered Russia was forcing the Carpathian Passes, and an invasion of Hungary seemed assured in the spring. Was it possible for this country to stand by and not make a movement to bring these bright prospects nearer? It was not as though success in Flanders was assured if only we did nothing elsewhere. The closer we approached to the problem of Flanders the more desirable it seemed to find a way round if one were possible.

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE CAMPAIGN.

Such were the arguments by which some prominent members of the Government became convinced of the desirability—even the necessity—of our taking part in the Eastern campaign on the left flank of the Russian armies, for this is what an attack on Constantinople amounted to. Among these members is believed to have been Mr. Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and in urging this project he showed, not for the first time in the war, a sound strategic instinct not unworthy of his great ancestor. A previous example of his grasp of a strategic situation was the Antwerp Expedition (Vol. I., pp. 275, 293), which, if it had been as sound in its organisation and its execution as in its general idea, would have solved most of our difficulties in Belgium. The Dardanelles campaign, like the Antwerp Expedition, was a great idea marred in the execution. It seems almost incomprehensible to us, knowing what happened later, to understand how any one could have conceived of the forcing of the Dardanelles as an operation for the fleet alone. How came it to be attempted without the assistance of an army? The materials for a complete

answer to that question will not be available for many years, and we can only hazard a guess. How far those responsible for the direction of our war operations had convinced themselves that the Dardanelles could be forced by the fleet alone is still uncertain. As late as March 22nd, the Admiralty issued a statement that "the power of the fleet to dominate the fortresses by superiority of fire seems to be established," and again that "nothing has happened which justifies the belief that the cost of the undertaking will exceed what has always been expected and provided for." On the other hand, Lord Fisher, the First Sea Lord, is believed to have been against a purely naval expedition, and it is certain that the Admiralty at the beginning of the war still held the view that a

fleet could not hope to reduce modern coast fortifications. Otherwise, it would have begun the war by an attack on Wilhelmshaven and utilised its naval supremacy to destroy the German fortifications along the Belgian coast between Antwerp and Ostend. The conversion to the uses of a naval bombardment of coast fortifications if it really took place would, therefore, seem to have been remarkably sudden. The probability is that the conversion was only partial. Mr. Churchill and others had convinced themselves that an attack ought to be made on the Dardanelles forts; might it not prove that against the fire of battleships coast fortifications would be as helpless as the forts of Liège and Antwerp against the German heavy artillery? There were some at any rate




A British sentry on the sea-shore.

[Central News.]

who thought it possible. Mr. Archibald Hurd, for example, a very competent critic of naval affairs, wrote soon after the bombardment had begun:—

"The consideration which has usually been rather overlooked is that in the 'fifties, when the belief in forts took root, the ships were not very different from those which fought at Trafalgar, and many changes have since occurred. The development of men-of-war, the improvement of the steam-engine, and the comparative lightness of the modern high-powered wire-wound gun has changed the conditions. In land warfare mechanical science has added immensely to the power of the defensive, as the conditions on the Continent continually remind us, but whenever naval power, strong and mobile, can be employed there are now good chances of success,




Why? It was an axiom that the amount of gunpowder which could be carried afloat was limited, whereas the weight-bearing capacity of a fortress was practically unrestricted.

"That is still true. But during the recent keen naval competition ships have increased in displacement. This growth in size and the advance in the power of the naval gun has enabled an armament to be mounted which, in fact, exceeds in power that of most forts. Concentration of effort on the creation of naval power resulted throughout the world, except in Germany and the United States, in a neglect of fixed defences. Moreover, by means of mobile ships carrying heavy guns, immense volume of fire can be brought speedily to any spot and concentrated on this or that shore fortress at will, the ships in the meantime by moving backwards and forwards proving elusive targets, whereas at Sebastopol the ships were anchored. Thus it happens that we are witnessing in process of execution an operation which a year ago, owing to a failure to realise the transition in naval power effected in the past sixty or seventy years, would have been regarded as extremely hazardous, if not impossible."

These views may or may not have been held with complete conviction in some official quarters, but they seem to have been held sufficiently strongly to make an experiment

desirable. They might be wrong; but the great thing was to begin. Perhaps the fleet might get through without assistance from an army; perhaps Greece, whose Premier, M. Venizelos, was in favour of intervention, would supply an army; perhaps, even if the fleet failed to get through, it might at any rate gain successes that would have a beneficial effect on the attitude of the Balkan States; and if all else failed, we might supply the army nucleus from Egypt. It was a typically British way of beginning a great military operation. Yet, haphazard as the means taken to carry out the idea may have been, the idea itself was perfectly sound, and censure, if censure is due, should be directed not against the enterprise as a whole, but against the impatience with which it was begun as an experiment in a theory of naval tactics which had hitherto been untested, and was not believed in by the responsible naval advisers.

The Dardanelles Straits are thirty-five miles long, and of a width varying from one to seven miles. At the entrance from the Aegean Sea they are three miles wide, and past the forts which guard the entrance the Straits



GATES OF CONSTANTINOPLE.

widen out to the Bay of Erenkoi. Further up, the Straits suddenly narrow to a mile wide, and here, in a quadrilateral, four miles square, of which Maidos and Kilid Bahr on the European side and Chanak and Nagara on the Asiatic side are the corners, the shores are studded with forts. Nagara is the ancient Abydos, where Leander, and after him Lord Byron, swam the channel—no very great feat except in bad weather, when the currents, always strong, become dangerous. Beyond the Narrows the Straits widen to two and three miles, until they emerge in the Sea of Marmora. Three times has a British fleet passed the Straits. The first time was in 1807, when Admiral Duckworth forced a passage, which, however, was hardly resisted, but was badly mauled on the return, after a stay at Constantinople sufficiently long to give the Turks time to fortify the Straits. The second time was in the Crimean War. The third time was in 1878, when Admiral Hornby passed the Straits at the height of the Anglo-Russian crisis. The progress of naval invention since then had undoubtedly been favourable to the defence, and in addition to the barriers of numerous

and well-planned forts, the waters were heavily mined. The forcing of the Straits was the most formidable naval operation ever attempted by the British or any other fleet.

THE REDUCTION OF THE FORTS AT THE ENTRANCE.

The attacks lasted over a month, and fall into three groups, separated from each other by intervals of bad weather, which, as most of our fire was at long range, and often indirect, depending on the ability of our aeroplanes to take careful observations and signal the results, interrupted the work. In the first group are the attacks on the four forts which guard the entrance. These began on February 18th, and were completed by the 26th. There followed a number of attacks on the forts inside the Straits on the Bay of Erenkoi and the Narrows. Finally, there was a general attack on March 18th, which failed badly, and may be said to have ended the attempts to force the passage by the fleet unassisted by an army. From this point onwards the main work of the fleet was in assisting the operations of the army, and in keeping it



British sailors round a hole in the deck of their vessel, caused by a shell from one of the Turkish forts.
[Central News.]



Members of a landing party of marines ashore during the early part of the operations against the Dardanelles.
[Central News.]

supplied with all the necessities of life to itself and death to the enemy—acting, as the British Commander-in-Chief expressed it, as “father and mother of the army.”

The despatch describing the opening attack on the forts at the entrance has already (Vol. II., p. 255-6) been quoted. This was not quite the first attack on these outer forts in the war, for early in November two British and two French ships had for a short time at long range bombarded them, and, according to the report of a Consul who was on land, did very considerable damage. But it was the first formal attack with a view to their reduction. These outer forts were much the easiest part of the work, for not only were they less modern in construction and armament than the inner forts, but the fleet operating in the open waters of the Ægean had much greater freedom of movement, and were a harder target to hit. But three days' bombardment were necessary before they were reduced—on the 18th, again—after a pause due to the misty weather—on the 25th, and on the 26th. On the first day five British ships, the *Inflexible*, the *Agamemnon*, the *Cornwallis*, the *Vengeance*, and the *Triumph*, and three French ships, the *Suffren*, *Gaulois*, and *Bouvet*, were engaged. All were powerful ships, though the latest, the *Inflexible*, completed in 1908, was a pre-Dreadnought. They succeeded in silencing the fire of the forts except of Kum Kale, but not in dislodging the garrisons or dismantling the guns. The plan of this, as of all the attacks that followed, was the same: first, a preliminary bombardment at long range by the heavy guns, and then, when it was hoped that the garrison could no longer serve their guns, a bombardment at closer range with the secondary armament. In the bombardment of the 25th, the *Queen Elizabeth*, one of the newest Dreadnoughts, and the proud possessor of the first 15 in. guns, took part. The *Queen Elizabeth* concentrated her fire on Fort A, near Cape Helles, and before noon had put both of its 9.2 in. guns out of action. They had been well served, and one shell hit the *Agamemnon* at a range of 11,000 yards. The *Vengeance* and *Cornwallis* afterwards engaged the fort at close range, and completed its destruction. The *Suffren* and *Charlemagne* did the same at Forts C and D on the Asiatic side. It was not, however, until the following day, when the ships entered the Straits and shelled them in reverse, that the garrisons evacuated the forts. Parties were then landed, and Forts A, B, and C were completely, and D partially, demolished. Already, however, it began to be suspected that the main difficulty in forcing the Straits was not likely to be the forts, but the concealed batteries. Until the army was landed, the Turks were constantly running field guns to the end of the Peninsula, and their fire, though not dangerous, was always troublesome to the ships that entered the Straits.

Admiral Carden, who was in command, continued his attack with energy. Three ships entered the Straits, on March 3rd, and engaged the batteries at White Cliff, in Erenkoi Bay. At night mine-sweepers covered by destroyers swept to within a mile and a half of Cape Kephez. On the following days Fort Dardanus, and some concealed batteries near, gave a great deal of trouble, and it was necessary to put parties ashore near Kum Kale and Seddil Bahr to destroy Turkish field-guns which were annoying the ships inside the Straits by fire from the entrance. On March 5th, an attack was delivered on the forts in the Narrows. The magazine of Fort L, the heaviest armed, was blown up, and in this attack the *Queen Elizabeth* took part by fire directed by aeroplanes from the Ægean. On the same day the Smyrna forts were bombarded by a squadron under Admiral Peirse. “The reduction of the Smyrna defences,”


said the Admiralty statement, in a somewhat cryptic passage, “is a necessary incident in the main operation.” Why it should have been necessary was not explained, but it may have been that Smyrna was to have been the field of operations for the Greek army. On March 6th, however, M. Venizelos resigned, owing to a disagreement with the King over his policy of intervention, and whether for that or for other reasons the operations at Smyrna were shortly afterwards discontinued. The operations in the Dardanelles for the next ten days were much interrupted by bad weather.

THE GENERAL ATTACK.

A general attack on the Narrows had now been decided. On March 16th, Admiral Carden had been succeeded in the chief command by Admiral de Robeck. The reason officially assigned was that Admiral Carden had been incapacitated by illness. He therefore cannot be made responsible for the attack. On March 18th, exactly a month after the first bombardment of the outer forts, this attack was delivered. The following is a list of the ships of the line that took part in it:—

BRITISH.					
	Completed.	Tons.	Guns.		
<i>Queen Elizabeth</i>	1915	27,500	8 15-in.	12 6-in.	
<i>Inflexible</i>	1908	17,250	8 12-in.	16 4-in.	
<i>Agamemnon</i>	1908	16,500	4 12-in.	10 9.2-in.	
<i>Lord Nelson</i>	1908	16,500	4 12-in.	10 9.2-in.	
<i>Irresistible</i>	1901	15,000	4 12-in.	12 6-in.	
<i>Majestic</i>	1895	14,900	4 12-in.	12 6-in.	
<i>Prince George</i>	1896	14,900	4 12-in.	12 6-in.	
<i>Cornwallis</i>	1904	14,000	4 12-in.	12 6-in.	
<i>Vengeance</i>	1901	12,950	4 12-in.	12 6-in.	
<i>Albion</i>	1902	12,950	4 12-in.	12 6-in.	
<i>Ocean</i>	1900	12,950	4 12-in.	12 6-in.	
<i>Canopus</i>	1899	12,950	4 12-in.	12 6-in.	
<i>Triumph</i>	1904	11,800	4 10-in.	14 7.5-in.	
<i>Swiftsure</i>	1904	11,800	4 10-in.	14 7.5-in.	
FRENCH.					
<i>Suffren</i>	1903	12,520	4 12-in.	10 6.4-in.	
<i>Bouvet</i>	1898	12,007	2 12-in.	2 10.8-in.	8 5.5-in.
<i>Gaulois</i>	1899	11,080	4 12-in.	10 5.5-in.	
<i>Charlemagne</i>	1898	11,000	4 12-in.	10 5.5-in.	

Admiral de Robeck's plan was certainly bold. He proposed, having silenced the fire of the shore batteries and swept the Straits of mines as well as it could be done in the course of an action, to make a dash through the Straits. Everything turned on silencing the fire of the forts, and this it would seem the Admiral felt fairly confident of doing. The passage of the Narrows, which was not more than five miles long, could be done in fifteen minutes, provided the fleets were secure from the shore batteries, and it was hoped that, even though one or two of the ships might be sunk by mines, the others might get safely through to the Sea of Marmora. There they would be in an excellent position either to hold up Constantinople or to assist in any land operations (for an army was now collecting on Lemnos) against the isthmus which joins the Peninsula of Gallipoli with the mainland. It was a bold plan, but, granted the likelihood of silencing the fire of the forts, not a rash one. It is improbable that Admiral de Robeck meant to force the passage with the whole of his fleet, and the six ships which were held in reserve in the earlier part of the action were apparently those which were intended to make the dash across the mines. These ships were the *Vengeance*, the *Irresistible*, the *Albion*, the *Ocean*, the *Swiftsure*, and the *Majestic*.



The crew of H.M.S. Grampus cheering the E11 as she came out of the Dardanelles Straits after her exploits in the Sea of Marmora. [Central News.]

At 10-45 in the morning the *Queen Elizabeth*, *Lord Nelson*, *Agamemnon*, and *Inflexible* entered the Straits in line ahead, and then opened out, forming a line abreast where the Straits widen between Eski Hissarlik and Erenkoi. On the left of the line, hugging the European shore, was the *Prince George*, and at the other extremity the *Triumph*. The four large ships engaged the forts round Chanak and Kilid Bahr at long range, while the *Prince George* bombarded Fort F on the European side and the *Triumph* Fort E (Dardanus), which still continued to give trouble from the near side of Kephez Point. After the bombardment had opened, the four French battleships entered the Straits, and at 12-22 they, with the *Prince George* and the *Triumph*, went ahead to engage the forts at closer range. Almost all the ships were hit by the fire of the shore batteries; the worst sufferers were the French ships, especially the *Bouvet* and the *Gaulois*; the *Inflexible*, about one o'clock, had her foretop struck by shrapnel, and either at the same time or later in the afternoon suffered further damage. At 1-25 all the forts had ceased firing, and it seemed that the moment had now come to call the six reserve ships into action. Accordingly, the four French ships, the *Prince George*, and the *Triumph* were ordered to retire and the reserve ships to take their place. As the *Bouvet*, considerably damaged by the fire of the forts, retired she struck what is described in the Admiralty report as a drifting mine, and went down in three minutes with most of her crew. The mine may have been a torpedo fired from

the White Cliff near Dardanus, or it is possible, as an observer on the *Prince George*, which was abreast of her, seems to have suspected, that a shell exploded her magazines. She sank in thirty-six fathoms, north of Erenkoi village. Soon afterwards all the forts reopened fire. It must have been a great disappointment to the Admiral, who had evidently hoped, when he gave the order to his reserve ships to take the place of the French, that the forts had been put out of action and that the time had come to rush the passage. He could have no thought of that, with the forts still firing. At 2-36 the attack on the forts began anew. Soon after 4-0, the *Irresistible* quitted the line listing heavily, and at 5-50 she sank. At 6-5 the *Ocean* sank. Both are said to have struck mines, but their crews, more fortunate than that of the *Bouvet*, were saved. The bombardment continued till nightfall, apparently without silencing the fire of the forts.

The Admiralty report on this very unfortunate action attributed our losses to "mines drifting with the current which were encountered in areas hitherto swept clear," and added that "this danger will require special treatment." The sentence is a remarkable one; and the intention would seem to be to throw the whole blame for the failure on the ill-luck of our ships in striking mines in seas which had already been swept. It is possible, as has already been suggested, that the cause of the destruction may not have been drifting mines but torpedoes fired from the land. But even if it were drifting mines, the danger from them


in a strong current like that which flows through the Dardanelles would seem obvious, and it is strange that the Admiralty should speak of it as though it could not have been foreseen. But though mines may have caused our losses, they were not responsible for the defeat. It is quite evident that the central idea of the attack—that the fire of the forts might have been silenced by a few hours' bombardment so as to allow a force of ships to dash through—was wrong. The effect of the long-range fire by heavy guns on modern fortifications was clearly nothing like so great as was supposed. The men might be driven from their guns temporarily, but it was rarely that a gun was actually hit by a shell, and nothing less could put it permanently out of action. Moreover, in the narrow waters of the Straits ships were at a great disadvantage through being unable to manœuvre. The great advantage of an attack from the sea on fixed defences, that it presents a moving target, was lost. If the attack was delivered in the hope that the failure of the forts of Liège and Antwerp against the German heavy guns would be repeated against a naval attack, the calculation was clearly wrong.

The general attack was never renewed, and henceforward the fleet confined itself to the less brilliant, but not less difficult, rôle of assisting the siege operations of the army. Its losses continued. On May 12th the *Goliath* was torpedoed; on May 26th the *Triumph*, and on the following day the *Majestic*, were sunk by a German submarine in the Gulf of Saros. The appearance of German submarines—there seem to have been several—in Near Eastern waters gravely complicated the task of the Allied fleet, for these waters,

studded with islands, are ideal for the operations of these craft. But, as will be seen in the next chapter, German submarines were not alone to win distinction.


Here should be mentioned a brilliant exploit by a British submarine in the Dardanelles two months before the first naval attack on the forts was delivered. On December 13th Lieutenant-Commander Holbrook entered the Straits in the *B 11*, dived under five rows of mines, and torpedoed the Turkish battleship *Messudiyeh*.

On May 15th Lord Fisher resigned, and in the reconstruction of the Cabinet that took place at that time Mr. Churchill was succeeded at the Admiralty by Mr. Balfour. It is believed that the main cause of Lord Fisher's resignation was the incompatibility of his temper with Mr. Churchill's. Both were masterful, not to say headstrong; and both were men who had no fondness for divided authority and compromise. There were also differences between them on questions of policy, and the chief of them was the naval attack in the Dardanelles, which Mr. Churchill believed in and Lord Fisher did not. Events justified Lord Fisher; and it might have been expected that when Mr. Churchill went, Lord Fisher would have come back. His views, however, on the powers that the First Sea Lord ought to have did not commend themselves to the Government; and Mr. Balfour was not, any more than Mr. Churchill, the sort of man to consent to act as the mouthpiece of any naval officer, however distinguished, and this, it was thought, was what the satisfaction of Lord Fisher's demands would have meant. Mr. Balfour, moreover, was in general sympathy with Mr. Churchill. The new First Lord was Sir Henry Jackson.



H.M.S. *Swiftsure* going into action in the Dardanelles.

[Central News.]



One of the most remarkable photographs of the war: An official photograph of the landing beach at Seddil Bahr, taken from the beached River Clyde immediately after the British troops had established themselves on the Peninsula, and showing the horses, provisions, baggage, etc., going ashore.

[Central News.]



The River Clyde as she lay beached after the landing at Seddil Bahr.

[Central News.]

CHAPTER III.

THE LANDING IN GALLIPOLI.

THE CONCENTRATION IN LEMNOS—THE DARDANELLES AND THE DEFENCE OF CONSTANTINOPLE—SIR IAN HAMILTON'S PLANS—THE SEVEN LANDINGS—FAILURE OF FIRST ATTACKS ON KRITHIA AND OF THE TURKISH COUNTER-ATTACKS.

IN its account of the attack of March 18th, the Admiralty stated that the operations were proceeding and that there were ample naval and military forces on the spot. It was odd that it should advertise beforehand its intention to use an army, seeing how strict its secrecy was with regard to other matters, but no doubt it was assumed that the Turks already knew everything that there was to be known about our intentions. It is interesting to speculate on what might have happened had the fleet not delivered an attack alone, but had waited until our military preparations were complete, and had the two then delivered simultaneously by sea and land a surprise attack, if surprise were possible. The Turks had been busy in the late autumn strengthening the defences of the Straits, and the widely-held idea that it was the work done in the month between the first and final naval attack that made our task formidable is an exaggerated distortion of the facts. But it is undeniable that the notice of the impending attempt to reach Constantinople through the Straits which was given by the bombardments, the terms in which they were described by the Admiralty statements and the comments in the newspapers, were of extreme value to the Germans, and it is to be regretted that the chance of a surprise for what it was worth was sacrificed to what turned out to be a baseless hope that the fleet alone might be able to get through.


Even on March 18th this hope had not been abandoned, though preparations for military co-operation were by that

time fairly advanced, and a considerable force had been landed on Lemnos Island, or were in transports in harbour, by an arrangement with the Premier of Greece. Presumably, the result of the early bombardments had suggested doubts about the ability of the fleet to do the work alone, and in any case, even if the fleet had forced a way, an army would have been necessary to take full advantage of the success at sea. Still, the Government was anxious to restrict the number of troops used as much as possible. On March 13th, General Sir Ian Hamilton, who had been appointed to the command of the Allied armies in the Eastern Mediterranean (the French had also arranged to send a force, which was to be under the command of General D'Amade, of Morocco fame), left London, and arrived at Lemnos on the day before the naval attack. The attack which he witnessed convinced him that there was no possibility of success by the fleet alone. He telegraphed to the War Office his "reluctant deduction" that the whole of the forces under his command would be required to enable the fleet "effectively" to force the Dardanelles. By "effectively" he seems to have meant that unless there were a considerable military force the passage of the Straits by a few warships would not have any great permanent effect on the situation. The accommodation in Lemnos was too cramped to allow him to redistribute the troops on the transports in accordance with the plans he had formed, and his first step was to order all the transports, with the troops on board, back to Egypt, so that they could be rearranged as they were required



Troops going ashore from their transports in the Dardanelles.

[Underwood & Underwood.]



Off Seddil Bahr: A battleship searching the enemy trenches with shell immediately after the landing of the British troops.

[Sport and General.]

for disembarkation on the Gallipoli Peninsula. A few details who had been landed, and the Australian Infantry Brigade, remained on Lemnos.

SIR IAN HAMILTON'S PLANS.

Constantinople on the land side is defended by the famous lines of Chataldja, which, as the Bulgarians found to their cost in the Balkan war, are impregnable. They can, however, be turned from the sea, for the Power that commands the Sea of Marmora can land troops in the rear of Chataldja. The Straits lead from the Ægean into the Sea of Marmora. The Peninsula of Gallipoli, as the land on the European side of the Straits is called, is connected with the mainland by the Isthmus of Bulair, and some plans for the capture of the Straits have contemplated a landing on the low land near the Isthmus. Its possession not only enables an enemy to attack from the north the forts commanding the Straits, but also completely bars the main channel by which supplies and reinforcements can reach them. It was generally expected that an attempt would be made to secure the Isthmus. Sir Ian Hamilton decided against it. His main reason seems to have been that it was essential to success that his whole army should be landed simultaneously, that is to say, at a number of points at once. Otherwise, the first detachments to land would be overwhelmed before they could establish themselves. A landing on the Isthmus itself was particularly dangerous, because of the absence of cover and the strength of the Turkish lines here. The only way in which an army could hope to establish itself for the attack on these lines would have been to land some distance away and march by the coast, and some Germans were persuaded that this would be the plan adopted, and that the landing would be made at Enos. But the march from Enos to the Isthmus would have been long, difficult, and exposed to attack from the flank, and at the end of it the force would find itself on the wrong side of the lines of Bulair. The advantage of cutting off the communications of the Dardanelles forts with Constantinople was great, but it was not worth these great risks. An ideal position for landing would have been along the southern shores of the Gulf of Xeros, between Bulair and Suvla Burnu (see map on page 16), but, unfortunately, the whole of this coast is a wall of precipitous cliffs, unbroken except by a few gullies, which were quite impracticable for any serious military movement. He therefore found his choice restricted to the coast line between Suvla Burnu and Eski Hissarlik. Accordingly, here he proposed to land at as many points as possible.

For the great enterprise that he was now to begin Sir Ian Hamilton had in his command a Division of Regular Troops—the Division afterwards famous as the Twenty-ninth—the Australian and New Zealand contingents, the East Lancashire Territorials from Egypt, and a Marine Brigade, perhaps 60,000 men in all. The composition of the Twenty-ninth Division has never been officially given, but among the regiments mentioned in official despatches as belonging to it are the following:—

- The King's Own Scottish Borderers.
- The South Wales Borderers (Second).
- The Royal Fusiliers (First).
- The Lancashire Fusiliers (First).
- The Inniskilling Fusiliers.
- The Dublin Fusiliers.
- The Munster Fusiliers.
- The Hampshires.
- The Essex.
- The Worcesters.

Observers of this Division in the camp in Egypt, at San Stefano, spoke in the very highest terms of its fine military appearance and efficiency, and the great expectations which were formed of it were splendidly fulfilled.

Sir Ian Hamilton's despatch describing the landing operations is the finest that any British General has ever written, both for the clarity with which he sets out the principles which decided the form his plans for landing were to take and for the great skill with which he characterises each part in an extremely elaborate set of operations. There were no fewer than seven distinct landings, and Sir Ian Hamilton has described why so many were necessary:—

"Altogether the result of this and subsequent reconnaissances was to convince me that nothing but a thorough and systematic scheme for flinging the whole of the troops under my command very rapidly ashore could be expected to meet with success; whereas, on the other hand, a tentative or piecemeal programme was bound to lead to disaster. The landing of an army upon the theatre of operations I have already described—a theatre strongly garrisoned throughout and prepared for any such attempt—involved difficulties for which no precedent was forthcoming in military history, except possibly in the sinister legends of Xerxes. The beaches were either so well defended by works and guns or else so restricted by nature that it did not seem possible, even by two or three simultaneous landings, to pass the troops ashore quickly enough to enable them to maintain themselves against the rapid concentration and counter-attack which the enemy was bound in such case to attempt. It became necessary, therefore, not only to land simultaneously at as many points as possible, but to threaten to land at other points as well. The first of these necessities involved another unavoidable, if awkward, contingency, the separation by considerable intervals of the force."

No official information has ever been given of the points at which feint landings were made, but it is possible that one of them was at Enos. At any rate, the very categorical statements in the German press that a landing had been effected at Enos can hardly have been invention; and as nothing ever came of it, any landing or show of landing here must have been a mere feint designed to deceive the enemy.

The British army, under the escort of the fleet, left Mudros, in Lemnos Island, for the Gallipoli Peninsula on April 23rd and 24th. The Twenty-ninth Division was the first to leave, on the evening of the 23rd, arriving at Tenedos the next morning, and the Australians followed on the afternoon of the 24th. The two expeditions had a separate naval escort. The Australian escort consisted of five battleships, the *Queen, London, Prince of Wales, Triumph*, and *Majestic*, with one cruiser and eight destroyers.

THE AUSTRALIAN LANDING.

The point selected for the Australian landing was under Sari Bair, a group of hills which lies to the north-west of the Kilid Bahr Plateau, on which the Narrows forts are situated, and rises to a height of nearly a thousand feet by a series of steep terraces covered with thick undergrowth. It was intended to be the most northerly landing, and owing to an accident the actual point of disembarkation was a mile further north than that which Sir Ian Hamilton had selected. North of Gaba Tepe the cliffs had seemed to him too steep for a landing, but in fact their precipitousness turned out to be a protection, screening the seashore from artillery fire. The beach was a narrow strip of sand, rather more than half a mile from end to end. The line of the cliffs almost overhangs the



The Dardanelles Expeditionary Force sets out: A transport loading up at Alexandria.

[Central News.]



General d'Amade and Sir Ian Hamilton at a review of French troops at Alexandria before the French force was despatched to the Dardanelles.

[L.N.A.]

beach, but at each end a narrow ravine runs up from the shore and gives access to the maze of cloughs which form the underfeatures of Sari Bair.

It was decided to attempt a surprise. At three o'clock on the morning of the 25th the Australians approached the shore in the *Queen* and two other battleships, steaming very slowly, and when a very short distance from the land took to the boats. Through the darkness a Turkish battalion could be seen, apparently surprised by their approach, and preparing to resist. The Australians, obeying their instructions, remained silent. The enemy fired as the boats approached, causing many casualties. The moment the boats touched the sand the Australians charged straight for the enemy with such downright fury that the enemy fled without waiting up the ravine at the south end of the beach. By two o'clock in the afternoon 12,000 men and two Mountain Batteries had landed. By that time the enemy had recovered from his surprise, and his heavy guns forced the transports containing the field artillery to stand further out to sea. The Australians were scattered northwards along the shore as far as Fisherman's Hut, and inland, where they had penetrated for two miles in pursuit of the Turks. As the Turks, now 20,000 strong, advanced to the attack, there was much confusion amongst the Australians, and it was impossible to sort out the units.

That did not affect their impetuous valour. Three Krupp guns were put out of action in a charge. The Turkish attacks, however, persisted all through the afternoon and into the night, and another two days passed before the troops gained a sufficiently long respite to disentangle the confusion of the units. All that time they lay in their trenches resisting the enemy's attacks, with the assistance of the guns of the *Majestic*. The enemy's losses were exceedingly heavy during this time. On the other hand, neither were the Australian attacks successful. They lost 800 men on May 2nd in an attack on an eminence in the centre of the enemy's line, and an attack two days later on Gaba Tepe also failed. Here


they must be left, in order that we may see how other portions of the line fared.

THE FRENCH LANDING.

The Australians were at the extreme left; at the extreme right, on the Asiatic side of the Straits, the French Colonial Division had been landed at Kum Kale. The object of this landing was to prevent the enemy from shelling our troops at the tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula. The landing was quite successful, and some 400 Turks, whose retreat after an unsuccessful counter-attack had been cut off by the fire from the ships, were taken prisoners. The French troops, however, were unable to make any progress along the coast; and as it appeared that an advance would be too costly, they were withdrawn on the 26th, the main object of the landing having been attained. They were later transferred to the extreme right of the Allied line, on the European side of the Straits.

THE FAILURE AT Y BEACH.

How in the meantime had the Twenty-ninth Division fared in the centre between the Australians and the French? No fewer than five separate landings were attempted. Two of these, on Y Beach and S Beach (Morto Bay), were made mainly to protect the flanks of the other landings at X, W, and V. The landing at S Beach, in spite of delays caused by the strength of the



The Landing Beaches in Gallipoli.


current, was successfully accomplished by 7-30 a.m. on the 25th, and Colonel Casson, with the South Wales Borderers, was able to establish himself at the top of the cliff near De Tott's Battery, and to hold his own for two days until the other landing parties came into line with him. Less fortunate was the landing at Y Beach, immediately to the west of Kriethia.

The force at Y Beach consisted of the King's Own Scottish Borderers and the Plymouth Battalion of Marines, the whole under the command of Colonel Koe. The very difficulties of the coast at this point—a precipitous cliff some 200 feet high—favoured the success of the landing, for the Turks, who had elaborately entrenched



Inside the wrecked fortress of Seddil Bahr.

[Central News.



One of the wrecked Turkish guns at Seddil Bahr.

[Central News.

a beach for a mile and a half to the south, had done nothing to strengthen the defence at this point. Moreover, there were gullies in the face of the cliff which both gave cover and helped the climb to the top, and the force was able to establish itself by morning. Water, food, and ammunition, as arranged, were hauled up to the top of the cliff by ropes. Later in the day, however, the Turks began to develop strong counter-attacks from the direction of Krithia, and indeed the position on the flank of Achi Baba, the main work of the Turks in front of the Narrows forts, was too important to leave unmolested. It was a bad position to defend, for the ground at the top slopes down inland, making it difficult for the guns of the fleet to give the defenders much assistance. The Turks made repeated assaults on the British lines, which continued through the night, and so great was the confusion of the fighting in the dark that the Turks actually "led a pony with a machine-gun on its back into the middle of the defences, and were proceeding to come into action in the middle of our position when they were bayoneted." At seven o'clock next morning it was seen that the position was untenable, and what was left of the force, with all its wounded and its supplies, were successfully withdrawn under the guns of the *Goliath*. The losses were heavy, and amounted to half of the Scottish Borderers, including Colonel Koe; but though the enterprise miscarried, it did service to the other landings by detaining very large numbers of Turkish troops.

THE IMPLACABLE LANDING.

The principal landings were at the three other beaches, X, W, and V. X is a strip of sand beach two-hundred yards by eight. Here the Royal Fusiliers were engaged, with the *Implacable* in support. This landing was brilliantly managed. The *Implacable* stood right into shore, and, firing with every gun she had at close range, did such execution amongst the Turks that the Fusiliers were able to land without a single casualty.* "The nature of the beach was very favourable for the covering fire from ships," writes Admiral de Robeck, "but the manner in which this landing was carried out might well serve as a model." The beach has since been called after the ship, Implacable Landing. The Royal Fusiliers did not wait to be attacked, but advanced boldly against Hill 114, near W Beach, but were compelled to give way before a heavy attack. Later, however, they were reinforced by two more battalions, and by night they had established themselves on a radius of half a mile round their landing place, and were in touch with the Lancashire Fusiliers on W Beach.

SEDDIL BAHR.

The landing on W Beach was perhaps the most remarkable of all; but though it lies nearest to Implacable Landing, it is convenient to turn to what happened at Beach V—Seddil Bahr. This was the most important landing in the number of troops engaged, and at one time looked like ending in complete failure. The cliffs at Seddil Bahr form a grassy amphitheatre, with the beach as stage. The Turks had expected a landing here, and made most elaborate preparations to meet it. At the eastern end of the beach is the old fort of Seddil Bahr, whose walls—though they had been dismantled by the fleet in the bombardment of

February—gave excellent cover for the enemy's riflemen, and right round the circle of the amphitheatre ran rows of desperate wire entanglements. Across the narrow strip of beach sand there is a little ridge about four feet high, forming a natural escarpment, which saved many lives in the fighting. The top of the cliffs was lined with skilfully-concealed machine-guns.

The Turkish position was heavily bombarded by the fleet before the landing was attempted, but the enemy held his fire until the landing began. An old collier, the *River Clyde*, had been prepared to assist in the landing. Large holes had been cut in her sides, through which the troops were to pour over a wide gangway into lighters which she had in tow. She was nicknamed the "Trojan Horse" by the troops, and the name was doubly appropriate, for over the straits, east of Kum Kale, is the site of ancient Troy. The Turks watched the *River Clyde* approach with her lighters, as they had endured the bombardment, in complete silence. Even when the *Clyde* was driven on the beach they refrained from fire, and it almost looked as though the landing was to be unopposed. The first troops were sent ashore in boats, and when their keels grounded, then and not before, there suddenly broke out from the hillside a tornado of fire. Most of the men—the Dublin Fusiliers—were killed in the boats before they could leap ashore; a few raced across the sand to the little escarpment, where they obtained some cover. But not one of the boats or of the men who stayed in them was saved. Nor was the device of the *Clyde* very successful at first. Commander Unwin had the greatest difficulty, owing to the strength of the current, in getting the lighters in position between his ship and the shore; the seamen were shot down when they exposed themselves in this work.

When the lighters were in position, a company of the Munster Fusiliers rushed across the gangway. Short as the distance was, few of them reached the protection of the escarpment. When the next company followed, the extemporised pier of lighters gave way in the current and drifted into deep water, the men who escaped being shot. It was then that Commander Unwin did the acts for which he has been so deservedly praised.

"Observing that the lighters which were to form the bridge to the shore had broken adrift, Commander Unwin left the ship and under murderous fire attempted to get the lighters into position. He worked on until, suffering from the effects of cold and immersion, he was obliged to return to the ship, where he was wrapped up in blankets. Having in some degree recovered, he returned to his work against the doctor's order and completed it. He was later again attended by the doctor for three abrasions caused by bullets, after which he once more left the ship, this time in a lifeboat, to save some wounded men who were lying in shallow water near the beach. He continued at this heroic labour under continuous fire, until forced to stop through pure physical exhaustion."

By noon, out of 1,000 men who left the collier, nearly half had been killed or wounded, and it was decided to discontinue the landing. Fortunately, the collier gave good protection to those who were still aboard her, and her machine-guns prevented the Turks from delivering a counter-attack against those who had landed and clung to the beach under cover of the escarpment. There they lay, unable to move, all through the night. With the remnants of the Dublins and Munsters on the shore were two companies of the Hampshire Regiment. Almost all their officers had been killed.

* So says Admiral de Robeck in his report. Sir Ian Hamilton says "with but little loss."



Turkish prisoners being marched to the British landing place on the Gallipoli Peninsula: A photograph which illustrates the nature of the type of country being fought over in the Dardanelles campaign.

[Central News.]



French soldiers sorting out the kits of their dead and wounded comrades.

[Central News.]

LANCASHIRE LANDING.

Meanwhile, better success had attended the landing of the Lancashire Fusiliers on W Beach, between Cape Tekke and Cape Helles. The beach, known now as Lancashire Landing, is some 350 yards long and from 15 to 40 yards wide. Its flanks are precipitous, but in the centre the ground slopes more gradually. The sand is dry and powdery. The beach was heavily fortified. Wire entanglements ran across the beach at the water's edge, and even under the water; there were both land mines and sea mines, and elaborate entrenchments had been made in the hills. There were redoubts on Cape Helles, between Lancashire Landing and the Seddil Bahr Beach, where the Irish regiments were to attack. As at Seddil Bahr, the enemy withheld his fire during the bombardment by the fleet, and until the boats grounded there was not a sign that the landing was to be opposed.


The landing was brilliantly successful. Three companies, under Brigadier-General Hare, made at once for a ledge of rocks in the cliffs on the left of the beach, near Cape Tekke, and this body contributed very materially to the success that was won. The main landing on the beach was a most heroic affair. The first men ashore fell instantly as though mown down by a scythe, but under cover of fire from the warships the following ranks hacked their way through the wire entanglements, and re-forming under the cliffs at once began to storm the entrenchments. Most of them moved to the left, and, helped by the fire of the three companies under General Hare, stormed Hill 114 and effected a junction with the men from Im placable Landing. The storming of the cliffs at the Cape Helles end of the beach took longer. The small party of the Lancashire Fusiliers which moved in this direction was not strong enough to make any progress, and the Worcester Regiment, which was brought to its assistance, for a long time fared no better. By four o'clock in the afternoon, however, Hill 138 was carried, and the redoubt captured. Some further progress was made in the direction of the Seddil Bahr Beach, but the wire entanglements were too numerous. Through

glasses, the wire cutters could be seen "quietly snipping away as if they were pruning a vineyard." They failed, however, to carry the hill overlooking Seddil Bahr Beach. All through the night the Turks counter-attacked, but not a yard of ground did they gain.

Sir Ian Hamilton's praise of the achievement of the Lancashire Fusiliers is as high as any regiment ever had from its general. "So strong," he writes, "were the defences of W Beach that the Turks may well have considered them impregnable, and it is my firm conviction that no finer feat of arms has ever been achieved by the British soldier—or any other soldier—than the storming of these trenches from open boats on the morning of the 25th. It was to the complete lack of the sense

of danger or of fear of this daring battalion that we owed our astonishing success."

On the morning of the 26th Cape Tekke and the beaches on either side, and the western side of Cape Helles, were firmly in our possession. A landing had been effected at Eski Hissarlik (Beach S), and between these two were the remnants of two Irish regiments on Seddil Bahr beach. At dawn, the fleet opened a furious bombardment of Seddil Bahr, and under cover of it our troops obtained a footing in the village about ten in the morning. In leading the attack from the west, Col. Doughty - Wylie, who had behaved with conspicuous gallantry, was killed just as the last defences were broken down. The fall of Seddil Bahr gave us the whole coast from the



H.M.S. Implacable, which, standing quite close into the beach, rendered great service during the landing of the troops at the Dardanelles.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

Implacable Landing to Eski Hissarlik. In the evening of the 26th, Seddil Bahr Beach was given to the French Colonial Corps, who had now been withdrawn from Kum Kale on the Asiatic side. By the following night we had advanced our position to a line running across the peninsula from two miles north of Cape Tekke to Eski Hissarlik. Orders were issued for a general attack on the following day.

THE ATTACK ON KRITHIA.

The decision whether to make the attack at once or to defer it was a difficult one. Sir Ian Hamilton had not yet landed his full strength, and he was especially

weak in artillery; but he reflected that delay would give the enemy time to strengthen his defences, and on a balance of the drawbacks immediate action seemed preferable. The attack was directed towards Krithia, and was entrusted to the Twenty-ninth Division. The French were to keep their right on the south side of the Kerevesdagh, a small stream flowing through a deep, narrow glen into the Straits just beyond Eski Hissarlik, but their left was to co-operate with the British. The attack on Krithia narrowly failed, mainly through inability to keep the line supplied with ammunition. Two days later the necessary transport had been landed. Both the British and the French losses in this day's fighting were heavy.

On April 30th, at ten o'clock at night, the Turks began a series of attacks all along the line. A proclamation had been issued to the rank and file, signed by Von Lowenstein, a German officer. (It must be understood that throughout these Turkish operations the directing intelligence was always German):—

"Attack the enemy with the bayonet and utterly destroy him!

"We shall not retrace one step; for if we do, our religion, our country, and our nation will perish!

"Soldiers! the world is looking at you! Your only hope of salvation is to bring this battle to a successful issue or gloriously to give up your life in the attempt."

The Turks attacked in dense formation in three lines, the front rank having no ammunition in order to encourage it to use the bayonet. The officers fired coloured Bengal lights from their pistols—red indicating to the Turkish artillery that the range was to be lengthened, white that our front trenches had been stormed, green that our main position had been carried. Until the final rush the Turkish attack was to crawl on its hands and knees. The attacks failed. Only at one point was there any breach made in our lines, and it was immediately cleared by the Fifth Royal Scots (Territorials). The French Senegalese troops were in greater difficulties, and had to be reinforced by the Worcesters and Essex battalions. The repulse of the attack was followed in the early morning by a vigorous Allied counter-attack, which at first had considerable success. It was held up later by machine-guns and barbed wire—"those inventions of the devil," Sir Ian Hamilton calls them—and the French were again in difficulties.

Our losses in these operations were heavy: 177 officers and 1,990 other ranks were killed, 412 and 7,807 wounded, and 13 and 3,580 missing—a total of 602 officers and 13,377 other ranks. The landing was the most brilliant operation of its kind ever attempted by an army; but the events of the week following showed that it was only an introduction to a long and arduous campaign.



Barbed wire entanglements constructed by the Turks to hinder the landing at Seddil Bahr.

[Central News.]



The beginning of an advance on the Turkish positions.

[Central News.]

CHAPTER IV.


THE FRONTAL ATTACKS ON ACHI BABA.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE BRITISH GENERAL AFTER THE LANDING—DESCRIPTION OF THE ACHI BABA POSITION—THE WORK OF THE FLEET—THE BRITISH SUBMARINES IN THE SEA OF MARMORA—THE GREAT ATTACK OF JUNE 4TH—THE ANZAC POSITIONS—THE OUTLOOK—DESPONDENCY AT HOME.

B RILLIANT as was the exploit of the British army in forcing a landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula, it left Sir Ian Hamilton in a position of great difficulty and even of some peril. Ten days after the landing, after repulsing two desperate Turkish attacks and making strong onslaughts on the enemy's position, the Allied armies were at no point further from the sea than one mile; at some points, notably at Gaba Tepe, where the Australians landed, they held little more than the summit of the cliffs on the seashore. The landings were all on open beaches, without even a wharf. All supplies had to be put ashore on lighters, and the landing places were under fire from the enemy's batteries. There was no base away from the firing line in which men could find temporary relief on the Gallipoli Peninsula; to escape from the fire a sea voyage was necessary. The beaches where supplies and reinforcements were landed and wounded men disembarked resembled in their

disorder not the docks of a seaport but the foreshore of a diminutive seaside resort, littered over with the impedimenta of a great overseas expedition. There was no apparatus on shore for unloading and loading; everywhere was extemporisation. Few armies could have survived the confusion of the first few days; and the feat of making the landing good on a harbourless shore in the face of hostile attacks was as great as the landing itself. It would have been impossible of accomplishment but for the fleet, which took over the whole responsibility of landing stores and keeping up the supplies of food and ammunition.

"Our Naval Commanders, Lieutenants, and Midshipmen in charge of this work have developed an efficiency which has completely upset all expert theories. Piers have been built out into deep water by our sappers, so that the largest lighters can come alongside. Roads have been cut along the cliffs to increase the area of disembarkation, and a hundred labour-saving devices have been extemporised, including a system of lighting which allows the work to



An ambulance waggon passing down one of the gullies on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

[Central News.]



Carrying wounded through the trenches.

[Central News.]

go on without interruption by night and by day. Work never stops. Even when the day's work is over and the last lighter has discharged her cargo, the wounded are walking or being carried down to the beaches, where they are embarked on the empty barges and despatched for transportation to Egypt, to the hospital ships, and transports.

"The line of demarcation between the authority of the army and of the navy is strictly drawn. As long as a soldier, a horse, a gun, or a biscuit is in a ship or in a lighter, on its way to the shore, all are under the control of our beach parties. Standing on one of the piers in the sweltering heat of the last few days, with the beach behind him crammed with men, stores, and animals, a young officer, with a megaphone in his hand, shouts orders to a dozen different lighters, each towed by a steam pinnace, in the offing. One contains mules, another guns, a third biscuits, a fourth tinned meat, a fifth ammunition, a sixth troops, a seventh Generals and Staff officers. Every one is directed to its right destination as if by some enchanter's wand, and no one dares to step ashore until he has received his orders. At the end of the pier the naval authority ceases and that of the army begins. Here are Army Service Corps officers, who are waiting to seize what the navy has brought them. The thousand miscellaneous articles, which look as if they never could be sorted out, are speedily divided, checked, and sent on their way down the lines of communication to the troops in the front trenches. The whole is a marvel of organisation."*

Great as was the service done by the navy in the actual fighting, it was as nothing compared with this work.

THE TURKISH POSITIONS.

The chief military problem after the landing was the confined space which made manœuvring and deployment over an extended area impossible. The map (p. 39) shows the position after the end of the fighting at the beginning of May. When the fury of the first Turkish attacks had subsided, the Allied front covered about two miles and a half, from Morto Bay to Implacable Beach, north of Tekke Burnu. On the left was the famous Twenty-ninth Division—the Eighty-seventh Brigade to the left, the Eighty-eighth Brigade to the right. On the right of our line were the Senegalese troops, and connecting the French and British fronts was the Naval Division. In reserve were (from left to right) the Indian troops, Australians, and New Zealanders (other than those who were still holding Gaba Tepe up the coast), and behind the Senegalese a brigade of French infantry, Zouaves, and the Foreign Legion. The East Lancashire Territorials were in the rear of the Indians and Australians. As a result of the three days' fighting, the Senegalese had pushed forward to the hills overlooking the ravine of Kereves Dere; our left, after almost reaching Krithia itself, had fallen back to the foot of the hill, a mile and a half away; and in the centre the Naval Division was between the Krithia and the Maidos roads on the foothills of Achi Baba. It was not great progress, measured in miles; but it was satisfactory measured by the extraordinary strength of the Turkish positions.

There was, it was now seen, no break in the Turkish line of fortifications. Achi Baba and its spurs straddled across the whole width of the Peninsula. It is a conical hill, marked 730 feet on the Admiralty maps, but probably under rather than over 700 feet. Its strength is not in its height but in its shape, and in the natural protection afforded by its underfeatures.


* From an excellent letter by Mr. Ashmead Bartlett (May 13th). The passage illustrates what Sir Ian Hamilton meant by calling the fleet the "father and mother" of the army in Gallipoli.

The side that faced the Allies' centre was a regular slope forming a natural glacis to the top. Many apparently precipitous and inaccessible hills are a trap to the defenders, because of the amount of "dead ground" on their slopes which cannot be touched by rifle fire from the summit. Majuba is a famous example. But round Achi Baba there was no dead ground. At the top there was a strong redoubt; and its sides were terraced from bottom to top with rows after rows of trenches. The top of the hill is about seven miles from Lancashire Landing, and of this distance our troops by the second week in May had covered perhaps three miles. Achi Baba, which completely concealed from view the hills behind it at the back of the Narrows Forts, is only the central point of a wonderful system of natural fortifications. It has two spurs, one running south-east towards Morto Bay, the other south-west to the Gulf of Xeros. The Morto Bay spur is intersected by a deep narrow ravine, the Kereves Dere, which the French had now reached but not crossed. There is a similar ravine, the Saghir Dere on the other spur, and along this spur, half way to the sea, is the village of Krithia, the hill above the village forming the shoulder to Achi Baba.


Sir Ian Hamilton's idea evidently was that if he could obtain possession of this shoulder it would give him access to the back of Achi Baba, and to this end his attacks in May and June were steadily directed. This enterprise would have been assisted had we been able to maintain our footing on the Y Beach; but after the failure of our landing there on April 26th (p. 27) the attempt to establish ourselves there from the sea was not repeated. A similar idea had evidently dictated the landing of the Australians near Gaba Tepe. They were to have landed about a mile to the south of Beach Z (christened "Anzac," after the initials of the troops engaged—the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps), and that would have put them in command of Gaba Tepe in a position to operate from the rear against Pasha Dagh, the hill immediately to the west of the Narrows and behind Achi Baba. Had the earlier attacks on Krithia succeeded, this would have been a most menacing position; as it was, the movement from Anzac had to be postponed to the more urgent need further south. Nor indeed was advance from Anzac easy without further reinforcement, for immediately to the west was the hill of Sari Bair, the centre of a wilderness of cloughs and sunken eminences. Sari Bair, too, had been very heavily fortified by the Turks, who indeed attached very great importance to the security of this flank. The Turkish scheme of defence may be conveniently figured in the form of two crescents back to back. The concave crescent has Achi Baba for its star and the two ravines of Kereves Dere and Saghir Dere for its horns. The convex crescent has Sari Bair and the Narrows for its horns and Pasha Dagh as its star.*

After the fighting at the beginning of May there were no general attacks of the Allies that month. There was much to be done in consolidating the positions

* Lancashire readers who know the geography of the Isle of Man may be helped by remembering that the Gallipoli Peninsula is in size almost exactly equal to Man, and is not unlike it in shape and physical features. If they think of Kilid Bahr and the Narrows as Douglas, Gallipoli town is Ramsey, Bulair is the flat land towards the Point of Ayre, Suvla Bay is Peel, Sari Bair is Cronk-ny-Irey-Lhaa, Anzac is Dalby, Lancashire Landing is Port Erin, Seddil Bahr is Port St. Mary, De Tott's Battery and Morto Bay is Castletown, and Achi Baba is South Barrule. (See page 37.)




Admiral de Robeck introducing Admiral Nicholson to General Gouraud on board the Lord Nelson.
[Central News.]



The officers and crew of the submarine E14, who carried out the daring raids against Turkish shipping in the Sea of Marmora.
[Central News.]

already won; and the Turks showed themselves adepts in the methods of siege warfare to which the advances from the south were for the present restricted. Their snipers were persistent and ingenious; protective colouring was never carried further than by the captured sniper who was found to have painted himself green so that



he could not be seen firing from the scrub. That the Turks were magnificent soldiers in the defence of fortified positions, the slopes of Plevna, to which Achi Baba bore some resemblance, had proved for all time. Their extreme ingenuity in their methods, the vigour of their counter-attacks, and the quickness with which they divined the meaning of every movement of the attackers were new to their warfare, and were due in part, at any rate, to the excellent training of their German officers. The average Turk does not seem to have liked his German officers, but that he benefited immensely by his teaching was undeniable. He may have regretted Turkey's participation in the war, and have resented both the politics and the methods of the Germans; but he knew, too, how much the army owed to its German officers in the field; and the stories of mutiny against them, which were current in the English newspapers of the time, were wild exaggerations, and often the invention of prisoners anxious, as prisoners usually are, to please their captors.

WAR COMMUNICATIONS—SUBMARINE ACTIVITY.

The month was an anxious one for the Allies, for it saw the loss of three large British warships, the *Goliath*, the *Triumph*, and the *Majestic* (p. 21). The loss of the *Goliath*, which was torpedoed just inside the Straits, was the more regrettable for the fact that 500 of her crew went down with her, and that it was the work of a Turkish destroyer. The *Triumph* and *Majestic* were sunk in the Gulf of Xeros by a German submarine, the *U23*, whose appearance in the *Ægean*, where its presence had for some time been suspected, caused very great uneasiness. The larger ships in the fleet seem, temporarily at any rate, to have retired from the shores of the Peninsula to a place of greater protection and less exposure; but happily the fears caused by the appearance of the submarines (there seems to have

been more than one) were not justified. There was no interference with the supplies for the army, and as no general attack was in progress the temporary absence of the battleships' heavy guns made the less difference to the progress of the operations. On the other hand, the activity of the British submarines was beginning to cause the Turks very great alarm. Towards the end of May a British submarine, the *E14*, entered Constantinople harbour and torpedoed the Turkish transport *Stamboul*. The sinking by the same submarine of another transport, the *Nagara*, has been described by an American newspaper correspondent who was on board:—

"At daylight a submarine suddenly came awash alongside the *Nagara*. Five men appeared on her deck, one firing a rifle across the bow of the transport until the latter's engines were stopped. The captain of the submarine, a large, ruddy-faced man in a white sweater, hailed:—

"Who are you?"

"The American correspondent replied: 'I am Mr. Swing, of the *Chicago Daily News*.'

"The submarine officer answered: 'Glad to meet you, Mr. Swing; but what I want to know is, what ship is this?'

"The *Nagara*, a Turkish transport,' was the reply.

"Well, I am going to sink you.'


"Can we get off?"

"Yes, and be damn quick about it.'

"In the ensuing panic the *Nagara's* crew swamped two boats while lowering them, but managed to bail them out with the fezes of the Turkish sailors. All got off safely.

"The captain of the *E11* made an inspection of the hold of the transport. The submarine then backed off and fired. There was a double explosion, and the *Nagara* blew up and sank in a cloud of orange-coloured smoke."

In the succeeding months the activity of the submarines increased. Their operations had a very important



bearing on the land campaign. There is no railway connection between Constantinople and Gallipoli. The roads, moreover, are bad, and the country is barren and incapable of supporting the heavy reinforcements which the Turks found necessary to replace casualties and to hold their lines against the increasing pressure of the




Getting a big gun into position at the Dardanelles.

[Central News.]



A big gun in action behind the British trenches.

[Central News.]



The advance of the Allies on May 6-7-8.


Allies. Much the easiest way of transporting supplies and troops to the front was by sea. There is fairly good railway connection from Asia Minor and Syria, which supply the bulk of Turkey's army, to Scutari, opposite Constantinople, and from there across the Sea of Marmora is a passage which would take as many days as the land journey along the European side would take weeks. The British submarines in the Sea of Marmora by interrupting the transport of supplies and troops by sea were thus strengthening our prospects at their weakest point. The chances of an early decisive victory were very small indeed if Turkey was to be free to keep up the strength of her army in Gallipoli by a constant influx of reinforcements, for she had by now a million men in the field or under training; but if her supplies could be interrupted the attack was much more promising.

The passage of the Straits by the submarines was attended with great risks, but was usually accomplished without mishap. Two mishaps, however, there were:—

On April 17th the *E 15* was lost by stranding off Kephez Point, where there is a shelf of rock rising precipitately from the deep water, and in the following month the *A E 2* (of the Australian navy) was reported sunk by Turkish warships while trying to enter the Sea of Marmora. The French also lost a submarine by mine in the Dardanelles early in the year. But on the whole, the Allied submarines, considering the number

of mines and the narrowness of the waters, suffered very little. Nor should the excellent work of the Russian Black Sea fleet escape notice. The arrival of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* in the Golden Horn (Vol. I., p. 73) did much to encourage the Turks to throw in their lot with the Germans, but the *Goeben* had her big guns damaged in an engagement with the Russian squadron, under Admiral Ebenhardt, in November, 1914, and though she was later reported out, her injuries were evidently serious, and the Russian command of the Black Sea could not be disputed. In the first week of April the *Medjidieh*, a Turkish cruiser, ran on a floating mine; and at periodical times the Russian fleet cleared the Black Sea of Turkish shipping.

All through May, both Allies and Turks were much preoccupied with the question of their communications. With the British submarines, which were infesting their sea bases of supply, the Turks could not deal effectively; but in May they made persistent attempts to clear their other flank by driving the Australians into the sea. At Gaba Tepe the Australian corps, though not at this time active, was strongly entrenched in a position flanking the Turkish communications, and the enemy was clearly apprehensive of a danger which they foresaw might develop later. In July the Australian position had been made impregnable by the labour of the troops, who showed themselves as patient and unwearying with the spade as they were impetuous




British soldiers posing for their photograph on a wrecked Turkish gun. [Central News.]



A bathing place at the Dardanelles.

[Central News.]



One of the guns of a French battery in action near Seddii Bahr.

[Central News.]

with the bayonet. The front was about three miles wide and three-quarters of a mile deep from the edge of the sea-cliff to the furthest point in our lines inland; and within that narrow space there were far more than one hundred miles of sap and trench. But in May they were not so firmly established. In the second week of the month the Turks began to sap towards the Australian trenches, and at Quinn's Post, a very dangerous corner, which was enfiladed by very cleverly hidden machine-guns, the opposing trenches approached to within twelve yards of each other, and the fighting was carried on by lobbing grenades over the parapet. Several times the position had to be temporarily abandoned, but it was always recovered. Another post of great danger was on the extreme left, where at one time a party of Wellington (N.Z.) Mounted Rifles were pressed until their ammunition was exhausted; but, the Turks delaying to come to close quarters out of respect for the New Zealanders' vigour with the bayonet, they were finally relieved by a company of Canterbury men. On May 19th the Turks made a general attack on the whole Anzac line. It failed badly, and the enemy suffered heavier casualties than on any other day up to that time. Sir Ian Hamilton, in a message to the Governor-General of the Commonwealth, estimated the enemy's losses at 7,000; ours at under 500.

"The terrible carnage amongst the Turks during their supreme effort to dislodge us on May 19th put great heart into our ranks. Ever alert, the Colonials were ready to meet the strain when it came. The sight of seemingly

endless masses of the enemy advancing upon them might well have shaken the nerve of the already severely tried troops. Our machine-guns and artillery mowed the attackers down in hundreds, but still the advancing wall swept on. On still! Would the ranks never waste in strength? Not till the wave was at point-blank range from the nimble trigger-fingers did it break and spend itself amongst our barbed wire entanglements. Turks were shot in the act of jumping into our trenches. Corpses lay with their heads and arms hanging over our parapets. Our fire gradually dominated the ground in front. Those who turned to fly were mowed down before they could go a dozen yards. The Germans sent their supports and reserves forward in droves. It was sickening to behold the slaughter our fire made amongst the massed battalions as they issued from concealment into open spaces. One realised the truth of the saying that the German officers regard the rank and file as "cannon fodder." These unfortunate Turks scrambled along towards us over piles of dead bodies. In an instant a company would be enveloped in the smoke of a shrapnel salvo. When the air cleared that company would be stretched or writhing on the ground, with another company approaching and ready to share its predecessor's fate. It became a question not of the success or otherwise of the attack, but how many Turks we could kill. The wastage of life continued long after the failure of the assault had become apparent. A green patch of cultivation on our right centre was a shambles. On these few acres our burial party, working during the armistice which followed, counted no fewer than 4,000 Turkish and German dead."*

THE ATTACK OF JUNE 4th.

Meanwhile, our main body at the southern end of the Peninsula was not idle in the month, although it

* *Morning Post*, June 29th.




A French telephone post.

[Central News.]



The interior of a naval underground observation station.

[Central News.]



The fighting in Gallipoli in June.

made no general assaults. It had been sapping towards the slopes of Achi Baba, and by dint of a succession of small advances, made for the most part during the night, the distance between the two fronts had been reduced from an average of 1,000 yards to, at some points, 200, and even 100. In this work the East Lancashire Territorials, who had been brought from Egypt, had opportunity, which they used, of showing their quality. They held the ground between the famous Twenty-ninth Division and the Naval Division. Towards the end of the month the French made progress on the right of the line, and on the 28th a Turkish redoubt on the south side of the Kereves Dere, which had been giving much trouble, was captured in a night attack by a mixed party of French and Senegalese volunteers. It was a starlit night, and the full moon was so low in the sky that its rays shone full in the face of the defenders and concealed the approach of the attackers. The same moon betrayed a battalion of Turks who were advancing in support to the French artillery fire. At the end of the month General Sir Ian Hamilton decided on a general attack. Except that he was now stronger, the conditions had not materially altered since the last general attack, but the spirits of the army were high and eager for attack. It was fixed for Friday, June 4th.

The day was overcast, with a north wind blowing clouds of dust in the faces of the Allies. At eleven began

an exceedingly heavy bombardment by both army and naval guns; the troops waited in the trenches with bayonets fixed. At twelve the bombardment ceased, and the men moved out, preceded by bomb throwers. At the extreme left of the line were the Indians, then (in succession from left to right) the Twenty-ninth Division, the Territorials, the Naval Division, and the French. The bombardment had done its work very well except at one or two points, where the wire entanglements had escaped destruction. The chief of these points was the juncture of the Indians and the Regulars. After a fine advance, in which two rows of trenches were carried, the Indians found that the troops immediately to their right could not advance, and their right wing hung in air and in danger of being outflanked. They were obliged to retire to their original position. Except opposite the undestroyed entanglements, the Regular Corps made good progress, and advanced some 500 yards. On the right, the French captured a strong line of trenches—still on the south side of the Kereves Dere—but were then held up by the Haricot Fort, so called from its shape; and the Naval Division stormed three lines of trenches, but, coming under enfilading fire from their right, they, too, had to retire. The principal advance was made by the Territorials in the centre. In spite of heavy casualties, the Territorials went on, unwavering, until as many as five rows of trenches had been carried, and their line had been carried nearly a mile forward. The Turks

at this point were now fairly on the run, but, unfortunately, the flanks, who had advanced nothing like so far, were compelled to fall back from the ground they had won, and the centre, too, had to evacuate its advanced gains to preserve the alignment. As it was, our centre at nightfall made a salient projecting beyond the flanks. The centre (including the Essex Regiment, which was immediately to its left) seems to have been favoured by the ground, but its achievement was by far the finest work yet done by Territorials in the war, and worthy of the very best regular troops.

The Turks were not slow to launch a counter-attack, bringing up troops from behind Achi Baba, and even from Maidos, in spite of a very vigorous demonstration made by the Anzacs from the Quinn's Post end of their line. These counter-attacks reached their climax on Sunday; but though some more of the gains in the centre were lost, the net result was to leave the army with an advance averaging some 500 yards ahead of its former positions. There was still a very marked salient in the centre of our line. This progress was less than had been hoped for, or than seemed likely to be realised in the earlier stages of the advance, but it was not unsatisfactory in view of the great strength of the enemy's positions. Our losses were very heavy, and the lists published toward the end of June greatly depressed feeling in England.

THE STRAIGHTENING OF THE LINE.

The first task after the battle of June 4th was to straighten out the line so as to reduce the salient, which was dangerously exposed and expensive of life to defend. The next fortnight witnessed some very small local actions. By a night attack on June 11th-12th, the Border Regiment and the South Wales Borderers carried two trenches. They were lost four days later, but recovered again at dawn of the sixth day by the Dublin Fusiliers. On June 19th the Turks effected a lodgment in a portion of our line, but were driven out by the Fifth Royal Scots—Edinburgh Territorials, brigaded with the Twenty-ninth Division—and a company of the Worcesters. Two days later an advance was made by the French, and after two failures they succeeded in a third attack, just before sunset, in carrying the Haricot Redoubt, and in establishing themselves firmly on the south side of the Kereves Dere. The fall of the redoubt in the light of the setting sun was one of the great spectacles in a war which, as a rule, has been too deeply felt to be regarded as a spectacle:—

"The smoke of the shells, which at dawn had been ethereal, almost translucent, was now, in the sunset, turbid and sinister, yet the sunset was very splendid, flaming in crimson streamers over Imbros, tinting the east with rosy reflections and turning the peaks of Asia to sapphires. It had a peculiar significance on this longest day of the year, crowning as it did those precious five hours of daylight that, for the French, had been fraught with such achievement. Slowly the colour faded out, and now, minute by minute, the flashes of the guns became more distinct; the smoke was merged in the gathering dusk, and away over the more distant Turkish lines the bursts of shrapnel came out like stars against the brief twilight. One knew the anxiety there would be in the darkness that now was falling upon this 21st of June, but in the morning we heard gladly that the enemy's counter-attacks had failed, and that our Allies were indeed firmly established.

"The Turkish casualties were at least 7,000. One trench, 200 yards long and ten feet deep, was brimming over with the dead. They were valiant those dead men. French officers who have fought in the West say that, as a fighting unit, one Turk is worth two Germans; in fact, with his back to the wall, the Turk is magnificent. The

French casualties were marvelously few considering what a day it had been, what an enemy was being attacked, and how much had been gained."*

THE GULLY RAVINE

This success was followed up at the end of the month by the crossing of the Kereves Dere and the capture of a system of entrenchments known from their shape as the Quadrilateral—the fighting in which the Quadrilateral was the sequel to a Turkish night attack along the shores of the Dardanelles, which H.M.S. *Wolverine* helped to keep in check.

Meanwhile, on the previous day—June 28th—there had been important operations on our left flank, again with the object of straightening out our line and reducing the Territorial salient. On the west of the Peninsula, and corresponding to the Kereves Dere on the east, there is the deep clough or gully known as the Saghir Dere. At the sea end, which was in our possession, the cliffs on either bank are high—some 200 feet—and the gully is narrow. Upstream—for there is a small stream at the bottom of the gully, besides many springs of very precious cold water, which were left carefully guarded against contamination—the cliffs fall in height, and the clough opens out to the plateau near the shoulder of Krithia mountain. The sides of the clough were covered with scrub, with here and there bare patches of the yellow marl characteristic of this part of the Peninsula. There had been no advance up the gully from the sea coast, but as our main body advanced from Seddil Bahr towards Achi Baba, the Turks between Saghir Dere and the sea fell back, and at the end of June more than half of the clough was in our possession. At the north end the Turks were heavily entrenched on the bank tops on either side, with a redoubt christened Boomerang Fort at the entrance to the clough. The clough within the Turkish lines was found to be a horrible place—cemetery, latrine, and rubbish heap, swarming with flies and oppressively hot, with a sedimentary atmosphere that the breeze alone could not stir, and an overpowering stench of insanitation—a veritable valley of death. On June 28th, General Hamilton began his attack on this valley, his idea being to pivot his line on the cliffs about a mile from the sea, and to swing his left round to the west of Krithia. The bombardment, assisted by the French artillery and by the ships' guns, began at 10-20, and at 10-45 the Boomerang Fort was captured by the Border Regiment, and soon after 11-0 the trenches west of the gully were in our hands. East of the gully our success was less marked, though the Royal Scots again distinguished themselves; but in the second stage of the attack we reached on the west bank of the ravine the desired extension. Further to the left, the Gurkhas pressed on under cover of the cliffs and captured some rising ground due west of Krithia. The ground now was all held, in spite of very heavy counter-attacks by the Turks. The Anzacs gave great assistance to this movement by demonstrating against the enemy on their front. These attacks were not meant to be pressed, but for several days the enemy delivered a series of counter-attacks in which he lost very heavily without any gain of ground. These wasteful attacks were made under the order of Enver, overriding the instructions of the German officers. They betrayed much uneasiness at the progress of the attack. A captured Divisional Order contained the following passage:—

"There is nothing that causes us more sorrow, increases the courage of the enemy, and encourages him to attack

* Mr. Compton Mackenzie.

more freely, causing us great losses, than the losing of these trenches. Henceforth commanders who surrender these trenches, from whatever side the attack may come, before the last man is killed will be punished in the same way as if they had run away. Especially will the commanders of units told off to guard a certain front be punished if, instead of thinking about their work, supporting their units and giving information to the higher command, they only take action after a regrettable incident has taken place.

"I hope that this will not occur again. I give notice that if it does I shall carry out the punishment. I do not desire to see a blot made on the courage of our men by those who escape from the trenches to avoid the rifle and machine-gun fire of the enemy. Henceforth I shall hold responsible all officers who do not shoot with their revolvers all the privates who try to escape from the trenches on any pretext.

"Commander of the Eleventh Division,

"COLONEL RIFAAT."

To the copy from which this extract was taken the following note is appended :—

"To Commander of the First Battalion.

"The contents will be communicated to the officers, and I promise to carry out the orders till the last drop of our blood has been shed. Sign and return.

(Signed) HASSAN,

Commander, 127th Regiment."

Then follow signatures of company commanders.

SUMMARY OF THE OPERATIONS.

By the middle of July General Sir Ian Hamilton had established himself firmly on the west side of Krithia. One horn of the Achi Baba crescent had been bent right back, and the tip of the other horn opposite the French was also turned. Our line had been straightened out, and the dangerous salient in the centre of our position had disappeared. At the same time, the Australians at Gaba Tepe were firmly established and were gradually extending their lines. These were great successes, and their quality was imperfectly appreciated at home. The landing was perhaps the most brilliant ever effected by an army in the history of war. But no less remarkable were the series of operations by which we gradually crumpled up the Turkish flanking positions and formed for ourselves freedom of movement. General Hamilton was now free to begin extended operations against the Narrows defences. It was no part of his plan merely to drive the Turks back on to a second line of defences, there to repeat the same obstinate resistance that they had offered on the first line. He still clung to the idea of an enveloping movement from the north, which should cut off the Narrows forts from their supplies and so force a surrender, and spare the army the carnage of storming operations. How he proceeded to carry out this enveloping movement will be narrated in a later chapter.

THE REAL ISSUE IN THE CAMPAIGN.

If people at home were somewhat unappreciative of the greatness of these operations in the Dardanelles, the reason perhaps was that they were doubtful of the policy of attacking the Straits. Yet the defeats of the Russians in Galicia and in Poland, narrated in the following chapters, went far to justify this great enterprise in the East. Had we been able by putting our whole strength on the West to make sure of breaking through and driving the Germans over the Belgian and French frontiers, say before the winter of 1915-16, the case might perhaps have been different. For the most certain way to complete victory was the occupation of Essen and of the industrial centre of Germany in

Westphalia. Yet the events of 1915 in the West showed that there was very little chance of that, and made it seem probable that, though local advances might be attempted, the great offensive in the West could hardly begin with any reasonable prospect of success before the spring of 1916. Had there been no expedition to the Dardanelles, therefore, the alternative would have been a long period of stagnation on the West, broken only by local attacks which it hardly seemed likely that we could have carried through to a decisive result. The campaign in the Dardanelles did not subtract from what we were able to do in France; it did, however, relieve from the reproach of complete inactivity a success which would otherwise have had no positive contribution to show towards the end of the war. Nor was there any rivalry between the Eastern and Western campaigns. With the Black Sea closed, the Russian left was deprived of its natural supports, and the ports which should have been open to the export of her products and the import of arms and munitions, of which our Allies were in such need, might just as well have had no existence. Complete and decisive victory on the West was past hoping for without the assistance of the Russian millions; but the events of the summer were to make it quite clear that that assistance was not to be had until the forcing of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus had given Russia communications with the outside world.

But there were other and even more important reasons still for the campaign in the Dardanelles. The beginning of the war had made it seem as though its principal object was the acquisition by Germany of power in the West. But as the war progressed, the scale inclined steadily to the East, and it became evident that the end of the war, as well as its origins, might have to be sought there. On the West, the last word after all was with sea-power. It was not so, necessarily, in the East. Had Germany won her great victories over Russia in the summer of 1915, and this country not taken the offensive, we should have been on the defensive in the whole of the East. What is more, the decision in the East could have been forced without victory on sea. In such a case it would have been quite sufficient for Germany to hold her own in Flanders and France; she might have forced a decision in her favour by the invasion of Egypt. The protecting desert is, after all, not an insuperable obstacle if there is time to build railways. India itself might have been threatened. That would have meant not a drawn war for this country, but crushing defeat, and that, too, without defeat at sea. Egypt was the Achilles-heel of our sea-power, and Germany knew it. It is not, therefore, too much to say that the campaign in the Dardanelles was one for the defence of our whole position in the East. The control of the Dover Straits might have been lost without our being defeated at sea or suffering any irremediable disaster. The loss of our Mediterranean communications with India would have been a far greater blow. True to the sound strategical principle by defending by attack, we were fighting in the Dardanelles for the sake of our empire in the East.

The losses of the campaign were exceedingly heavy, but they were not disproportionate to the issues involved. Was it to be supposed that the Turkish Empire would fall to the first assault? The wonder was not that the campaign lasted so long and was costly in life, but that in the face of difficulties without precedent we came so soon to within two or three small mountain ranges of decisive victory.



The German advance through Galicia: A bivouac of troops by the roadside.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



On a Galician road: German transports and field kitchens on the left, cavalry on the right.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



Austrian troops, resting by the roadside after being withdrawn from the trenches, watch their German allies marching up to take their place.

[Topical Press.]

CHAPTER V.

THE GERMAN RECOVERY OF GALICIA: RECAPTURE OF PRZEMYSL.

POSITION IN APRIL, 1915—THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE ON HUNGARY—COUNTER-STROKE EXPECTED—THE RUSSIAN FRONT IN WESTERN GALICIA BROKEN—MACKENSEN'S "PHALANX"—RUSSIAN STAND ON THE SAN—FALL OF PRZEMYSL.

AT the end of April, 1915, there was movement only at the extremities of the Russian front, which stretched for nearly a thousand miles from the coast of the Baltic provinces to Bukowina. In the far north a German force, consisting largely of cavalry, was raiding beyond the Niemen river for an object which, for some time, remained obscure. It was thought that it was perhaps playing a part in some larger scheme—the nature of which would only be seen later, or that it was perhaps conducting nothing more than a large foraging expedition; its real motive was apparently to create a diversion which should keep the Russians in uncertainty as to the dangers which might threaten them on their right flank and prevent them from detaching troops freely to any other quarter of the field. On the East Prussian front, further south, there was little or no movement, and in Poland itself the war had become one of positions, in which the Germans appeared to have done their worst.

In Western Galicia, also, from a few miles east of Cracow, where the Russian line ran almost due south to the crest of the Carpathians, the campaign had for months been an affair of trenches, in which neither side seemed either anxious or able to press for a decisive issue. But this part of the Russian front was of the first importance. On its stability depended the efforts

of the Carpathian armies to penetrate into Hungary. The attack on the Hungarian passes had continued from the winter into the spring, and, in spite of the utmost endeavours of the Russians, had made progress almost by inches. By the end of April the Russian forces had succeeded at last in descending from the ridge of the mountains between the Dukla Pass on the west and the Uzsok Pass towards the centre of the range, and at heavy cost they were slowly gaining ground along the upper courses of the Hungarian rivers. The most persistent attacks, however, had failed to give them possession of the Uzsok Pass itself or of the ground on either side of it. Farther east, they were either confined to the crests or, on their extreme left towards the Dniester and the Bukowina border, still held on the northern slopes. For many weeks Russia had seemed always to be on the point of breaking down the resistance of the enemy and laying her hand on the Hungarian plain. But success, however close at hand, always evaded her, and the most that could be said at the moment to which we have come was that in months of desperate and exhausting warfare the balance of advantage had been with her, and that if she found it unexpectedly difficult to achieve her purpose of invading Hungary, the Germans and Austrians could not hope to drive her back into Galicia by a frontal attack



German troops, ammunition, and baggage advancing through Galicia. [Newspaper Illustrations.]

along the way by which she had come. There was, however, another means by which that end might be attained, and the Germans proceeded to take it.


THE LINE OF COUNTER-ATTACK.

In an invasion of Austria-Hungary through Galicia the lines of attack and counter-attack are dictated clearly by the geography of the country. The invader—that is to say, Russia—has three courses open to him. He may, if he has sufficient men and is assured of the neutrality of Germany, march both on Vienna through the gap which lies between Cracow and the Carpathians, and on Hungary and Buda Pest through the main Carpathian passes. It was not open to the Russians to follow this plan, because hostile German armies lay on the flank of any advance towards Cracow. For the same reason they could not adopt the second possible course, which would have been to march past Cracow while contenting themselves to hold the line of the Carpathians as a wall against the counter-attack by which the Austrians would have struck at their lines of communication in Galicia. Anxious to overrun Hungary, and in any event controlled by the general strategical position, the Russians followed the third plan. They established the line between the Upper Vistula, near Cracow, and the Carpathians as a wall of defence, while their armies along the line of the Carpathians, which lay, roughly, at right angles to the wall, were to descend into the Hungarian valleys. This wall of defence, the preservation of which was essential to the security of the armies entering Hungary, was about fifty miles in extent. Its northern section lay along the right bank of the Dunajec river, from its junction with the Upper Vistula, down to the point near Tarnow, where the river Biala joins it. From Tarnow for some distance it ran along

the right bank of the Biala, and then, with a southeasterly trend, through Gorlice to the Carpathian ridge, some twenty miles west of the Dukla Pass. Text-books and common sense alike indicated that if this line of defence were to be battered down the Russian scheme for the invasion of Hungary must collapse—unless, of course, the Russians had taken the precaution of setting up a second line which they could hold. But this line, if it existed, must not be far behind the first, for the danger of the Russian position was that the line of defence in Western Galicia ran very nearly at right angles to the front in the Carpathians. Break down the northern line, therefore, and it was clear that some of the columns on the southern slopes of the mountains would be in serious danger. The passages of their retreat were few and narrow, and the enemy would be within a few miles of them. All these were good reasons why the Russian line in Western Galicia should be of the most formidable kind; they were reasons, too, why the Germans, following both common sense and text-books, should strike at this quarter as soon as they had decided that the time had come to strike at all. So obvious were the elements of this strategical problem that at recent Austrian manœuvres the plan of dealing with the invader, which the Austro-Germans were now to put in operation, had actually been practised.

THE GERMAN PLAN.

The Germans decided to deliver an attack on these fifty miles of Russian positions in Western Galicia. It was essential to the success of their plan that they should break the line at so many points and press the pursuit so rapidly that the Russians should not be able, after a retreat of a few miles, to call a halt, as they had done on some occasions, and then bring up their reserves and



Galicia and the Carpathian Passes.

withdraw their Carpathian columns in an orderly retirement. The moment that the main attack was seen to be succeeding, the Austrian and German armies along the Carpathians were to fasten on the troops in front of them in order to hinder their withdrawal. The faster the advance could be pressed after the line of the Dunajec and Biala had been broken, the more urgent would be the need for the Russians in the Carpathians to withdraw along the railways in Galicia which supplied their needs; the harder the Austro-German armies in the south pressed on the retreating Russians, the less would the Russian commanders be able to strengthen their forces in Western Galicia and the more numerous would be the detachments cut off in the retreat.

It would probably be inaccurate to suppose that in organising this attack the Germans had before them any larger scheme than that of driving the Russians out of Hungary and clearing Galicia. No doubt the German General Staff would have been well pleased to achieve the maximum of success at one blow, and, by completely crushing the Russian line in Western Galicia, break up the Russian armies, divide them into two sections, and deal with them separately. But with the possibility of large Russian reserves along the main railway through Galicia, this was a grandiose scheme which the Germans could scarcely at this stage have expected to carry through. Even General Staffs must wait on circumstances, and probably the Germans saw no further than the recovery of Galicia and the hope which lay beyond of striking a still heavier blow at Russia.

THE GERMAN METHOD OF ATTACK.

For the special purpose which they had in view the Germans had framed a special instrument. In the

winter they had on one occasion attacked the Russians with great force and driven them back, but after a few days the steam went out of their attack, the Russians had recoiled, and the face of the campaign had been scarcely changed. A large success was a question of surprise and speed: surprise in organising the attack with instruments and on a scale which had not been anticipated; speed in following up the blow so rapidly that a Russian recoil would be impossible. It was natural to assume that the Russians, standing on the defensive and having elaborated their positions for many months, would have a great advantage. The Germans met it by a great concentration of troops from the mouth of the Dunajec to the Carpathian heights and by assembling masses of artillery (field guns, howitzers, and the heaviest mobile guns which they possessed) at those sections of the line where they had a railway to assist them.

Once more, as so often in the Russian campaign, tactics and strategy alike depended on the railways of the country. One mass of the German artillery lay on either side of, and depended for transport on, the great trunk railway running from Cracow, through Tarnow, to Jaroslav on the San, Przemysl, and Lemberg; another, which was assembled about Gorlice, depended on the line which runs through that place north-eastwards to the trunk line. It was the intention of the Germans with these masses of artillery to breach the Russian lines as though they were the walls of a besieged town, and then hurl their troops into the breach. The Russians being thus driven to retreat, the guns would be pushed forward along the railway on which they depended, together with ample supplies of shells, and when the Russians attempted to make a stand the breaching



Naphtha mines fired by the Russians on their retreat to prevent them falling into the possession of the advancing Austrians. [Topical Press.]



A factory wrecked by the Russians to prevent its being any use to the Germans. [Photopress.]



A Russian commander watching the progress of the battle from outside his dug-out.

[Record Press.

operation was to be repeated. The execution of this stroke, in devising which the Germans utilised the experience that they had gained during their massed attacks on the Ypres and Warsaw lines, was entrusted to General von Mackensen, who in the winter had commanded the Germans in the great Battle of Lodz.

THE OPENING OF THE ATTACK.

The work began on the night of May 1st. The Staff reports of that day gave no inkling of the imminent attack. They were composed of the usual catalogue of insignificant advances and retreats at different parts of the front, and it is a curious point that one of the foreign correspondents, writing on the prospect in Western Galicia at this time, remarked that the scouting by airmen was so efficient on both sides as to preclude all possibility of a surprise. Surprise, however, there was. On the Saturday night and throughout Sunday the Germans maintained a bombardment of unprecedented violence. At least fifteen hundred guns were concentrated against two corps under General Radko Dimitrieff. In an explanation of the retreat which the Russian Staff issued at a later date, they declared that at the height of the bombardment, immediately before an assault was delivered, the Germans discharged 700,000 shells in four

hours—"double what is necessary for a six-months' siege of a great and well-provisioned fortress"—and that another 700,000 were held in readiness for the development of the attack. "Generally speaking," says the report, "the enemy uses in an attack on our positions ten projectiles of medium calibre, weighing over eight hundred pounds, against each of our riflemen holding a space of about a yard on the front of our trenches. . . . In presence of such a violence of fire, without speaking of serious losses, all within the sphere of its action became more or less bruised or stupefied."

The Germans brought to the attack the use of stratagems which they had carefully prepared during the preceding weeks, and of which one instance may be given. Part of Mackensen's left wing was to cross the Dunajec a few miles south of its junction with the Vistula. Here the banks were high, and the Russians had excellent positions for their guns, so that the Germans were in great difficulties as to how they might bridge the river. What they did was to dig an excavation some distance from the bank of the river, and then to bore huge tunnels towards it. In these they laid railway tracks, put their pontoon boats on wheels and collected them on the light railways in the tunnels. When the appointed night came they suddenly blew up the ends



Transporting German high-explosive shells in wicker baskets.

[Photopress.]

of the tunnels close to the river, cleared out the débris and launched the boats—of which there were twenty, already filled with men—and at the same time protected the movement by a violent bombardment. Of the twenty boats, nine were sunk. The others reached the eastern bank of the river, and, succeeding in carrying the first line of the enemy's positions, gave time for larger forces to cross.

THE RUSSIAN LINE BROKEN.

The result was decisive. Dimitrieff's army was shattered, and at the close of the attack was in full flight towards the east. The German report referred ominously to the "portions of the enemy's army which were able to escape." Over 20,000 prisoners had been captured, and there was little chance of stemming the retreat short of the line of the San river, although vigorous rearguard actions were fought at intermediate positions.

The immediate and striking success of the German attack was everywhere unexpected. The likelihood of an onslaught in Western Galicia had been foreseen for weeks by military critics. Its preparation had been mentioned in war correspondents' telegrams, and the Russian Staff afterwards announced that it had been well aware of the stroke which was about to fall. "From the middle of April," they said, "news began to reach us of the transport in great numbers of German troops from the western front and of their concentration in Western Galicia. The state of affairs thus created obliged us to stop the development of our advance in the direction

of Mezo Laborcz (Hungary) and Uzsok in order not to extend our movements too far, and to ensure ourselves facilities for sending available reserves to the threatened section of our front." It was found, however, that General Ivanoff, the commander of the Galician group of armies, had neither left General Dimitrieff with sufficient men nor had retained a large enough reserve.

Even the Germans, though they were naturally interested in ascribing the credit for the victory to the superiority of their men and guns, cast round for some reason to explain the weakness of Dimitrieff's army, and some of them evolved the fanciful theory that he had been made the victim of jealous rivals on the General Staff. There is no reason to doubt that the explanation which was offered in Austria was the true one, and that Dimitrieff's army had been dangerously weakened and the general reserves drained away by the demands of the Carpathian fighting, especially in the prolonged and unsuccessful struggle for the Uzsok Pass. The Russian generals had trusted too much in the power of the defensive and of the works, in themselves not unformidable, which had been constructed on the Dunajec and the Biala. Their Intelligence Department, also, had failed to warn them of the character of the attack which was preparing for them. Concentration of guns is comparatively easy to conceal, but the experience both of the Japanese campaign and of some of the earlier battles in this war—that of Tannenberg and the defeat of the Tenth Army on the borders of East Prussia—have shown that the intelligence system is a weak spot in the Russian armour.

THE "PHALANX."

Some fifteen miles east of Gorlice the Russians made a stand on the Wisloka river, but they were driven back again by Mackensen's artillery, to which they frankly owned their inferiority. Here the so-called "phalanx," moving along the railway towards the trunk line in the north, was in operation. Perhaps the more accurate analogy would have been with the battering-ram, for the core of the "phalanx" was a mass of guns which followed the railway and at intervals breached the enemy's defences. Where the Russians had torn up the railway the Germans relaid it at the rate of about four miles a day.

A week after their first defeat, the Russians made an effort to hold back the pursuit. At three points—just south of the Upper Vistula, across the Lemberg railway, about half-way between Cracow and the San, and across the line which runs along the southern Galician slopes—they made a stubborn resistance, and then fell back towards Przemyśl and the San, where it was thought that reserves would be available and the retreat might definitely be stayed. It was noted, as an indication of the shock which Dimitrieff's army had suffered, that at one place prisoners were captured who belonged to five separate divisions. On May 14th the Russians deployed on the line of the San, and the campaign entered on its second phase. Their retreat had led to a corresponding withdrawal of their forces immediately on the other side of the Vistula, which had been outflanked by the advancing Germans.

THE CARPATHIAN ARMIES.

The battle in Western Galicia had reacted immediately on the campaign in the mountains. The Russians who were south of the Dukla Pass, in the upper valleys of the Ondawa and Laborcz rivers, hastened to extricate themselves, and the Austro-German armies along a hun-

dred miles of front hotly attacked them. The whole front south of the Vistula was engaged. Germans and Austrians combined had recently had in the east some forty-one corps, of which twenty-six were engaged in the Galician fighting. To these were now added some units which had been transferred from the West—the active Guard Army Corps, the Forty-first Reserve Army Corps, the Eleventh Bavarian New Division, and the 119th New Division (their places being taken in the West by other troops). There were also newly-trained


Austrian divisions and some from the Servian front, so that in all the Austro-Germans probably numbered thirty-five corps, or nearly a million and a half of men.

In less than a week after the opening attack the passes were again in German hands, and the Russians had entirely evacuated Hungary. The keystone had been pulled out of the arch. Almost in a single day they had lost all that they had gained in so many laborious months. The retirement through the passes was not made without heavy loss. The Germans, pushing eagerly eastwards, came after a few days on the Russian columns still marching up through the Dukla Pass. One division, that of General Korniloff, was entirely surrounded, but managed eventually to cut its way through at heavy cost. The extent of the Russian losses during these days is not exactly known, but it was inevitable that they

should be very heavy; had it not been for the Russian resistance on the Wisloka and the Upper San, they must have been much worse than in fact they were.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE IN EASTERN GALICIA.

The Russians attempted to relieve the situation by opening a vigorous offensive in Eastern Galicia. They succeeded in inflicting a check on the army of General von Linsingen in the Carpathian foothills, and a severe defeat on that of General von Pflanzer, which lay further



The German loop round Przemyśl.



The recapture of Przemyśl: The entry of the Austro-German troops.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



Inside one of the recaptured forts at Przemyśl.

[Topical Press]

to the east, along the Dniester river and the borders of Bukowina. The attack was pressed for several days, and Pflanzer was finally driven southwards over the River Pruth, with a loss of twenty thousand men. This success was without any effect on the general military situation. If its object was to divert troops from the onslaught in Galicia, it failed. The Austrians were hard beset; they pressed into the firing line even sappers, railway guards, and the like, but nothing was done to weaken the main attack, and the scene of operations was much too far removed from the lines of communication of the main Galician armies to cause them inconvenience. It was not essential to the Germans at this moment that the Russians should be driven out of Eastern Galicia; their calculation was that everything would come in good time if they succeeded in making steady progress in Northern Galicia from west to east.

THE POSITIONS IN THE MIDDLE OF MAY.

When the second stage of the campaign opened the Austro-German armies held the following positions:-- North of the Upper Vistula, and pressing the Russians in their retreat from Kielce, was General von Woyrsch, with three army corps. South of the Vistula, facing the Lower San up to Przemyśl, was Mackensen, with ten corps under his command; of these, five were led by the Austrian Archduke, Joseph Ferdinand, and were posted to the west and south of Przemyśl. South and south-east of the fortress, and pushing up towards it, was Boehm-Ermolli's Austrian army of five corps; its mission was to attack from the south the railway connecting with Lemberg, and join hands with Mackensen if he succeeded in his plan of coming down upon the line from the north-east. Between them these three were to surround and capture Przemyśl. Next in order, and covering the country as far as the marshes lying to the south of the Dniester river, was General von Marwitz; beyond him, Linsingen on the Dniester; and farthest to the east, Pflanzer. Each of these had about five corps, making in all some thirty-five engaged in the great attack.

The Russians had taken up their positions on the San river on May 14th. On the 15th they withdrew from Jaroslav, which lies on the west bank, and on the next day Mackensen delivered his attack. It was directed at a small section of the Russian line, and it achieved an immediate success. Jaroslav and its bridgehead were seized, and farther to the north bridges were thrown over the river on a section about twelve miles long. The forces which had crossed established themselves firmly, and for the next four days they extended their foothold gradually towards the east. At the same time, the army to the south-east of Przemyśl began to deliver a series of violent attacks on the Russian positions. The encircling movement was in progress. Between Jaroslav and Przemyśl the Russians still held both banks of the San, and, north of the narrow strip where the Germans had crossed, they were on the western bank.

The question was now whether the Russians, having failed to hold the line of the San at a most important point, would be able to dislodge the Germans either by frontal attack or by coming down from the north on the rear of the columns which had crossed. There was no time to be lost, and their first effort was made at once. They delivered a counter-attack in Southern Poland against the army of Von Woyrsch, and drove him back ten miles. At the same time they sought to enlarge the ground which they held on Mackensen's flank in the apex of the triangle made by the junction of the

Vistula and the San. Mackensen was compelled both to send some troops across the Vistula to the aid of Von Woyrsch and to front north-east to face the pressure on his flank. But he held up the attack successfully, and by May 20th saw his way clear to carry his plans a stage further. For the next four days he made no attack on the Russian positions, but sundry movements in a southerly and south-easterly direction were observed to be taking place in his army. The Russians believed that he had been reduced to the defensive, and might even be meditating a partial retirement. He was, in fact, preparing to make the final onslaught over the San river, both north and south of Jaroslav. While his army was changing front, he brought up further supplies of munitions and arrayed again the famous "phalanx" for the new attack. By this time he had constructed no less than fifteen bridges over the San in the few miles which he held north of Jaroslav.

On May 24th he struck again. He attacked the Russian positions on the west of the river between Jaroslav and Przemyśl, and, while aiming at breaking them down, sought also to outflank them on the north by pushing his advance south-east of Jaroslav. The Russian reports pointed out the similarity of this manoeuvre to that which Mackensen had almost succeeded in carrying out during the great battle of Lodz in November. Against the Russian western positions, on a front of fifteen miles, were brought up "hundreds of thousands of infantry, supported by a thousand guns of various calibre, well supplied with munitions." The onslaught was again successful. The ground west of the San being cleared of Russians, the Germans advanced a further stage towards the complete envelopment of the fortress. On the south the loop was tightened after an artillery bombardment which the Russians described as "a perfect hurricane of artillery fire." By this time the attacking forces were within about six miles of the railway on the north and on the south, and it was obvious that only a miracle could prevent the fall of Przemyśl. The Russians had, however, decided long before to abandon it, and had been busy since the first defeat in Western Galicia in clearing it of its munitions and stores. They were not yet ready, however, to abandon the forts, and they offered a fierce resistance to the attack which Mackensen, the Archduke, and his neighbour to the right pressed day after day with increasing violence.

A BLOW AT THE GERMAN FLANK.

Not only so, but the Russians delivered a last counter-attack. North and east of Sieniawa, a few miles north of Jaroslav, they drove the Germans back with heavy losses, and for a moment seemed likely to threaten the success of Mackensen's plans, for they were, as their report announced, "behind General Mackensen's army." Only a few miles separated them from the first of the bridges by which he supplied his troops lying in the restricted area across the San, and popular report in Russia had it at the time that some of the bridges had actually come under the Russian fire. It was not so, and the Germans escaped with a loss of seven thousand men and a dozen guns. It was a small price to pay for the success of their main plans, but there can be little doubt that the Russians were at this time almost within reach of a large success, and that if they could have thrown into the scale a few more well-armed divisions, Mackensen's plan might have ended in disaster. The question was merely whether the Russians could put sufficient extra pressure on his flank and rear to

make him withdraw his troops from across the San, or to isolate them where they lay on the eastern bank ; or whether, on the contrary, Mackensen could hold up the attack from Sieniawa with such satisfaction to himself as to press on with his southerly thrust towards the rear of Przemyśl. So soon as the Lemberg railway was under German fire, the troops and guns within the large loop which the Russians were at present holding would be lost. Mackensen held to his plans. He held off the attack on the north and his bridges remained safe. He pushed forward a short distance further towards the railway, while on the south, after days of incessant fighting, the railway line was at last coming within range of the Austrian guns. All that remained for the Russians was to straighten out their line and to withdraw their troops from the Przemyśl salient with as little loss as possible.

FALL OF PRZEMYŚL.

On May 30th the last stage of the attack on Przemyśl was reached. While the Germans on north and south, who were well aware that the evacuation of the place was being systematically carried out by day and night, sought to complete their lines of encirclement, Mackensen brought up 16-inch guns on the west and north-west and opened an attack on the defences of the fortress. The result was not for a moment in doubt. The forts of Przemyśl, especially on the front which was now attacked, had been systematically demolished by the Austrian General, Kusmanek, before he surrendered on March 22nd, and the Russians had had no time to restore them. But as they were not able, so neither was it any part of their plans, to attempt a prolonged resistance to a siege train ; their object was to hold back the Germans sufficiently long to enable them to withdraw their troops and guns.

In the night of May 30th-31st the Germans gained a footing in part of the western defences, but were driven out. On May 31st they captured three of the northern forts, and on the following day two more. In the night of June 2nd-3rd the Russians withdrew their troops from the western and northern positions, the besiegers became masters of all the remaining fortifications, and early in the morning of June 3rd Przemyśl was once more in their hands. During all this time the Russians delivered incessant and violent attacks against the encircling forces on both sides of the railway. An official Russian explanation of the evacuation of Przemyśl was published a little later :—

"As Przemyśl, in view of the state of its artillery and of its works, which were destroyed by the Austrians before the capitulation, was recognised as incapable of defending itself, its maintenance in our hands only served our purpose so long as our possession of the positions surrounding the town on the north-west facilitated our operations on the San.

"When the enemy captured Jaroslav and Radymno, and began to spread along the right bank of that river, the maintenance of the said positions forced our troops to fight on an unequal and very difficult front, increasing it by thirty-five versts (twenty-two miles), and subjecting the troops occupying these positions to the concentrated fire of the enemy's numerous heavy guns.

"Consequently we had for some time been proceeding with a gradual removal from this point of various material which we had taken from the Austrians. This having been completed, we removed on June 2nd the last batteries, and the following night, in conformity with orders received, evacuated on the north and west fronts the positions surrounding Przemyśl, and formed on the east a more concentrated force."

The recovery of Przemyśl was a substantial military achievement for the Germans, but the orderly evacuation was very creditable to the Russian commanders. The Germans captured with the fortress neither men, nor guns, nor supplies ; all had been removed. This had only been made possible by the resistance which the Russian army had offered for a full fortnight on the San and in front of the Lemberg railway, and which had been broken down by the same concentration of men and guns on a narrow front which had led to the first collapse in Western Galicia. The second phase of the retreat was now over. The line of the San had gone, and it was becoming more and more doubtful whether Eastern Galicia and Lemberg could be held. Preparations were already begun to evacuate Lemberg, and to throw up defences against the advance northwards which was expected to follow if Lemberg should be lost.

THE TWO SIDES.

The Russians had suffered a very severe defeat during this month, but they had averted a disaster. They had succeeded in withdrawing the great bulk of their forces from the Carpathians and had kept their armies together ; they had reduced Przemyśl to the condition of an empty shell before abandoning it ; they had gained a breathing space for themselves, and they had from time to time hit the enemy hard. Their soldiers had fought most gallantly against very heavy odds. In artillery they were outmatched. On the Dunajec and Biala, in the rearguard actions on the railways leading to the San, in the first crossing of the river, in the onslaught against the positions north of Przemyśl and in the final bombardment of the forts, the Germans were carried to victory by the hurricane attack of their heavy guns. It was foolishly said at the time that the German soldier could no longer fight without the protection of a great array of guns. This was, of course, untrue ; seldom had the German soldier had bitterer fighting to go through than during this month in Galicia. But it is true that without the special weapon which the German commanders had devised for him he would probably not have made this march to Przemyśl. That it gained so decisive a victory in Galicia, as compared with the moderate success which similar artillery concentrations won in the west when employed either by the Germans or the Allies, was due to the inferior resources of the Russians ; their guns and their numbers alike were less than those employed on the western front, and their defensive system was less powerful. The Russians were in a difficult position. They had to hold a line almost a thousand miles in length, and, as they said themselves, they could not be equally strong at all points. A great advantage lay with the side that held the initiative. In the spring the Russians had had it. They gathered their strength for a blow against Hungary, but the enterprise had small success ; the enemy and the mountains had been too much for them. Then the initiative passed to the Germans, and when they struck in overwhelming force they found that the Russians were weak at a vital point of their line.

THE LOSSES.

Of the extent of the casualties on either side it is impossible to speak with certainty. The Germans and Austrians stated that during the month of May they took close on 270,000 prisoners, 250 guns, and nearly 600 machine-guns in the south-eastern area alone, and that


of these Mackensen's captures accounted for 150,000 prisoners, 160 guns, and 400 machine-guns. A single Austrian army was declared to have taken over 81,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, five and a half million cartridges, 32,000 rifles, and 21,000 swords and bayonets. If it is impossible to accept these figures, neither is it possible to reject them outright, in view of all the circumstances of the defeat and the far-reaching and long-continued retirement which was its consequence. Every retreat means a large continuous wastage, especially when positions have to be held to the end in order

to secure the safety of the main body. On their side the Germans undoubtedly suffered severely, though nothing like so much as the Russians. The Russians claimed 40,000 prisoners during the first three weeks of the month, and asserted that in the early days of the campaign the Germans had lost "several tens of thousands" daily, and had, in all, been weakened to the extent of a fourth or even a third of their total strength. However this may be, the Germans had gained a great advantage, which, unless it could be checked, threatened disaster to Russia's military fortunes.



One of the blown-up bridges at Przemyśl.


[Topical Press.



A foot-bridge built by the Germans in their advance. [Newspaper Illustrations.]



Russian prisoners in Galicia, proceeding to the rear under escort, meet German reserve troops on their way to the trenches. [Central News.]



At the heels of the Russians: Tyrolean cavalry riding in pursuit of the Russian rear-guard.

[Topical Press.]

CHAPTER VI.

THE AUSTRO-GERMAN RECOVERY OF LEMBERG.

POSITION AFTER THE RECOVERY OF PRZEMYSL—ATTACK ON THE LINE OF THE DNIESTER—THE GRODEK LINES—THE DNIESTER CROSSED—SUCCESSFUL RUSSIAN COUNTER-ATTACK—MACKENSEN'S ADVANCE—GRODEK LINES TAKEN—FALL OF LEMBERG.

IT was about this time that the Germans introduced some of their barbarous devices on the eastern front. On the Dniester they used projectors of liquid fire, and poisonous gases were employed in some of the attacks in front of Warsaw. The users of gas, however, must have found their weapon disappointing. Towards the end of May, during the night, large volumes of it were set rolling towards the Russian trenches. So lavish was the use that the fumes were felt twenty miles behind the Russian lines; women and children, horses used in transport service, cattle in the country, and even fowls were said to have been destroyed. But the Russians in the trenches, warned by the experiences of the western front, were better prepared than the Germans had anticipated. When the infantry attack following on the cloud of gas was made it was received with an unexpectedly violent reply from rifles and machine guns, and, while the Germans were still hesitating, fresh reserves arrived in the Russian trenches with muffled faces and, charging out, drove the attackers back. On one section of the front the breeze changed suddenly, and the gas was driven back again into the German trenches. The Germans who were not suffocated fled over open ground, and were the mark for Russian fire.

THE THIRD PHASE.

After the fall of Przemyśl the Galician campaign entered on its third phase. Lemberg was now to be recovered. On the left flank of the Germans, protecting

the movements of their main forces against the Russians, who still occupied a threatening position between the Vistula and the San, was the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand. South of his army, lying to the north of the Przemyśl-Lemberg railway, was Mackensen, and linked up with him to the south of the railway, and as far as the Dniester marshes, was Boehm-Ermolli, together with Marwitz. Next in order from the Dniester marshes came Linsingen's army, holding positions south-east and south-west of Stryj, on the river of that name, and threatening Lemberg by a direct approach from the south. Beyond Linsingen the line tailed off south-eastward towards Bukowina.

The base of the Russian positions was Lemberg—the capital of Galicia and the centre of the railways of the country. The Russian front might be regarded as in four sections. On the far right was the army between the Vistula and the San, which might threaten the advance of the whole of the Austro-German forces along the northern railway to Lemberg. Facing Mackensen and Boehm-Ermolli, in front of Przemyśl, lay the bulk of the Russian army. The third section held the Upper Dniester, south of Lemberg; a fourth covered the lower stretches of the river in Eastern Galicia.

THE NEW POSITION.

Hitherto the main thrust of the Germans had been from west to east. Automatically by its success the Russians had been forced to retreat through all the western and central passes of the Carpathians. The



An abandoned Russian trench, showing the effect of the German high-explosive shells.


[Newspaper Illustrations.]

position was now somewhat changed. From Przemyśl to Lemberg is a distance of about sixty miles. From Lemberg southwards towards Stryj was only forty. The Germans would therefore achieve their object more easily if, by advancing over the shorter road from Stryj to Lemberg, they could compel the main Russian forces facing them along the Przemyśl-Lemberg line to fall back than if they adopted the converse plan. There were two further advantages about this course. In the first place, the less heavy fighting Mackensen had to do the better would he and the Archduke be able to push out north-eastwards and remove the very real danger on their left flank. Secondly, if Linsingen's army, by advancing from Stryj, could force the passage of the Dniester south and south-east of Lemberg, they would have placed themselves in the rear of the Grodek lines, which were the most formidable obstacle that an enemy had to meet in attacking Lemberg from the west. These lines, which were a little more than fifteen miles to the west of Lemberg, stretched for almost fifty miles north and south. Beginning in the region of the Dniester marshes, they consisted of a chain of river and lake and swamp, and, like the similar districts of East Prussia and the Russian province adjoining it, were thought, if vigorously defended, to be almost impregnable. The Austrians had prepared them mainly for defence against an enemy approaching from the east; but for the most part the strength of the lines lay in natural obstacles which could be as well defended from one side as from the other, and the Russians had had nearly nine months in which to add art to nature. There

was good reason why the German commanders, at the moment when they knew Przemyśl was about to fall into their hands, had opened up a great attack on the passages of the Dniester between Stryj and Lemberg.

LINSINGEN'S SUCCESSES.

About the end of May the Germans had brought up large numbers of fresh troops and guns into the Stryj district, and a sudden attack delivered under the command of the Bavarian general, Count Bothmer, broke and drove back the Russians. This was a repetition on a smaller scale of the success which in the north had accompanied Mackensen's sudden blows. The Germans first of all pursued the retreating Russians along the main road and railway to Lemberg, which cross the Dniester at the fortified position of Mikolajow, and to the west of it. It was not, however, their intention to attempt a crossing of the river at this point. The Dniester marshes were close to their left hand, and Mikolajow itself was a strong point from which the Russians would have been able to resist attack. As soon, therefore, as they had disposed of the enemy to the north-west of Stryj, the main part of Linsingen's army turned along the two roads running north-east towards the Dniester below Mikolajow. A special reason for this diversion of their line of advance lay in the character of the country on the north bank of the river. Opposite Zurawno, the point at which their attack was now to be aimed, and which lay about twenty-five miles below Mikolajow, there was a thick forest coming down close to the river bank. The German calculation was





A Polish town under German occupation.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

that the forest would prevent the Russians planting their guns in good positions to prevent the rapid crossing of the river at the points where pontoon bridges were to be thrown over it. On the 3rd and 4th of June the Germans delivered attacks both at this place and at others farther to the south. These were repulsed, but on the 6th the bridgehead at Zurawno was captured, and strong forces were thrown across the river. Russian counter-attacks failed, and Linsingen's troops, spreading northwards, soon reached and cut the railway which ran along the northern bank of the river and served the Russian line of communication. At the same time German forces farther to the south-east pushed up towards the north, and approached the river at points from which they might be able to support the troops who were already across.

Linsingen's advance was threatening, and on June 8th strong Russian reserves were brought south from Lemberg. In front of Mikolajow, where the Russians still held their ground south of the river, they drove the Germans back. North of the river, on the Zurawno front, they pushed them first from the railway towards the river and then back to the southern side, when they retook Zurawno. It was the most substantial success that they obtained in the Galician campaign; in three days they took over 15,000 prisoners and nearly a hundred guns and machine-guns. They were not able to push their victory further, but it was no part of their plans to attempt a large offensive south of the Dniester. Such strength as they could spare for anything beyond the maintenance of the river line was likely to be required to meet a violent attack in the north so soon as it was apparent that the advance on the Dniester line had failed.

MACKENSEN MOVES AGAIN.

The attack soon came. For some days there had been stubborn fighting a few miles east of Przemysl, in which

the Germans had made only slow progress, but on June 12th Mackensen made a great assault along forty miles of the Russian front, and met with complete success. The Russians fell back towards the northern half of the Grodek lines, and their forces on the south retired simultaneously before Boehm-Ermolli. At the same time the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, guarding Mackensen's flank, pushed out towards the north-east, and the Russian armies both on the Lower San and across the Vistula withdrew before him. The Russians had lost their chance of striking at Mackensen's flank and rear. On June 17th the German armies stood before the Grodek lines and were threatening already to outflank them on the north.

The position of the Russians, in spite of their gallant resistance and their constant counter-attacks, had become very difficult. They were fighting day after day with inferior forces, and yet the enemy were bringing into the field troops which had not before appeared on the eastern front. It had been so in the Battle of Stryj, and again in the heavy fighting which broke down the Russian resistance east of Przemysl. The Russian infantry, on the other hand, were becoming worn out. The Russians themselves described how in the region of Lubaczow (east of the San), when their infantry had been exhausted by four days' heavy fighting cavalry had been ordered to charge the German infantry. The exploit was no doubt a gallant one, but it necessarily illustrates the straits to which, at least in this quarter of the field, the Russian troops had now been reduced.

THE GRODEK LINES CARRIED.

It was perhaps the strain on the Russian army, due both to the lack of reserves and to the deficiency in artillery (which threw an excessive amount of work on the men) that led to the immediate loss of the Grodek lines. On the 17th an attack on the southern part of the position was repulsed, but on the 19th the attack was general.

It began in the early morning, and by the afternoon twenty miles of the northern positions had been carried. As a consequence, the southern half of the line could not hold out against the Austrian attack. At the same time the Russians withdrew from all the positions on the south side of the Dniester which they had held so stubbornly since the end of May.

The Grodek lines had fallen with unexpected quickness, and it seems likely that after the failure of their prolonged efforts against Mackensen the Russians decided that Grodek could not be defended, and that it would be better to husband their strength for another stand in defence of the Lublin-Cholm railway, which was certain to be attacked after the fall of Lemberg. Their troops were weary, and Lemberg, they knew, had already been cleared of munitions and supplies, so that it could as well be surrendered now as later. They had also to consider that the Germans might succeed in working round from the north to the rear of the Grodek positions, and that at this time it was a less evil to sacrifice a good defensive position than to lose an army in defence of it.

The fall of Grodek meant the loss of Lemberg, which promptly followed. On June 21st the Austrians reached the railway south of Lemberg, and on the next day they carried all the Russian positions down to Mikolajow on the Dniester. On the same day the Russian positions to the west and north-west of Lemberg were captured. The attacking forces passed round to the east, and the city fell into their hands.

The hard fighting that went on during part of this time far down the Dniester had no effect on the major operations. More than seventy miles below Mikolajow the Austrians crossed the Dniester near Nizniow, where there are deep windings in the river.

"The Dniester in this region follows a most erratic course. A rectangle fifteen miles long, in the direction of the general course of the Dniester, and seven miles wide, encloses over fifty miles of stream. The larger bends are to the south, with narrow necks of land between sharp curves to the north. In these narrow necks the Russians placed adequate containing forces."*

North of Nizniow the Russians annihilated the enemy who had crossed; to the south of it they drove him back so impetuously that he could not destroy his bridges, and the pursuing Cossacks crossed over close behind him.

FIRING THE OIL-FIELDS.

It had been counted among the successes gained by Russia that since September, 1914, she had deprived the Central Empires of the rich Galician oil fields, and when, in May, 1915, the Austrians came back to recover their own the Russian armies destroyed as much of the oil-fields as the circumstances of the retreat allowed. It was a great deal, though probably not as much as the Russians hoped and the Austrians feared. One who witnessed the Russian retreat, the northward march of the crowds of refugees and the beginning of the fires, thus described the scene:--

"As dusk came on I became aware of something on the horizon to the south--a lurid glare which tinged the sky with crimson. It flickered and went out, appeared again, and columns like tongues of fire shot up from the earth. 'They are burning,' said a Cossack to his mate as he galloped by; 'our brothers will leave them nothing.' The naphtha fields at the foot of the Carpathians were burning, and the contents of oil tanks, refineries, and six square miles of wells were going up to heaven in shafts of flame

and columns of smoke. Two huge smoky coils rose up to the clouds, closing up above into a gigantic arch. Within the arch tongues of fire shot up from the oil wells, rising and falling, lighting up the vault of heaven with a flickering glare. A veritable inferno! and hundreds of thousands of pounds of capital were going into the air. But it is war, and all obstacles must be put in the way of the enemy.

"Next morning the road was packed with refugees moving northwards. Some of them came from the scene of the burning oil wells. One peasant told me that for twelve hours he had been rained upon by oily rain. The reservoirs and underground tanks had been blown up by dynamite; dense clouds of smoke had risen up in coils, forming huge banks of soot up in the sky. Every now and then some unburnt gas escaping from the ground would explode in the air with a loud rumble, and a flash, like lightning, would light up the whole sky. This was the flicker that I had seen the night before. The whole countryside, he said, was turned into a black inferno. The trees, budding with the green shoots of spring, were blighted with an inky film; horses, cattle, ducks, and geese fled wildly from the scene of terror. I looked southwards, in the direction pointed by my narrator, and there I beheld a huge bank of smoke drifting slowly northwards in the south wind. All that day and the next it lay over Lemberg like a thunder-cloud, and the inhabitants of the town had to use candles and lamps at mid-day.

"All along the road I met large numbers of Ruthenian peasants from the Carpathians, who were pouring northwards with wives, families, and household goods in creaking waggons. Though they were flying before an army and had left behind all that they possessed, and though many of them had seen the terrors of a burning oil-field, still there was a look on all these peasants' faces as if they were only going to the weekly market. Their household goods consisted of a large painted chest, in which were packed crockery, linen, and sacred pictures. Outside the city of Lemberg they camped in the open fields, and here I witnessed a seething mass--boxes, bundles, babies, wives, and waggons. Those who had food ate it and passed on to the Russian frontier. Those who were penniless and had no food stayed and got something from the soup kitchens which had been provided by the Polish municipal authorities."

THE AUSTRIAN ARMIES.

The Galician campaign showed how exaggerated had been the reports of the demoralisation of the Austrian armies, which were based on the earlier Russian successes and the surrender of Przemysl. The Austrians, as it proved, had suffered comparatively little from the heterogeneous composition of their forces, and, to judge from all the available evidence, Poles, Italians, and Roumanians did their duty no less bravely than the Hungarians. The Czechs, the Slav inhabitants of Bohemia, gave serious trouble. They did not forget their feud with Austria nor their nationalist aspirations, and in the Galician fighting some of them went over to the Russians. The 28th Infantry Regiment was disbanded on this account. On the whole, the Austrian army gave a good account of itself. Nor is this to be ascribed simply to its being "stiffened" by the admixture of Germans, though it is true that it could make little headway against the Russians by itself, and that its recovery was made under German leadership and side by side with large masses of German troops. The truth is that the modern armies of millions cannot be demoralised nor made to crumble away any more easily than they can be surrounded or broken through. They suffer the heaviest blows, lose whole army corps, retreat over a vast front, yet their numbers are so great, the organisation so elaborate, the means of reinforcing them so many and varied, that while the contemporary observer continually announces their approaching end, they are found to be yet far from

*Morning Post Petrograd message.

the end of their resources, and able, perhaps, if the turn of fortune favours them, to renew the struggle with some hope of victory.

A NOTE OF DISCONTENT IN RUSSIA.

While the Germans were on their way to Lemberg the first slight evidence developed that there was some little discontent in Russia at the supposed failure of the Western Allies to take their fair share in the attack. A semi-official statement was issued in Petrograd, which remarked that the position of Russia was many times better than that of France when the Germans were in the very heart of the country and under the walls of Paris. It added: "In that period, when our foe was occupied on the west front, we successfully developed our advance. Now it is the turn of our Allies." This was not a pronouncement of the Russian Staff, but apparently a hint of the Government that England and France might be expected to take advantage of Germany being so involved with Russia and strike a blow which would lead to an advance in the west and thereby quickly relieve the strain on Russia and the east. A Petrograd newspaper followed up the hint by suggesting that thirty per cent of the German forces in the west, as they stood in the middle of April, had been withdrawn for use


against the Russians. This was quite inaccurate. It was only known with certainty that two or three corps had been withdrawn, but it was also known that their places had been filled by an equivalent number of fresh men. It was not, of course, unnatural that there should be some such feeling as this in Russia, which saw herself made the target of a tremendous and sustained attack, while, except for the long French offensive round Arras, there was comparative inactivity in the west.

After the capture of Lemberg the Germans did not proceed at once to clear the whole of Galicia. North of Lemberg they followed the Russians up to the River Bug; to the south they drove them back to the Zlota Lipa. These two rivers, whose sources are close to each other, gave the Russians a fairly straight front from north to south, and left a long and narrow strip of Galicia in their hands. This was of no great military importance to the enemy, and could be neglected by them for the present. For the Austro-German armies were now to take up the plan which Austria had had before her at the beginning of the war. They intended to move into the country east of the Vistula, and they would then combine with the German armies of the north in executing a great strategic scheme against the main Russian armies and all their positions southwards from the Baltic.



Men of a Landsturm regiment repairing a Polish road in order to facilitate the German advance.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



German pioneers repairing the Vistula Bridge, between Praga and Warsaw, destroyed by the retreating Russians. [Photopress.]

CHAPTER VII.

THE FALL OF WARSAW.

RUSSIA AND THE GALICIAN RETREAT—THE TSAR IN COUNCIL—THE DUMA TO BE SUMMONED—GERMANY'S PLAN—A DOUBLE ENVELOPING MOVEMENT—THE ADVANCE ON THE LUBLIN RAILWAY—ATTACK ON THE LINE OF THE RIVERS—WARSAW TO BE ABANDONED—A PROLONGED STRUGGLE—FALL OF WARSAW AND IWANGROD.

THE Germans watched keenly the effect of their Galician victories on public opinion in Russia. In their most sanguine mood they could hardly hope to conquer Russia in the ordinary military sense. Its spaces were so great; its numbers of men so large; the life of the country so little dependent on industries; its most important centres—Kieff, Petrograd, and Moscow—so remote, that they could scarcely expect to be able to crush Russian resistance, as they could that of a smaller and more highly-organised country, by a succession of military victories or the occupation of territory. They hoped, however, that Russia might be made to weary of the war. Military successes might induce her Government to think that nothing could be gained and much more might be lost by continuing the struggle, and the people might perhaps turn on their Government and declare their unwillingness to make further sacrifices. The analogy of Russia's war with Japan helped to encourage this view. Russia had not then been finally defeated, but the Government had come to the conclusion that the doubtful prospect of success was not worth the dangers and sacrifices which it involved, and

the people had shown themselves alike indifferent to the war and openly hostile to their governors. The campaign in Galicia had been a very serious blow to Russia's military resources. At the best it was doubtful whether for many months it could be retrieved. It would have been small wonder, then, if all grades of society in Russia had been discouraged by the prospect which opened out before them, and German hopes were increased by the knowledge that there were some sections of Russian society which were strongly pro-German and might be expected to use their influence on the German side.

THE DUMA AND THE GOVERNMENT.

The Germans were destined to be disappointed. Any among them who had expected to find signs of weariness at this stage had forgotten that this, unlike the contest with Japan, was a national war. In August of 1914 all parties had declared their resolve to stand together in the struggle, because they believed both that the Slav family was being attacked through Servia and that Germany was making the Servian question a pretext



German troops digging camp quarters on the banks of the Bzura. [Newspaper Illustrations.]



Russian troops in a dug-out.

[Record Press.]

for an attempt to weaken the power and influence of Russia. The Germans were perhaps less to be blamed if they had forgotten also the existence of the Duma. It was an institution whose importance for the future of Russia had never been very highly estimated in Germany, and there were many there, as in Russia itself, who expected that its end would be to be thrown aside altogether, as had been known to happen with some other Parliaments. But the Duma was, of its kind, a national organisation, and the effect of the trials and reverses which Russia was now undergoing was that public opinion began to find through its proper organ, the Duma, means of expression which were not to be ignored. For some time, now that the dimensions of the defeat in Galicia had been realised, the heads of the different parties of the Duma had been meeting in conference to consider the weaknesses which had been shown to exist in the administration of the war, and the remedies for them. There was even talk of the necessity of a National Committee of Defence. No sooner had Lemberg fallen than the activity of the Duma, and of public opinion outside it, began to have its effect.

General Sukhomlinoff, who had been Minister of War for six years, resigned. This was the almost inevitable result of the recent course of the campaign. He was the official mainly responsible for the organisation and equipment of the army as it had entered on the war, and it had been shown that in some respects, such as the provision of heavy guns, it was in no position to make an equal fight against its enemies.*

A CONFERENCE AT HEADQUARTERS.

Lemberg fell on June 22nd. On the next day the Tsar arrived at the headquarters of the Grand Duke

* The Second Belgian Grey Book has some remarkable references, written before the outbreak of war, to this question of heavy guns. On July 26th, 1914, Baron Beyens, the Belgian Minister at Berlin, explaining why the German General Staff is anxious to have the war sooner than later, remarks that "As to France, M. Charles Humbert has disclosed the insufficiency of her heavy guns—and it seems that it is just this weapon that will decide battles." Still more to the point is Baron Beyens's statement on July 28th: "The impression that Russia is unable to face a European war prevails not only among the members of the Imperial Government, but among the German manufacturers who specialise on military equipment. The one best qualified to speak, Herr Krupp von Bohlen, assured one of my colleagues that the Russian artillery was far from being good and complete, while that of the German army had never been of such a superior quality. It would be madness, he added, for Russia to declare war on Germany in these conditions."



General von Linsingen.

[Universal.

Nicholas. On the 24th General Polivanoff joined them, and was immediately appointed Minister of War. He had been Assistant Minister from 1906 to 1912, had held many important appointments on the General Staff, and was reported to have liberal political views. On the 26th came the Premier, M. Goremykin, and other ministers, making ten in all. On Sunday, the 27th, a conference took place in a tent near headquarters. There were present at it the Tsar, the ten ministers, the Grand Duke Nicholas and his Chief of Staff. It was decided to carry on the war with the utmost vigour and resolution, to organise the supply of munitions for

the army on a great scale, and, in response no doubt to the appeals of all kinds which had reached the Tsar from the people, to summon the Duma at an early date. Russia's reply to two months of almost unbroken reverses was contained in the rescript which the Tsar issued after the conference:—

"From all parts of the country I have received appeals testifying to the firm determination of the Russian peoples to devote their strength to the work of equipping the army. I derive from this national unanimity unshakable assurance of a brilliant future.

"Prolonged war calls ever for fresh efforts, but, surmounting growing difficulties and parrying vicissitudes which are inevitable in war, let us strengthen in our hearts the resolution to carry on the struggle with the help of God to complete the triumph of Russian arms.

"The enemy must be crushed, for, without that, peace is impossible.

"With a firm faith in the inexhaustible strength of Russia I anticipate that the Governmental and public

institutions of Russian industry and all faithful sons of the Fatherland, without distinction of ideas and classes, will work together in harmony to satisfy the needs of our valiant army. This is the only and henceforth the national problem to which must be directed all thoughts of United Russia, invincible in her unity.

"Having formed for the discussion of the questions of supplying the army a special commission, in which members of the legislative chambers and representatives of industry participate, I recognise the necessity, in consequence of the advancing date, of the re-opening of these legislative bodies in order to hear the voice of the country. Having decided that the sessions of the Duma and the Council of Empire shall be resumed in the month of August at the latest, I rely on the Council of Ministers to draw up, according to my indications, bills necessitated by the time of war."

The decision of the Tsar voluntarily to summon Parliament "in order to hear the voice of the country" was perhaps the most momentous political event in Russia since the Duma was established.



Destroyed shipping on the Vistula.

[Photopress.]

GERMAN PLANS AFTER LEMBERG.

The German Staff did not hesitate as to the course which it was to follow after the fall of Lemberg. The positions of the armies under its control were these. North of the Niemen Von Below's army, which had been strongly reinforced, was pushing forward towards Riga, and eastwards in the direction of the railway from Warsaw to Petrograd. It was still too far distant from its object to cause the Russians serious disquietude. From the Niemen to the Vistula, near Warsaw, the German forces lay well back from the line of the Rivers Niemen, Narew, and Bobr; they were not apparently in great strength, and there had been no recent activity to indicate to the Russians that an attack in force was likely to be made from this quarter. West and south-west of Warsaw the Germans had made no movement of importance since the opening of the Galician advance. Along the southern bend of the Vistula, where it forms the border of Galicia, General von Woyrsch was waiting to press the Russians back east and north towards Iwangrod as soon as the army of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, on the other side of the river, could move in co-operation with him. The Archduke's army, again, was aligned with that of Mackensen, which was now lying to the north and north-east of Lemberg. South of Mackensen was Linsingen, who was slowly pushing the Russians back towards the tributary streams which run due north and south into the Dniester. The last section of the line was occupied by General Pflanzer, and lay south of the Dniester towards the frontier of Bessarabia.

There is no reason to suppose that the Germans were tempted by the idea of advancing direct from Galicia on Kieff. From Lemberg to Kieff, which was the base of the southern Russian armies, is about three hundred miles in the straight line. But in order to be free to advance in this direction the Germans would have had to clear the whole country of the Russian armies as far north as the railway running from Warsaw to Brest Litowsk and the Pripet marshes lying to the eastward, and even this would not have made them safe, for they would still have had the northern Russian armies threatening their rear. An advance on Kieff really meant, therefore, that the Germans had to deal with the whole Russian positions. In other words, they had first to get the Russian central armies out of Poland and force a general retirement. That being done, they could decide whether to advance on Kieff, Moscow, and Petrograd, or any one of these places.

The plan adopted by the Germans was that which the Austrians had intended to carry out at the beginning of the war. It had been the traditional scheme of Austrian strategy in attacking Russia to stand on the defensive in Eastern Galicia, and to advance north and north-east from Lemberg into Russia. About fifty miles north of the Galician frontier runs the trunk railway from Kieff to the fortresses of the Vistula—Iwangrod and Warsaw. The chief points through which it passes, and at which the Austrian advance would aim, are—taking them from east to west—Kowel, Cholm, and Lublin. If the Austro-Germans were able to advance through this stretch of country, fifty miles in depth and

about one hundred in width, between the Vistula and the Bug rivers and to seize the Lublin and Cholm railway, they would secure important military results. They would compel the Russian army lying to the west of the Vistula to fall back on the river, at least as far as the fortress of Iwangrod, and probably a good deal further. They would cut one of the main lines of supply to the whole of the Russian forces between Iwangrod and Warsaw. They would be within a distance of from fifty to seventy miles of the railway which runs into Warsaw directly from the east—the line on which, if the Warsaw position had to be abandoned, the Russians would have mainly to rely in conducting the evacuation of the city and the withdrawal of their armies. Thus, if the German commanders succeeded in gaining possession of the Lublin-Cholm railway they would go far towards breaking down the whole Russian positions in Poland, and would outflank and cause the Russians passively to abandon both the military positions which months of incessant fighting had failed to capture, and also Warsaw itself, the possession of which was of great importance from the political point of view.


A GREAT SCHEME OF ENVELOPMENT.

This plan, imposing as it was, was only part of the great programme which the German strategists had now conceived. Their successes in Galicia had put it in their power to take advantage of the unfavourable geographical position in which the Russians lay. The nature of this will be made clearer if it be remembered why Russia had been unable at the beginning of the war to take her stand on her westernmost frontier. The nearest geographical point from which Russia might have attacked Germany was about the centre of the Prusso-Polish frontier. But obvious military considerations made this impossible. Poland juts out into Germany in a great salient, and had the Russians stood on its frontiers their

armies would have been struck at from behind by the Germans moving down from East Prussia and by the Austrians moving northward from Galicia. Hence the Russians decided to hold the line of the Vistula, although there was a school of strategists which held that this was too venturesome, and that the best policy from the start would have been to concentrate on a line a hundred miles further to the east. But what had now happened was that the Austro-German occupation of Galicia had reproduced almost exactly the unfavourable conditions which Russia would have imposed on herself

had she attempted to hold all Poland at the beginning of the war. For just as Poland would have been a salient threatened from Galicia and East Prussia, now the positions in front of the Vistula were a salient threatened from the south by the armies of Mackensen and the Archduke, which were moving on the Lublin-Cholm railway, and from the north if the Germans simultaneously attacked the lines of the Narew, Bobr, and Niemen.

It was this scheme that the Germans had in mind, and the final touches were given to it when at the beginning of July the German Emperor, on his way to the operations in the north, held a conference at Posen with Falkenhayn, the Chief of the General Staff, and Hindenburg, who was in control of the northern group of armies. From the north Hindenburg, from the south



The German armies in the north.

Mackensen, were to cut in on the great salient of Warsaw. Mackensen had the harder obstacles—the rivers, and a number of fortified places—to surmount. Hindenburg's threat would be the graver as soon as the blow was struck, for the most suitable places on the Narew river—Pultusk, Rozan, Ostrolenka, and Lomza—are all of them less than forty miles from the Warsaw-Petrograd railway line, although in the region immediately north-east of Warsaw the railway had the River Bug, as well as the



A German military motor car being helped over a bad road in Poland.

[Central News.]



Removing the points on a Russian railway in order to make it useless to the Germans.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



Austrian infantry passing through a village which the retreating Russians had fired.

[Topical Press.]

Narew, between it and a German attack. The Russian armies were thus lying within a vast pair of pincers, of which the claws were to be forced together behind Warsaw by the Germans. The question was whether the Russians could hold the claws back altogether, or, if not that, keep them back so long as to withdraw their armies from the grip which threatened to close on them.

Whatever the result might be, it is impossible to deny the sweep and boldness of the German strategy which contemplated an enveloping movement on this stupendous scale. The Germans, however, knew and were calculating on the results of the last two months' fighting, in which the Russians had been terribly shaken. Whatever had been the case at the beginning of May, they were probably in a position now to bring superior numbers to bear against the Russians at almost every section of the front. It seems likely that just as the Carpathian campaign had used up the reserves which should have been available to stem the first defeat in Western Galicia, so the prolonged resistance in May and June on the San and the Dniester had consumed a large part of the general reserves on whom the Russian commanders should have been able to call when Mackensen and Hindenburg began to strike in respectively towards the southern and the northern of the three chief great railways lying behind Warsaw.

During the last week of June the Germans occupied themselves with clearing their flank in Eastern Galicia so as to leave themselves free for more important work in the north. As in the earlier stages of the Galician campaign, they attempted to drive the Russians back between Lemberg and the Dniester by crossing



Prince Leopold of Bavaria.

[E.N.A.]



General von Woyrsch.

[E.N.A.]

the river in the rear of their positions, and in particular they attacked persistently for five days in the neighbourhood of Halicz, which lies about twenty-five miles further down the river than the point at which Linsingen had first crossed at the beginning of June. Their efforts met with little success, until at last they succeeded in pushing back the northern part of this section of the Russian line. It was then useless to hold out on the Dniester, and the Russians withdrew, first to the Gnila Lipa and then to the Zlota Lipa, a little further to the east. This Dniester army was, from first to last, a thorn in the side of the German commanders in Galicia. Immediately to the north-east of Lemberg the Russians fell back to the Bug, so that they now [held a line running more or less directly north and south through Eastern Galicia. Here for a time Eastern Galicia passes out of the military operations. From Sokal, which lies on the Bug near the border of Galicia and Russia, the Germans and Russians faced one another for over a hundred miles, as far as the banks of the Dniester. Meanwhile, Mackensen's main army, together with that of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, began to spread out in the direction of the Lublin railway.

It was necessary to the German plans at this stage that they should distract the Russians as much as possible and keep them in a perpetual state of indecision as to the point at which the next attack was to be launched against them. The chief threat following on the Galician campaign seemed clearly to be coming from the south, but it was not desirable from the point of view of the German commanders that too much of the Russian strength should be attracted to this quarter; the Russians,



German troops leaving for the trenches with their machine guns.

[Central News.]

weakened as they were, had made much too obstinate a fight on the San and the Dniester for the Germans to be confident that they might not still be held up or even driven back. A few days after the fall of Lemberg, therefore (June 24th-25th), the Germans suddenly developed considerable activity along the East Prussian border facing the Narew river. They were not, in point of fact, yet ready to deliver a serious attack in this quarter; all that they were concerned to do was to keep the Russians in a state of expectancy, and distract, so far as possible, the disposition of their forces.

ADVANCE OF MACKENSEN.

This diversion lasted only two or three days, and on June 27th the advance of Mackensen and the Archduke began in earnest. The region in which their march took place is divided, roughly, into two parts by the River Wieprz, which runs from south to north for some ninety miles from near the Galician border, and then turns south-westward, and after about thirty miles falls into the Vistula near Iwangrod. On the left of the advance from the Vistula towards the Wieprz was the Archduke; Mackensen filled up the space between him and the Bug, on which, near Sokal, his right flank rested. Throughout this time the left flank of the German army was thrown considerably farther forward than the right; it was in some danger from the Russian forces on the Vistula, who, if they succeeded in breaking through the German front, would have been comparatively close to the German

lines of communication. The farther the left wing could be thrown forward, the more breathing-space had the Germans in case they were forced into a retreat.

For the first few days the Russians fought nothing more than orthodox rearguard actions, and the Germans advanced steadily, finding no impediment in the growing distance that they were putting between them and the railway system of Galicia. On the Vistula itself they were halfway to Iwangrod, and had soon reached Krasnik, which is little more than twenty miles from the Lublin railway. From Krasnik they drove the Russians northwards for another four or five miles, and at the same time, in the neighbourhood of the Wieprz, they advanced towards Krasnostaw, and were even nearer to the railway. The time had come when the Russians must stand on the positions which they had been preparing since they were driven back from the River San, and here, if at all, they must repel the thrust which was made at Warsaw from the south.

On July 4th the Russians, having for the first time since the fall of Lemberg brought up large reserves, turned and attacked the enemy on a front of about twenty miles lying to the north of Krasnik. The attack achieved considerable success, and was pushed for several days. The Austrians fell back on Krasnik, and retired slightly on a front of nearly forty miles lying east of the Vistula. But the Russian success, although it had led to the capture of 20,000 prisoners, was indecisive. The Russians were not able to bring into the field

sufficient forces to drive the Archduke's army back so hurriedly that it could not take up fresh positions. Had they been able to put more vigour into their stroke and to gain more ground, they would soon have compelled not only the Archduke, but Mackensen as well, to fall back. As it was, the Archduke gave way only slightly, and Mackensen not at all, so that the general position of the Russians was only a little less difficult than it had been before, and the Lublin railway was still in imminent danger. But almost at the moment when from motives of prudence they drew their counter-attack to a close, they had to turn their attention to a fresh and startling development elsewhere.

THE GERMAN STROKE IN THE NORTH.

On July 12th the Germans suddenly advanced in great force against the line of the rivers which protected the Warsaw salient on the north. They had for some time been concentrating fresh troops at Thorn, the fortress on the Vistula from which they could sally out either to the south of the river, as they had done in November, 1914, or along its northern banks towards the Narew, as they now did. In the valleys of all the rivers which run from the neighbourhood of the East Prussian frontier towards the Narew—the Lidynia, the Orzec, the Omulew, the Wkra—appeared the forces of Von Gallwitz. They attacked with special vigour the Russian positions north of Przasnysz, the place which had been the scene of some of the fiercest fighting in the winter campaign.

Von Gallwitz's attack was the most formidable that was now made on the northern wing, for it was the nearest to Warsaw, but it was backed up by others stretching northward along the course of the Bobr and the Niemen, and these, if they were neither likely nor designed to yield an immediate large success, would at least chain down Russian armies while Warsaw was being made untenable by the attack further to the south. Northward of Gallwitz, Von Scholz attacked towards Lomza, on the Upper Narew, and advanced towards the Bobr. Northward of Scholz, again, Von Eichhorn sprang into activity in the lake region of Suwalki—where the Germans

had been twice before, but never with any great success—and moved towards the Niemen river, while on the far northern section of the line Von Below spread out his forces in Courland, pushing the Russians back north and east. All these armies, together with the troops lying to the west of Warsaw, were under the general command of Hindenburg. The army of Von Woyrsch, which was operating in the region west of Iwangrod, linked up the army groups of Hindenburg and Mackensen.

THE BATTLE OF PRZASNYSZ.

The advanced Russian positions on the Narew extended on both sides of Przasnysz, between that

place and the East Russian frontier. They had during the preceding months been fortified in a most formidable manner, and the survey of operations which was afterwards issued from the German Headquarters declared that an astonishing amount of work and technical skill had been put into them. As many as five systems of trenches stretched one behind another over a front which was many miles in length and ten or more in depth. The forests in the neighbourhood had been largely hewn down, so that the defending troops would have a wider field of fire, and many hundred thousand trunks of trees, together with millions of sandbags, had been used in the construction of the defences. It was impossible, said this German authority, that a front of such




A Russian machine-gun in position.

[Central News.]

strength should be attacked and broken through on its whole length. In particular, Przasnysz itself was encircled with a series of defences which had converted it into a veritable fortress.

Von Gallwitz, in order to achieve his object, proceeded to put into operation pretty much the same methods as those by which Mackensen had gained his success in Galicia. He decided to batter through the Russian line at two points: one to the north-west and the other to the north-east of Przasnysz. The result, as he calculated, would be that the whole of the Przasnysz positions lying between the two points at which he struck would be enveloped, and that the Russians would be compelled to abandon the heart of their defences almost without



A view of a destroyed bridge over the Vistula at Warsaw.

[Photopress.]



German troops building a pontoon bridge over the Vistula.

[Photopress.]

a blow ; while at the same time they would have to fall back at the extreme portions of their front, lying respectively east and west of the places where he broke through, because each would be outflanked. His strategy was thus a repetition on a smaller scale of the larger plan by which the Germans were attempting to force the Russians out of Poland. Just as the armies of Hindenburg in the north and Mackensen in the south were the two blades of a pair of shears which were gradually to be forced together, so Przasnysz was to be caught within the blades of a smaller pair, coming together from the north and south. Large infantry forces were, therefore, concentrated against the two points chosen, and at the same time great masses of artillery were brought up. It is an interesting point, in view of possible later developments in the campaign when the German lines of communication became longer and longer, that even at this stage Von Gallwitz was in some difficulties as to munitions for his guns, owing to the bad state of the roads behind him.

The Germans say that all these preparations were unknown to the Russians, who had no conception that a really serious attack was at hand ; as evidence of this, they mention that immediately in the rear of Przasnysz passenger traffic was just about to be opened on one of the Russian railways. It is not possible to credit this statement. Not only had the Germans shown considerable activity in this part of the field only a fortnight before, but the general situation was such that any commander must have anticipated at least the possibility of an attempt to strike at Warsaw from the north on a large scale. That the Russians had no conception of the strength of the forces which were gathering against them is very probable.

THE RUSSIAN LINE BROKEN.

Early on the morning of July 13th the attack began. As it had followed the methods of Mackensen's attack on the Dunajec, so also it achieved a similar immediate success. Terrific and sustained bombardment was again the means to victory. At Przasnysz, as at Neuve Chapelle and in Western Galicia, observers noted that the effect of the heavy guns in destroying the enemy was not more important than its success in demoralising him. Just as at Neuve Chapelle the British reports stated that many Germans were found dazed and broken in nerve in the remains of their trenches, so now the Germans declared that the effects of their shell fire were such that troops of Russians threw away their weapons and were only anxious to surrender. A wood which was held by

the Russians, and was regarded as a formidable obstacle, was reduced by the German guns to a mass of broken timber, and the defences on the heights north-west of Przasnysz were completely demolished. Both the German attacks had an equal success, and before the end of the day the Russians were falling back on their second line of positions which lay to the south of Przasnysz and were the last that they held in front of the Narew.

On July 14th the Germans passed through Przasnysz, which the Russians had hastily abandoned, joined up the forces which were converging from the north and south, and on the 15th again attacked the Russians. The contest was brief. Because the second line of positions was not of the same strength as those which had already been abandoned, and also because the Russians were out-weighted in artillery, they were

forced speedily to retreat, and early on the 16th they were falling back to the Narew on a front which stretched from the fortress of Nowo Georgiewsk, which lies some miles north-west of Warsaw, to Lomza—a distance of nearly eighty miles. At the same time a new and violent attack was made by the Germans against the Russian positions on the Lublin railway.

DECISION TO EVACUATE WARSAW.

The Russians decided to evacuate Warsaw. This meant not only the abandonment of the strongest defensive lines which they had constructed during the first year of the war, but the surrender of the whole of the advanced positions which for so many months it had been their main object to defend. It meant that all Poland would fall into the hands of the Austrians and Germans, and that their armies would acquire added territory and prestige. It meant, again, that the

Vistula fortresses and, in all probability, those on the Narew and the Bobr would be in the possession of the Germans and serve as the basis of a defensive line against any attack which the Russians might be able to make at a later time. With the abandonment of Warsaw and the Vistula, the Russians must fall back on the second line based on the Niemen and Brest Litovsk, which, according to one school of Russian strategy, it would have been better for them to adopt in the first instance.

But prudence left them little choice. The attack of Von Gallwitz had shown them, both from the number of guns and the strength of the fresh troops employed, that they had to meet an attack which was as formidable in its way as that directed against their southern front in Galicia, and which was even more dangerous because



General Alexieff.

[Central News.]




Citizens of Warsaw watching the entry of the German troops from one of the damaged bridges.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



German troops marching through Warsaw.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]




The Austro-German armies in the south.

it was so much closer to Warsaw and the Petrograd railway on which the northern Russian armies depended. The Russian staff chose the more difficult but the wiser course, and decided to pursue the traditional Russian policy of abandoning cities and territory rather than fight decisive actions under unfavourable conditions. Had they persisted in holding the Warsaw salient and the German armies had broken through, they would have suffered a disaster which would once and for all have ended any hope of retrieving Russian fortunes in the war. As it was they suffered heavily, in both a political and military sense. Their armies, fighting rear-guard actions day by day over an immense front, and pressed by an enemy more numerous and better equipped, were being slowly frayed away, until, at the end of a month, their losses were equivalent to those suffered in a great pitched battle. Against this they could set great advantages. The Germans were made to pay heavily for their advance; their difficulties of transport and supply must increase as their line of march lengthened out, and, most important of all, the Russian armies, weakened and battered as they might be, still maintained an unbroken front. It is one of the features of warfare on the modern scale that a pursuing army has the greatest difficulty in getting the better of one that is retreating. The front held by the Russian army, resting on one wing on the Baltic and on the other on the Dniester, could not be turned; even if one of the extreme wings had been driven in, the distances were

so great that it would scarcely have been possible to roll up the whole front, or even a large part of it. All that the Germans could do was to push on day by day after the retreating Russians, attempting to force them to give battle at one point or another in order that they might break through and cut up their front into sections, which they might have some hope of crushing separately. The decision to evacuate Warsaw was not made known until a fortnight later, and in the semi-official statement the reasons for it were clearly stated:—

“It is opportune at this moment to recall that the capture of Warsaw by the Austro-Germans is nothing more than an episode in the retreat that began almost three months ago, a retreat on which the Russian army was compelled to enter by the superior numbers that were brought against it.

“The greater part of the whole Austro-Hungarian army (with the exception of the corps detached for use against Italy), together with seventy German divisions and the whole of the German cavalry, was directed against the Russian troops. This mass of men is provided with an immense number of guns, all the most perfectly-equipped instruments of modern warfare, and a great reserve of munitions. On the other hand, Russia, which had not, like its opponents, been preparing for this war for a long time back, and which has not like them highly-developed industries, has not been able thus far to furnish its troops with the technical equipment needed to meet an enemy so formidably armed. Thanks to the efforts that are now being made, Russia will soon be in a position to obtain success; but until then she must carry on a defensive war.



Prince Leopold of Bavaria receiving the chiefs of the Austrian command after a parade through Warsaw.
[Newspaper Illustrations.]



Prince Leopold of Bavaria presenting Iron Crosses to his troops after the entry into Warsaw.
[Photopress.]

"In this defensive war the courage and endurance of the Russian troops have enabled them to hold the enemy in check, and he has only been able to advance slowly and with heavy losses. The occupation of a town or of pieces of territory during the war is of secondary importance; it is the shock of battle between armies that decides, and in order to be victorious Russia must keep her armies in being and place them in the most advantageous positions possible.

"The most important consideration of all is that the resources of Russia are inexhaustible. The immense area of her empire permits her to suffer the temporary loss of provinces and cities without her military strength being crushed. It is only now that this great country is beginning to exert her resources to the full, while it appears that her opponents have already reached their maximum effort.

"The enemies of Russia expect that this effort of theirs will be sufficient to oblige Russia to make peace. They will be disappointed, and their strength will begin to diminish, while that of Russia cannot but increase."

THE FIGHT FOR THE LUBLIN RAILWAY.

The task of the Russians was now to hold off the German enveloping movement on north and south until they had evacuated the Warsaw salient and withdrawn the armies within it to a position of security. They went about the task with the same doggedness and perseverance that they had shown in the fortnight's resistance on the River San, and their armies were handled from this time onwards with great ability. Heavy wastage was inevitable, but they gradually straightened out their line and began to withdraw their chain of armies intact towards the east. On July 15th the enemy resumed his advance between the Vistula and the Bug, captured Krastnostaw, and threw the Russians back on their last positions in front of the Lublin railway. At the same time they sought to force a passage over the Bug, on which their right wing rested, and fierce fighting was maintained for days, as the Russians not only had good positions on the banks but had laid mines and wire entanglements in the river. The Germans eventually made good the crossing.

The advance towards the railway, together with that of Von Gallwitz, had its immediate effect on the positions of the Russians west of the Vistula, who had no other part now than that of extricating themselves as skilfully as possible from the efforts which Von Woyrsch made to detain and crush them. They fell back slowly towards Iwangrod; and about the time that Mackensen approached the last Russian positions in front of the railway, Von Woyrsch carried the positions defending the bridgehead at Iwangrod, drove the Russians back on the river over a front of twenty miles in front of the fortress and, farther north, crossed

over to the east bank. Simultaneously, in the northern section of the Vistula front, the Russians fell back from the Bzura to the Blonie lines, which had been said to be the strongest they possessed, and then began gradually to withdraw from the west bank of the river all the way to Warsaw.


Almost to the end of July the Russians resisted the attempts to drive them from the Lublin railway, and the Germans, seeking for a weak spot in the line, made the most vigorous efforts on their right wing, which had hitherto been held somewhat withdrawn. They aimed at striking the railway to the east of Cholm, but they found as stout a resistance here as elsewhere, and at last they made a final attempt on the front between Lublin and Cholm, and secured their object on July 29th. On the night of that day the Russians withdrew from the railway line over a distance of some seventy miles from the Vistula. Here, as in Poland west of the Vistula, they everywhere burned and devastated the country as they withdrew before the enemy.

HARD FIGHTING IN THE NORTH.

The progress of the German attack in the north bore a general similarity to the course of events in the south. The Russians, thrown so rapidly from their long-prepared and fortified positions in front of the Narew, made an admirable fight for the next fortnight. The Germans soon approached the west bank of the Narew, but for several days they were subjected to fierce and repeated counter-attacks which the Russians directed against them from their bridgeheads. On July 23rd Rozan and Pultusk were carried; crossings of the river were effected by means of pontoons which were floated down tributaries to the main stream, and in a

few days the Germans were east of the Narew over almost its whole course between the Vistula and its junction with the Bobr. There their successes for the time came to an end. The Russians attacked them along the whole front and held them firmly back, while the Warsaw army withdrew from the Blonie positions into the outer ring of the fortress, and the German army, seeing that the moment of evacuation was imminent, hastened to the assault.

Iwangrod had been attacked since August 1st by an Austrian force under General von Kövess, and the advanced positions were all carried on the following day. They were strongly constructed, but the Russians could not now defend them to the end. "The Russians," said a German report, "had built their position very advantageously—redoubts with lines of




General von Gallwitz.

[E.N.A.]



German troops marching past Prince Leopold and the army commanders during the formal entry into Warsaw.

[Photopress.]



The Germans in Warsaw: A military band playing outside one of the hotels.

[Photopress.]

communication; all the positions well covered and carefully masked. The enfilading trenches, constructed in masterly fashion for guns and machine-guns, were protected by stretches of barbed-wire entanglements, and at spots by broad ditches of water. The positions were, where possible, constructed in tiers. The works were partly made of concrete, especially the enfilading trenches." Like much else of the Russian defensive lines, Iwangrod had to be abandoned to the enemy. General von Kövess captured the whole of the western part of the fortress even before his siege artillery had come up.

Warsaw fell on August 5th, and Prince Leopold of Bavaria was chosen to make a formal entry into the Polish capital. He signalled the advent of the Germans by the issue of a proclamation characteristic in its assurances and threats, and it was perhaps its terms which were in part responsible for the coldness of the Poles towards the victors. "Mistrust and doubt," said the correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, "combine to make the Poles reserved." The proclamation ran:—

"INHABITANTS OF WARSAW,—Your city is in German hands, but we wage war only against hostile troops, not against peaceful citizens. Peace and order shall be preserved and rights protected. I expect Warsaw's citizens to undertake no hostile action, to trust to the German sense of justice, and to obey the instructions of our army commanders.

"It has, however, come to the knowledge of the German military authorities that the enemy has prepared attacks against the safety of our troops in Warsaw. Therefore, I am compelled to take as hostages the leaders and most prominent citizens of the town, who will be pledged for the security of our troops. With you it rests to protect the lives of these fellow-citizens of yours.

"It is the duty, therefore, of anyone who has any knowledge of designed attacks of any kind, in the interest of his fellow-citizens, as well as the peace and safety of Warsaw, to bring such promptly to the notice of the German military authorities.

"Whoever is guilty of negligence in this respect, or gives any assistance to attacks, must expect to pay the death penalty."

THE CLEARING OF WARSAW.

Warsaw was not formally abandoned until August 5th, but the process of clearing it of everything that might be useful to the enemy had been going on for three weeks. As early as July 10th, even before Von Gallwitz had broken in towards the Narew river, the offices of the Warsaw government had been transferred

eastward. On the evening of the 15th it was publicly announced that the city would be evacuated, and that everyone who could should leave Poland for Russia proper. The Grand Duke Nicholas assisted the process by calling up for some form of military service the whole of the male population between the ages of 17 and 45. A third of a million of the population of Warsaw, it is estimated, began to move eastward, part of them along the roads, part of them in the trains which had been gradually accumulated in large numbers near Warsaw. While the population of the city moved out, that of the neighbouring countryside came in. "Practically the entire rural population," says an American eye-witness, who afterwards sent a graphic account to the *Chicago Daily News*, "left their homes and, north, south, east and west, came in ceaseless procession day and night to the shelter of the city. Dead-tired, dust-whitened peasant families, with cattle, portable goods and chattels, thronged every road that converged upon Warsaw." But the military authorities did not allow them to remain, and they also were sent out towards the east. As remarkable as the story of this exodus is the account given of the thoroughness with which the Russians removed from Warsaw all the metals and equipment of every kind, and even foodstuffs, which might have been of use to the Germans. A certain amount of foodstuffs was left behind, but the Russians aimed at leaving only so much as was absolutely needed to support the remnant of the population. Says the American writer:—

"I left Warsaw for Moscow with the British, French, Belgian, and Serbian Consuls, together with the contents of the consular archives. The American Consul remained behind, having laid in a big stock of provisions. He will stick to his post to the end. On

our train also was the British chaplain, the last member of the British colony in the Polish capital. With us was treasure amounting to nearly three and one-quarter millions sterling.

"The evacuation began on July 15th. All property likely to be useful to the enemy, especially metal machinery, was removed or destroyed. Factories were feverishly stripped of their plant, and the owners granted free transport for it to the east.

"Day and night one heard the muffled roar of dynamited factory plant that was embedded in concrete or too cumbersome to dismantle by other means. Every fragment of this dynamited metal was transported eastwards.


"The newspapers made their last appearance with the announcements of the evacuation, after which the linotypes were uprooted and the floors carted away. Police and soldiers visited every printing works and newspaper office, taking away founts of type and dismantling presses.

"Hardly a ton of copper fittings was left in the city. All



General von Scholz.

[E.N.A.]



THE RUSSIAN RETREAT, FROM THE FIRST DEFEAT IN GALICIA TO THE FALL OF WARSAW.

stocks of copper piping in factories, plumbers' shops, ironmongery establishments, as well as household and hospital utensils and fittings, were taken away.

"Warsaw knew no sleep. The huge post office, banks, telegraph offices, Law Courts, and various municipal departments were scenes of universal dismantlement. Every kind of portable equipment was packed for immediate transport to the interior.

"Through the streets passed endless columns of carts and luries, heavily laden, converging upon the Praga and Alexandrovsky bridges across the Vistula, only soldiers, with their legs swinging over the side, distinguishing a waggon laden with millions of roubles in paper money and irreplaceable records from those containing peasants and their sacks of potatoes.

"Day and night gangs of soldiers were busily employed stripping league after league of copper telegraph wires from their poles.

"Church doors flung open revealed the interiors filled with weeping, praying Poles and Russians, amongst whom passed ministering priests in their gorgeous vestments.

"Aloft in the towers the huge bronze bells had been unslung, lest they should become food later for Krupps' furnaces. Not only the bells, but all the church plate, precious vestments, and ikons were transported into the interior.


"In the Church of the Holy Cross, Krakovski Street, reposed in a vault Chopin's heart. The vault was opened, and the precious relic removed to Moscow.

"The telephone exchange was dismantled, and dynamos supplying power for street cars removed, together with all wheels and detachable fittings connected with the tram service.

"Wherever possible, troops were sent out to garner the crops in the surrounding country. Where this was impossible the harvest was destroyed, villages being razed to the ground.

"From the suburbs of Warsaw the dwellers were ordered to retire to the city so as to leave the military authorities free to carry out their plans.

"Food costs ten times as much in Warsaw as it did a month ago, and during the last few days there was no public water supply, the pumps for operating the machinery having been despatched eastwards. Every wheeled vehicle was transported across the Vistula, and nearly all the horses. Two thousand



General von Eichhorn.

[E.N.A.]



General Otto von Below.

[E.N.A.]

hackney carriages were driven by their owners out of the city to find refuge somewhere on the Moscow road."

A few days before the fall of Warsaw a further slight indication was given that the Russian Government was not altogether satisfied with the failure of the Allies in the west to enter on a vigorous offensive. An official statement issued in Petrograd remarked that "Each Russian success compels the enemy to withdraw fresh forces from the western front. This fact creates favourable conditions for the active operations of our Allies." The truth, however, was that in a war of positions like that in the west it would have been useless to undertake an offensive merely in the hope of relieving the pressure on Russia, or because one or two German corps had been withdrawn from France to the east. There is reason to believe that the Germans in the west were not, as a matter of fact, weaker in numbers at this time than they had been in the winter; and all the evidences of the trench warfare and of the partial offensives which had been attempted, namely, in the Champagne and Arras region, at Neuve Chapelle and elsewhere, showed that it was of little use to undertake an attack except after the most exhaustive preparations, and at the moment when the Franco-British Staffs believed that it would be most likely to achieve success.

CAUSES OF THE GERMAN VICTORIES.

The events on the Russian front during the last three months were themselves evidence of this. The abandonment of Warsaw was necessary simply because the whole of the defensive positions of Russia had fallen before the German attacks, which had been methodically planned,



General Mackensen crossing a stream during the advance against Warsaw.

[Photopress.]

delivered at a carefully chosen moment, and carried through with the greatest tactical skill. The task of breaking through a strong defensive position, which may be anything from ten to twenty miles in depth, is two-fold. Experience has shown that it is comparatively easy, by means of a violent and sustained artillery attack, to break into a portion of the enemy's front. The difficulty lies in following up the success, and especially in obtaining thorough co-operation between the artillery and the attacking infantry. There had been occasions on the western front when a successful attack had come to grief owing to the inability of the attacking side to carry it on, to bring up its guns and renew the bombardment before the Germans could hurry up reinforcements, steady themselves, and open the expected counter-attack. Alike in Galicia and on the Narew, the Germans did not make these mistakes. The Russians, it is true, had neither the heavy guns nor the men to match the German forces. But neither were they given time by the enemy to pull themselves together and to take up strong reserve positions once they had been driven in. The three chief things for which the Germans deserve credit in this period are their success in organising the attacks by which they broke the Russian front, the perfection of the Staff arrangements by which they pressed their initial advantage on to complete success, and the scope and boldness of the strategic scheme which they carried out as soon as the Russian defensive rampart had been breached.

The Russians on their side had some ground for satisfaction. After their first throw-back they had

rapidly recovered themselves, and had succeeded, though always fighting under heavy difficulties, in holding firm on the flanks sufficiently long to enable them to withdraw their centre from its dangerous position. The extent of their difficulties was freely admitted by the Germans. Colonel Gädke, in *Vorwärts*, wrote that "the longer the operations lasted the more the Russians lacked guns, and especially ammunition. The Russian infantry also lacked rifles and cartridges; its battalions consisted for the most part of but superficially trained recruits." Another German writer remarked on the skill with which the Russians were careful to get their heavy artillery away in time. It is a curious comment on the value to be attached to fortifications that the Russians only began to offer a successful resistance when they had been forced to withdraw either from fortresses or from entrenched positions which had the character of permanent defences. Both the Galician retreat and that which followed it seemed likely to establish as one of the lessons of the war that the less a field army puts its confidence in permanent fortifications the better for its chances. On the other hand, the Germans seem to have developed at this stage a greater skill and aptitude in demolishing strong positions than any of their opponents, and in the west, where both sides had established themselves in fortifications similar to, but even stronger than, those of the Russians in Galicia and on the Narew, neither had been able to break through.

German rejoicings over the capture of Warsaw were sobered by the discovery that Russia was not disposed to bend beneath the storm, nor to consider, as many

Germans had apparently hoped, the question of a separate peace. It was persistently reported that tentative suggestions were actually made by Germany to the Russian Government as to the terms on which she would make a settlement, and even that she had offered Russia access to the Mediterranean—a gift at Turkey's expense for which Turkey was to obtain compensation somewhere else. However this may be, neither the Russian Government nor the Russian people was disposed to peace. The Duma had met on August 1st, and, while criticising the conduct of the campaign and demanding the punishment of those responsible for blunders and neglect, had declared for the firm prosecution of the war until victory was won. The discussions were evidence of a spirit which promised well for Russia; but the new activity of the Duma with regard to the Government of the country and the conduct of the war was not likely to be welcomed by an official world which found itself, at a moment when its weaknesses were being revealed, confronted by a critic and, perhaps, a judge. The resolution which the Duma adopted was remarkable for its repeated references to the part which must be played by the Russian people in the struggle:—

"Certifying that in the past year the military trials experienced fortified still more among the whole population of the Empire the unshakable and unanimous resolution to continue the struggle with our faithful Allies until the final

success is attained, and not to conclude peace before victory is complete;

"Recognising that the nearest way to victory is the willing assistance of the whole population for the creation of fresh means of continuing the struggle, which demands the strengthening of internal peace and the forgetting of old political quarrels, as well as the benevolent attention of the authorities in regard to the interests of all loyal citizens of Russia, without distinction of race, language, or religion;

"Believing that rapid victory can only be attained by the close union with the whole country of a Government enjoying its entire confidence;

"Expressing the unshakable faith that the shortcomings which have hitherto existed in the provision of munitions for the army will be immediately removed with the assistance of the Legislative Chambers and the great force of public opinion, and that those responsible for criminal omissions should pay the penalty, no matter what their position;

"The Imperial Duma passes to the Order of the Day."

Germany was unfortunate. She won battles and gained cities, only to find a Russian Parliament boldly declaring for the prosecution of the war, but under a Government which must enjoy the entire confidence of the whole nation. This might prove to be for the Germans a defeat more momentous than the fall of Warsaw was a victory, and there were those, no doubt, in Germany, and they would be highly placed, who looked anxiously for assistance against this new portent to the Duma's enemies in Russia.



An Austrian general examining Russian prisoners at Iwangrod.

[Topical Press.



General Sir Arthur Paget, who as the King's envoy conferred the Order of the Bath on the Crown Prince of Serbia, leaving the headquarters of the Servian Army. General Paget is on the left. [Topical Press.]



A popular demonstration outside the dwelling of M. Venizelos, at Athens, in support of Greece's intervention in the war. [Universal.]



French reinforcements on their way to the front.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

CHAPTER VIII.

THE SECOND SIX MONTHS—A SYNOPSIS.

THE fall of Warsaw ended the first year of the war, and it may be useful to exhibit the progress of the war for the second six months in the same way as has already (Vol. II., Chap. XXII.) been done for the first six. One of the chief difficulties in following a war almost world-wide is to correlate the happenings on the several fronts; and the plan of exhibiting them in synoptical form is convenient because, without attempting anything like a complete diary, it enables a reader to see the shape of events month by month. Nearly every month will be found to have a distinctive character of its own; not, of course, that events group themselves according to these artificial divisions of time, but because in a war of this vastness the main current of interest is constantly shifting, and a diary of the principal events month by month may perhaps tend to greater clarity by exaggerating their saliency, much as a relief map may usefully supplement the flat map. If the events of the first six months may be summarised in the title of "The German Escape," the best title for the second six months would be "The German Recovery." Several times in the first six months the Germans were on the brink of military disaster; the second six months show how—quicker than some of the Allies to grasp the true magnitude of the war and to make provision for the future—they were not only able to redeem their early failures but to obtain a position, in appearance at any rate, if not in reality, more menacing than in the earlier periods of the war.

THE SEVENTH MONTH.

In this month the most important events of the war are neither on the western front nor in Poland, but at

sea. There is very heavy fighting in Champagne, in Alsace, and also in Poland, but the features of the month which give it a distinctive character are the beginning of the submarine "blockade" (so-called) and of the naval attack on the Dardanelles. The submarine blockade, following close on the Battle of the Dogger Bank (Vol. II., p. 53), which only the intervention of the German submarines saved from being a great naval disaster for the Germans, is an acknowledgment by Germany of the powerlessness of her battle fleets at sea and a naval equivalent to *franc tireur* war on land. The attacks by the fleet on the Dardanelles are the first example in the war of an attempt to use the navy in the first line of attack against shore fortifications. They are also to be understood as an attempt to relieve the semi-blockade of Russia by the closing of the Dardanelles and the German naval command of the Baltic.

THE EIGHTH MONTH.

The chief event of the month is the failure of the naval attack on the Narrows of the Dardanelles Straits. The failure was important not merely for the loss of ships and men, but as a demonstration of the soundness of the conventional view that in spite of the immense increase of the gun-power of ships they were powerless to achieve anything decisive against land fortifications without the assistance of an army. Had the battle gone differently, it would have profoundly modified our naval policy elsewhere; and the navy—instead of confining itself to the support of military operations, as it had done—would almost certainly have opened attack on the German coasts. There might have been an attempt, in Mr. Churchill's unfortunate phrase, to "dig the German fleet out of its holes." There is some

reason for thinking that there was always a section of opinion at the Admiralty which favoured direct naval attack on the German fleet in spite of its risks, and success in the naval attack on the Dardanelles would certainly have strengthened this minority. The actual result confirmed the Admiralty in the policy it had

was not a good one for the Germans. The Russian successes in the Carpathians reached their zenith in this month; and the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, though it did not end so badly for the Germans as it began, certainly came as a shock to them. Their new armies were not yet ready to take the field; and if Neuve

SEVENTH MONTH.

DATE.	WEST FRONT.		EAST FRONT.		TURKEY.	NAVAL.	COLONIAL.
	BRITISH.	FRENCH	POLAND.	GALICIA.			
Feb. 3...					Turkish attacks on Suez Canal repelled (Vol. II., 121).		
" 4...						Germany proclaims seas round British Isles a prohibited "military area" (Vol. II., 105).	
" 5...				Russians reach Mezo-Laborcz over Carpathians (Vol. II., 244).			
" 6...						<i>Lusitania</i> flies American flag (Vol. II., 107).	
" 11...	Air raid on Belgian coast (Vol. III., 3).						
" 15...		Offensive in Champagne begins (Vol. II., 147).					Riot at Singapore.
" 16...			Third Campaign for Warsaw begins. Russian defeat in East Prussia (Vol. II., 197).				
" 18...					First attack on Dardanelles forts (Vol. II., 255).	Submarine blockade begins.	
" 21...							Advance into S.-W. Africa begins (Vol. II., 330).
" 26...		French capture Hartmannsweilerkopf (Vol. II., 268).			Entrance forts to Dardanelles destroyed (Vol. III., 18).		
" 27...			Russian victory at Przasnysz (Vol. II., 202).				

hitherto pursued, and relieved the Germans of any fears that they may have had that they might have a northern front to fight upon as well as an eastern and a western. In spite of the failure of this naval attack on the Dardanelles--in spite, too, of a big victory over the Russians in the Masurian Lakes and of some success in torpedoing British merchantmen--the month

Chapelle had ended as it began and could have been followed up by other attacks, the Germans would have been in extreme difficulties. As it was, Neuve Chapelle seems to have decided them to hasten the arrival of their winter-trained reinforcements, and to have given them tactical hints on which they were not slow to act. The month is notable for the appearance on the

EIGHTH MONTH.

DATE.	WEST FRONT.		EAST FRONT.		TURKEY AND NEAR EAST.	NAVAL.	HOME. POLITICS.
	BRITISH.	FRENCH.	POLAND.	GALICIA.			
Mar. 1...				Fighting in Carpathians throughout the month.		Mr. Asquith announces embargo on all German overseas trade (Vol. II., 111).	
" 3...					Allied fleet enters Dardanelles (Vol. III., 19).		
" 6...					Greek Cabinet resigns (Vol. II., 256).		
" 9...							Defence of the Realm (Munitions) Bill introduced (Vol. II., 314).
" 10...	Battle of Neuve Chapelle (Vol. II., 277-288)						
" 13...					General Sir Ian Hamilton at Lemnos (Vol. III., 23).	<i>Dresden</i> sunk (Vol. II., 39).	
" 14...			Russian raid on Memel.				
" 15...							Lord Kitchener: "The supply of war material... is causing me very serious anxiety." (Vol. II., 314.)
" 17...							Government conference with trade union leaders
" 18...					Allied naval defeat in Dardanelles (Vol. III., 19).		
" 21...				Surrender of Przemyśl (Vol. II., 244).			
" 24...				Russian victory at Lupkow Pass (Vol. II., 247).			
" 28...						<i>Falaba</i> sunk (Vol. II., 114).	
" 29...							"We are fighting Germany, Austria and drink."—Mr. Lloyd George to a deputation of shipowners (Vol. II., 315).



A Belgian cavalry patrol.

[Alfieri Picture Service,



First aid to a wounded man in one of the French trenches.

[Photographic Service of the French Armies.

horizon of the difficulty over munitions, which was later to produce a storm in England.

NINTH MONTH.

In domestic politics, April was a month of anti-climax. It began with a letter from the King to Mr. Lloyd George engaging to abstain from alcohol for the rest of the war as an example to his subjects, and it ended with the introduction of proposals for increased

French trenches adjoined those of the Canadians. Cruel as the means employed by the Germans were, it is impossible not to admire the energy with which the Germans, who must by this time have decided upon their great campaign against Russia in Galicia, instead of waiting for the threatened attack on the west, anticipated it by themselves delivering on the left of the Allied line an attack which, at one time, looked like breaking down the defence of Ypres itself. The

NINTH MONTH.

DATE.	WEST FRONT.		EAST FRONT.		TURKEY AND NEAR EAST.	NAVAL.	HOME. POLITICS.
	BRITISH.	FRENCH.	POLAND.	GALICIA.			
April 1...						Series of Subma- rine attacks off Beachy Head begins.	King's letter to Mr. Lloyd George on Drink and Munitions pro- blem.
" 7...		French offensive in Woevre: Cap- ture of Les Eparges (Vol. II., 271).					
" 11...					Turkish counter- offensive in Mesopotamia: Kurnah attacked		
" 17...	Fighting begins on Hill 60 (Vol. II., 291).				E15 runs ashore in Dardanelles.		
" 22...	German gas at- tack north of Ypres: Defences broken (Vol. II., 298). Canadians save the situation. Germans cross the Yser.						
" 23...	Interview be- tween Generals Foch and French (Vol. II., 298).						
" 25...					Landing effected in Gallipoli (Vol. III., 23-32).		
" 29...	Second interview between Foch and French (Vol. II., 298).				Attack on Krithia fails.		Mr. Lloyd George introduces his Liquor Proposals (Vol. II., 317).
" 30...					Turkish counter- attack fails.		

taxation on liquor, which exhibited a striking decline from the ambitious schemes for the nationalisation of the liquor traffic, and were later withdrawn. There was, too, an anti-climax in the military operations. It had been expected that April would see the beginning of the forward movement in France and Belgium. But while the Allies were still completing their preparations, the Germans forestalled them by a gas attack on the northern flank of our defences at Ypres, where the

Canadians saved the situation, but not before a great deal of ground had been lost, and the success of the proposed combined operations against Lille gravely compromised. What was said at the interviews between General Foch and Sir John French at the end of the month has not been reported in detail, but the occasion of them was certainly dramatic in character. It was a great disappointment that the beginning of the second campaign in the west should find the Germans

TENTH MONTH.

DATE.	WEST FRONT.		RUSSIAN FRONTS.	ITALY AND SOUTHERN FRONT.	TURKEY.	COLONIAL.	NAVAL.	HOME POLITICS.
	BRITISH.	FRENCH.						
May 1...	Dunkirk bom- barded. Attacks on Ypres continue (Vol. II., 298).							
" 2...			Heavy Russian defeat at Gor- lice. German cam- paign in Gali- cia begins Vol. III., 51).					
" 4...				Italy denounces Triple Alliance (Vol. II., 329).				
" 7...	Desperate fighting at Ypres (Vol. II., 298).						<i>Lusitania</i> sunk (Vol. II., 348).	
" 8...			Germans occu- py Libau.					
" 9...	British attack on <i>Aubers</i> Ridge fails (Vol. II., 303).	French success near <i>Arras</i> (Vol. III., 305).						
" 11...		French pro- gress continues						Anti-German riots (Vol. II., 361).
" 12...					<i>Goliath</i> torpe- doed (Vol. III., 21).	Windhoek oc- cupied by <i>Botha</i> (Vol. II., 343).		
" 13...		Capture of <i>Carency</i> (Vol. II., 306).		Italian Minis- try resigns (Vol. II., 333).				Lord Bryce's Committee's Report pub- lished (Vol. II., 359).
" 14...			Jaroslav occu- pied (Vol. III., 55).				Resignation of Lord Fisher (Vol. II., 318 and Vol. III., 15).	
" 16...	Battle of <i>Fes- tubert</i> Vol. II., 306).			King recalls <i>Salandra</i> .				
" 17...			Germans cross the <i>San</i> (Vol. III., 55).					
" 18...								Coalition Gov- ernment to be formed: Lloyd George Minister of Munitions. (Vol. II., 317.)
" 23...				Italy declares war on Austria (Vol. II., 334).				
" 25...					<i>Triumph</i> sunk (Vol. III., 21).			
" 27...					<i>Majestic</i> sunk (Vol. III., 21).			

the first to take the offensive. On the other hand, the landing in Gallipoli at the end of the month was perhaps the finest example in history of combined operations of the army and navy, and perhaps the best thing the British army had done in the war since the retreat from Mons.

some conspicuous success, it did not counterbalance the failures at other sections of the line.

At sea, the *Lusitania* was torpedoed by a German submarine. In the east, the Germans inflicted on the Russians at Gorlice their most serious defeat in the war, and by the end of the month had wrested from them the

ELEVENTH MONTH.

DATE.	WEST FRONT		RUSSIAN FRONTS.	ITALY AND SOUTHERN FRONT.	TURKEY.	COLONIAL.	NAVAL.	HOME POLITICS.
	BRITISH.	FRENCH.						
June 3...			Przemysl re-occupied (Vol. III., 56).					
" 4...				Monte Nero captured.	General assault on Achi Baba (Vol. III., 41).			
" 7...	Zeppelin destroyed near Brussels (Vol. III., 7).							
" 8...							Mr. Bryan resigns (Vol. II., 352).	
" 9...		French capture Neuville St. Vaast.						
" 11...				Italians occupy Gradisca.				
" 13...			Russian defeat on San (Vol. III., 62).		Victory of Venizelos in Greek Elections			
" 18...	Fighting at Hooge.							
" 22...			Fall of Lemberg. Mackensen turns north against Lublin (Vol. III., 71).					Munitions Bill (Vol. II., 320).
" 21...								British War Loan.
" 28...					Capture of Gully Ravine. Turkish counter attacks (Vol. III., 44).			
" 29...								National Register Reports announced.

TENTH MONTH.

May was the worst month for the Allies since the beginning of the war, even the first August not excepted. At Ypres the fighting was quite as fierce as in the previous October, and though the attack of the Germans was finally stayed, there were times when the situation seemed almost desperate. The British attacks on the German lines failed, and though the French had

greater part of the territory gained at the expense of Austria. At the same time the Germans were gaining ground in the Baltic Provinces, and their occupation of Libau was a dramatic reversal of the conditions in the early months of the war. It was a month of grave uneasiness at home. Popular indignation at the sinking of the *Lusitania* and the gas bombardments at Ypres found expression in anti-German riots, and even in the



A squad of German-trained Turkish infantry in Constantinople.

[Central News.]



Issuing passes for a few days leave at home to the wounded Servian troops at Nish.

[Central News.]

less passionate and more thoughtful sections of the community the philosophy which up to now had been fairly well maintained began to give way to settled animosity against everything German. In the Government the disappointment of the German gains at Ypres and the breakdown of the offensive in Flanders caused much searching of heart. It was recognised that there

month were the successes of the French near Arras and the entry of the Italians into the war.

ELEVENTH AND TWELFTH MONTHS.

How the situation on the eastern front developed in these months has been described in the last few chapters. The story contained nothing to encourage, except the

TWELFTH MONTH.

DATE.	WEST FRONT.		RUSSIAN FRONTS.	ITALY AND SOUTHERN FRONT.	TURKEY.	COLONIAL.	NAVAL.	HOME POLITICS.
	BRITISH.	FRENCH.						
July 1...		German advance in Argonne.						
" 2...					Heavy Turkish losses in counter attacks in Gallipoli.			
" 6...	British advance near Pilkern.							
" 9...						Governor of S.-W. Africa surrenders. End of campaign (Vol. II., 344).		
" 11...		Germans recover lost ground near Souchez.						
" 14...			Germans recapture Przashyz (Vol. III., 75).					South Wales Strike.
" 18...			Germans occupy Windau.					
" 19...			Russians defeated near Iwangrod (Vol. III., 79).					
" 22...				Hard fighting near Gorizia.				South Wales dispute settled.
" 26...					Nasrie occupied in Euphrates. Refused cession by Turkey to Bulgaria of Dedeagatch railway.			
" 30...			Fall of Lublin (Vol. III., 79).					

had been faults of organisation, and that any hopes of an early conclusion of the war that may have been entertained must be abandoned. Nor did the campaign in the Dardanelles offer much immediate encouragement. No one could see what the future would bring forth, and to give formal expression to the necessity for national unity the Liberal Government gave place to a Coalition Ministry. The only bright spots in the gloom of this

proof of the extraordinary stoicism of the Russian infantry under trial. Nor were there any happenings on the other fronts to inspire hope of early decisive success. The Dardanelles campaign was terribly costly in life, and progress, though steady, was extremely slow, at any rate in proportion to the very extravagant hopes that had been indulged in in its early stages. Nor did the intervention of Italy make much apparent

difference to the strength of the German Allies, though her army accomplished great feats against the extraordinarily strong defensive positions held by the Austrians. In France, the problem of the offensive was seen to be one of munitions. Mr. Lloyd George did excellent service in spreading amongst English people the meaning of the truth that the war was rapidly becoming a war between German and British workshops—a truth that without his forceful rhetoric might have been in some danger of becoming a mere truism, sterile of action or performance. Yet, though there was little positive encouragement during these months, the confidence of the British, somewhat shaken

by the military and political events of May, gradually revived. For hopes of decisive success in offence they began to look to the Dardanelles. For the rest, they were content to wait until British industry had been adapted for war and its supremacy vindicated, and until the fabulous difficulties of an offensive campaign in Russia had begun to tell. But their chief ground of confidence was the clear proof that these months afforded that the Alliance was to hold fast, that France was resolute, and that the German hopes of separate peace with Russia were doomed to disappointment.

On this note, subdued perhaps but confidently firm, the first year of the war ended.



General Joffre and General Maudhuy riding through a conquered part of Alsace. It will be noticed that they are mounted on mules.

[Alfieri Picture Service.]



The launching of the War Loan: The platform at the great Guildhall meeting in support of the new loan. Mr. Asquith is seen speaking, and Mr. Bonar Law is on his left, next to the Lord Mayor of London, who presided.

[Central News.]

CHAPTER IX.

THE FINANCE OF THE WAR.

ESTIMATES OF THE TOTAL COST OF THE WAR—THE GOVERNMENT'S FINANCIAL POLICY—THE WAR LOAN—MR. McKENNA'S WAR BUDGET—THE FINANCE OF THE ALLIES AND OF GERMANY.

THE cost of the war to Great Britain has risen steadily. For the 240 war days of the financial year 1914-15 it averaged 1·7 millions daily. From April 1st, 1915, to the end of June it averaged 2·7 millions a day; from July 1st to July 17th, 3 millions; from July 17th to September 11th, over 3½ millions. These figures, of course, include the ordinary peace expenditure on armaments as well as the extraordinary war expenditure. In moving a Vote of Credit for 250 millions on September 15th, Mr. Asquith estimated the weekly average gross expenditure until the third week of February at 35 millions, or 5 millions a day. It would seem that the expenditure had been abnormally heavy during the last stages of the period under review owing to three causes:—Repayments to the Bank of England exceeding 50 millions, big advances to Allies and other associates, considerable purchases of food-stuffs and raw materials. Apart from these perhaps extraordinary factors, the increased daily expenditure has been chiefly due to the higher cost of the army and of munitions. In September the army, including muni-

D2—VOL. III.

tions, absorbed 60 millions, or 2 millions a day. The cost of the navy rose steadily till the end of June, but has been declining since, and from September the daily cost was £600,000.

The vote of credit for 250 millions which the House of Commons passed on September 15th was the seventh since the outbreak of war. There were three in the financial year ending March 1st, 1915, amounting to 362 millions, and the four in the current year amounted to 900 millions, bringing the total since the beginning of the war to 1,262 millions. Mr. Asquith estimated that these votes would last until the third week in November, or less than sixteen months of war. The Prime Minister gave some details of actual realised expenditure in the current financial year up to the time of his statement. Between April 1st and September 11th the army cost 374 millions; repayments to the Bank of England amounted to 50 millions (mostly made up of loans to foreign powers); loans direct to foreign Governments 30 millions, and to the Dominions 18 millions; food supplies, 16½ millions; railways, 1·1 millions.

MR. McKENNA'S SURVEY.

In his Budget speech on September 21st Mr. McKenna gave a larger survey of the financial situation. Last May Mr. Lloyd George estimated the total Government expenditure in 1915-6 (including non-war services) at 1,136 millions. In Vol. II. of this History reasons were given for concluding that on the most optimistic view the expenditure could not be less than 1,338 millions. Mr. McKenna's figures show that this was still too cheerful. He anticipates that during the last six months of the financial year the daily expenditure on all services will be more than $4\frac{1}{2}$ millions, and that in the later weeks it will exceed 5 millions. He, therefore, estimates the total expenditure of the year at 1,590 millions. The principal items in this estimate are:—Navy, 190 millions; army, 715 millions; external advances, 423 millions; ordinary national services, 170 millions; pre- and post-moratorium bills, 36 millions. The deficit in 1914-5 was 334 millions, and Mr. McKenna estimated the revenue for 1915-16 (apart from the new taxes in his Budget) at 272 millions. The deficit, therefore, for 1915-16 would be 1,318 millions, and for the two years under review 1,652 millions. As the National Debt before the war was over 700 millions, the National Debt at the end of March, 1916, would thus stand at 2,352 millions. Mr. McKenna gave the figure 2,200 millions. But this is difficult to understand, even making allowance for the revenue from Mr. McKenna's war taxes, which would not amount in the current year to more than 30 millions.

Certain items in the above estimates—the loans to the Dominions and Allies, expenditure on food purchases and the like—will one day be made good in whole or in part; but against this must be set other charges which are not fully taken into account in a mere annual survey. The charge for pensions will continue for many years; the actual war operations will almost certainly last beyond March next; the months immediately following peace will be exceedingly costly. In Volume II. of this History an attempt was made to calculate the total cost and the addition to our indebtedness if the war were to last three years—that is to say, for another sixteen months beyond the term of Mr. McKenna's estimate. We may take the average daily expenditure during those sixteen months at the low figure of 5 millions. To this we may add expenditure for four months of peace at the same rate, and put the capital cost of pensions and allowances at 150 millions. These estimates are, almost certainly, too favourable. We get the following results:—

ESTIMATED COST OF THREE YEARS' WAR.

	Millions.
Expenditure, August, 1914, to March 31st, 1915	561
Expenditure, 1915-6	1,590
Expenditure to August, 1917	2,280
Expenditure of four months of reorganisation	450
Capital Cost of Pensions, &c.	150
Total (say)	5,030

This estimate, it should be observed, includes non-war as well as war expenditure and advances, and other outlay, which should not be a permanent charge. The National Debt, it was shown above, would, on the basis of Mr. McKenna's Budget, rise by the end of March, 1916, to 2,350 millions. On the same basis a war lasting for three years would add to our national indebtedness the equivalent of another 2,200 millions, so that the total National Debt as a result of such a war would be not less than, say, 4,500 millions.

We can hardly estimate the cost of interest and sinking fund at less than 7 per cent; so that the annual charge upon the revenue to meet this would have to be some 315 millions. This, of course, would be additional to the ordinary expenditure on army, navy, civil service, &c., though exclusive of the pre-war debt charge. A three years' war would thus raise the total annual Government expenditure afterwards to some 480 millions. The national income before the war was estimated at 2,400 millions, and the State took from this about 200 millions, or one-twelfth. If the national income rises again to 2,400 millions after peace (a rather speculative proposition owing to the variety of factors), then, as a result of a three years' war, the State will have to take until the extinction of the debt one-fifth of the whole income of the nation.

THE COMMITTEE ON RETRENCHMENT.

The advantage of attempting an estimate of total cost (hypothetical though many of the elements must be) is that it gives a standard by which to test the financial provision made by the Government to deal with the situation. There are three devices open to the Government:—Retrenchment in non-essential expenditure, loans, and taxation. In July the Government appointed a Committee on Retrenchment to suggest economies in public expenditure. The Committee was presided over by Mr. McKenna, assisted by Mr. Montague, and it included non-official members, although its composition was not perhaps very strong. The Committee issued its first report on 21st September. It will, in a later report, deal in detail with the various public departments, but its immediate suggestions were the following:—

- (1) Various increases in postal charges.
- (2) The suspension of the Road Board's activities and the diversion of its income of $1\frac{1}{2}$ millions derived from motor car licences and petrol, and of its surplus of 3 millions, to the National Exchequer.
- (3) An enquiry into the possibility of reducing the present heavy expenditure of local authorities on highway maintenance by restricting the speed or types of heavy motor traffic.
- (4) Pressure on local authorities to undertake new work to be relaxed.
- (5) No vacancies to be filled except in special cases; discouragement of war bonus to civil servants.
- (6) Economy in stationery, shorthand notes, coal and lights.

The Government has adopted some of the proposals relating to postal charges, though some of them are very ill-considered, but it has not yet pronounced on the others. The suggestions under (5) would probably cause discontent out of all proportion to the gain. In any case, the economies here outlined, taken altogether, amount to very little. As the Committee is not permitted to enquire into Admiralty and War Office expenditure, the most fruitful field for economy is closed to it.

It is obvious that for any efforts at economy to be of serious effect, the Government must be backed by the co-operation of the nation. The expenditure of 1,590 millions out of a national income of 2,400 millions means that two-thirds of all the earnings of the nation must be taken by the State. To some extent assistance may be obtained by foreign loans—such as that now being raised at the time of writing in America—and a

good deal of the war expenditure is not so much pure loss as a taking by the Government of national earnings and the redistribution of them. Still, clearly only by strict economy can the nation find out of its own resources what is needed and can be obtained from no other quarter. The Prime Minister and Mr. Bonar Law, at the end of June, opened a thrift campaign, and speeches were followed up by the issue of literature. It cannot be said that the results have been appreciable. The best way of bringing the necessity of thrift open to the nation is by heavy taxation, which compels economy. Mr. McKenna alleged that his absurd import duties are designed to discourage luxury. They are, of course, quite impotent to do anything of the kind. Nor is his Budget as a whole as effective as it should be for this purpose. It raises little more than 30 millions of new revenue in the current year, and, as will be seen later, most of the new taxes press with especial gravity on the middle and working classes, whose margin for thrift is scantiest.

THE SECOND WAR LOAN.

The second device open to the Government for dealing with the financial situation is the raising of loans. On November 17th, 1914, Mr. Lloyd George introduced, as set out in Vol. II. of this History, a Bill to raise a loan for 350 millions. It was a $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent security issued at 95, and redeemable in March, 1928. On June 21st, 1915, Mr. McKenna proposed a new loan. It had several novel features:—

- (1) The issue price was par, a wise decision, because an issue at par is much easier to convert when at a later period the money market favours such an operation.
- (2) The interest was to be $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, an increase of at least $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on the real return on the old War Loan.
- (3) The Government was to have the right to redeem in 1925, and must redeem by 1945.
- (4) The amount of the issue was unlimited.
- (5) Subscribers to the new War Loan might convert equal nominal amounts of old War Loan and Consols, rating old War Loan at 95 and Consols at $66\frac{2}{3}$.

- (6) The minimum for ordinary subscribers was £100. Small subscribers might buy £5 or £25 bonds through the Post Office. Vouchers for 5s. could be bought through the Post Office, to be subsequently converted into £5 bonds.
- (7) Should any later War Loan be issued on better terms, holders of the Second War Loan Stock could convert into it without charge.


The subscriptions through the Bank of England closed on Saturday, July 10th, and on July 13th Mr. McKenna announced the result. Through the Bank of England alone 570 millions was subscribed, independently of 15 millions by that date through the Post Office. The total of subscriptions through the Post Office is not yet

known, but it is believed that it should bring the proceeds of the loan to some 620 millions. There were 550,000 subscribers through the Bank of England, and the 15 millions through the Post Office were subscribed by 547,000 persons. This result was very gratifying, because the practical closing of the Stock Exchanges made it impossible to sell securities in order to subscribe to the War Loan. There will, doubtless, be need to issue another loan early next year. It is not possible for the layman to estimate the date, because we do not know how much the Government is raising by means of short-term loans, such as Exchequer bonds and Treasury bills. At the end of March, 1915, the amount of Exchequer bonds issued was 47·7

millions, and of Treasury bills 64·15 millions. There is also the uncertainty as to the yield of the loan in the United States now being negotiated.

MR. MCKENNA'S BUDGET.

The third resource open to the Government for meeting the financial demands upon it is taxation. As was stated in Vol. II. of this History, Mr. Lloyd George, in his first War Budget (November, 1914), imposed new taxes estimated to produce in a full year 68·5 millions. His second War Budget (May, 1915) included no new taxation. Mr. McKenna introduced the third War Budget on September 21st, 1915. The new taxes he proposed were:—



Issuing prospectuses of the War Loan at a counter set up in the courtyard of the Bank of England. [Central News.]

- (1) Forty per cent on the income tax. The exemption limit was to be reduced from £160 to £130, and the abatement from £160 to £120. Agriculture is to be assessed on the rent paid, not, as before, on one-third the rent. Payment to be by half-yearly instalments in the case of firms and individuals liable to direct assessment, and employes to be assessed and pay quarterly.
- (2) The super-tax to be raised for incomes above £8,000 :- 2s. 10d. between £8,000 and £9,000, 3s. 2d. between £9,000 and £10,000, 3s. 6d. above £10,000.
- (3) A tax of 50 per cent on all profits greater by £100 than in the pre-war period.
- (4) Bankers' interest to pay income tax at the source.
- (5) The sugar duty to be raised from 1s. 10d. to 9s. 4d. per cwt., but the Royal Commission on sugar supplies to reduce its price from 2s. 6d. to 3s. a cwt.
- (6) Duties on tea, coffee, tobacco, cocoa and chicory, and dried fruits to be raised 50 per cent.
- (7) Import duties without countervailing excise duties on motor cars, cinema films, clocks, watches, musical instruments, plate glass, hats.
- (8) Postal charges, including abolition of halfpenny post, reduced letter-weight, higher charges for parcels post, 9d. for first twelve words of a telegram, higher rates for press telegrams, ½d. more poundage on postal orders up to 2s. 6d., higher telephone charges.

The estimated revenue is as follows :—

	£	Totals. £
Customs	37,600,000	
Do. new taxes	11,300,000	
	-----	48,900,000
Excise	54,650,000	
Do. new taxes	200,000	
	-----	54,850,000
Estate, &c., duties		30,000,000
Stamps		6,500,000
Land tax		660,000
House duty		1,090,000
Income tax, including super-tax	103,000,000	
Do. added	13,424,000	
	-----	116,424,000
Excess profits tax		6,000,000
Land value duties		350,000

Total receipts from taxes..		£265,674,000
Postal service	22,700,000	
Do. added	1,505,000	
	-----	24,205,000
Telegraph service	3,100,000	
Do. added	270,000	
	-----	3,370,000
Telephone service	6,500,000	
Do. added	205,000	
	-----	6,705,000
Crown lands		530,000
Suez Canal, &c.		2,100,000
Miscellaneous		2,430,000

Total non-taxed revenue		£39,340,000

The estimated yield of the alterations of taxation is given as follows :—

CUSTOMS.		Estimate. 1915-16. £	Estimate. 1916-17. £
Tea		1,900,000	4,500,000
Cocoa, coffee, and chicory		140,000	290,000
Sugar, &c.		5,270,000	11,500,000
Dried fruits		150,000	180,000
Tobacco		2,300,000	5,090,000
Motor spirit		540,000	1,080,000
Imported motor-cars and cycles.		600,000	1,080,000
Do. kinema films		200,000	400,000
Do. clocks and parts		20,000	40,000
Do. watches and parts ..		90,000	180,000
Do. musical instruments..		20,000	40,000
Do. hats		40,000	80,000
Do. plate glass		30,000	60,000
		-----	-----
Total Customs.....		£11,300,000	£24,590,000
EXCISE.			
Sugar, &c.		90,000	200,000
Motor spirit		10,000	20,000
Patent medicines		100,000	250,000
Tobacco		--	10,000
		-----	-----
Total Excise		200,000	480,000
Total Inland Revenue.....		19,424,000	85,002,000
Grand total Customs, Excise, and Inland Revenue		30,924,000	110,072,000

It is worth while examining the character and effect of some of these imposts. The import duties are, without doubt, purely protective in character and purpose. The changes in income tax and super-tax are much less than was anticipated, and they are so devised that they fall more heavily on small than on large incomes. Some of the postal changes were severely criticised, as dislocating industry far beyond their merits. But the chief test to apply from the standpoint of sound finance is whether the revenue from the new taxes suffices to provide an adequate sinking fund and interest on the war debt. It was estimated above that the war debt (as distinguished from the pre-war debt) would by the end of March, 1916, exceed 1,600 millions. Allowing 7 per cent for interest and sinking fund, this would involve an extra burden of 112 millions a year. The national revenue in the last peace year was 198 millions. The revenue in 1915-16 will, as a result of Mr. Lloyd George's and Mr. McKenna's new taxes, be 305 millions, an increase of 107 millions. That is not quite enough to meet the interest and sinking fund charges. The revenue for 1916-17 is estimated at 387 millions, but those additional twelve months would add another 1,400 millions, resulting in a total war debt of 300 millions, and requiring an annual provision of 210 millions to meet it. For this, Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. McKenna have so far provided only 189 millions. Nor is that all permanent taxation; the tax on excess profits, amounting in a full year to 30 millions, will be exhausted in a year or two. It follows that the country will have to provide further permanent revenue, amounting to over 50 millions, merely in order to deal with the war debt should the war last until March, 1917. Mr. McKenna made it clear that he foresees the necessity of further War Budgets. These figures should leave no doubt on the matter.

Before leaving British finance, two other points must be referred to. Since the summer the British Government and the banks have been taking measures to increase the gold reserves of the Bank of England by substituting paper for gold in domestic circulation, and by transferring gold from the joint-stock banks. Under a minute issued in August, 1915, the Treasury sanction is waived for the most important military and naval expenditure. The system of token votes introduced early in the war abolished Parliamentary control over war expenditure. Now Treasury control is gone, also, and the Admiralty and the War Office are given, with few exceptions, unfettered freedom. The justification urged for this grave change is the necessity of taking and acting upon decisions with rapidity.

FRANCE.

On September 24th, 1915, M. Métier, the Reporter-General of the Budget Committee, presented to the Chamber a review of French finance during the war. From the declaration of war till the end of 1915 the total outlay for all purposes was estimated at 30 milliards of francs, or 1,200 million pounds; for 1915 alone, at 840 million pounds. In the early weeks of the war the monthly outlay was 32 millions for war purposes only, and in September 62 millions. These figures are lower than for England, Germany, or Russia; so low, indeed, as to suggest that the French are carrying on the war not only cheaper but more economically than ourselves, although M. Métier complained that some departments were persisting in avoidable undertakings, apparently for no better purpose than to exhaust the credits voted to them. It is worth noting that in France the Parliamentary control of finance remains strict in spite of the war, and M. Métier insisted on the Chamber being allowed ample time to consider demands for credit. This practice may be contrasted with the system now in vogue in England.

The expenditure on relief arising out of the war amounted to 120 millions sterling since the beginning of the war. For the last three months of 1915 there were voted for the assistance of families of soldiers 24 millions sterling. The outlay under this head has risen

from 2.6 millions sterling a month to 8 millions a month. From August, 1914, to August, 1915, the ordinary revenue declined by 56 millions sterling, as compared with 1913. There has been a steady revival. In August, 1915, the receipts from indirect taxes and State monopolies were 2½ millions sterling higher than in August, 1914, but this is chiefly due to heavier imports, owing to the diminution of production in France and the heavy imports for army purposes. As compared with August, 1913, these sources of revenue declined by 17.2 per cent. The extent to which French industry has suffered by the mobilisation, and by the occupation of her richest provinces is indicated by certain taxes. The stamp duty on commercial and civil transactions has fallen by 44.85 per cent; against that, there has been a revival of sales of real property

land of the goodwill of businesses.

From January 1st to September 19th the excess of withdrawals from the Post Office Savings Bank over deposits was £3,700,000. Generally speaking, the cost of living has gone up much more in France than in England. Thus, a leg of mutton is now 1s. 9½d. per lb., and fish has become a luxury. But there are two exceptions. The import duties on wheat and flour have been suspended, and as a result bread is no dearer than before the war. The quartern loaf costs a trifle more than 8d. Rent, again, has been in many cases suspended or reduced.

According to M. Ribot, France has financed the war, apart from the ordinary revenue, from the following extraordinary sources:—

	Millions sterling.
National Defence Bonds	480
Treasury Bonds	120
To which M. Métier adds—	
Advances from the Banque de France	260
—	—
Total	860

It will be seen that France has resorted neither to war taxation nor to a long-term loan. The decision not to tax is explained by the rise in prices and the depressed state of industry, which would make indirect taxation—the customary French system—oppressive. On the other



The crowd waiting outside the Guildhall, London, in order to gain admission to the meeting, addressed by Mr. Asquith and Mr. Bonar Law, on behalf of the War Loan.

[Central News.]

hand, the advisability of an income tax was perhaps the most embittered of political controversies during the war. It has now become clearly unavoidable. M. Ribot, the Minister of Finance, promises a long-term loan early in October. It is only after the loan is launched that the question of further tax revenue will be taken up. It is believed that M. Ribot contemplates heavier duties on alcohol and a State monopoly of commercial alcohol.

Since the summer, with the exchange persistently unfavourable, great efforts have been made to strengthen the gold reserve of the Banque de France. These have been so far successful that, in spite of large shipments for American use, the amount of gold in the Banque is steadily growing.

RUSSIA.

In addressing the Duma on August 1st, 1915, M. Bark, the Finance Minister, stated that up to July 28th, 1915, the war credits voted amounted to 735 millions sterling, of which, up to July 14th, 576 millions had been expended. This was equal to an expenditure of £1,657,000 a day, while in future it would not be less than 2 millions a day. The ordinary revenue fell 71 millions below the estimate, and, in spite of economies, the ordinary non-war expenditure exceeded revenue by 50 millions. The decline in revenue was due chiefly to the vodka changes, £45,600,000. M. Bark anticipated for the current year:—

Receipts from old taxation	£243,617,000
Receipts from new taxation	51,510,000
Total	£295,127,000

This is 35½ millions less than the original estimate.

M. Bark estimated the war expenditure from June 14th to end of the year at £429,188,000, and a total of £764,233,000 for the whole year 1915, or from the commencement of the war, 1,000 millions. Some account was given in Vol. II. of Russia's war taxation. The Ministry of Finance is now drafting proposals for the complete reform of the Russian tax system, and the foundation of any such reform will be an income tax. M. Bark enlarged upon the fact that savings had increased. He expected the amount to be 600 or 700 million roubles for the year, instead of the usual 40 to 60 millions. He explained this by the suppression of the sale of vodka. He described the measures taken for strengthening the gold reserve, which resulted in an influx into the coffers of the State Bank of 30.5 million roubles during the first six months of 1915, as compared with 14.8 during the first six months of 1914.

The commercial dislocation due to the closing of the Baltic and the Black Sea has persisted and been accentuated by the German invasion, and by the necessity of increasing purchases abroad for war purposes. To mitigate the consequent derangement of the exchanges, the Government has raised loans abroad amounting to £158,330,000 to cover foreign purchases. Moreover, as Russian private banks had heavy commitments abroad, the State Bank obtained credits from the Banque de France to liquidate this, amounting to £52,770,000, and from the Bank of England amounting to £10,000,000. Five hundred and twenty-eight thousand pounds was assigned from the Treasury for relief to the inhabitants of the Polish provinces, and the State Bank opened supplementary credits. Under the law of 1912 the dependents of soldiers receive a monetary grant equivalent to the cost of food necessary for subsistence. Between August 1st, 1914, and 28th July, 1915, this cost the Treasury 500 million roubles.

THE JOINT FINANCE OF THE ALLIES.

The British and French Finance Ministers have had several meetings to discuss their common financial affairs, and at the time of writing M. Bark is in London, after having visited Paris. But no conference of the Finance Ministers of all the Allied States has taken place. From Mr. McKenna's Budget speech we know that Great Britain is advancing to her Allies and the Dominions over 450 millions, but the proportions in which this vast sum is distributed are naturally a secret, although M. Bark's Budget speech leaves little doubt that the lion's share has gone to Russia. It is to be supposed that France is acting in the same way as England.

A problem which has caused the Allies some concern has been the steady fall of the rate of exchange. The sovereign fell in terms of the dollar 4 per cent, and the franc in terms of the sovereign some 8 per cent. The decline of the rouble was far heavier, amounting in terms of the sovereign to about one-third. The cause of these phenomena commonly offered is the unfavourable balance of trade owing to decreased exports and increased imports, but this is not the full explanation. The vast output of inconvertible paper money in France and Russia is one important factor. Another is the disinclination of all the States to export gold in order to correct the unfavourable balance. These two circumstances account for the depreciation extending so far beyond the gold point. In September the British and French Governments sent a joint financial commission over to the United States to discuss with the American bankers the means that should be taken to correct the rate of exchange. It would appear that from the first the obvious and proper course—the sending of bullion and the organisation of the export of American securities—was put aside, or reduced to a subordinate place, in the deliberations. The English bankers object to sending gold because they are apprehensive of their reserves; the American bankers object to receiving gold because it gives them no profit, and would send prices up in America.

The Joint Commission negotiated a loan in America to be employed in paying for Allied purchases there. It is understood that the loan will be of the following character:—

- (1) Loan of 100 millions through the sale of notes on the joint and several credit of Great Britain and France, the proceeds to be wholly expended in the United States.
- (2) The notes for five years, with conversion at option into long-term bonds.
- (3) Interest to be 5 per cent; price to the public 98; syndicate to get 2 per cent discount.
- (4) Notes to be free of all British and French taxation, including income tax.

Such an arrangement would be of a revolutionary character, in so far as the loan would be on the joint security of two countries, and, in the case of England, in so far as free of taxes. The terms of issue, too, represent a heavy fall in British credit.

GERMANY.

The German Government is reticent as to German war finance, but some facts may be gleaned from the speech to the Reichstag on August 20th, 1915, by Dr. Helfferich, the Finance Minister, and other sources. Credits of each 250 millions sterling were voted by the Reichstag in August and December, 1914, and of 500 millions in March, 1915. In August, 1915, a further

500 millions was voted, bringing the total up to 1,500 millions. This does not represent the full amount of German war expenditure, because it takes no account of payments by the local authorities and the States, and probably excludes the transport charges of the railways and contributions from other properties owned by the State; nor can there be any certainty that the Imperial Government is not directly or indirectly spending money without the authorisation of the Reichstag. Dr. Helfferich estimated the cost of the war to all belligerents at 15 millions a day, and 5,000 millions a year, or a third of the whole movable and immovable property, public and private, of Germany. He suggested that the Allies are bearing nearly two-thirds of this burden, and Germany and her associates not much more than one-third. He admitted that up to the time of speaking Germany had spent more than any other power, but contended that England's rate of expenditure now exceeded that of Germany, which in an interview he put at 3 millions daily. We have no means of applying a rigorous test to these statements.

In default of taxation, Germany has met her war costs from (1) the surplus of the 1914 Budget, which amounted to nearly 11 millions sterling; (2) paper money; (3) Treasury bonds and other short-term loans; (4) advances from the Reichsbank and other banks; (5) war loans. In Vol. II. it was pointed out that the first German 5 per cent war loan, issued in September at 97½, brought in 223 millions, and that the second, issued in February, 1915, at 98½, brought in 450 millions. The third war loan was issued in September, 1915. The issue price was 99, and the amount subscribed, apart from small subscriptions, was stated to be 601 millions sterling. How far this figure, which looks like an attempt to beat the British record, may be accepted, is not clear. There were again stories of pressure brought to bear upon individuals and institutions to subscribe. More important is the question how far the War Loan Banks have been called upon to assist. These institutions are empowered to lend money for the purpose of subscription to the war loan on securities and commodities. According to Dr. Helfferich they provided the funds for 75 millions of the second war loan. It should also be remembered that German capital is concentrated in the great banks and savings banks more than is English capital, and that these institutions are very amenable to official pressure. The savings banks alone subscribed for one-fifth of the second war loan.

GENERAL REFLECTIONS.

The cost of the war to each of the belligerents is growing steadily. It already exceeds not only anything before known to history, but any guesses before the outbreak of the war. That is due to three circumstances:—The armies in the field are much larger than was anticipated; the wastage of munitions and material is immensely greater; and the war has lasted much longer than was believed to be possible for a war between so many great Powers. If we put the income of the British nation at the pre-war figure of 2,400 millions, then the Treasury is taking by way of loan and taxation some 1,600 millions, quite apart from what the local authorities take. Between the central and the local

authorities some five-sixths of the national income must be going for public purposes. The proportion is pretty much the same for France and Germany. The war credits already voted by Germany are equal to the value of the whole German railway system, with all its apparatus and rolling stock.


Figures of this kind are difficult to understand. It might be asked how it is that the nations do not become bankrupt, or the peoples at least starve? The answer to this second question would appear to be that the war finance involves a vast scheme of redistribution. The State takes a considerable part of the whole earnings of the nation. Part of this is irretrievably wasted, but that part is not enough to reduce the residue below the amount necessary to sustain the people; the rest is redistributed among the people. One reason why the war is so costly to the British State is that the British State is carrying out the redistribution on a far more comprehensive scale. The scale of pay, of allowances, and of pensions is much higher. This is reflected in a bigger war bill, but on the other hand the English people feel the pinch of suffering less than do any other belligerent people. What are called "economies" are often savings to the Treasury at the expense of disproportionate suffering to the masses. It is this fact of redistribution which explains why the nations are passing through the war with, on the whole, far less privation than might have been expected. That the belligerent States can raise the vast sums needed for the war mainly out of their own resources without bankruptcy is due to the power of the modern economic machine. So long as the economic machine of a country can turn out supplies for the army and maintenance for the people, it can keep going. This implies that a certain relation must be maintained between the number of persons retained in productive work and the number under arms. If that proportion be passed, there will be collapse. Economists, with their minds fixed upon money rather than the realities, of which money is only a symbol, have tended to under-estimate the capacity of a State or nation to bear the financial burden of a great war. They have also been inclined to exaggerate the importance of those international relations which in peace time distinguish the world's finance.

The war will doubtless leave all the belligerents saddled with a heavy debt, necessitating taxation perhaps three times as heavy as before the war. The recuperative power of the modern economic machine is such that this should not be an intolerable burden, though it may cause serious internal crises by checking expenditure on social reform. But it is bound to affect the financial and economic position of Europe in relation to America. A heavy tax system will be a handicap for all European countries in industrial and commercial competition with the United States. The United States, again, from being a borrowing nation, has not only been compelled to satisfy her own needs, but has even begun to lend to the belligerents. This tendency for the monetary centre of the world to shift across the Atlantic is bound to be accentuated. It will be stimulated by the unfortunate manner in which the exchange difficulty has been handled. In effect, England has ceased to be a free market for gold, and it will be difficult to recover the prestige lost, or to shake off the bad precedent created.



The platform at the National Conference on Food and Fuel Prices, with Mr. Arthur Henderson in the chair.

[Topical Press.]



Part of Canada's gift of flour for the relief of war distress in England.

[Sport and General.]



The Coal Strike: Mr. Lloyd George addressing the miners' representatives at Cardiff.

[Central Press.]

CHAPTER X.

LABOUR IN THE WAR.

THE INDUSTRIAL TRUCE—TRADE DISORGANISATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT—GOVERNMENT GRANTS TO UNIONS—RISE IN FOOD PRICES—EFFECT ON THE WORKERS—THE WAR BONUS MOVEMENT—ASTONISHING FIGURES—RECURRENCE OF STRIKES—COMPULSORY ARBITRATION—LABOUR AFTER THE WAR.

DURING the two years which preceded the war Great Britain was distracted by bitter industrial struggles. A ferment of unrest and angry discontent spread through the ranks of the workers, the sympathetic strike policy gained adherents in many industries, and the controlling influence of trade union officials was extensively undermined.

From the beginning of 1913 until July, 1914, no fewer than 2,300 disputes occurred, and preparations

for future conflicts were being made by both employers and workers. A far-reaching treaty of alliance between the railwaymen, transport workers, and miners had been drafted by joint conferences of the representatives of the unions concerned, and it was just about to be ratified when all thoughts were turned abruptly to the problems created by the war. Only by keeping these facts in mind can the events in the world of labour during the succeeding twelve months be seen in true perspective.



The King pays a visit to a munitions factory in the Midlands.

[Central News.]



The Navvies Battalion, raised by Colonel John Ward, M.P., erecting an internment camp for German prisoners.

[Photopress.]

Within a fortnight of the entry of this country into the war virtually all causes of difference between employers and workers were put aside. The London building trade lockout, which was just on the point of extending to the whole country, was ended; Scottish coalowners withdrew a demand for reduction of wages; railwaymen postponed indefinitely the claim they were about to make for higher wages and improved conditions; and sectional disputes in various trades in all parts of the country were hurriedly settled. The country braced itself for a period of unprecedented unemployment and distress, and the rapidity with which national and local relief funds mounted into millions was the measure of the belief that trade and manufacture were about to suffer a serious disaster. None could then foresee the magnitude of the military operations which England would be called upon to undertake within the next year, or the industrial effects of the withdrawal of millions of men, and the events of the first few weeks of the war seemed to confirm the gloomiest prophecies concerning the prospects of labour.

HELP FOR TRADE UNIONS.

In the first derangement of trade many thousands of workers were thrown out of employment, and in Lancashire, which was already feeling the effects of short time in the mills, a complete stoppage of the cotton industry was feared.

The principal trade unions, which included unemployment pay in their benefits, were called upon to distribute so large a sum each week that the exhaustion of their funds was threatened. No such menace to the stability and power of the unions had arisen since the early struggles for the legal right to exist. Some officials suggested the suspension of unemployment benefit in order to throw the burden of distress upon the relief funds. An appeal for Government aid was powerfully supported and sympathetically considered. A proposal that block grants should be made to the unions from the National Relief Fund was rejected on grounds of expediency, but the need was met by extending the scope of the clause in the Insurance Act which provides for the refund of a certain proportion of trade union expenditure on unemployment benefit. This proportion was increased according to the amount of levy imposed upon employed members—the maximum refund being one-half—and the unions were thus relieved of a great part of the burden thrown upon them during the acute stage of industrial disorganisation. With this help, and the gradual improvement in trade which now set in, the peril of imminent financial collapse passed away from the thoughts of trade union members. After

four weeks of war the percentage of unemployed reported by certain representative unions to the Board of Trade was 7.1, as compared with 2.8 at the end of July. These figures, however, do not indicate the full extent of unemployment, for the stroke fell heavily on the ranks of unorganised labourers, casual workers of all kinds, and women and girls employed in factories and warehouses. In Lancashire the position was worse than anywhere else in the country. It was estimated that 50,000 people were unemployed at one time in the Oldham district. Ten thousand operatives were out at Bolton, and in all the other important centres of the industry widespread distress was manifest.

The turn of the tide was hardly perceptible for two or three weeks, except in certain trades to which the War Office sent large orders for equipment, but the rate of progress was accelerated as more and more men joined the forces, and as the financial measures of the Government restored stability to the financial world. By the end of October the trade union rate of unemployment was down to 5½ per cent. Six weeks later it reached 3.46, and was still falling. Both men and women were being absorbed from other trades into those engaged on war orders. At the end of November reports indicated remarkable activity in the engineering, shipbuilding, woollen, worsted, hosiery, clothing, cutlery, boot and shoe, and metal trades, while some recovery in the cotton industry was noticeable.


GROWTH OF UNREST.

Up to the end of the year the industrial truce was generally observed, but with the subsidence of unemployment and the diminution of distress other matters increasingly claimed the attention of the wage-earners. The rapid upward rush of prices in the first days of the war was regarded as a temporary result of panic, but when, after a period of fairly tolerable conditions, a rising movement set in with a steady sweep which had a sinister look of permanence about it, there was a corresponding reaction in the mind of labour. It could be said that up to this time the majority of the workers were disposed to make sacrifices without much complaint, but when the price of flour and bread went bounding up, and the general cost of living rose by nearly a quarter, the temper of the people changed. They saw freight charges advanced to unexampled rates, and wheat quotations rising by shillings at a time, while the Government apparently looked on without any intention to intervene. Stories of the accumulation of enormous war profits by firms engaged on Government work passed from mouth to mouth, and



Sir George Askwith.

[Lafayette, Manchester.



The shortage of farm labour: Soldiers assisting with the harvest.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



Girl workers in a munitions factory.

the demand of some employers for the abolition of rules which limited output and restricted the use of unskilled labour had the effect, in the circumstances in which it was made, of heightening suspicion that the nation was being exploited by "profit-mongers," and that many employers were prepared to take advantage of the war to lower standards of wages and working conditions which the unions had won by long and costly effort.

The first hint of impending trouble was conveyed in a striking warning and protest by the secretary of the Boilermakers' Society in the middle of January. A few days later a conference called by the Workers' National Committee demanded Government control of shipping, and on January 25th Tyneside workers threatened industrial revolt if the Government remained inactive. The announcement on the same day that a Cabinet Committee had been appointed to consider the situation, while it showed that the authorities were already concerned at the growing irritation of the wage-earners, did not silence the chorus of protest. The Management Committee of the General Federation of Trade Unions published a manifesto in which they asked for more efficient organisation of the ports to reduce congestion of traffic, for a reduction of freight charges, and for Government control of the wheat supply. "The situation is not yet desperate, but it is serious, and will become increasingly so unless the Government moves quickly." Point was given to the warning by the demand of railway workers, transport workers, and engineers for higher wages. Miners organised meetings of protest, and widely representative trade union and labour conferences in London, Manchester, and other industrial centres were held on one day to discuss the food question. Government control of wheat and shipping was again suggested, and Mr. W. Brace, who was later to enter the Coalition Government, demanded at Cardiff the organisation of the coal supply. "The Government must check monopolist power," he said, "or the workers must be free to use their own power to demand advanced wages to meet the advanced cost of necessities." In the middle of February the question was discussed in the House of Commons, and Mr. Runciman, who did not appear to favour definite Government control, suggested that the practicable remedy was to be found in higher remuneration, which had just been conceded to railwaymen and workers in Government dockyards. The demand for direct Government action was pressed forward, however, and in the middle of March Mr. Arthur Henderson, another Labour member who was destined to enter the Coalition Government, presided at a conference called by the War Emergency Workers' National Committee. In a circular issued a few days later by the Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Union Congress, the industrial unrest which had now become general was attributed to the increase in the cost of living, and, in certain trades, to the strain of

overwork. About this time it became known that the Government had purchased considerable quantities of wheat—in the Argentine it was surmised—but the details of the transaction were kept secret, and its effect on prices, coupled with that of the control of the Indian wheat market, was not felt for some months.

Meanwhile, workers all over the kingdom, adopting Mr. Runciman's advice, presented demands to their employers for increased wages or war bonuses, and the attention of the Government was directed by a recurrence of strikes and threats of stoppages to the question of devising new conciliation and arbitration machinery. These measures, and others of greater importance which followed them, profoundly affected industrial conditions and the position of trade unions from this time onwards. The correlation between all the complex happenings of this period will be better understood, however, if the changes in the state of employment, the rise of prices, the wages movement, and the Government action which led to compulsory arbitration are separately reviewed. A close examination shows that the correspondence between the rise in prices and the growth of discontent which led to a renewal of industrial disputes is too clearly marked

to admit of much doubt that the main cause of the one was the pinch of hardship produced by the other.

THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT.

By the end of December substantial improvement in the labour market was reported, and the trade union rate of unemployment was down to 2.5 per cent, as compared with 7.1 per cent at the end of August. In all trades engaged on war work there was increasing pressure and more overtime. In April the percentage had fallen to 1.2, the lowest for twenty-five years, and a growing


shortage of men in engineering, shipbuilding, coal-mining, and agriculture was noted. An improvement had taken place in the cotton industry, and linen, lace, brick, pottery, and tinsplate were the only important trades to be adversely affected by the war at this period. The amount of abnormal unemployment benefit paid by trade unions was now so small that the special Government grants were discontinued. Altogether, a sum of £84,175 was refunded to 185 unions, and this represented roughly one-half of their expenditure caused by the war.

By June there was very little unemployment except in luxury trades, and transference of workers from these trades to others where the demand could not be satisfied was proceeding rapidly, while the expansion of women's employment on classes of work to which they were accustomed was steadily going on. The engagement of women for work which had previously been done exclusively by men was also beginning, and in subsequent months this process of replacement was accelerated. At the end of the first year of war the trade union rate of unemployment was as low as .09, while in the engineering industry it was down to .06. The demand for skilled



A girl worker making ammunition boxes and testing the finished result with a dummy shell.

[Topical Press.]



[Topical Press.]

The scene of the Coal Strike : A typical South Wales coal mine.

workers was unabated, and the absorption of women and girls into a variety of trades continued. In certain industries, particularly in engineering and shipbuilding, pressure was abnormally high, and much overtime and Sunday labour was recorded.

CAUSE AND EFFECT.

After the rapid rise and fall in food prices immediately after the declaration of war, the general standard was for two or three weeks about ten per cent higher than the level in July. Another upward movement began much more slowly in the early days of October, and at the end of the year the principal necessities cost 19 per cent more than in July. A month later the increase had risen to 23 per cent, while flour was higher by 33 per cent and bread by 29 per cent. The increase continued in March, and it was still more acutely felt in May owing to an addition of from 11 to 15 per cent to the cost of meat. The general average of prices at the beginning of July was 35 per cent above the level of the previous July, but the price of flour and bread was respectively 60 and 45 per cent higher. This was the top point reached during the first year of war, and although during the next few weeks there was a downward movement in the price of wheat quotations it made little difference to the price of a loaf, and the general high cost of living continued to press heavily on the poorer classes of the population. In September the price of butter, eggs, and bacon became almost prohibitive, and the new Budget opened a prospect of further increases on tea, sugar, and other articles of food.

The higher wages and war bonus movement first assumed definite shape towards the end of January, by which time the housewife's purchasing power had been reduced by nearly one-quarter. The railwaymen demanded a 5s. per week increase for all grades, and so menacing was the attitude of some of the branches of the unions that negotiations with the companies were completed within a fortnight. The men accepted a compromise, under which a war bonus of three shillings a week was awarded to those who received under thirty shillings a week, and one of two shillings to the remaining employes, and the Government agreed to bear part of the cost. Scottish companies announced similar concessions a week later.

Meanwhile, other wage-earners were claiming increases. The transport workers achieved their first success at Hull, where an advance of a penny an hour was conceded, and during the next few weeks dock workers in London, Liverpool, Manchester, Dublin, and other ports were granted increases or war bonuses. Agitation in the engineering trade led to Government intervention early in February, and Sir George Askwith, Sir Francis Hopwood, and Sir George Gibb were charged with the duty of investigation. They presented a report shortly afterwards, and on February 21st it was announced that they had been constituted a new tribunal, under the name of the Government Committee on Production in Engineering and Shipbuilding Establishments, to prevent stoppages on work for Government purposes. One of their first successes was the settlement of the claims of the North-East Coast engineers, to whom they awarded a war bonus of four shillings on weekly wages and ten per cent on piece rates.

By the end of March the wages movement had extended to nearly every industry, and in very few cases did the claimants fail to achieve some measure of success. The Gas Workers and General Labourers'

Union rescinded a resolution passed at the beginning of the war that no advance should be asked for before the end of hostilities, and defended its action on the ground that the increased cost of living made it impossible to keep the pledge. Engineers in many centres, carters, general and agricultural labourers, and large numbers of workers in miscellaneous trades, came forward with varying demands. In April 193,000 workers secured increases or bonuses amounting to £12,900 a week, and thirty-four claims were dealt with either by courts of arbitration or by the Committee on Production. In May awards of war bonuses to miners, and to large numbers of engineers and boot and shoe trade employes, became operative, and the total of the awards this month was equal to no less than £188,000 a week, divided among 970,000 workers.

In the words of the official report, this was "by far the largest increase ever recorded in any month." June showed a considerable falling off, but in July a war bonus of five per cent, to date back to June, was awarded to 170,000 Lancashire cotton operatives. An application by the weaving section of the industry was not successful, and the agitation was renewed some weeks later. In August 438,000 workpeople benefited, at a cost to the employers of £55,000 a week. In the same month a new movement was started in the ranks of the railwaymen for an increase of the bonus, on the ground that it was insufficient to meet the advance in the cost of living since February, and by September the demand was so widespread and insistent that the Executive was compelled to approach the companies again.

£24,000,000 IN BONUSES.

By this time the astonishing nature of the movement, and its equally astonishing results, could be surveyed broadly, and it was ascertained by the Board of Trade that, in the eight months from January to August, 2,564,480 workpeople, not including Government and railway employes or agricultural labourers, had participated in wage increases or bonuses amounting to £467,470 a week, or in round figures over twenty-four million pounds a year. Yet, gigantic as this sum appears, it only compensated partly for the heavier burden of food prices. The average increase per head was 3s. 8d., and the average for different trades varied from 1s. 7d. in the textile section to 5s. 6d. for iron miners and 5s. 3d. for coal miners. Leaving the miners out of account, the average for the rest of the workers was 2s. 1d., with which to meet an increase of over one-third in the cost of living. Many workers, of course, earned considerable sums by overtime, at the risk of impairing their health, but the great majority of workers were not able to augment their incomes in this way, and many received neither higher wages nor war bonuses.

As a rule, little difficulty was experienced in convincing employers or arbitrators of the justice of the claim to higher remuneration. Indeed, some firms, whose employes numbered many thousands, took the initiative and conceded war bonuses before a claim was presented to them. These facts must be kept in mind if an impartial judgment is to be passed upon those workers who answered opposition and refusal by a re-assertion of the power of the strike at a time when maximum production was imperatively needed. If certain sections of the men flouted appeals to patriotism, and ignored the needs of the soldiers in the trenches, some employers showed equal disregard of their duties and obligations to the nation. The majority



The beginning of the Coal Strike: Miners leaving the pithead after the expiration of their strike notices.
[Newspaper Illustrations.]



After the settlement; Miners taking their ponies back to the pit.

[Topical Press.]

of the workers who engaged in disputes were impelled to their course of action by a burning sense of injustice, or by the conviction that they were being exploited for the production of abnormal war profits, and the Government delayed far too long before taking even the mildest action to make such exploitation difficult.

During the first five months of the war only 137 disputes, affecting 23,000 people, were recorded, and all these were unimportant and of short duration. Contrasted with the number for the preceding seven months—836 disputes, directly affecting 423,000 workers—they emphasise the state of industrial tranquillity which succeeded the ferment of 1913 and the first half of 1914. It was in the seventh month of the war, on the Clyde, that the storm first broke.

During the seven months January to July there were 414 disputes, affecting 343,680 people, but of these the South Wales and Clyde strikes were by far the most important and alarming. From March to August the monthly number of disputes fluctuated between seventy-four and forty-nine, and at the end of August only thirteen, affecting 3,300 workers, remained unsettled.

In the majority of these troubles agreement was reached without much difficulty, either by direct negotiation between employers and workers, by the intervention of Sir George Askwith's Committee, or by recourse to courts of arbitration.

THE CLYDE STRIKE.

The strike of Clyde engineers began in a small way in the middle of February, following a demand, made some weeks earlier, for an increase of 2d. an hour on a wage rate of 8½d. The employers were not conciliatory, and the offer of an advance of a halfpenny, extended subsequently to three farthings, was described by many of the employés as an insult. In this mood the men got out of the control of their leaders, and the strike extended sporadically until virtually the whole of the engineering industries on the Clyde were held up.

On February 27th the Government, acting through the Committee on Production, ordered the men back to work, pending immediate arbitration proceedings, but

this action inflamed the temper of the men still more. They argued that without guarantees as to Government control of the workshops it was in effect the initiation of compulsory service for private profit. Conferences and appeals to reason were more successful than peremptory demands, and on March 2nd the men agreed to return to the shops, but in order to hasten a settlement they decided not to work overtime until the result of the arbitration was made known. On March 22nd they were awarded and accepted an increase of a penny an hour and ten per cent on piece rates. On the Tyne similar terms were negotiated in a few days with little friction, and it was widely believed that if equal readiness to meet the men had been exhibited by the Clyde employers the strike stage would not have been reached.



Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Runciman, and Mr. Henderson at the Park Hotel, Cardiff, after their interview with the coalowners.

[Central Press.]

SOUTH WALES MINERS.

The dispute in the South Wales coal-field, although far more extensive and dangerous, bore certain resemblances to the Clyde trouble. The employers were less yielding than the English or Scotch coalowners. The men were angered by long delays, and stiffened to stubborn resistance by an attempt to impose compulsory service upon them without the establishment of State control over the mines or prices, and the employers had finally to yield what English owners conceded without strife.

The dispute had its origin in a request by the miners for a new wages agreement to supersede the one which expired in March. Under that agreement the maximum rate of wages had been reached. Prices had gone up

by leaps and bounds, but until a new agreement was negotiated the men were unable to present to the Conciliation Board any claim for an advance proportionate to the increase in prices. It was apparently the object of the employers to prevent such a claim being put forward by refusing to be a party to a new agreement.

Interposing upon this cause of contention came the war bonus movement, which was initiated simultaneously in England, Scotland, and Wales. The Welsh miners asked for twenty per cent upon the current wage rate. The employers offered ten per cent upon the old

standard, which was much lower than the current rate. The men were awarded 17½ per cent on the standard rate, and in this affair they again saw a determination of the employers to give less than an impartial arbitrator considered the men were entitled to.

When the question of the agreement had dragged on for three months it was taken up by the Board of Trade, and certain rulings were made by Mr. Runciman in July. The men's claim for a new standard rate was allowed, but the proposed abolition of a minimum rate, and other points in the rulings, aroused hostile feelings, and a delegates' conference decided upon a strike policy, against the advice of a majority of their executive. The Munitions Act was now in force, and the area was proclaimed under that Act on July 13th. The threatened strike was forbidden; but warnings of pains and penalties and the institution of a Munitions Tribunal had the effect of consolidating the position of the miners by stiffening the attitude of those who had joined reluctantly in the strike movement. The action of the Government, it was quickly seen, had destroyed any hope that a large section of the men would refuse to strike. Not a single miner entered the pits on July 15th. Mr. Runciman's Coal Prices Bill came too late to persuade the miners that censure was not reserved for them alone, or to shake their conviction that the coalowners were to be permitted to maintain prices at the abnormally high level which had been reached.

Within three or four days it was tacitly acknowledged that compulsion could not possibly be enforced against a large, solid body of workers determined to resist, and the hurriedly-arranged visit of Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Runciman, and Mr. Henderson to Cardiff resulted in the immediate settlement of the dispute in favour of the men. Even yet the trouble was not at an end. The ratification of the new agreement was delayed week after week, and points of settlement were questioned. Mr. Runciman gave a ruling which conflicted with the men's understanding of the Cardiff settlement, and the strike was partially renewed. The union officials, while endeavouring to avoid another stoppage, supported the contention of their members, and after a further discussion with Mr. Runciman and Mr. Lloyd George the tangle was satisfactorily straightened out. The agreement was signed, and the men were now free to press forward a claim for increased wages on the new standard. They asked for 12½ per cent, which they contended was very moderate in view of the price of coal. The employers offered five per cent, but they failed to convince the chairman of the Conciliation Board that that was the utmost the conditions justified. After carefully considering all arguments, Lord St. Aldwyn awarded the full 12½ per cent, and thus confirmed the justice of the miners' case throughout the long and regrettable struggle.

The strange strike of coalheavers, and the week-end strike of dock workers at Liverpool and Birkenhead in February and March, followed a concession of increased wages. Only a small proportion of the dock workers of the ports were involved. They objected to the abolition of the pernicious old system of "subbing" wages during the week, but they could not stand up against the opposition of their leaders, a hostile public opinion, and the pressure of Lord Kitchener. The organisation of the "Khaki Dockers" arose out of this trouble. It was thought at first that the establishment of the Liverpool battalion might develop into an important mobilisation of transport labour for Government service, but this hope was not realised.

COMPULSORY ARBITRATION.

In the early months of the war the trade unions showed no disposition to respond favourably to the request for relaxation of workshop rules and restrictions, and at the Elswick works a dispute was threatened in February because of the employment of unskilled labour on work which had been performed hitherto by trained men. The union leaders were won over in a series of conferences with Mr. Lloyd George, but they insisted on certain guarantees, which the Minister of Munitions persuaded the employers to accept. The question of relaxation of rules became linked up with that of compulsory arbitration, the establishment of which Mr. Lloyd George had foreshadowed at Bangor on February 28th, and which up to this time had been strenuously resisted by the unions.

Thirty-two organisations accepted on March 19th an agreement which included, as a set-off to the sacrifices made by the men, a guarantee that the old conditions should be re-established after the war, and an undertaking to limit profits in works engaged on Government orders. The agreement provided that the restrictive rules and customs should be relaxed in order to accelerate the output of war equipment and munitions. Disputes were to be settled, if employers and workers failed to agree, by reference either to Sir George Askwith's Committee, to a single arbitrator, or to a court of arbitration.

The points embodied in this agreement were carried to a more drastic stage in the Munitions Act, which set up control over workshops and attempted to make compulsory arbitration effective by a provision for the imposition of penalties. In small disputes it was found possible by the infliction of fines to compel an immediate resumption of work, but it soon became evident that opposition of the kind which was offered in South Wales had not been contemplated by the framers of the Act.

Restrictions on the freedom of workers engaged by war contractors operated in practice as a species of compulsory industrial service. The Munitions Courts constituted under the Act were kept busy, and in some respects the operation of the Act was thought to favour the employers as against the workers. Much local irritation was set up, and the cumulative effect of this was largely the cause of the vehemence of the opposition which was manifested when suggestions were made for the establishment of general compulsory industrial service.

The reluctance of the workers to relax their rules and customs which limited output and restricted the employment of unskilled labour was ill-understood by the other classes in the community, and much acrid criticism was directed against trade unionists because of it, not a few of the critics being members of the professional classes, which rigidly preserve their own restrictions and privileges. Limitation of output was, under normal conditions, the workers' effective safeguard against excessive speeding up and the consequent reduction of piece rates of pay, while employment restrictions acted as barriers against a flood of cheap labour which, it was feared, might sweep away the hardly-won standard wage of the trained artisan.


LABOUR'S SACRIFICE.

Looked at from this standpoint, and not underrating the trouble caused to employers by "slackers" and careless workers, it is seen that trade unionists have made great sacrifices upon guarantees which many of them consider inadequate. It is hardly possible to judge at present how far the strength and influence of labour

will be modified after the war, or what problems its leaders will be called upon to face. It may gain new power from the closer association of those leaders with the Government. On the other hand, it may have to struggle hard to recover its lost privileges and freedom in the workshops. Will some employers endeavour to retain the use of semi-trained labour for machine work, and to what extent will women strive to keep the new positions they have taken in productive industry? The answer to these questions must depend upon the conditions which prevail at the end of the war, and in the uncertainty

which veils the future it is not surprising that trade union leaders prefer expediency to the task of elaborating a precise policy to meet problematical contingencies

During the past year the industrial workers have had a more vivid revelation of their real place and value in the life of the nation than has ever been given to them before. In the light of recent experiences, it seems clear that the task of guiding this newly-awakened consciousness will need all the knowledge, sympathy, and foresight that statesmen can bring to the aid of the trade union leaders.



A war meeting of the Executive of the National Union of Railwaymen, with Mr. Bellamy in the chair.

[L.N.A.]




The copper shortage in Germany: A schoolmaster collecting copper household articles from his pupils.

[Photopress.]



Russian prisoners of war at work in the fields in Prussia.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



Part of a Government store of flour in Berlin.

[Photopress.]

CHAPTER XI.

THE TREND OF GERMAN POLICY.

AIRSHIP RAIDS AND SUBMARINE WARFARE—GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES—DISCUSSION OF PEACE TERMS—THE ANNEXATION QUESTION—PETITIONS AND COUNTER-PETITIONS—A YEAR'S WARFARE—NEW HOPES IN THE BALKANS—THE INFLUENCE OF THE PRESS—INTERNAL POLITICS.

IT will be remembered that at the beginning of the new year the question most prominent in the minds of the German people was the question of the food supply. Allied statesmen had declared that Germany could be reduced by starvation—the image of a besieged fortress had been quoted—and the strict measures which were taken by the Federal Council with regard to the distribution of grain made it seem as if, after all, they might be right. As in a besieged fortress, everyone was placed on rations. Within a short time of the seizure of stocks by the authorities the system of bread tickets was introduced throughout the whole country, and each individual had to be content with an allowance of a little over seven ounces per day. For a while there was a certain suspense. The public was encouraged to return as many bread tickets as possible unused; the town of Bochum offered rewards of money to those who effected a saving in the course of the week. The patriotism of the German people was, however, equal to the sacrifices demanded of them. Gradually it became apparent that, by continuing to exercise strict economy, Germany could hold out in the matter of food for an almost

indefinite period, assuming, of course, that the German armies held their ground. The authorities were able to enter upon the new harvest year of 1915 with a surplus of wheat and rye amounting to more than 70,000 tons.

It is true that at the same time the cost of foodstuffs steadily increased. At the end of the first year of the war there was only salt which could be obtained at the same price as before; almost all the other important foodstuffs had become considerably more expensive—some by 100 to 200 per cent. Great bitterness was felt against the “usurers” who took advantage of the general scarcity to fill their own pockets. After a year's hesitation, the Federal Council was induced to pass a decree empowering the authorities to suppress any unreliable dealer, and exposing the dealer himself to imprisonment and the loss of his civil rights. All this, however, belongs mainly to the chapter of internal organisation. What should be noted here is that the menace of starvation which seemed to hang over Germany in the early months of the year made a deep impression on the German people, and helped to prepare their minds for methods of warfare hard for the outside spectator to understand.



An inspector visiting a Berlin bakery in order to see that the Government limitation on the use of flour is being observed. [Universal.]



A store of war bread for the German troops.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

AIRSHIP RAIDS AND SUBMARINE WARFARE.

The menace of starvation left the German population, as a matter of fact, firmly persuaded that the Allies were waging war on non-combatants. The *Aushungerungsplan*—the attempt to starve out a population of seventy millions, old men, women, and children—was depicted as the *non plus ultra* of inhumanity, and the exasperation which prevailed may be judged by a threat in the *Kölnische Zeitung* to the effect that if matters looked serious the entire Belgian population, not to mention the prisoners of war in German hands, would be left to die. Once again it was England that came in for all the fury. The *Aushungerungsplan*, though it was declared to have failed, became a catchword which served to cover the extension of the war to non-combatants which followed shortly after in the air raids, and the submarine blockade of the English coasts proclaimed on February 4th.

There were, however, further excuses for these two new forms of warfare. How far the German people sincerely believed and believes in them, it is not easy to tell. At any rate, they are constantly to be found in the German press. They remind one rather of that wicked animal in La Fontaine, of whom it was said: "Quand on l'attaque, il se défend." The towns liable to airship attack are armed with anti-aircraft guns; therefore, according to the German view, they are fortresses; therefore they must not complain if they are attacked. As an example of the grotesque extremes to which certain German critics were prepared to go might be mentioned an article by Count Reventlow, which accused the English of a crime against justice, civilisation, and international law for not removing the population of London from this "fortress." In the case of the submarine blockade, justification for sinking merchantmen at sight was found in the fact that these can ram the submarine with their bow: therefore they are really warships; therefore they must not complain if they are attacked. The ingenious phrase, "Franc-tireurs at sea" was devised for the occasion. The sense of righteousness was further kindled by the reports that English ships frequently flew a neutral flag in the threatened waters. The disappearance of Commander Weddigen, in the *U 29*, was ascribed, in the absence of details from the British Admiralty, to treacherous attack on the part of some disguised merchant ship, and his name was glorified as that of a hero and martyr.

GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES.

It may be taken for granted that the German Admiralty, in ordering the submarine blockade hoped to accomplish one or more of the following objects:—Firstly, to cut off England's food supply; secondly, to interfere with English trade; thirdly, to reduce the numbers of British merchant ships; fourthly, to create the impression that England had lost the supremacy of the seas. As time went on, however, it became obvious that none of these objects had effectively been achieved. There was no likelihood of England being starved out; English trade continued, not very much diminished; the merchant marine was still formidable in numbers; and the supremacy of England at sea, especially after the North Sea battle, was undisputed by all except Germans—it was even acknowledged by cooler naval critics like Captain Persius. On the other hand, besides very considerable wastage of material, there were complications with neutral powers like the United States. For some time feeling had been growing very intense

against America. Her regular supply of munitions to the Allies was interpreted as a direct breach of neutrality. In modern warfare to give bullets and guns was as good as giving men, indeed better. Very easily, it was said, could America have put an embargo on the export of munitions if she had liked. By her selfish action she was prolonging the war, and losing the lives of many brave Germans. The hatred of America threatened, indeed, to rival the famous hatred of England. The temper of the people is best described by quoting the letter of a German mother announcing the death of her son: "Yesterday I received news that my son fell a victim to an American bullet."

Under the circumstances, it may be understood that the sinking of the *Lusitania* was not greeted with the protests it deserved. Even those who regretted the heavy loss of innocent life—and they were perhaps more than is generally thought—maintained that generally right was on their side. It seemed likely as if relations with America would become strained to the point of war. The Admiralty encouraged the opinion that the submarine war must not be modified. More moderate counsels, however, began to assert themselves. In June the first signs of divergence in the German command became obvious in the suppression of the *Deutsche Tageszeitung*. This journal, the organ of the intrepid Count Reventlow, had openly attacked the Chancellor for his "cowardly, weak, and undignified" policy towards America. The divergence showed itself in a sharper form later when the *Arabic* and *Hesperian* were torpedoed with Americans on board, at the very moment when the German Government was assuring Washington of its friendly intentions. Why should Admiral von Tirpitz set himself at variance with the Chancellor in this fashion? It is impossible to give a definite answer as yet, but a reasonable hypothesis seems to be that the authority of his department was at stake. The German battle-navy, which was instrumental in bringing on the war, proved useless in it. The prestige of the Admiral responsible was therefore bound up with the submarine war and the air raids, which, however futile they may relatively have been, were showy enough in their results to keep Admiral von Tirpitz in office.

The failure of the German navy may also explain the invention of a new object in the war—"The freedom of the seas." This object of the war was formally adopted by the Chancellor in his speech in the Reichstag in August, and is the only case where Germany professes to be fighting for any other interests besides her own. What precisely is understood by the phrase is less clear than the motives which inspired it. Certainly the freedom of the seas includes the abolition of the right to capture private property at sea, most probably also the right of blockade and the right to capture contraband. But there is a good deal of humbug behind the phrase. One of Count Reventlow's most persistent demands is that Germany should wrest the freedom of the seas by force, otherwise, according to him, it is valueless. That is, evidently: there can be no real freedom at sea until Germany is navally supreme. But in that case it can hardly be expected that Germany will forego the chief advantages which naval supremacy can confer. Even in Germany, amongst the general chorus of self-righteousness, there were critics who saw through the humbug. Captain Persius, the well known writer in the *Berliner Tageblatt*, concluded a candid article on the subject by adopting the ironical observation of an American to the effect that "Germany will begin to think over what this great,



Showing civilians round the exhibition trenches on the outskirts of Berlin.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



Explaining the construction of trenches to a party of civilians.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



The German pride in the exploits of their submarines is shown by the fact that pleasure boats, as in the photograph, are christened after the notable vessels.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

noble, and large-minded ideal of the freedom of the seas means when she has crushed England."

DISCUSSION OF PEACE TERMS.

The discussion of the objects of the war was nominally forbidden by the censorship. However, under one pretext or another, the question of Germany's peace terms was brought up, and the Conservative press, at any rate, was able to express its views more or less freely. In June, the controversy as to who was Germany's chief enemy was revived. The Junker party began to suggest that the real interests of Russia and Germany did not clash, and linked up with this the statement that Russia might possibly be prepared to conclude a separate peace with Germany. This at once called to arms the Radical press, who have always insisted on the cultural bonds between the Central Powers and the Western Powers. A league called the "Neues Vaterland" was formed by a group of well-known men with the object of furthering an understanding with France and England. This league carried on an active propaganda by means of privately-circulated pamphlets, amongst which should be mentioned a letter on Belgium by Dr. Hans Wehberg, a prominent jurist—the only vigorous protest against the violation of its neutrality which appeared in Germany. Within a short time the rumour went round that consultations about peace were taking place. The English Government was reported to be putting out feelers through the medium of neutral personalities. To this and similar rumours the *Norddeutsche*

Allgemeine Zeitung gave an emphatic denial. Nevertheless, the Conservatives were alarmed, and continued to agitate more actively than before.

The success of the operations against Russia in June and July gave a great impetus to the discussion of the prospects of peace. Hindenburg's victories in Poland led the people to think that the end of the war was in sight. The object of his campaign, it was repeated again and again, was not to capture territory, but to encircle and annihilate the Russian armies. An Austrian paper, the *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung*, published various speeches made by the Kaiser after the recapture of Lemberg, all of them asserting that "we are nearing the end." It is significant that the German people should thus have to be buoyed up with hopes of an early peace. In none of the other Allied countries was this done. It would be quite wrong to suppose that there was any wavering in the resolution to hold out. Nevertheless, the toil of the past year could not but be beginning to tell. There is no doubt that in many circles the opinion was held that enough had been done to secure an honourable peace. Towards the end of June the Committee of the Social Democratic party published a manifesto calling for peace. "If the war is not to go on indefinitely until all the nations have been completely exhausted, one of the powers taking part must stretch out its hand to peace. Germany has already proved itself unconquerable, and can therefore take the first step towards peace. In the name of humanity and culture, supported by the bravery of our men in arms, who have created a favourable situation, we demand

of the Government that it shall announce its willingness to enter into negotiations for peace in order to make an end of the bloody struggle." For publishing this manifesto the Socialist organ *Vorwärts* was suppressed for a few days by the censorship.

THE ANNEXATION QUESTION.

All sections by now were busy defining their conceptions of an honourable peace. Roughly, two large groups may be distinguished, one for annexation, the other against. The annexationists very early on received encouragement. The Kaiser, in an address to his people at the end of July, spoke of a peace "which will guarantee us the necessary military, political, and economic guarantees for the future and realise the conditions for the unhindered development of our creative forces at home and on the free sea." The phrase of "real guarantees" was extracted from the Chancellor. It is worth noticing that both Kaiser and Chancellor always treated the war as a war of defence, and never defined the actual objects for which they were fighting, as was done in England by Mr. Asquith, in France by M. Viviani, and in Russia by M. Sazonoff. By this means they would save their prestige with the people in case of failure. Other important personages were less discreet. On June 9th, in a speech before the Bavarian Canal League, the King of Bavaria remarked how glad he was that England had joined in the coalition against Germany—"because now at length we can settle accounts with our foes and hope to secure more favourable connections with the sea for South and West Germany."

A large section of opinion—including notably the supporters of Admiral von Tirpitz—agree with the King of Bavaria in considering expansion in the West as more urgent than expansion elsewhere. It is in the light of this opinion that the meaning of one of Germany's widest-circulated slanders, the slander that England intends to keep Calais, becomes clear. The new campaign of Hindenburg in Poland meant, it must be remembered, a good deal more than the fact that the military staff

had decided to transfer their offensive from the West to the East—it was a definite sign of change in the German Government's policy. Concessions were to be obtained chiefly from Russia, not from France. Against this the navy party strongly protested. Their call was for an energetic renewal of the attack in France, in order to secure the large sea-board which they thought necessary for effective naval development. The slander about Calais may perhaps best be construed as a means of propaganda to this end. If the English had made up their minds to keep Calais, must not the Germans, out of sheer self-defence, drive them out and establish themselves there?

The annexationists, who were composed chiefly of the agrarians, the great industrials, and the jingoes, were not troubled about the fate of the alien populations whom they proposed to bring under German rule. On the contrary, they were afraid that the Chancellor, who is probably by nature a mild Liberal, would show himself weak when it came to the peace negotiations. A series of attacks on Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg was begun by the leader of the National Liberal party, Herr Bassermann. They did not succeed in shaking the Chancellor's position, but they probably had their influence on Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, who, in his speech in the Reichstag in August, used the words: "We have put aside sentimentality." These words



The great wooden statue of Von Hindenburg in Berlin, into which nails could be knocked by the patriotic public for a small fee, the proceeds going to war charities.

[Photopress.]

were welcomed and re-echoed throughout the whole country. There is no doubt they struck a particularly responsive chord in the German people, which has always been taught that its political failures have been due to excessive consideration. The words, however, are significant in themselves. They represent that uneasiness and mistrust of self which is felt by most people whose actions are guided—as those of the Germans' so often are—by impulse. The sentimentalist fluctuates between kindness and absolute unscrupulousness—in brutality he is inclined to see an escape from his sentimentality. The course of the war has illustrated this aspect of the German mind more than once, and in the matter of annexation it was evident again

PETITIONS AND COUNTER-PETITIONS.

The most striking expression of the annexationist views was in a petition addressed to the Chancellor, at the singularly inopportune moment when the fate of Poland was under discussion in Europe, by representatives of six of the leading agrarian and industrial leagues of Germany. This petition, which was drawn up chiefly by the well known Director of the Gelsenkirchen group of mines, Herr Kirdorf, demanded the annexation of Belgium, of a large portion of the French industrial regions, of the French coast down to the Somme, as well as of formidable masses of territory in the East, to counter-balance the increase in industrial power. "While taking into German hands the economic enterprises and properties necessary for the domination of the countries appropriated, the Germans," says the petition, "must govern and administer them in such a way that the inhabitants acquire no influence over the political destinies of the Empire." Throughout the whole petition there is not one word to show that the writers have any ideal before them beyond that of material power. Even Herr Kirdorf seems to have felt this, for he followed up this first petition with a second petition to the same effect, signed by some not very well-known intellectuals, and this time botched up with some phrases about kultur.

Both these petitions evoked protest within Germany itself. A counter-petition was sent to the Chancellor with eighty-two distinguished names, amongst them that of Herr Dernburg, former Minister for the Colonies. The Socialist party met at a special sitting to decide its attitude, and declared itself in favour of the right of the peoples to decide their own fate—except in the case of Alsace-Lorraine. The Socialist party was, as a matter of fact, drifting more and more with the general current. "I am going over to Hindenburg," wrote the editor of the Socialist paper, the *Chemnitzer Volksstimme*, and his words roused considerable comment. Dr. Liebnicht still held out uncompromisingly for his views, and he was supported by a minority which included Herr Bernstein; but the party, in spite of a show of outward unity, was


split up into divergent groups, and the points of divergence included not only matters of foreign policy, but also the tactics of the party in home policy.

The moment for showing to which side the Government inclined in the matter of annexation seemed to have arrived with the fall of Warsaw. The German troops, it was reported in the papers, had been greeted as liberators by the inhabitants of the town, and there were some who thought that the Chancellor might make a bid for neutral opinion by a revival of the old Polish State under German auspices. As the days passed, however, it became obvious that the problem was to be left untouched. For the time being, Poland, according

to the Chancellor, would be administered by the Germans with the help of the population, and a few harmless concessions to Polish national feeling were made, as at Warsaw, where the policing of the city was entrusted to the inhabitants. But whatever references the Chancellor made to the future were vague. "I hope," he declared in the Reichstag in August, "that to-day's occupation of the Polish frontiers represents the beginning of a development which will remove old contrasts between Germans and Poles, and will lead the country liberated from the Russian yoke to a happy future, so that it can foster and develop the individuality of its national life."

It was not merely the desire to avoid controversy at

home, however, which was responsible for the vagueness of the Chancellor's words. The fall of Warsaw had, in the meanwhile, raised the question of Austrian interests in Poland. Considerable indignation was caused in Germany by the manifestoes of the Polish leaders in Austria, who openly declared their preference for that country, and expressed their regret "that the capture of Warsaw did not take place precisely as we wished it"—that is, by the Austrians instead of by the Germans. The incorporation of Poland into the Austrian confederation seemed to hold out to them greater hopes for their national aspirations than any form of German dominion. That the "old contrasts" between Poles and Germans persisted was shown in the course of the succeeding months by




Another national hero is ornamented with nails: A wooden effigy of the Captain of the Emden, erected in the city of Emden.

[Photopress.]



The treatment of German wounded: Exercising the muscles of the arms by means of embroidery work.
[Topical Press.]



Apparatus for exercising the stiff leg-joints of soldiers who have been wounded.
[Newspaper Illustrations.]

sundry outbursts in the German press, and by the report of Polish agitation in the occupied districts—agitation which the commanding general threatened to suppress by all the means at his command.

A YEAR'S WARFARE.

The discussion of peace terms, however, soon died out. It was seen that the campaign in Russia did not look like achieving any supreme results, and peace still hovered far in the distance. What use was it for the Chancellor to declare from his balcony that fortresses were being smashed like earthenware pots if the Russian army eluded the enemy and was ready to strike new blows? The fall of Warsaw, it was reported, was celebrated in Berlin without the display of boisterous confidence so common in the early days of the war. Moreover, whatever hopes there were that the Russian defeats might lead to a revolution in Russia remained unfulfilled. The meeting of the Duma, and its declaration that it would fight to the end, was a distinct disappointment to the Germans. It was denied, of course, that any peace proposals had been made to Russia. In the meantime, the confidence in the German army was never so great, and the public were told to look elsewhere for a really decisive blow.

It may not be out of place at this point to review the general situation at the end of the first year or so of the war as the Germans were persuaded to see it. The Colonial possessions had mostly disappeared, it is true, but it was declared that their fate really depended on the operations in Europe. The intervention of Italy did not make much difference. The first outbursts of fury at "the people of Machiavelli" soon simmered down, when it was seen that a relatively small number of Austrian forces sufficed to hold back the Italians. In France, Joffre was exhausting himself in his vain attempts to pierce the German line. The English were gathering together munitions and men, but otherwise doing nothing against the Germans. The threat of a great offensive in the end did not trouble the people. It was said that an army for a Continental war could not be improvised, and though no one disputed the courage of the British soldier, German critics were constantly pointing out that his officers could not possibly be adequate, and that a vast expenditure of munitions was of no use in itself. In Turkey, the Dardanelles expedition of the English was regarded as a fiasco, and it was believed that the Turks could not only hold their own in Gallipoli, but also threaten Egypt again. The balance of the year's warfare was, they held, on their side, and there was no need to shrink from the future. Germany could hold out yet for a long time. Its trade had succeeded in adapting itself to war conditions; Germany had become self-supporting; and the financial resources of the Empire had proved equal to all demands. The confidence that Germany could stand the financial strain better than any of her enemies was increased not only by the encouraging—at any rate apparently encouraging—result of the second and third War Loans, but also by the statement of the financial secretary, Dr. Helfferich, that the Allies would have to pay indemnities to Germany which would cover the greater part of the war expenses.

NEW HOPES IN THE BALKANS.

It only remained to strike the really decisive blow. For some time attention had been turned to the Balkans. It was claimed that the fates of Turkey and Germany were henceforth inextricably bound up together. Already proposals for economic union between Germany and

Austria had been made; it was desirable to extend this union to Turkey. The moderate Germans probably think that the chief results of the war will be obtained in Turkey. In a singularly frank leader, the editor of the *Berliner Tageblatt* scouted the view that this was a war of cultures. It amounted, he explained, to little more than a contention for the East. In Germany this was well known. From the very beginning everything had been done to prepare the way for German influence in Turkey. Fourteen German professors were appointed to the University of Constantinople, and Turkish was adopted as a language of study in several of the German technical schools. As an instance of the efforts taken to ingratiate Germany with Turkey might be mentioned the fact that wounded Turkish officers from Gallipoli were invited to pass their convalescence at Wiesbaden. At the same time, if Turkey was to be firmly attached to Germany, communications must be kept clear. "It is our task," wrote Herr Wolff, the editor of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, "to open up that free path to Constantinople which shall be not simply a military road improvised for the campaign, but a permanent way for the future."

The phrase appealed to the imagination of the Conservative press no less. By smashing a way through Serbia to Turkey effective aid in the shape of munitions could be given to Turkey, the English could be driven from the Dardanelles, and a renewed and better prepared attack on Egypt might at last strike the fatal blow at the chief enemy, England, who, it had to be admitted, had so far escaped serious injury. In the Reichstag meeting in August, the Chancellor declared that Germany had armies at her disposal to strike new blows, and it was no doubt the prospect of an important campaign in the south-east which reconciled the hotheads to the Government's conciliatory attitude towards America.

When at length it was announced that German artillery had opened fire on the Servian positions near Semendria, a wave of enthusiasm swept over the country. No secret was made of the fact that the final stages of the war were at hand. A few days before, Bulgaria had mobilised her army. German diplomacy had not hitherto been popular with the people, and it was even said that, after the war, a strict enquiry into matters would have to be held, but the engineering of the Turco-Bulgarian convention was considered a distinct triumph. It was expected confidently that Bulgaria would join in the war with the Central Powers, and help to complete the economic, commercial (perhaps even military) alliance of the countries between Germany and Turkey. The cases of Roumania and Greece were more problematic. Ever since it was declared that Bulgaria was the pivot of the Balkans, Roumania had been treated somewhat off-handedly. Her refusal to allow the passage of munitions to Turkey created hardly less indignation than what was alleged to be her attempt to get rid of her harvest at extortionate prices. In Greece, Baron Schenck, the German Ambassador, had organised a remarkably efficient army of agents and propagandists, and the German public was told that the cry of "Long live Hindenburg" had actually been heard in the streets of Athens. Certainly, great confidence was placed in the King, and the resignation of M. Venizelos in the early months of the year was hailed as a sign that the pro-Entente policy was definitely abandoned. There was some perturbation when M. Venizelos returned—the famous Greek statesman, instead of being called "the prudent Herr Venizelos" was now referred to as the "Cretan adventurer"—but on the whole



A Berlin crowd bidding good-bye to Landsturm on their way to the front.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



A troop train for German reserves, photographed in August, 1915. It will be noticed that the pleasant fiction that the troops are on the way to Paris is still kept up.

[Central News.]

it was felt that Greece and Roumania might both be persuaded to remain passive in face of a German offensive in the Balkans.

Visitors to Germany have testified to the almost hypnotic atmosphere of confidence prevalent in the country. A neutral correspondent of the *Times*, who had been a firm believer in the Allies, describes the eerie change which came over him after crossing the frontier. "It was a remarkable experience. Before many days had passed I made the disagreeable discovery that I was being influenced by the German war atmosphere. The confidence of the people in the invincibility of their armies, the smooth working of the State machine that seemed to leave nothing to chance, the determination everywhere noticeable beneath the subdued expressions of feeling, the daily outpourings of the Press, the contemporary literature—everything in short combined to entice me into a different mood. I began to understand the workings of the "German mind, which had before seemed mysterious to me."

THE INFLUENCE OF THE PRESS.

In creating this atmosphere, the Press naturally played a prominent rôle. A more excellently disciplined body of newspapers it would be hard to find. As soon as German troops pierced into foreign territory German editors followed, and in certain districts special papers in the native tongue—such as the *Gazette des Ardennes*—were instituted. The propaganda abroad was carried on just as energetically, and in Bulgaria the Press, by means of subsidy, was brought almost entirely under German influence. At home, besides the voluntary work of the ordinary papers, there was the Chancellor's organ, the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, to encourage or explain as the occasion required. It was here that the documents from the Belgian archives were published—with the object of bringing forward neutral evidence that Germany had been the victim of a conspiracy. Here, too, Herr Bethmann-Hollweg carried on an indirect controversy with Sir Edward Grey, and Dr. Helfferich, who soon gave signs of possessing a pawky humour, assured the country of its excellent financial prospects.

One of his glosses proved especially palatable—the one suggesting that English indignation at his pronouncement on indemnities after the war showed that the chief enemy had been touched at his sensitive spot, the purse. The hatred of England had, as a matter of fact, begun to subside a little in intensity. It had been, to a considerable extent, due to Press agitation; and when some of the papers pointed out the absurdity and harmfulness of stamping "Gott strafe England" on commercial letters and the like, a more sober frame of mind began to appear. Even Herr Lissauer, the author of the "Hymn of Hate," wrote to explain that his poem was not dictated by hatred of Englishmen, but of English foreign policy, and recommended in any case that it should not be placed in the hands of immature persons.

Side by side with the positive work of the Press went the negative—the suppression of facts or opinions. It is interesting to notice that after the first six months of the war it was forbidden to publish any figures with regard to casualties. The lists which the papers gave contained nothing but the units in which casualties had taken place; there was thus no means of discovering the total. The censorship in Germany worked, if not fairly, at least effectively. There was, significantly enough, very little mention in the German press of poisonous gases, and of the other inhumane methods of warfare intro-

duced by the Germans in the West. Even if there had been, however, the Germans would not have worried—where, they would say, is the difference between being dismembered by shot and stifled by gas? Death is death. Another subject of which the German public is ignorant is the outrages on the Armenians which are being committed by the Turks. What complaints were brought against the censorship dealt with lack of uniformity and political bias. The work of examining news was entrusted to the commanding generals in the various districts. These, it was asserted in a discussion in the Reichstag, varied between themselves, and also, as a whole, showed leniency towards the Conservative papers and strictness towards the Socialists. Dr. Delbrück, the Minister of



A memorial to the German and Russian dead who fell on the battle-field of Lowicz. [Newspaper Illustrations.]


the Interior, announced that a central bureau would be formed to introduce uniformity, but considered the other charges not proven.

INTERNAL POLITICS.

There does, however, seem to be evidence that the Social Democrat party was not looked on favourably by the censors—chiefly retired officers who had volunteered their services on the outbreak of war. It was the Social Democrat party which seemed to threaten the political armistice. In its protests against the leisurely legislation of the Federal Council with regard to the food supplies it often attacked the agrarian interests. Moreover, it demanded—even though in vain—the reform of the Prussian electoral system, whose effect is to place the preponderating power in the hands of the large taxpayers. After the enormous sacrifices which the German people had made, it was only fair that they should have their share in governing themselves. Very interesting was the fate which befell the proposal to revise the Reichsvereingesezt, which contains amongst other paragraphs the one regulating the use of languages amongst the subject nationalities. The restrictions on French, Danish, and Polish had naturally been increased by various military orders. Polish, for instance, could not be used near the war zone at all, and in Alsace-Lorraine it was even an offence to have French headings in commercial correspondence. The restrictions on the use of these languages in meetings in normal times were, however, a different matter, and seemed particularly absurd after it had been declared that all Germany had shown itself loyal and

enthusiastic in the "war of defence." In the Reichstag a majority of two-thirds declared itself in favour of their abolition. No encouragement, however, came from the Government. Dr. Delbrück, who spoke for the Chancellor, stated that the Reichsvereingesezt formed part of a whole series of inner reforms, and was best left over until after the war.

One hopeful sign was indeed given—but a very harmless one. The dedicatory words "to the German people," which had been removed from the Reichstag building by order of the Kaiser in 1894, were ordered to be re-inscribed. Great enthusiasm was aroused in the Reichstag in August when the announcement was made. The Kaiser had spoken, vaguely enough, it is true, but still loudly, of "new paths" to be trod after the war, and the Chancellor, who was reported to be personally in favour of internal reforms, was trusted to give effect to the phrase. It should be mentioned, however, that the *Burgfriede* was far from being general. Party and other recriminations had not ceased. Even the agitation against the Jews smouldered on. At one meeting a speaker mentioned the preposterous invention that Signor d'Annunzio (who was regarded in Germany as one of the chief instigators of the Italian attack) was a Jew, and added that Dernburg, another Jew, was betraying German interests in America. The audience gave a great cry of indignation—"And such people want to become reserve officers." It is, of course, still exceptional for a Jew to become an officer, though many are appointed to a convenient rank which carries with it all the duties and responsibilities, but none of the privileges, of an officer.



German women being trained as tramway workers in Berlin.

[Topical Press.



Russian prisoners exchanged from Germany being entertained to lunch by the Grand Duchess Maria Pavlovna on their arrival in Petrograd. [Central News.

CHAPTER XII.

RUSSIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS.

EARLY CONFIDENCE IN RUSSIA—THE DEFEATS OF MAY AND THE RISE OF CRITICISM—THE GROUNDS OF DISCONTENT—THE MEETING OF THE DUMA—DEMANDS FOR POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM—HOW FAR CONCEDED—THE DUMA PROROGUED.

THE change in the fortunes of the Russian campaign, which set in with the Battle of the Dunajec at the beginning of May, had a profound effect upon the domestic situation of the empire, and gave rise to a new reform movement fraught with momentous consequences, not only for the Russian nation itself but also for the Allies.

It is only too natural that in a country like Russia, which is still governed very largely by bureaucratic methods, misfortunes on the fields of battle should create a widespread political discontent. From this point of view history may be said to have repeated itself. Both the Crimean and the two subsequent great wars which Russia waged against Turkey (1876-7) and Japan (1904-5) brought in their wake strong reform movements which, at least in two cases, led to great and enduring changes in the empire's internal organisation. The Crimean war, as is well known, was followed by the abolition of serfdom, the introduction of local self-government both for the towns and country

districts (Zemstvos), the creation of a new and modern Civil Code, and new judicial institutions, and several other important reforms. The war with Japan was instrumental in calling to life such a body of public opinion directed against the bureaucratic régime that a constitution had to be granted, which took the shape of the establishment of a national Parliament (Duma), and the transformation of the ancient bureaucratic State Council into an Upper House, known as the Council of the Empire. In each case the reform movement and the reforms themselves were caused by the evident breakdown of the bureaucratic foundation of the empire's system of government, which bred incompetence and corruption, and kept down the vital forces of the nation, so valuable—indeed, indispensable—for the successful prosecution of modern war.

It is essentially the same phenomenon which has repeated itself in the present war. The grant of a constitution had brought about a certain amount of co-operation between the nation and the ruling bureaucracy,

and had placed the Government to some extent under the control of the nation's representatives. But, apart from the fact that the narrow basis of the Russian franchise had militated against the formation of a really strong democratic force in the Duma, which could exercise that control in a serious and effective manner, the financial — and especially the military — organisation of the empire were precisely the two domains which the bureaucracy had withdrawn almost entirely from the competence of the Duma, and reserved, in all its essentials, to itself. The result was that though much money and much labour had been spent, with the sanction of the Duma, on the army and navy of the empire during the ten years preceding the present war, the nation's representatives, as evidenced by their repeated utterances in Parliament, never felt quite sure that the right thing had been done, and were not free from secret anxiety when the war broke out. Would the story of the previous wars repeat itself, with its contract scandals and anarchy in the medical and sanitary services?

THE ZEMSTVOS AND WAR WORK.

To a certain extent the Government itself had taken measures of precaution against a repetition of former failures by allowing the municipalities and the Zemstvos to associate themselves in the sanitary and food supply services. This was an unprecedented step on the part of the bureaucracy, which called forth the greater enthusiasm as at the same time the town and Zemstvo organisations were allowed to form central unions for the whole of the empire for the co-ordination of the local activities. The result was the creation of an All-Russian Union of Zemstvos, under the chairmanship



M. Goremykin, the Russian Premier.

[Stanley's Press Agency.]



M. A. T. Goutchkoff, Chairman of the Russian Committee for War Munitions.

[Underwood and Underwood.]

of Prince Lvoff, one of the most enlightened Zemstvo workers in the country, and another All-Russian Union of Towns, under the chairmanship of M. Tchelnokoff, the Mayor of Moscow. The success of the two organisations was instantaneous. All educated Russians threw themselves heart and soul into the work of the two bodies, with the result that the entire country became organised in a very short time for the feeding and clothing of the army, for the removal of the wounded and sick, and for the formation of numerous hospitals and ambulances in all the main centres. It is sufficient to mention that in the first two months of the war the Union of Zemstvos succeeded in installing 150,000 beds in the rear of the theatres of operations, and in forming innumerable "flying" detachments for transporting, wherever needed, complete sanitary installations and kitchens. Together with the Union of Towns it has also established pharmaceutical and chemical laboratories for the production of medical and surgical articles, hitherto imported from Germany, and has supplied the Red Cross with trained assistants of every kind. The Union of Zemstvos also took a leading part in organising the purchase and collection of foodstuffs as well as of clothes in all parts of the vast empire, and in distributing them in a co-ordinated fashion.

It is this novel and entirely successful co-operation of the nation in the organisation of future victory which, perhaps more than anything else, has made the Russian nation regret that nothing of the kind had been formerly permitted by the ruling bureaucracy during the years of peace. For almost immediately sinister rumours began to circulate that the conduct of the war was being hampered by the same kind of mismanagement which

had prevailed on former occasions, and that the time and the effort of even the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Grand Duke Nicholas Nicolayevitch, were, to a considerable extent, taken up with suppressing corruption and incompetence in the supply services. There were reports to the effect that the depôts lacked the necessary stores of clothes and foodstuffs, that in many magazines considerable deficiencies of war material had been discovered, and that collusions between contractors and army officers—even of high rank—were not infrequent. As it afterwards turned out, the reports were largely true; but so long as the career of the Russian armies continued to be crowned with success, their importance was discounted.

THE AWAKENING OF CRITICISM.

The turn of the tide, which began on May 2nd, brought about an almost immediate reaction from the early confidence. The first body to raise its voice was the Imperial Technical Society, one of the most respected associations in Russia, consisting of engineers, technologists, chemists, and other specialists in applied sciences. All through the war it had been watching the activity of Russian industry in face of Russia's isolation from all foreign markets, and had come to an early conclusion that this activity had not been adequate to the requirements of the State and national defence. The Battle of the Dunajec, and the subsequent series of reverses, confirmed its observations, and it then drew up a memorandum for the information of the Government, insisting upon immediate measures for the creation of an independent national industry in Russia. But it added:—

"A necessary condition for the development of such



M. Rodzianko President of the Duma.

Underwood and Underwood.



M. Miliukoff Leader of the Democratic Party in the Duma.

[Underwood and Underwood.]

a national industry is an appropriate political atmosphere guaranteeing to all citizens, without distinction of nationality and religion, complete freedom in application of labour and capital, and wide opportunity of initiative, individual and social, on the firm basis of law and legality, since without the reign of law, outside guaranteed legality, tasks of such magnitude as the creation of a national industry for the benefit of the country cannot be realised."

Those were veiled, but perfectly plain, words, and it so happened that they became known to the large public through the Press on the very day (June 3rd) when Przemyśl was surrendered to the Austro-Germans. The cue was immediately taken up by a still more important body. Five days later the Ninth Congress of Representatives of Russian Industry and Commerce was opened at Petrograd. At first the congress was inclined to follow the advice of its chairman, M. Avdakoff, to confine its labours to the ordinary economic business, but the arrival of M. Riabushinsky, one of the foremost Moscow industrialists, straight from the front, changed the entire aspect of the business. He made a long speech describing the disorders which he had witnessed at and behind the front, and while calling upon the delegates to leave aside every other interest but that of the industrial organisation of national defence, proclaimed the necessity for placing at the head of affairs men enjoying the confidence of the nation:—

"Our first task is to entrust the work to men of firm character, experienced and competent. We, representatives of large industrial undertakings, know well that the success of business depends upon the proper selection of men. Look at England and France, who at this moment are selecting for the work of national defence their best and ablest men. We, too, must have persons deserving our confidence."



Refugees from Poland being fed at one of the canteens organised by the Petrograd Municipal Authorities.

[Central News.]



Polish refugees on their arrival in Petrograd.

[Central News.]

The following speeches were all couched in the same terms. Even M. Rodzianko, the President of the Duma, who had agreed to attend the congress on the condition that no political speeches were made, could not, after a long and fervid exhortation for united action in face of a dangerous enemy, refrain from observing that "the bureaucracy was played out," and that "the nation itself must take over the management of affairs." The congress decided to form a "Central War Industrial Committee," at Petrograd, consisting of delegates from commerce and industry, learned societies, railway administration, and the Unions of Zemstvos and Towns, in order to organise the production and distribution of war material, quite apart from the Government. In addition, it passed a series of resolutions in favour of equal rights for all nationalities, including the Jews, and of a responsible Government. This latter phrase, however, had to be withdrawn at the last moment, and replaced by another speaking of "co-operation" with the Government, as the authorities had intimated that otherwise they would close the congress. The reply to this action of the bureaucracy came very soon. A few days later the Moscow Bourse Committee, having to re-elect its officers, elected M. Riabushinsky, the leader of the anti-Government movement, as its president, in the place of M. Avdakoff, his chief political opponent.

The effect of the action of the congress was striking. M. Maklakoff, the reactionary and corrupt Minister of the Interior, was dismissed, and was soon followed by two others of the same stamp, the Minister of Justice and the Procurator of the Holy Synod. After the fall of Lemberg, General Sukhomlinoff, the Minister of War, went too. At the same time, by the decree of the Tsar, a technico-military advisory committee was established at the Ministry of War, consisting of one of the Assistant-Ministers and a number of experts, together with four members of the Duma and four members of the Council of the Empire.

CAUSES OF DISCONTENT.

This committee was, no doubt, intended as a response to the demand of the Industrial Congress for association of the nation with the Government, and it naturally found but little favour. In the meantime, things were going from bad to worse at the front, and equally badly at home. Riots over the rising cost of living were taking place in various cities, the Press censorship was raging with increased vigour, and, in addition, a mighty flood of fugitives, counting many millions, spread all over Russia, carrying terror and misery into the remotest corner of the empire. Who those fugitives were has since been revealed in the Duma. At first they were mainly Jews, against whom the wholesale accusation had been launched of being actual or potential traitors to their country. Tens and hundreds of thousands of them were forcibly driven from their homes into the interior provinces at forty-eight hours', and sometimes even shorter, notice—mostly old men, women, children, and cripples, because all the able-bodied males had already been enrolled in the army. Then came the forcible evacuation of the remaining population of Poland, Courland, and Lithuania, as a military measure, in imitation of the strategy of 1812. The Press on many occasions, in spite of the censorship, openly expressed its doubts as to the wisdom of this measure, but what was certainly unwise was the way in which it had been carried out. There had been no provision made for the reception of the fugitives or for their proper

transportation. They were often packed in cattle trucks, or driven on foot along the roads, with the result that the movement of troops was impeded, and the fugitives themselves suffered terrible hardships. The property which they had left behind was frequently plundered, and they themselves were let loose upon the wide world without any means of subsistence, and very often without knowing where they should or ought to go. Private and public philanthropy, as well as the Unions of Zemstvos and Towns, came to their assistance as best they could, but that best, improvised as it was at a moment's notice, was very little. One has to read the speeches which were subsequently delivered on the subject in the Duma, by men of extremely moderate views, to realise the profound impression which had been produced in the country by this clumsy handling of a vast and delicate problem by the bureaucracy.

THE MEETING OF THE DUMA.

It became evident that the nation must raise its voice through its proper channel, the Duma, if it was not to come through the streets. The Press began to ventilate the demand for the immediate summoning of the Duma, and party leaders were holding private conferences at which the question was discussed. Almost without knowledge of each other's doings, the individual deputies soon found themselves at Petrograd from all over the empire, and what was virtually private sittings of the Duma began to be held under the chairmanship of M. Rodzianko, the President, in the Taurida Palace. The movement became well-nigh irresistible, and after a consultation with the Ministers, held at the Grand Duke's Headquarters, the Tsar issued, on June 27th, a rescript in the name of M. Goremykin, the Prime Minister, ordering the convocation of the Duma at a date not later than August.

The Duma, in fact, reassembled on August 1st, but previous to that much preparatory work had been done by the parties privately. The Constitutional Democrats (Cadets) held several meetings, both alone and in conjunction with the other progressive parties, to consider the question whether a demand for a responsible Ministry should be raised in the Duma. After prolonged discussions the question, on the motion of M. Miliukoff, the leader of the Cadets, was decided in the negative, as being too far-reaching and controversial to be raised at such a moment of crisis. On the other hand, the two parties which adjoin the Cadets on the right and on the left respectively, the Progressives under M. Yefremoff, and the Labour (Socialist Peasant) Party under M. Kerensky, were in favour of immediately insisting upon the formation of a Ministry from among the Parliamentary parties. As it afterwards turned out, M. Miliukoff had the majority of the Duma on his side. But the Constitutional Democrats were in favour of two other measures closely related to that of the formation of a responsible Cabinet. The one was that the Cabinet should be formed and presided over by men "enjoying the confidence of the nation." Formally, such a Cabinet would be a different thing from a responsible Ministry, since it could be recruited from outside the Duma, and would still leave the authority of the Tsar intact. But in the long run it is evident that such a Cabinet enjoying the confidence of the nation would have become dependent on, and therefore responsible to, the Duma, as the authorised interpreter of the nation's wishes. The other measure suggested by M. Miliukoff's party was the creation of a special Ministry of Munitions, after the British model, which should be



Refugee children, separated from their parents in the flight from the invaded provinces, appearing at one of the Registry Offices appointed to deal with refugees.

[Underwood and Underwood.]



Inmates of a Russian State Reformatory for Women making shirts for wounded soldiers.

[Underwood and Underwood.]

virtually a Ministry of National Defence, and presided over by a man like M. Goutchkoff, the eminent Octobrist leader and ex-President of the Duma, who enjoys universal confidence. In the subsequent deliberations of the leaders of the various Duma parties this scheme was altered, and took the shape of a plan for the creation of a Board of Defence consisting of six leading Ministers, one representative of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and of nine members of the Duma, and as many members of the Council of the State, thus securing a permanent Parliamentary majority.

Neither of these plans proved acceptable to the Government. One of the Vice-Presidents of the Duma, Prince Volkonsky, and another member of the Duma were given minor seats in the Cabinet as representatives of the nation, and the post of a second Assistant-Minister of War was created to take charge of the supply of ammunition. This, and the formation of a consultative board from among industrialists and members of the Duma to assist the new Assistant-Minister, was all that was conceded. When, therefore, the Duma assembled, even the Nationalists and a section of the Extreme Right were found to be more or less on the side of the Opposition. A portion of the former, led by M. Savenko and Count Bobrinsky (the latter a well-known Slavophil and a cousin of the ex-Governor-General of Galicia), openly broke away from the party and joined an informal alliance with the Progressives; and among the Extreme Right, men like the notorious M. Purishkevitch frankly declared that they preferred Shingareff, a well-known leader of the Cadets,—that is, a Parliamentary Government,—to a defeat at the hands of Germany. Only a section of the Extreme Right, small in numbers, but exceedingly powerful in influence, remained as irreconcilable as ever before. "We shall not give up Holy Russia to you," was their programme as formulated by their leader, M. Markoff, who openly argued that the only country which had hitherto proved victorious in the war was Germany, because she had a semi-absolutist Government, whereas the two Parliamentarily-governed countries, England and France, sustained nothing but defeats.

The proceedings in the Duma itself revealed distinctly the state of mind of the nation. Its present complexion, so far as political opinion is concerned, is distinctly moderate. Apart from the small Socialist group (one-half of whose members had, moreover, been arrested and sent to Siberia at the beginning of the war on a charge of high treason), and the equally small Labour group, the Opposition is represented chiefly by the Cadet party, whose tendencies are those of moderate Liberalism, and by the Progressives, who are in many ways still more moderate. The most important party in the Duma is the Octobrists, the party of industrialists and rich merchants, who are constitutionalists of the Whig variety. Yet with such a complexion the reassembled Duma proved more like the first "revolutionary Duma" of 1906. Sitting after sitting were filled with speeches against the ruling bureaucracy, which mercilessly laid bare the incompetence and corruption which had hitherto prevailed in the organisation and conduct of the war. For the first time in its history the Duma took upon itself to demand the impeachment of a Minister, namely, General Sukhomlinoff; and so strong was this demand that the Government had to agree to the appointment of a Commission of judicial inquiry into the conduct of the General, consisting of seven members of the two Houses of Parliament. It is as well to note here that ultimately

the majority of the Commission, including Count Bobrinsky and M. Varun-Sekret, one of the Vice-Presidents of the Duma, reported in favour of taking judicial proceedings against the ex-Minister, but inasmuch as the finding was not unanimous the Commission decided to take supplementary evidence. The Duma also decided in favour of admitting the Socialists to the standing committees on the army and navy, as well as on the Budget, and elected M. Shingareff to the chairmanship of the former in the place of the hitherto traditional Octobrist. In the same way the Duma demanded and obtained the formation of consultative boards at the chief Ministries, and decided in favour of admitting to them delegates from the working-class, along with those representing the manufacturers.

THE QUESTION OF RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT.

One question remained supreme throughout, viz., the one concerning the establishment of a responsible Ministry, or, at least, one enjoying public confidence. At one time the volume of opinion on this subject became so powerful that there was serious talk in the highest quarters of summoning M. Rodzianko to form a Cabinet. That was after the fall of Kovno. But the tension passed, and once more the ruling bureaucracy lapsed into its reactionary passivity. Then, after the fall of Brest-Litovsk, the tension once more became acute. The scheme then brought forward at the Court and the Headquarters of the Grand Duke was for the nomination, from among the Parliamentary and other authoritative circles, of ten Ministers without a portfolio. This time the scheme was repudiated by the Duma leaders themselves, as being more in the nature of a measure for taking hostages than for the formation of a responsible Cabinet. It was then that the majority of the Duma parties, embracing the entire range of political opinion, from the Cadets on the left and the Progressive Nationalists (under Count Bobrinsky) on the right side, and counting about 400 members out of a total of 442, decided to form a united block on a comprehensive programme, which included the following main items: A Cabinet enjoying the confidence of the country; a complete political amnesty; complete and equal rights for all nationalities; autonomy for Poland and restitution of the Finnish constitution; extension of the right of combination, and democratisation of the Zemstvos and municipalities. This was a momentous, almost a revolutionary, step. It was both significant of the profound change which had taken place in the political complexion of the Duma and the country.

The initial idea was not to enter into any negotiations with the Government, but simply to confront it with an accomplished fact so as to compel its resignation or leave to it the responsibility for a grave constitutional conflict. Again, it was chiefly M. Miliukoff, who, for patriotic motives, suggested and carried through a less intransigent policy. A committee of five was appointed to inform M. Goremykin of the new state of affairs, and to ask him to resign in favour of a Cabinet of national representatives. M. Goremykin himself refused to meet them, but authorised M. Kharitonoff, the Comptroller of the State, to do so. The committee put the issue before M. Kharitonoff quite plainly: either the Crown accepts the programme of the block in its entirety, or the block assumes complete liberty of action. M. Kharitonoff made an attempt to bargain: "Suppose M. Goremykin were to accept only part of the programme, would that satisfy the block? Or suppose M. Goremykin were to appoint new men of the block's selection to the

posts of Ministers of Finance and of Railways, would that meet with the favour of the Duma's majority?" The reply of the delegates was a firm negative. Even the resignation of the entire ministry would not satisfy the Parliamentary majority if it were not followed by the formation of a Cabinet enjoying the confidence of the block. M. Yefremoff, one of the delegates, even added: "Either the programme of the block was accepted, or the Crown would have to establish a dictatorship to fight the Duma."

THE MOVEMENT IN THE COUNTRY.

While this was going on in and around the Duma, an equally important movement was going on in the country. In the middle of August a Congress of the War Industrial Committees of the Empire, attended by over 1,000 delegates, was held at Petrograd to receive a report from the Central Committee, and to discuss the future requirements and possibilities of the work. Though the discussions were chiefly confined to technical questions, it was the feeling of every one present which M. Goutchkoff, as the President-elect, expressed, when in a brief but impressive speech he frankly warned the delegates against exaggerated hopes "so long as the present conditions prevail."

In a telegram addressed to the Tsar the congress proclaimed the determination of those whom it represented to fight to the end, until complete victory was achieved, but added that this would only be possible "if accompanied by a proper organisation of the productive forces, and by a close association with a Government enjoying public confidence." It is worthy of note that the congress also passed a resolution expressing sympathy with the national aspirations of Poland and Finland, and demanding the abolition of all exceptional legislation and administrative treatment of the Jews. The congress was followed by a meeting of the Council of the Associated Industries of Russia—the same which had been instrumental in bringing to life the War Industrial Committee—at which also a resolution was passed expressing the determination to carry on the war to a finish, for which, however, it was necessary "immediately to change the personnel of the Government, and to call to power persons enjoying public confidence."

Then came the remarkable conference at Moscow—the second capital of the empire—of all the public institutions of the city, the Zemstvo, municipal, political, financial, industrial, commercial, and educational, under the chairmanship of M. Tchelnokoff, the Mayor, assisted by all the Parliamentary representatives of the Moscow constituencies. Again the same series of resolutions were passed embodying the nation's resolve to see the war through to the end, and demanding the formation of a Ministry composed of representatives of the Duma and Council of the Empire, and of persons possessing the confidence of the nation. This weighty and unmistakable voice of Moscow found an immediate echo throughout the empire, and the municipalities, the Chambers of Commerce and Bourse Committees at Petrograd, Nizhni-Novgorod, Tver, and scores of other cities, passed resolutions solemnly joining Moscow in its national demands.

Yet another series of facts must be referred to here in order to complete the picture of public sentiment in Russia at the end of August and the beginning of September. The working-class, too, began to show signs of considerable restlessness. The causes were at first purely economic, due to the enormous rise of

prices and the unwise conduct of employers in many instances. Strikes began to break out here and there, and in two cases—at Kostrona and Ivanovo-Voznesensk—troops were called out without any provocation, and numerous strikers and inoffensive passers-by were shot down. This caused great excitement among the town proletariat, and political watchwords began to play a more or less considerable part in the strike movement. The authorities naturally denounced it as a movement engineered by German agents, but the charge was baseless. A particularly bad instance of a working-class outbreak occurred at Moscow on August 23rd, when a sensational evening sheet came out with the false announcement of the capture of the Dardanelles. The town mob at once organised a "patriotic" street demonstration, which soon began to assume the character of a "pogrom." The police did nothing to stop it, whereupon a large crowd of workmen came out from the factories and attacked the mob. Red flags made their appearance. Cries: "We are again being deceived!" resounded, and a revolutionary speaker ascended a public monument and harangued the crowd. He was arrested, but the crowd followed him to the house of Senator Krasheninkoff, who had been holding a judicial inquiry into the first Moscow pogrom, and obtained his release. It was then attacked and ultimately dispersed by mounted police and troops.

THE DUMA PROROGUED.

This and other incidents showed that the atmosphere was dangerous. M. Goremykin now openly declared to the representatives of the Progressive block that its programme was not acceptable, and proceeding to the Tsar, who had now assumed the supreme command of the army, obtained from him a decree of the prorogation of the Duma, on the pretext that the clamour for a National Ministry was threatening the very existence of the State. This was like a thunderbolt from the blue sky. The parties at once assembled at private conference to consider how best to reply to this unexpected stroke, and it is worthy of note that even M. Miliukoff, who had always been opposed to drastic measures, was now in favour of withdrawing the party delegates from the consultative boards at the various Ministries. This idea was approved of by the Progressives. Nevertheless, at the joint meeting of the Progressive block, the idea did not meet with the necessary sanction, as being detrimental to the cause of national defence, and it was agreed to meet the reading of the decree of prorogation in silent protest. Nevertheless, feeling ran very high, and it was with great difficulty, out of consideration for Russia's difficult position in face of the invader, that the majority kept themselves under restraint. On September 16th, the Duma was prorogued till the middle of November. During the reading of the decree by M. Goremykin a number of deputies could no longer hold out, and broke down in sobs, while the Progressives, the Socialists, and the Labour group left the Chamber by way of demonstration, M. Kerensky, the leader of the latter, turning round at the door and exclaiming: "Long live the people and the army!"

The situation was one of despair. It was suggested by some of the Cadets and the Progressives, at the private sitting of the Duma after it had been prorogued, that if an appeal were issued to the nation calling upon it to overthrow the bureaucracy it would have risen like one man. But it was felt that a revolution would at this juncture play into the hands of the Germans, and the idea was abandoned. It was merely decided that all the

members of the Duma should remain at their posts at Petrograd, and that M. Rodzianko should proceed to the Tsar's headquarters to submit to him the true state of affairs.

On the outside public the effect of the prorogation of the Duma was tremendous. A strike wave of great dimensions swept the empire from one end to another, beginning with Petrograd and Moscow, and not sparing even the establishments manufacturing munitions (including the famous Putiloff works), so that the Commander of the Petrograd Military District saw himself constrained to issue a proclamation threatening the strikers with six years' hard labour. The Press broke out in a language that vividly recalled the revolutionary period of 1905, and various public bodies passed resolutions denouncing M. Goremykin's Cabinet, and demanding its resignation. But the most remarkable reply came once more from Moscow, where, on September 20th, a congress of the Union of Zemstvos and a congress of the Union of Towns simultaneously assembled—the former under the chairmanship of Prince Lvoff, the latter under that of M. Tchelnokoff. They were two of the most remarkable gatherings that Russia ever witnessed, and the proceedings were historical. At both congresses the former determination of clearing the Russian soil from the enemy was reiterated by numerous speakers, and embodied in solemn resolutions, but the demand for a National Government formed a not less important burden of the utterances. The reports of these proceedings in the Press were heavily mutilated by the censorship, and several papers were fined for publishing parts of the resolutions adopted. Nevertheless, what little appeared gives a sufficient idea of the general tone which prevailed at the congresses. Prince Lvoff, for instance, said :—

"Our country is thirsting not only after the restoration of peaceful life, but also after the reorganisation of that life. . . . After two months' labour on the part of the Duma we feel its need more than ever. Like a torch in the dark labyrinth of events, the Duma was shining forth. . . . But the consciousness of the need for mutual trust between the Government and the nation has thereby been only strengthened. . . . We are more convinced than ever that the organisation of victory is only possible through the complete union between the Government and the nation in the persons of its legitimate representatives as members of Government."

Of the other speeches delivered at the Zemstvo Congress, only one phrase of another delegate, that of M. V. Surko, the son of a famous General, and an ex-Assistant Minister of the Interior and member of the Council of the Empire, was allowed to appear: "Perplexion has seized the country after the dissolution (*sic*) of the Duma."

At the Congress of the Towns M. Goutchkoff made a great speech, of which the following sentences were allowed to appear :—

"The organs of the military administration have deceived the Duma, the Government, and the Allies, and only when truth began to come out from all the pores did the Ministry

of War acknowledge it. . . . The organs of the military administration were either criminally inactive or criminally active. Men who did badly the work of peace are doing still worse the work of war. We must have in the Government men possessing the confidence of the country, and leaning for support on Parliament."

M. Goutchkoff also warned against the danger of permitting the "dark popular instincts" to gain the upper hand, and insisted upon the necessity of having strong authority. But that authority, he reiterated, must be such as would be approved of by public opinion.

M. Shingareff spoke in the same strain, demanding a national Government, and warning against the "excesses of the street." M. Tchelnokoff, in summarising the speeches, laid down the following principles :—

"Russia must win together with the Allies, without whose consent peace is inadmissible. One of the conditions of victory is the renewal of the activity of the legislative assemblies, the re-construction of the Government, unity in the interior, and equal rights for all nationalities."

These principles were embodied by the congress in a formal programme containing the following items: Immediate convocation of the Duma; formation of a Cabinet enjoying the confidence of the country, and including representatives of the nation; a political and religious amnesty; and equal rights for all nationalities living in Russia. It was then resolved to send a deputation of three members to the Tsar, in accordance with the following resolution :—

"This congress of representatives of the empire's towns charges the committee, conjointly with the representatives of the Zemstvos, to inform the Emperor of the anxiety and wishes which animate the country, and of the wishes of the congress, namely, the continuance of the war to a victorious end, the immediate reassembly of the legislative bodies, and the summoning to the Cabinet of persons enjoying the confidence of the country."

It must not be concealed that the general public outside was slightly disappointed at the moderation expressed in this resolution; nevertheless, its importance was obvious.

As a further indication of the trend of public opinion in Russia, it may be mentioned that on September 30th electors from all over the empire assembled at Petrograd to fill four vacancies in the Council of the Empire—two representing industry and two commerce. The choice fell on M. Riabushinsky, a Progressive; M. Goutchkoff, the leader of the Octobrists and former President of the Duma; M. Laptef, a Constitutional Democrat; and M. Weinstein, a Liberal Jewish banker—all four belonging to the Progressive block. The election of a Jew to the Council of the Empire—the first occurrence of this kind—is itself highly symptomatic.

Every friend of the Russian nation will express the hope that her domestic crisis may be overcome without public disorders and without damage to the common cause of the Allies.



One of the frontier passes through which the Italians advanced on Cortina.

[*Topical Press.*]



The King of Italy at an Italian outpost during a visit to the front.

[Topical Press.]

CHAPTER XIII.

THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN.

THE STRENGTH OF THE ITALIAN ARMY—DESCRIPTION OF THE FRONTIER—THE PLANS OF GENERAL CADORNA—THE FIGHTING IN THE TRENTINO—THE ATTACKS ON THE ISONZO FRONT—COMMENTS.

THE nominal full strength of the Italian army on a war footing was, according to the official figures for 1912, no fewer than 3,442,150.

This figure, however, included 2,281,802 of the Territorial Militia, who certainly could not be counted upon for any offensive movement on the frontier. The strength of the First Line Troops in 1915 would be, roughly, 350,000 officers and men, with a first-line reserve of 500,000, making 850,000 in all. Between this first line and the Territorial Militia is the Mobile Militia, some 325,000 strong, making the total number of men available for active operations on the frontier to not far short of 1,200,000 men. It is a very formidable army in numbers, and also, especially in some services, in quality. The Italian cavalry, the engineering and artillery services, and the Alpine troops have a very high reputation. The organisation of the standing army is in twelve corps, consisting of twenty-five infantry and three cavalry divisions. Of these twelve corps, eight are stationed in the north, at Turin, Alessandria, Milan, Genoa, Verona, Bologna, Ancona, and Florence. The remaining four stations are Rome, Naples, Bari, and

Palermo in Sicily. The territorial distribution of corps in peace times is a fairly safe guide to the probable area of their employment in war. Much the best troops in the Italian army are those of the north, and as the northern is also the frontier with Austria it was to be expected that at the beginning of the war the eight northern corps would be deployed against Austria, while the four southern corps were kept in reserve. And, though very little is known of the distribution of the Italian corps on the frontier, it is reasonable to suppose that this arrangement was followed. That would leave of the First Line Army and the Mobile Militia, roughly, three-quarters of a million men available for service against Austria. It may be doubted whether so many were actually employed. If the four central or southern corps were held in reserve for service across the Adriatic, it is not at all improbable, in view of the risk of a German offensive, that two or more of the northern corps would be kept back against that contingency. Perhaps 600,000 men, or roughly half the First and Second Line Army, would be a reasonable estimate of the numbers that Italy deployed for her attack on the Austrian frontier. No just appreciation, however,



An Italian field hospital directly behind the firing line.

[Topical Press.]



Alpini behind a snow barricade in the Alps.

[Topical Press.]

of the situation, as it presented itself to the Italian General Staff at the beginning of the war, is possible without a general survey of the frontier. Its difficulties dictated the whole military policy of the Italians.

Tyrol, Carinthia, and Carniola, the three Austrian provinces on the frontier of Italy, make an amphitheatre of mountains overlooking the province of Venice. The two ends of this semicircle of hills—in Tyrol and in Carniola—separate Italians in Italy from Italians living under Austrian rule, and make Italy's standing grievance against Austria. The southernmost province of Tyrol, the Trentino, projects between Venetia and Lombardy, and cuts off communication between these provinces except by the plain on the south which stretches between Verona and Milan. Yet the Trentino is mainly Italian in population, and should be a part of Italy. At the other end of the semicircle is the Trieste province, where, again, the Austrians are in a small minority. These two provinces—Trentino and Trieste—are the "unredeemed Italy" which she hopes to recover in the war. But Italy had more than a political grievance on their account. The configuration of the Austrian frontier in these provinces placed Italy at a great military disadvantage, which, unless Austria were preoccupied on other frontiers, forbade Italy to hope for success in any war with her. At all points the higher ground was in the possession of the Austrians, and the Italians, whether for attack or for defence, began with the odds heavily against them.

THE THREE SECTIONS OF THE ITALIAN FRONTIER.

The frontier may be divided into three sections. The first is formed by the Trentino, which has an eastern aspect looking towards Verona and a western towards Milan. The second section is made by the Carnic Alps extending from the Dolomites near Cortina to Tarvis. The third section extends from Tarvis to the head of the Adriatic, and the frontier runs parallel with the course of the Isonzo, some little distance on its right bank. On this section are the Julian Alps.

The Trentino salient is almost unassailable on its western side. There are three principal passes across the hills—the Stelvio, the Tonale, and the Giudicaria Valley. These were the scene of Garibaldi's operations against General von Kuhn in the War of Italian Liberation. Garibaldi had 38,000 men, and Von Kuhn perhaps half as many. But Von Kuhn had not the least difficulty in holding his own. The Austrians have given great attention to the fortification of the few gaps in the chain of Alps, and it is doubtful whether a superiority of ten to one in the attack would now be sufficient to overcome the natural strength of the Austrian front. Nor is the situation much more favourable on the eastern front of the Trentino. Only at the southern end, where the frontier crosses Lake Garda, is there any natural break in the hills, and here the points of access are guarded by very strong fortifications. Riva stands at the head of the lake, reputed impregnable. In the valley of the Adige the road from Rivoli to Trent passes in succession Ala, Mori, and Rovereto—all places of great natural and artificial strength. The Adige here flows in a narrow valley flanked by hills, Mount Baldo on the west and on the east the Lessini Hills (which dominate Verona from the north). Unlike most rivers, the valley of the Adige widens instead of contracting nearer its source. Between Ala and Rovereto the valley is a quarter of a mile wide; at Botzen it is a vast plain. The frontier crosses this essentially Italian river just where it squeezes through

the hills and their pressure is at its closest. On the east side of the Trentino the Sugana Valley, formerly the avenue of trade between Germany and Venice, makes the only break in the wall of hills.


The direction of the hills in the Trentino is north and south. In the Carnic Alps it is east and west. Here the frontier follows the line of the watershed. The Carnic chain has one break at Plöcken, as the Austrians call it, or Monte Croce Carnico in Italian. Unfortunately, this pass leads only into the Gailthal, a curious rectangular valley, flanked on the north side by another difficult range, and opening into the Pusterthal on the west, and the valley of the Drave on the east. The valley is a back lobby behind the hills, commanded on both sides by hills and beset by extensive marsh land and with its exits covered by the Franzensfeste fortress at the Pusterthal end and by Klagenfurt and Tarvis at the eastern end.

In the third section of the frontier there are fewer commanding heights, but the hills are broader, and the high level plateaux lend themselves to obstinate resistance. The Austrian frontier runs from Tarvis, and comes down to the coast along a line some distance in advance of the Isonzo. At the northern end of this line the character of the hills is like that of the Carnic Alps. Tarvis, in a commanding position which dominates the approaches to Carinthia and Carniola, is the headquarters of a German colony wedged in between the Italians of the western hills and the Slovenes to the east. It is heavily fortified. The Predil Pass connects the hills about Tarvis with the valley of the Isonzo and the Italian frontier province of Friuli. On the east, towards Austrian Carniola, the hills fall gently to the valley of the Save and the Croatian highlands. But to the south the descent is rapid. Monte Nero, south of the Predil Pass, is nearly 7,000 feet high. At Tolmino the hills are broken by the ravine of the Idria, and south of Tolmino the mountains with their sharp dolomitic crags, give place to rolling plateau, which rises along the east bank of the Isonzo like a wall. The frontier province of Friuli is partly arid steppe and partly swamp. The Campagna district near Udine is made of the débris of the mountains, and the rainfall, heavy as it is, sinks through the stones and leaves the surface dry. Nearer the coast the river beds are too narrow and the descent too steep to carry off the water, which spreads out in marsh lands. It is the most barren province of Italy, and over the greater part of its extent the most thinly peopled. Plezzo has not fifteen inhabitants to the square mile. The coast here is without ports; and as though to mock at the misfortunes of Friuli, immediately over the frontier is the flourishing town of Monfalcone, and on the other side of the bay the great port of Trieste. The line of the Isonzo and the wall of hills on the east bank give Austria an exceedingly strong defensive front, in which Tolmino and Gorizia are the chief military centres. Tolmino is at the entrance to the Idria Gap, Gorizia near the junction of the Vipacco with the Isonzo. Between Gorizia and Trieste is the great waste of the Carso plateau, dry and barren as crocodile skin.

Such are the main features of the Italian frontier with Austria.

THE PROBLEM OF DEFENCE.

It may be gathered from this brief survey that the military problem that confronted General Cadorna, alike in defence and attack, was one of extreme difficulty. In passing judgment on what an Ally is doing in the field, it is necessary, unless grave injustice is to be done, to regard the problem from that Ally's point of view.



THE AUSTRIAN FRONTIER OF ITALY.

The three Entente Powers, especially England, which knew next to nothing of the military problems of the Italian frontier, formed somewhat exaggerated estimates of the difference which the intervention of Italy might make to the Allied cause. They added Italy's military strength to the forces which seemed in approximate equilibrium on the east and west, and concluded that it would turn the scale in our favour. The Italian regarded the problem somewhat differently. He had a frontier which was very difficult to defend, and in some stretches might have been drawn for the express purpose of facilitating Austrian invasion. The inequity of that frontier, both political and military, had been his principal motive for intervening in the war. General sympathy with the cause of the Entente he undoubtedly had, and without that sympathy he would not have sided with us. Still, he did not go to war solely or mainly on that account. He was not crusading on behalf of the principles of international justice for which the Allied Powers stood, but going to war, in the first instance at any rate, to redress his own grievances and to secure his own position. His first preoccupation, and a very proper one, was to convert a bad into a good, or at any rate a tolerable, frontier. On two, if not three, sections his military position was exceedingly dangerous. He knew that the Austrians had elaborate plans for invasion over the Carnic Alps, and it was necessary that he should

keep a strong force to guard against any attempt to carry them into execution. Their preoccupation in Galicia would not be permanent, and if Austria were free to attack, Italy might well be the first to receive her blows. The danger of invasion through the Trentino was less serious, and Napoleon's classic campaign in Northern Italy in 1797 against Alvinzi and Wurmser had shown how risky it might be for an invader to make this province the base of his operations. But Italy had always to bear in mind the possibility that Germany might cross the Tyrol from Bavaria and assail her on the western flank of her defence, so that here, as well as in the Carnic Alps, the Italian position was one of some danger. It was,

however, in the Friuli province that the immediate danger was most serious. The Italian plans of campaign for a war with Austria alone had for its first principle that an Austrian invasion across the Isonzo could not be resisted on the frontier, and that the first line of defence must be on the Tagliamento. One of the great advantages of beginning a war with an Austria occupied elsewhere was that at any rate it need not begin with a wholesale evacuation of territory owing to the indefensible nature of the frontier. Considerations of defence, therefore, which had the first place in the mind of Italians, made it their first business in the war to secure a better frontier by the occupation of commanding positions on the Austrian side of the border. Such positions were to be found all

along the frontier, but especially in Friuli, on the line of the Isonzo.

THE PROBLEM OF OFFENCE.


[Naturally, General Cadorna had also to consider, apart from securing his defence, where best he could undertake a forward movement such as would compel Austria to satisfy his political demands, and would fit in best with the strategy of the Allies. There were many reasons against making his main attack against the Trentino. The principal one was that any marked advance in the Tyrol would bring him dangerously near to Germany, and expose him to the risk of an attack through Innsbruck, which he was anxious to avoid. Other reasons were the great difficulty of the country, and the



A general view of Monfalcone.

[Central News.

fact that past Trent an attack here would lead to nowhere. The military value of the Trentino and the Tyrol, both to the defence and the attack, is that they are on the flank of the main routes to Vienna. Had Italy's ambition been to deal a mortal wound at Austria, undoubtedly her best plan would have been to strike with all the force she could command, through Tarvis and Klagenfurt, at Vienna, and for such a movement the possession of Trent would have been necessary. If Russia had been able to hold the Carpathians and invade Hungary, this movement, though dangerous, would have had many attractions, and it would have been of inestimable service to the Allies. But, if ever the Italians indulged the hope of it, the Russian defeats



The road through the Stelvio Pass.

[Central News.



A halt by an Italian cyclist corps on its way to the front.

[Central News.

in Galicia would be decisive against further indulgence. The enterprise was far beyond the power of Italy, for the present at any rate, until Russia was in a position to co-operate from the other side. The whole of this northern frontier, therefore, was closed to a serious Italian offensive.

There remained the eastern frontier. This, the frontier which was weakest to defend, seemed also the frontier which promised the easiest and the most valuable rewards to an offensive movement—rewards moreover, which might well be in the power of the Italians, without co-operation with any other army, to secure for themselves. The great fort of Trieste is barely fifty miles from Udine; it has a very large Italian population, and it is a very important industrial centre, the loss of which would be a serious blow to Austria's ability to maintain her armies. It was here that the Italians decided to make their chief attack. The obstacles were formidable. First, the line of the Isonzo, with its fortified positions; then the wall of the heights on the left bank; and finally the bare, wind-swept plateau of the Carso. Still, they were less than the obstacles to advance in any other direction. Moreover the attack in this direction would fit in with Italy's ambitions on the eastern shores of the Adriatic, and if everything went well might be followed up by attacks on the rest of the Austrian seaboard. Accordingly, General Cadorna decided to make his main effort towards Trieste. This was not perhaps the direction in which Italian assistance was likely to be of most value to the Allies. Still, if the attacks made progress, as was hoped, they would draw off an increasing number of Austrians from the other campaign, and it was a great gain to have Austria, like her great Ally, employed on more than one front.


THE FEAR OF GERMANY.

It seems likely, as has already been estimated, that no more than 600,000 troops were employed on the frontier operations. That left Italy with about an equal number of men in reserve, even without drawing on the Territorial Militia. Two possible uses for these reserves suggested themselves. A strong contingent might have been sent into France, where its co-operation would have been very useful in Alsace. When General Joffre visited General Cadorna at the beginning of September,

it was thought by some that it was for the purpose of arranging some such scheme. But if anything of the kind was ever discussed, nothing came of it. A second possibility was that Italy would declare war on Turkey, and take part in the Dardanelles operations; but these hopes, too, were disappointed. The reason for Italy's reluctance to take part in operations except on her own frontiers was doubtless her fear of Germany. Prince Bülow, it must not be forgotten, who had been sent as Germany's special envoy to Rome, is a man of very great diplomatic ability. He failed to prevent war with Austria, but he may have succeeded in convincing Italy's rulers that Germany was disposed to be friendly. He may even have hinted that so long as Italy's operations were confined to the Austrian frontiers, Germany might be disposed not to go to war with her.

However that may

be, Italy not unnaturally was anxious to do nothing that would bring the German armies down upon her, and that may have influenced her attitude in regard to any suggestions that may have been made to her for the employment of her troops in other countries. Large reserves were, in her opinion, necessary as a precaution against German attack; and on the other hand, it may have been feared that the employment of troops in France



The Isonzo Front.




Italian cavalry passing through an Austrian frontier village.

[Record Press.]



Alpini on the march to an advanced position.

[Central News.]



The Italian gains in territory.

or in Turkey might precipitate a German declaration of war, with all its grave risks to Italy. It is not suggested, of course, that there was anything like an arrangement between Italy and Germany; but that fear of German attack had a great effect on Italy's strategy, and in certain directions hampered the services that she would have been willing to render to her Allies, does not admit of doubt.

Few good accounts of the fighting on the Italian frontier have reached this country, and an attempt to collate the official bulletins and construct a continuous military story would not yield very satisfactory results. It is sufficient for the present purpose, which is to estimate the influence of Italy on the war, to take note of the ground won by the Italians on each section of the frontier by the time that the advent of winter put an end to active offensive operations in the Alps. The division of the frontier into three sections, made in our survey of its leading geographical features, holds throughout the course of the operations. The Italian offensive began in the third week in May. At the beginning of the offensive the King issued a Proclamation, which ran as follows:—

"SOLDIERS OF LAND AND SEA,—The solemn hour of the vindication of the national claims has sounded. Following the example of my great ancestors, I assume to-day the supreme command of the land and sea forces with sure confidence in victory, which your valour, your self-sacrifice, and your discipline will bring.

"The enemy whom you prepare to fight is seasoned and worthy of you. Favoured by ground and scientific preparation he will offer you an obstinate resistance, but your indomitable dash will certainly defeat him.

"Soldiers, yours is the glory of hoisting the tricolour of Italy upon the sacred bounds which nature places as the confines of our country, yours the glory of accomplishing the work undertaken with so much heroism by our fathers."

The wording of the last two sentences is somewhat remarkable. The objects of the campaign are there stated to be two-fold. First, to secure a natural defensive frontier, and secondly, to complete the work of Italian unification

THE ADVANCE IN THE TRENTINO.

In the Trentino the fortifications round Riva prevented the Italians from attempting the approaches at the head of Lake Garda, and it was not till the third week of October when they captured Pregasina, near the shores of the lake about two miles over the frontier, that they could be said to come into touch with the Riva group of forts. But they early effected an entry into the Trentino by the valleys of the Adige and the Sugana. In the Sugana valley they forced the Austrians to evacuate Borgo, about half-way to Trent, from the point at which the Sugana crosses the frontier; but as the town was dominated by hills in the occupation of the Austrians, the Italians did not occupy it. Up the valley of the Adige the Italians pressed towards the neighbourhood of Rovereto, through Ala. These operations were conducted with very great skill, the advance being secured by very fine work in the hills on the east shore of Lake Garda. Some progress was also made up the Giudicaria Valley, and a little ground was also gained near Tonale Pass, in the great wall of mountains which forms the western face of the Trentino. Measured in mileage, it is true, the progress was small, and they never passed the outworks of the defences of Trent. But the military merit of these operations, when the terrible nature of the natural obstacles is taken into account, was high. The Italian engineers, in particular, did wonderful work, especially in the mountains on the east side of the Trentino front. The great difficulty was not to scale the summits, but to keep the forces that had occupied them supplied with food and munitions.

"Whenever the situation demands the occupation of a summit, the engineer comes in and cuts a road for mule and muleteer. Sometimes the obvious route is denied him because it faces the enemy, and he has to choose a line the difficulties of which would appal anyone not endowed with the optimism of the Italian military engineer. They are not short paths. I have seen roads cut out of rock on mountains rearing lofty heads 7,900 feet above sea-level. In one place, which shall be nameless, an Alpini relief column, proceeding to the relief of a detachment in trenches

only 300 metres distant from Austrians, took three hours and a half on the journey, and Alpinis do not hesitate on the way. The miles of that zig-zag road were cut in two months, and it is so banked that it looks as if it would last for ever. Up this path, some parts of which are very precipitous, mules carry water, cement and other secure 'consolidators,' and rations; and one splendid animal I saw had on its back, in two double-lined tanks, the hot cooked meat and soup rations for sixty men. Adequate attention for the men fighting up there in the clouds was made possible by the daring and skill of the soldier engineer, who may be as proud of his job as the constructor of a tunnel through the Simplon.

"These newly-cut roads abound wherever the Italian soldier has gained ground for new Italy. They are not in just a few isolated places in each valley. A commander gets so far towards his goal and says, 'To secure this place a post in that height would be an advantage.' The engineer replies, 'Of course,' and straightway blasts the rock and cuts and hews until the muleteer approves, and he, knowing the capacity of his animals, is a good judge. Perhaps very shortly the dash of the Bersaglieri will add another kilometre or two, and then the good work will begin afresh."


THE FIGHTING ON THE ISONZO.

At other points in the Tyrol, Italian troops made progress, notably near Cortina d'Ampezzo, so well known to tourists. All these gains, however, were in the nature of military rectifications of the frontier rather than invasions in the strict sense, though the sum total of Austrian territory that came into Italian hands, even by quite small advances spread over a great many different points along the frontier, came in the end to be quite considerable. In the Trentino district alone, between Garda and Cortina, nearly a thousand square miles of Austrian territory passed into Italian occupation. In the Carnic Alps the Italians made no attempt to penetrate the enemy's country, and were content to improve their defensive position against enemy's attacks, which in July were delivered with much vigour. Twenty-four hours after the declaration of war the Alpini, by a brilliant bayonet charge, seized the Vall' Inferno Pass, and by the end of June they had possessed themselves of most of the positions round Plöcken, or Monte Croce. By these

successes they not only thwarted the Austrian offensive which had been planned over the Carnic Alps, but they freed the main Italian attack of all anxiety on the score of an invasion, and enabled the Italian General Staff to give its undivided attention to the offensive against the Isonzo. Some progress was also made towards Malborghetto, a position defending Tarvis from the west, but though in the first fortnight of July Fort Hensel, one of the outworks of Malborghetto, was demolished, the attack at this point was not further pressed.

In their attacks on the Isonzo front, the Italians gained comparatively early three important successes. These were the occupation of Monte Nero, on the Upper Isonzo, near Tolmino, of Monfalcone near the coast, and on the Middle Isonzo at Plava. As a defensive campaign

it was a brilliant success, and the Italians achieved their first object of establishing a strong defensive frontier along the Isonzo. Instead of having to evacuate large tracts of territory between the frontier and the Tagliamento, as they had always expected to have to do in the event of war with Austria, the Italians crossed the frontier, and occupied the whole of the enemy's territory on the west bank of the Isonzo. They also established some strong bridge-heads over the river. The heaviest fighting of the campaign took place in front of Gorizia in July, but though the Italians gained some very great successes, and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, they nowhere succeeded in establishing themselves on the great Carso plateau which



In order to avoid the fate of Rheims Cathedral: Removing the stained glass windows from Milan Cathedral to escape possible damage from Austrian air raids.

[Central News.]

stretches from the Isonzo to Trieste. Too little information about the details of the Carso fighting has yet been published to make a critical account of its progress possible, and the fuller treatment of the fighting for the Carso plateau is deferred to a later chapter, when it may be dealt with as a whole. Here it is enough to say that the offensive campaign against Trieste was for the first six months not a success.


The Italians did a great service to the Entente Powers by holding on their frontiers an Austrian force which can hardly have been less than half a million strong. The Austrians put their numbers lower, and estimated the

number of Italian troops employed against them at over a million, which is certainly a gross exaggeration. Except on the Isonzo front, there does not seem any great disparity between the numbers on either side, and the geographical conditions were not favourable to the deployment of great masses of troops. If the estimate given in this chapter of the numbers of Italian troops engaged in the fighting is near the truth, it reflects the highest credit on them that they should have gained the measure of success that they did. The Austrian

frontier is naturally the strongest in Europe, and it had been fortified with the utmost skill and ingenuity. General Cadorna's strategy was cautious to a fault, and he thought first of all, as it was his duty to do, for the interests of Italy. That did not prevent him from rendering very great, if indirect, service to his Allies. Grave as the Russian reverses were in Galicia, they would have been graver still if Austria had been free to use in the east the half million men tied to the defence of the Italian frontier.




On the Austro-Italian frontier: A scene in Sexten.




Building a pontoon bridge over a French stream.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



The passage of troops over the completed bridge.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



A French war map in the headquarters of a Divisional Staff.

[Photographic Service of the French Armies]

CHAPTER XIV.

STRATEGY AND POLITICS.

STRATEGY AND POLITICS: TWO ASPECTS OF THE SAME THING—THE MISCALCULATIONS OF THE BRITISH AND GERMANS—THE THREE CAMPAIGNS—IN FRANCE, IN FLANDERS, AND IN THE DARDANELLES—THE SHIFTING OF THE CENTRE OF GRAVITY OF THE WAR—CONCLUSIONS.

THE strategy of a nation is not a separate department of its life, but an aspect or mode of its politics. Politics, as the word is ordinarily understood, is the peaceful persuasion to accept this or that view of the national interests or duty, and this or that means of obtaining it. Strategy is such a disposition of the nation's strength as will persuade other nations, if necessary by force, to accept our views. The common idea of politics and strategy as a pair which are never seen out together, but only at different times, the one in peace, the other in war, is thus fundamentally false. A nation's policy must depend very largely on the amount and disposition of its force, and these in their turn will influence its policy. In the department of foreign affairs, that nation will achieve the most conspicuous material success which shows the most perfect balance between its views of what is expedient or right and its means of enforcing them; that is to say, between its policy and its strategy. This correspondence must be established in peace time; it cannot be extemporised in war, but must grow. War is foreign policy in khaki uniform.

On the continent of Europe, where every able-bodied citizen is liable to serve in the army, these truths are generally understood. But English people have for the

most part kept the states of peace and war in separate watertight compartments. Peace has tended to be regarded as the sphere of activity for citizens alone, war for the army and navy alone. But this war differs from all preceding wars in which this country has ever been engaged in that it has completely broken down this separation between the army and navy and the rest of the nation. The country has not been invaded by the enemy, but none the less there is no department of civil life which has not been invaded by the war. Into this, perhaps the greatest revolution in our history, the country slipped unconsciously, and almost, as it were, absent-mindedly.

BRITISH INDIFFERENCE TO NAVAL AND MILITARY PROBLEMS.

The curious course which the development of our free institutions took restricted the size of our standing army. It was regarded as the instrument of domestic tyranny, and jealously restricted. The place which the army had in other countries as the defence against invasion was in this country occupied by the navy. From the Revolution of 1688 down to the present generation, the ideas of national defence which held were those of the great Chatham, who was the first consciously



A battery of French artillery on the march to take up a fresh position on the Western front.
[Newspaper Illustrations.]



A convoy of ammunition passing from a railhead to the French lines.
[Newspaper Illustrations.]

to rest British power on the command of the sea. A navy to defend our own communications and cut the communications of the enemy, a small army to conquer his outlying possessions which our navy had cut off from their supports, and alliance with a friendly military Power to carry on a Continental land campaign—these were the principles of the great Chatham. They were adopted by Pitt, the younger, in the war with Napoleon, and so jealous was our regard for them that even the Peninsular campaigns of Wellington were criticised at the time on the ground that they were a departure from the tradition, and committed us to the policy of Continental military adventure. Pitt was less fortunate than Chatham, for while Chatham had the good fortune to have a Frederick for his military ally, Pitt had the misfortune of having nothing better than the Austrian Mack to oppose to Napoleon. In the long peace which followed the great war, the Chatham principles were supreme. The army was regarded simply as a garrison for our foreign possessions, and any extension of our responsibilities on land was resisted by both parties. A small striking force we had, it is true, but it was only suitable for a small war, and a colonial war at that. As we never had any difficulty in manning our navy by voluntary recruitment, and as our army, too, being mainly intended for foreign garrison work, was necessarily a long-service professional army, it was natural that the country as a whole should regard both not so much as a part of its own life, but as a wall behind which its ordinary life was to go on undisturbed, even in time of war. Meanwhile, two things happened. The Continental nations adopted the principle of universal service, and this country, at war with the Boer Republics, found to its surprise that its military force was barely equal to the conquest of two small nations, whose total population did not exceed that of a second-rate English town.

The adequate discussion of problems of imperial defence which the Boer War brought to the front was prevented by the obtrusion of other political issues, but the only principle that was definitely accepted was that our military system, in order to be satisfactory, must contain within itself possibilities of expansion outside the regular forces of the Crown. The reorganisation of the old Volunteer force by Lord Haldane was the principal measure adopted to this end; and the strength of our regular striking force was fixed at four army corps, with cavalry and artillery arms, or perhaps 160,000 men in all. With this force, and behind it the Territorial Force and the National Reserve, we entered upon the greatest war in our history.

With our knowledge of what has happened since, it seems almost incredible that a British Government should have entered upon a course of policy for which it was so ill prepared. Adequate inquiry into the reasons for this unpreparedness would carry us too far from the main subject of this chapter, and transgress into political questions which are outside the scope of this work. There seems, however, no reason to doubt that just before the beginning of the war the British Government believed that, with its overwhelming naval power, this country was sufficiently organised to play its part in the great struggle that was now beginning.


EARLY MISCALCULATIONS.

It seems reasonably certain that both the French and the British Governments knew that in all probability the German attack would be delivered through Belgium. So far as can be inferred from the course

of events, the British plans of intervention on the Continent were purely Belgian. The British Expeditionary Force was to land in France and to advance rapidly into Belgium, keeping in touch with the left wing of the French army and filling up the gap between it and the Belgians. Namur was to be the pivot of these Allied operations. Meanwhile, the French army was to develop a strong offensive movement in Alsace and Lorraine, trusting thereby to distract the German movement through Belgium by threatening to break the centre of the enemy's line. Under favourable conditions, the plan was very promising. Assuming that Namur held on the one side, and Antwerp, if not Brussels, on the other, an army of 300,000 men—the Belgian Field Force and our own Expeditionary Force—might not unreasonably be expected to hold their own in the interspace until such time as the French offensive in Lorraine began to tell. Weak as the British force was—60,000 or 70,000 men—it could count on early reinforcements of another two army corps. As it turned out, there were many flaws in these calculations. The French over-estimated the number of men that Germany would have to put on the Russian frontier for purposes of defence, and under-estimated the size of the army that could be put against them. They under-estimated, too, the proportion of the western army which the Germans would throw into Belgium—it was in fact about three-quarters—and, again, they under-estimated the proportion of strength which the Germans would put on their outside wing in Belgium. Still more fatal miscalculations, they over-estimated the resisting power of the Belgian fortifications and under-estimated the rapidity of the German advance. Lastly, their own offensive in Lorraine and in Alsace was a bad failure. The result of all these miscalculations was that the Belgian campaign, for which our little army had prepared its plans, never even began. The British army, which had been thrown across to conduct more or less independent operations against the right flank of a German invasion of Belgium, was entangled at the outset in the reverses of the French. It became the left wing of a retreating French army. The model of the campaign was to have been the operations of Wellington in the Peninsula; a small British army was to operate in a friendly country against which the enemy could not employ his full strength because of his preoccupations elsewhere. The war had hardly begun before any plan that we had made was shattered.

SIR J. FRENCH'S ALTERNATIVES.

Under these circumstances, there were two alternatives before Sir John French. Either he could remain on the left flank of the French army and retreat with it upon Paris, or he could separate from it and retreat to the coast. The second plan, if it had been practicable, would have been more serviceable than that which was in fact adopted. It would have enabled Sir John French to unite with the Belgian forces, and to organise in conjunction with their army a position on the German flank stretching from Antwerp to Lille. Either the Germans would have ignored the menace of this flanking force in which case Sir John French would at the beginning of September, with Antwerp still intact, have been in the very position which he desired to win in the following October, and failed to win; or, if the Germans had detached a force to deal with him, they would have weakened their advance, and the French would have been relieved. In either case, the British would have been able to resume the plans for a campaign in Flanders which they had presumably prepared with



The Dardanelles campaign: A destroyer carrying troops to Gallipoli.

[Central News.]



Some of the troops at Suvla Bay showing warships in the background.

[Central News.]



A busy scene at Suvla Bay.

[Central News.]

such care, and the full strategic value of the British intervention would have been secured. It has been said that Sir John French, after the battle of Mons, would have preferred this plan to that of retreating on the French left, and the arguments for it were exceedingly strong. The great argument on the other side, namely, that but for the British on the left wing the French army would have been driven in and not have been in a position to win the Battle of the Marne is very flattering to our self-esteem, and does not admit of refutation. It is not, however, one that the French would accept; and though the British army in the Battle of the Marne was a very necessary link between the main French army and the new army, French troops might conceivably have been found to take its place. If so, and if Sir John French at that moment had been in Flanders, the Marne would have been more than a strategical victory. It is doubtful whether the Germans could have held the Aisne with a powerful and growing force on their flank in Flanders. Nor, in all probability, would Antwerp have fallen.

Some further light may be thrown on the question by an examination of the German plans. It is evident that the plans of the General Staff for an advance through Belgium not only made very little allowance for the resistance of the Belgian army, but took no account at all of the possibility that a British force would be landed. Otherwise they would certainly have enlarged their radius in Belgium, and would have seized the whole coast region down to Calais in their first advance. They forgot Flanders, and the mistake cost them more dearly than all the others that they made in the war. It might have lost them the war. The legend of the Russians which so fascinated imagination in England might, under other and more favourable conditions, have been reality, only with British troops in the place of the mythical Russians. The most interesting passage perhaps in the strategy of the whole war was the race for Flanders in October, the British endeavouring to put themselves in the position in which they had hoped to be at the beginning of the war before the Battle of Mons and the decision to retreat

on Paris with the French army; the Germans hastening to repair the faults of their original strategy in ignoring Flanders, and the risks from a British expedition descending from overseas on their flanks.

Few members of the Government have been more abused for their part in this war than Mr. Churchill, when he was First Lord of the Admiralty, and of all that he did nothing has been more abused than his measures for the relief of Antwerp. It has been asked how the First Lord of the Admiralty came to be so actively interested in land operations. The answer is that Mr. Churchill realised, perhaps sooner than his colleagues, what the true significance of the German operations


against Antwerp was. These were begun in a great hurry, as a sequel to the temporary abandonment of the advance on Paris. The Marne brought the German offensive in France temporarily to a close, and substituted for it an offensive in Flanders, directed primarily against the British and against British naval power. They saw that until the whole coast of Belgium was in their hands there could be no security for their flank and against a power which held the command of the sea as England did, and was beginning to train large new armies. Moreover, they hoped that by getting the Belgian coast in their power they might be able to work their way along the channel, and so cut the shortest line of sea communications between




French cavalry swimming their horses across a stream in Northern France.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

England and France. Already they knew the power of the submarine, and they may, even as early as this, have conceived the idea of a submarine blockade, which, with the Narrows in their hands, would have been a much more serious thing for this country than it actually was. They had seen a ghost in the legend of the Russians, and they determined to lay it once and for all. It is to Mr. Churchill's lasting credit that he should have divined the meaning of the new German movement, and taken some steps, miserably inadequate as they were, to counteract it. He failed to save Antwerp, but Rawlinson's Division, landed nominally to cover the retreat of the garrison, began the resistance of Ypres, which saved the left of the British line.



On the Eastern frontier: Austro-German forces advancing through Galicia. [Newspaper Illustrations.]



Russian guns arriving at a siding on a specially-constructed light railway. [Central News.]



Hauling a Russian heavy gun up on to a track which has been laid for it. [Central News.]

It is interesting to speculate what course the war might have taken if there had been that complete correspondence between our strategy and policy which is the ideal. It seems possible that this country may get through the war without resort to conscription, but, undoubtedly, if it had been known beforehand that we should need three million men or more, no Government would have dared to follow a policy leading to that result without introducing some change into our system of recruiting. That such great numbers could be raised by voluntary means would have been beyond the wildest expectation before the war. But failing the adoption of universal service in some form, which would have been the obvious, though not necessarily the best, way of giving our policy the necessary material support, our strategy and policy might have been correlated in other ways. Instead of a general understanding with France, we might have proclaimed in advance exactly under what circumstances and with what objects we meant to assist her. The result of such a declaration made beforehand might have been that Germany, if she was attacking France, would have done so in such a way as not to raise the *casus federis* with her. If, as is possible, we had undertaken to assist France against any attack on her Channel ports, or announced that we should regard any infraction by Germany of the neutrality of Belgium as a hostile act against us, there is a strong probability that there would have been no invasion of Belgium and no attack from the north, in which case France would have had an invasion from the east alone, and would have been equal to it; or, if Germany had attacked through Belgium, our obligations would have been strictly defined, and our military function after Mons would in that case clearly have been to retire to the coast and attack the German flanks in Belgium. It is a singular fact that the legend of the Russians, for all its absurdities, showed amongst the people of England a far clearer perception of the strategy of the war on the west and of the most effective use of sea power than the campaign as it was actually carried out. The surprises of the first few months of the war in the west came from hazy and ambiguous political thinking, the commonest of all causes of disappointment in war. The expedition to Antwerp, which was so liberally criticised, was, for all its woful shortcomings in equipment, the first—or, if we give that place to Sir John French's transference of his army from the Aisne to Flanders, the second—piece of clear strategical thinking in the war. It was a chapter of what might have been had our strategy and our policy been equally yoked.

GERMAN BLUNDERS.

Defective as our own strategy was, the Germans, who had made this correspondence between policy and strategy their special study, made even worse mistakes. No single miscalculation of ours was comparable in magnitude with that of the German General Staff in leaving England out of account. It would not have been difficult for Germany to make it almost impossible for this country to declare war upon her, and it would surely have been worth her while to do so. Instead, she made it easy, and afterwards pursued a policy which made the war popular in this country. How different the attitude of England and France would have been if there had been no invasion of Belgium, and if Germany, instead of attacking France, had remained on the defensive in the west and attacked in the east. And how much stronger the military position of Germany would have been. Two causes contributed to the early

miscalculations of Germany in the war. One was the conservatism or bigotry of the General Staff, which, having made plans on the assumption that England would not be in the war, failed to adapt them to the new circumstances when it was evident that she would be in. The other was the Von Tirpitz influence. German naval ambitions, as the course of the war has shown, were an excrescence on her real policy; her policy was essentially Continental. Von Tirpitz not only made the open quarrel between England and Germany possible, but his influence, by enlarging the naval advantages which Germany had to gain in the west, made England's entry into the war inevitable, and strengthened her resolution to persist to the end.

It is just, however, to acknowledge that if the Germans made grievous mistakes in their strategy at the outset of the war, they knew how to correct them later. There were many causes for the fact that the Germans did better in the second six than in the first six months of the first year. Undoubtedly they were prompter to recognise that it was a war not only between the armies but between the workshops of the belligerent countries, and quicker to grasp the changes in tactics and machinery made necessary by the trench war. But a still more important cause than these was the fundamental change in their strategy during the winter. To say that they definitely abandoned the offensive on the west would be too much, for the offensive against Ypres in May was exceedingly serious. But their main offensive was transferred to the east. Broadly, the history of the first six months was the failure of two offensives, the Austrian on the east and the German on the west; and of the second six months, the success of the German offensive on the east and of their defensive in the west. In fact, they did in the spring of 1915 what they might have done with greater certainty of success in the summer of 1914. It is remarkable that opinion in England should have been so slow to grasp the fundamental revolutions in the German strategical plans that took place after the failure of the first campaign in Flanders. The true motive of the war, though its opening passages obscured it, was Germany's ambitions in the Balkans, and all else was really subsidiary to that end. That this motive came to dominate her strategy was probably due mainly to the Hindenburg influence and the enormous prestige of his victories.

TURKEY AND ENGLAND.

Rarely has a nation in time of real danger paid so heavy a penalty for the fear of imaginary dangers in the past as England has done in this war in the Dardanelles. The closing of the Straits to ships of war was an "ancient principle of the Ottoman Empire," which this country supported through fear of Russia. But the closing of any of the great highways of the sea is clean against the natural interest of a sea-power, and the entry of Turkey into this war was a direct consequence of this error. For had the Straits been open, the *Goeben* could have been followed into the Straits and destroyed; and it is doubtful whether had a British squadron been off Constantinople before the war—as it might well have been if the Straits had not been closed to ships of war—the Turks would ever have dared to declare war. Our consent to the closing of the Straits was intelligible enough so long as Russia was regarded as the enemy; but the moment Turkey began to draw closer to Germany and become a possible enemy of ours, a diplomacy in touch with our strategy would have bent all its efforts to secure



Lord Kitchener's visit to the front: Lord Kitchener, M. Millerand, and General Joffre leaving after a review of the French troops. [Alfieri Picture Service.]



British troops receive a welcome as they arrive by motor van in a French town. [Central News.]

the opening of the Straits, and, if possible, their neutralisation. As it was, our whole past policy seemed to have been ingeniously framed so as to prevent our using our sea-power against Turkey if she should become an enemy. Yet the contingency of her turning against us was one that surely might long have been foreseen. What did Germany's backing of Austria in her quarrel with Servia mean except that the Germanic Powers looked forward some day to reaching over the Balkans to Turkey and extending their influence to the Persian Gulf? This was a danger against which, as things were, no excess of sea-power could safeguard us. It is a principle of our imperial defence, as far as possible, to avoid land frontiers, or frontiers which cannot be defended at a great advantage over any possible enemy through our command of the sea. India was not a real exception to this rule, for she has frontiers of desert and mountain which are naturally stronger than any other frontiers in the world. But Egypt was a real and a dangerous exception. Against a hostile European Power in league with Turkey the only sound defence of Egypt for a sea-power was in the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. There were only two courses open to us consistent with a sound strategy. Either we must keep friends with Turkey at all costs or—if that was impossible (and probably it was)—we ought to have thrown our lot boldly in with Russia and joined her and France in the opening of the Straits.

Again it was Mr. Churchill who saw most clearly the danger that threatened us, and of all the criticism passed on the conduct of the war the least intelligent was that which attacked the Dardanelles expedition as irrelevant to the main purpose of the war. The attack began at the end of February, and already the Germans were forming plans which were to make the Dardanelles the centre of gravity of the whole war. She had made no more than a bad draw of the offensive against Paris and in Flanders, which last was inspired mainly by a desire to injure British sea-power. These campaigns in the west had greatly compromised her position in the east. Galicia was lost, and the Russians

were pouring over the Carpathians into Hungary. A little more and her eastern front would have been definitely turned. It is strange that the complete change of front was not sooner and generally realised. In attacking the Dardanelles, Mr. Churchill was not only forestalling the German offensive on the east that was preparing for the spring, but was repairing, as far as was possible, the errors of our past policy and adopting the only sound policy of defence for Egypt and the British Eastern Empire. It was not for nothing that our policy in the nineteenth century was pro-Turkish; it was believed that a strong and friendly Turkey was necessary to the safety of our Eastern Empire. But a strong Turkey under the influence

of our enemy was the greatest menace that our Eastern Empire had ever faced. The wonder was not that our attack on the Dardanelles should have been begun when it was, but that we should not have foreseen long before the war the possibility of our having to make it, and that when it did begin it was not made our main campaign. So far as our material interests and safety were concerned, it mattered infinitely more to us whether Germany was astride the Straits between Europe and Asia than whether she was in possession of Antwerp.

An even more striking instance of the failure of our foreign policy and our strategy to keep in touch was in the law of naval war. When the war broke out, the import of the new

cotton crop was just beginning. Yet for many months after the war began Germany was freely importing cotton into her own ports on neutral ships, and there was no restriction whatever on its import through neutral ports; and not for nearly a year was cotton put on the contraband list. The Declaration of London actually put this essential for the manufacture of explosives on the free list. It is true that the Order in Council of February prohibiting all imports and exports into and from Germany, whether through her own or neutral ports, superseded the distinction between contraband and non-contraband, but that Order was expressly made in retaliation for Germany's violations of international law. And if she had not been guilty of these violations



British troops being moved to a fresh part of the line by motor 'buses.

[Photopress.]

it would seem to follow that we should not have been justified in prohibiting the importation of non-contraband articles in neutral ships through her own ports. That would hardly seem to be a satisfactory position for a naval Power which still retains the commercial blockade as one of its weapons.

THE MORAL.

The explanation of our contraband and blockade policy, as of some other examples of wisdom after the event, would seem to be lack of co-ordination between the several departments of national policy. This is not a political matter in the ordinary meaning of the word politics in England, for the fault (if fault it be) is one of which both parties in the State have been equally guilty. The cause is rather a habit of the British mind in approaching certain departments of government, such as those concerned with our foreign policy and the management of our army and navy. For forty years or more there have been two quite distinct tendencies of opinion on these questions. On the one hand, there was a strong body of opinion which was constant to the views of foreign policy and strategy which were accepted by both political parties in the middle of the nineteenth century—views which may be said to have developed in the great reaction which followed the Napoleonic Wars, and in many aspects represented a genuinely conservative tradition in British politics. On the other hand, new ideas were at work. There were those who either did not


understand that the traditional British conception of an empire based on sea-power implied the avoidance of land frontiers, and of what may be called a "Continental" foreign policy, or, understanding, thought that it was no longer applicable to new conditions and new problems. It was not strange that this double tendency should manifest itself. It would be strange indeed if, while men should dispute on every other branch of politics, there should be instinctive unanimity about these departments. Unanimity in war time, no doubt, there is, but not necessarily or even desirably in peace time, when the ends of policy are being shaped and the naval and military organisation necessary for their attainment is being fixed. If it be true, as is so often alleged by men of all shades of opinion, that the people at large have failed to realise the meaning and bearing of these issues, one cause is the habit noted at the beginning of this chapter of regarding foreign policy and the army and navy as something separable from the rest of politics, a mere barrier behind which the ordinary life of the country goes on with as little disturbance as possible.

But whatever the cause, the effect is undeniable. The two tendencies have gone on side by side, and have never been reconciled. Both political parties have done their best to ignore them. What is more, they have both found expression in the acts of the Government, and too often this ambiguity has infected the decision of the Government at critical moments and its means of prosecuting a war.



"Vive la France": French troops on board a transport going to the Dardanelles.

[Central News.]



The guns of H.M.S. "Queen Elizabeth."

[Central News.]


CHAPTER XV.

GUNS AND AMMUNITION IN THE WAR.

THE MECHANICS AND CHEMISTRY OF HIGH EXPLOSIVES—RIFLING—BULLETS AND SHELLS—THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SHRAPNEL AND HIGH-EXPLOSIVE SHELLS—ARTILLERY—THE FRENCH 75'S—A TYPICAL GERMAN GUN.

THOSE branches of engineering which produce military guns and ammunition labour under a great handicap. Their products can only be given a thoroughly practical trial in the dire calamity of war. And those who desire information concerning improvements in this branch of engineering must always go ill served, because in time of war, when only there are made serious contributions to the artillerists' science, and when curiosity is at its height, really salient information must not be given. But behind the veil of half-secrecy there is always going on a process of evolution, which produces improvements and new types much more quickly than they can be tested in war. There is no end to the tale of military inventions which have been carefully and painfully developed only to be superseded by something else before they have ever been tried in warfare. Had the amount of ingenuity so directed been turned instead upon industrial engineering, civil life to-day would be appreciably more comfortable, and warfare would probably be on a smaller scale, and certainly be less horrible. But from the point of view of those technologists whose business it is to devise

weapons and missiles, there is some professional satisfaction in the circumstances that the world war of 1914 broke out at a time when the great nations had just completed their several schemes of armament. Whether the coincidence was fortuitous or not, it is none the less remarkable that this technical preparedness of the nations extended to all branches of their military organisations. Great Britain, France, Russia, and Germany had just set their military air-craft services on a properly organised footing. A little earlier a new view of the relative values of the different types of fighting ships had received a recognition which spread like wildfire, and the war came just at the climacteric moment to test the "Dreadnoughts" which were the tangible result. In the guns, whether on sea or land, there had been no such revolution; but in almost all countries the artillery well represented the latest current ideas at the outbreak of war. In former wars, notably that of 1870, much of the science of artillery was in the melting pot of the engineer and the chemist. In 1914, what controversies there were on the subject were less scientific and radical than of a minor military nature.



Artillery recruits having the mechanism of an 18-pounder explained to them. *[Newspaper Illustrations.]*



A machine gun in position in the Belgian trenches.

[Central News.]

In approaching the examination of the guns used in the war, it is necessary to view them through a preliminary understanding of the changes made in fairly recent years. Not only is the "high explosive" of to-day much more powerful than the gunpowder which it superseded, but to make proper use of it requires a different design of gun. Also it permitted corresponding changes in the missiles thrown from guns, abolishing old forms and classifications, and introducing new ones. To fire the old-fashioned standard solid spherical cannon ball from a modern gun would be to make bad use both of the gun and of the weight of metal in the ball; although it would be making in most cases a considerably better use of the ball than could be achieved by it when fired by the appropriate cannon of, say, Nelson's time. The destructive effect of the ball would be much greater to-day owing to the much higher velocity imparted by a modern gun, and also owing to the very great improvement in sights which has taken place concurrently with the major improvements in artillery. With a cannon whose trajectory could never be relied upon to be quite the same twice running, sighting and range finding were not worth developing into the fine art which they have become to-day.

GUNPOWDER AND AFTER.

The extremely rapid combustion, which is the immediate cause of the effect which we know as an explosion, was for centuries typified in gunpowder. The action of gunpowder is merely the very rapid burning of the charcoal, which is one of its constituents, the other main constituent being the saltpetre, which supplies the oxygen necessary to support combustion, so that it is unnecessary to draw the oxygen for this purpose from the atmosphere. It is the intimate mixture of the oxygen-consuming substance with the oxygen-yielding substance which permits the necessary rapidity of combustion. The gaseous products of the burning are produced so freely and quickly that, in a closely-confined space, they will generate almost instantly a pressure which can be measured in terms of tons. The third and last ingredient of gunpowder is sulphur. The part it plays in the action is not essential theoretically, but in practice it is of very

great convenience. Sulphur inflames at a comparatively low temperature. For saltpetre to yield up its oxygen to charcoal the mixture would have to be heated to a temperature of 335 deg. Cen. The function of the sulphur, which inflames at 250 deg. Cen., is to make it possible to initiate the explosion more easily. In the same way, we use first paper and then sticks to start the domestic coal fire. In the analogy, the sulphur corresponds to the sticks and the fuse or percussion cap corresponds to the pieces of paper. Further, the sulphur has the effect of making the explosion of the whole mass of gunpowder more rapid than it otherwise would be—not an unmixed blessing, as will be seen when we come to consider the causes which have influenced the adoption of modern "high explosives."

The structural distinction between these and gunpowder is, that while in all of them the action depends on their containing ingredients that will burn readily, and other ingredients to supply the oxygen necessary for the burning, in gunpowder these ingredients are distinct and separate substances which have been mechanically mixed together as salt may be mixed with pepper; while in the "high explosives" both classes of ingredients exist in one chemical compound, just as hydrogen and carbon exist together in any one molecule of, for instance, paraffin oil. This structural difference is accompanied by a difference in the potential energy contained in a given weight of material. The



Firing a bomb-thrower in the French trenches.

[Photographic Service of the French Armies.]

chemical compound, weight for weight, liberates a greater amount of gas than the mechanical mixture, and at a very much higher pressure, the surrounding conditions being the same in each case. Also, research has made it possible so to treat the "high explosive" that the gas evolved by it does not reach its maximum pressure quite so rapidly as the gas evolved from gunpowder. Paradoxical as it may seem, this is an advantage.


A projectile of whatever shape or weight cannot be set into full flight instantaneously. It resists the attempt to move it, as it also resists the attempt to stop it. We know that the obstruction caused by the atmosphere will not stop a rifle bullet until it has travelled many

hundreds of yards, and so has withstood the action of the atmosphere during a period of several seconds. Yet it is customary to visualise the starting of a bullet as an instantaneous action. Actually, the more nearly the starting approaches the instantaneous, the greater the strain on the gun without there being any compensating advantage; because what matters is not the rapidity with which the bullet is started, but the rapidity with which it emerges from the muzzle of the weapon. Weight for weight, the destructive energy possessed by a bullet is measured by its velocity at the moment when the explosion has *ceased* to act upon it—that is, when it has just left the gun. Obviously, therefore, the ideal explosive would be one which imparted this velocity rather by a continuous and cumulative push of the gases all the way up the barrel until the muzzle was reached, rather than by a very violent momentary application of the pressure in the breech end of the barrel. Modern "high explosives" have this desirable property in a remarkable degree, and allied with it they have the properties of comparative smokelessness. Either property alone is almost a sufficient reward for the immense amount of research which has brought them to light.

The diagram which is annexed presents, in a way which is due to Dr. W. Anderson, F.R.S., a former Director-General of Ordnance Factories, the relative properties of similar charges of gunpowder and

rather more than one foot; and instead of falling away almost immediately, as is the case in the gunpowder curve, it sustains its maximum height for quite a long time. In fact, the projectile has moved more than three feet before the driving pressure begins to drop. Further, the drop, when it does begin, is not so rapid as with gunpowder, and the final pressure before the projectile is clear of the muzzle is about three times that which we get in the case of gunpowder.

This device of a curve relating pressure to distance is a common one amongst mathematicians and engineers, and is such that the total area enclosed by the curve and the base line represents the total amount of mechanical "work" done. It is clear that the area bounded by the cordite curve is much greater than that bounded by the gunpowder curve, and the power imparted to the projectile by a charge of cordite is proportionately more than that which is imparted to it by the same weight of gunpowder. Also, as we have seen, this power is at the beginning generated more slowly, so that the strain on the gun is mitigated, and it is better prolonged, so that the friction between the projectile and the gun barrel is not allowed to exercise such a retarding influence as it does when gunpowder is used. As a result, the cordite-driven projectile leaves the gun with a velocity of 1,960 feet per second, while the powder-driven projectile only has a velocity of 1,000 feet per second. As the energy of any



a modern propellant explosive—in this case cordite. The two heavy parallel lines at the bottom of the diagram represent the barrel of the gun, in which the projectile is seen ready to start on its flight at the breech end, at the left side of the illustration. This barrel, it will be seen, is nearly eleven feet long, while the diameter of the projectile is some seven or eight inches. Vertical height in the diagram, as will be seen by reference to the vertical scale at the left-hand side, represents the pressure in tons behind the projectile. Of the three curved lines, the lower one represents the pressures developed by a charge of 13 lbs. 4 ozs. of gunpowder. The highest point of this curve is vertically above a point in the barrel, which is only some nine inches forward of the breech. That is to say, the maximum pressure of gas occurs when the projectile has travelled nine inches, and thereafter the pressure falls away as time goes on and as the projectile moves forward, until by the time the projectile has left the muzzle the pressure is only about a ton and a half.

The next curve, printed in heavy black line, represents the pressures generated by exactly the same weight of cordite. This curve rises to very nearly twice the height of the gunpowder curve, but it has other important differences as well. It does not rise so abruptly as the gunpowder curve. Its maximum height, representing the maximum pressure, does not occur until the projectile has moved


projectile varies as the square of its velocity, the weight being the same in each case, the relative energies in the two cases are almost as four is to one. The third curve, shown by a broken line, illustrates that the result of using 48 lbs. of gunpowder is only to get the same muzzle velocity as accrues from 13 lbs. 4 ozs. of cordite. This big charge of gunpowder gives a somewhat greater pressure at the beginning, but after the first three feet of travel it gives a less pressure than the cordite; and the two differences, each with regard to the distance through which it obtains, will be found to cancel out.

For the gun constructor these curves have several important lessons. First, it is clear that he need not make his gun so strong and thick at the breech end as he must make it if he wants to use gunpowder; or, conversely, for a given thickness or strength of gun he can use a more powerful charge if he determines to use such a high explosive as cordite. Secondly, it is clear that the useful length of a gun is greater for cordite than for powder. It is no use prolonging the length of a gun beyond that point at which the pressure of the explosion gases is no longer great enough to compensate for the retarding effect of friction between the projectile and the gun bore. Thirdly, and perhaps it is the most important, the properties of a high explosive as shown by its curve point to the admissibility of using heavier projectiles. For a given diameter, the length of the pro-

jectile can be increased without putting up the weight (and consequently the inertia, or "resistance to movement") to a point that would cause dangerous strains in the gun. The advantage of a heavy projectile is even more considerable than might at first appear, especially when the extra weight is due to extra length rather than to extra diameter. It is obviously desirable that a projectile should take a comparatively straight course to its target rather than a curved one. The immediate cause of a curved trajectory is the action of gravity. The longer gravity acts upon the projectile, the greater its fall and the more curved must its course be made. At the high velocity now possible the time of flight for a given range is reduced. This is mainly because of the increased initial starting velocity, but another factor which affects the time of flight is the resistance offered by the atmosphere. This resistance increases much more rapidly with the diameter of the projectile than it does with its length. Consequently, without regarding minutely the several steps of progress, we get as the final result a long ogival

it gave too rapid and violent an explosion. Had it not been for its great property of smokelessness, probably no prolonged effort would have been made to adapt it to anything but the purely destructive explosions required in explosive shells, mines, and torpedoes. Its smokelessness tempted chemists to search for a means of making it less violent.

The problem is solved in cordite. Cordite consists of gun cotton and nitro-glycerine, mixed together in acetone, which is afterwards evaporated off. A little vaseline is added to lubricate the surface of the projectile on its way along the gun-barrel; and it is the burning of this and of the silk bag which contains the charge that causes the modicum of smoke which attends the firing even of the "smokeless" explosive. The secret of the comparative gentleness or "tame" of cordite lies, firstly, in the acetone treatment, and secondly, in the fact that the finished product is given a cord-like form which promotes progressive, as opposed to simultaneous, combustion. In fine, we have in cordite an



Krupp 21-centimetre howitzer.

form of projectile, relatively heavy and swift in flight, practically superseding the relatively light spherical projectile which was slow in flight, had a very much curved trajectory and, for another reason which we will see later, could not be so relied upon to travel accurately to the target.

THE EVOLUTION OF CORDITE.

But this state of excellence of the modern high explosive was not brought about easily or quickly. Even gun cotton and nitro-glycerine, though each much more powerful than gunpowder, could not at first be used for propelling a projectile. In their unmodified form they explode in the peculiar way called "detonation." This is a virtually instantaneous burning of the whole mass, in contradistinction to the progressive, though extremely rapid, burning of gunpowder. To turn from gunpowder to unmodified gun cotton as a propellant would be to jump out of the frying pan into the fire. Loose gun cotton occupied far too much space in the gun, and, compressed,

explosive which is sufficiently tame, does not evolve a destructive degree of heat on explosion, does not erode the gun-barrel excessively, is comparatively smokeless, keeps well without much risk of accidental or spontaneous explosion, and has a high propelling power.

The initiating of an explosion, whether of cordite, gun cotton, gunpowder, or other explosive, involves the use of a small quantity of yet another kind of explosive, a "fulminate," which possesses the properties of being very easily detonated, and of evolving a great amount of heat very quickly, and so gives the certainty of raising the temperature of the main explosive to its inflaming point. In gunpowder this, as we have already seen, is 250 deg. Cen. We can raise a portion of the charge to that temperature by applying a flame, a red-hot metal rod or wire, or by a detonator in the form, familiar to most people, of a percussion cap. This last, without any adjunct, is the most convenient for small arms. It is now commonly included in the cartridge, but in old muzzle-loading shot-guns, such as may still be seen in



Making bombs out of tin cans in Gallipoli.

[Central News.]



Taking 9.2-inch shells to a British battery in Gallipoli

[Central News.]

rural districts, the cap is a separate article. In any case it consists of some fulminating substance, commonly fulminate of mercury mixed with potassium chlorate and antimony sulphide, suitably mounted in a little copper cap or case. A comparatively slight percussion or even friction is enough to cause the mixture to detonate, and so ignite the main explosive. When the main explosive is cordite, or some other of the smokeless powders which do not ignite so easily as gunpowder, the percussion cap inflames a small charge of gunpowder, known as an "exploder," which in turn fires the main explosive.


THE RIFLE AND ITS CARTRIDGE.

The rifle grew out of the musket, which in turn grew out of the arquebus. The musket fired a round ball of lead: round, because that was the easiest shape to cast, and the easiest to ram down a barrel from the muzzle end. The elongated or ogival bullet of the modern arm was evolved from several considerations. The pointed cylinder offers, for the same mass of bullet, about half the air resistance of the spherical form, and so helps to promote higher speeds and longer ranges. The length of cylindrical body engages better with the spiral grooves or "rifling" in the barrel than the spherical form, which, obviously, only touches the barrel at a circumferential line, and so allows less escape of the gases of explosion. On the other hand, although rifling was used for firing spherical bullets, it is, to say the least of it, very much more necessary for elongated bullets. The whole idea of rifling is to impart a spinning motion to the projectile, with the final object of making it fly straighter. How this object is achieved we will come to in a moment; but long before it was in the power of scientists to analyse the subtleties of gyroscopic action, it was known to the practical artists, as artillerists were called in the period when the bow and arrow was just beginning to feel the competition of explosion weapons.

They knew that if an arrow were made to spin it would fly straighter, and they set the feathers at a "cant," windmill or propeller-fashion, to get this result. An all-metal bullet is not to be spun effectively by the action of the air, so it has been found necessary to make the gun itself impart the spin by forming spiral grooves or ribs inside the barrel. This device was first applied to firearms by Gaspard Kollner, a Viennese, in the fifteenth century, but it seems to have failed to attract much attention. At any rate, when one Augustus Kotter, of Nuremberg, revived it in the following century, it was largely accepted as a novelty, and for many years after him it was applied only to sporting weapons. The earliest recorded use of rifling for military firearms seems to have been for Danish troops in the seventeenth century.

Much scientific research has been devoted to analysing the way in which the spinning action realises its known effect. To begin to understand the matter we cannot do better than first study the behaviour of the ordinary toy gyroscope. It is, essentially, a rapidly-rotating disc. Referring to the figure, A is its axis, and it revolves in the direction of the arrow—that is to say, clockwise. Anyone who has experimented with the toy gyroscope knows that forcibly tipping the axis to the left, or towards the point marked P, causes the disc, apparently of its own volition, to tip itself towards the point marked Q₁. In other words, a forced inclination—or, as it is called, "precession"—in any direction gives rise to a natural precession at an angle of 90 deg. further on in the

direction of rotation. Why? To answer the question we must consider the disc not as one unit of mass, but as a conglomeration of many small particles of matter, each contributing its quota of weight to the whole. Consider one such particle, *k*. It is clear that when the upper part of the axis is tilted to the left, *k* is given a downward motion in addition to its motion in the circular path shown in dotted line. This means that while the particle *k* is passing from Q to P it is made to pass through a somewhat longer distance than if the plane of rotation were not being changed during that time. In fact, the speed of *k* is being accelerated owing to the inclining action. Now, every body which has weight has inertia, which is only another way of saying that it resists being moved or being stopped once it is in motion, or having the rate or direction of its motion changed. Consequently, *k* endeavours to resist the downward motion due to the inclination. It tries to keep up to this original level, and to indicate this it is marked with a plus sign. Next, take the particle *l*. The inclination gives it a downward motion too, but its circular motion is tending all the time to reduce the value of its downward motion until it reaches Q₁, when manifestly the inclination of the axis does not affect it at all. As its downward motion is being continuously reduced, its inertia causes it to exercise a pressure in the downward direction. This is indicated by a minus sign. Next, take the two corresponding points in the other half of the disc, which is,



Gyroscopic Disc.

"Manchester Guardian."

of course, rising on account of the inclination. The upward motion of the particle *m* is increasing all the time that its circular motion is taking it away from Q₁ and towards P₁; consequently, it exercises a downward pressure, and is marked with the minus sign. The particle *n* is having its upward velocity reduced all the time that it is moving from P₁ to Q, and consequently it exercises an upward pressure, and is marked with a plus sign. We have, therefore, two upward thrusting particles below the diameter P P₁, and two downward thrusting particles above this diameter. The thrust of each pair acts harmoniously, and the whole disc naturally tilts downward at Q₁, or at right angles to the inclination originally forced upon it.

How does this fundamental principle of rotating bodies apply to the flight of a bullet? In the first place, what would a bullet do if it did not rotate? It is difficult, if not impossible, to make a bullet which is perfectly proportioned and has its weight distributed quite symmetrically. If the manufacturer could be assured that all his bullets would be so made, then so long as they described a perfectly straight path through the air, as a bullet can be considered to do for a certain short distance after it leaves the muzzle, then there would be no need to invoke the aid of gyroscopic action. But in practice a bullet is not symmetrically weighted, and its



French soldiers being taught how to use the trench bomb-throwers.
[Photographic Service of the French Armies.]



A French 220-mm. (8 7/8 in.) howitzer and its artillerymen in the Argonne.
[Official Photograph issued by the French War Office.]

path is not a straight line. So that from the very moment it leaves the muzzle it tends to turn so as to bring that point at which its weight may be considered to be concentrated undermost. Next, as the energy may be considered to be concentrated at the same point as the weight, the heavy part will tend to get in front of the lighter parts, which, though of course only in a comparatively small degree, act as the feathers of an arrow by offering a resistance to the wind rather than by contributing appreciable momentum to the missile. At this stage, therefore, we would have the bullet advancing more or less crab-fashion; and then a further cause of erratic flight would begin to act. In this way:

When any elongated body, whether a bullet, the wing of an aeroplane, or the rudder of a dirigible balloon, meets a stream of air at right angles to its main surface, the pressure of the air may be considered to be concentrated on the centre of the surface; but when the stream of air meets the surface obliquely the air pressure acts as though it were concentrated on a comparatively small area near the leading or forward edge of the surface. In the case of the bullet, this means that if the point is already tipped upwards through some irregularity of weight, the air pressure will tend to tip it up still further, and *vice-versa*. But if the bullet is rotating rapidly about an axis which is also the line of flight, any irregularity of weight is moved so rapidly from one side to the other that the bullet behaves virtually as if it were symmetrically weighted about its axis, and all would go well until the influence of gravity makes the bullet drop and begin to describe a curved path. Then, however symmetrically it was weighted, the pressure of the stream of air, which is now oblique to the bullet, acting on its underside and concentrated near the point, would cause the bullet to cant upwards.

It is here that the gyroscopic action in its full beauty gets to work. The forced inclination or precession of the nose upwards causes a natural gyroscopic precession


horizontally to the right (assuming that the bullet is revolving clockwise). If the action were to stop there, it would achieve nothing, but the action continues; the inclination to the right causes, in turn, a downward inclination, thus counteracting, at least to a very great extent, the original upward topple of the bullet. Actually,

of course, the cycle does not stop even at that, and the point of the bullet continues to trace out a spiral course of imperceptibly small diameter around the line of flight. The constraint thus imposed upon the bullet is analogous to the vertical position imposed upon the spinning top. There does remain, however, a small uncanceled balance of this repeated cycle of forces which results in the bullet taking a course slightly to the right or left of its original line of flight, according to whether the spin has been


clockwise or anti-clockwise. That is the price paid—but as it is computable beforehand it can be allowed for with certainty—for keeping the bullet nose-first against its natural tendency. The highest application of the principle is seen in a howitzer projectile, which is fired upwards at a high angle and yet contrives to drop on to its objective with its nose still in front.

Although rifling was essentially a Continental invention, and England was lamentably slow to appreciate it, the most remarkable and systematic development of the principle was ultimately made in England. Sir Joseph Whitworth, easily the greatest mechanic of his time, was invited, in 1860, to make rifles for the Government. He could not see his way to agree to the Government proposal in the form in which it was first made, but eventually he did very much more for them than they had asked, or they had sufficient imagination

to think possible. He experimented with different shapes of bullet and different types of rifling, varying the shape of the grooves, the degree of twist, and so on, till at last he produced a combination which was so much better than the product of the Government factory at Enfield that even the Government repre-



German 15-pounder field gun (front view).



German 15-pounder field gun (back view).

sentative reported that no comparison was possible. One of the conclusions to which he came was that the twist for a rifle musket bullet must not be less than



(Birmingham Small Arms Co. Ltd.)

The British Service Cartridge.

The British service cartridge with "blunt" bullet, as illustrated, weighs 2.5 grains, and has a muzzle velocity of 2,060 feet per second. This weight and velocity give it an energy, on leaving the muzzle, of 2,074 foot-pounds.

one turn in twenty inches, the minimum diameter of the barrel (bore) being 0.45 of an inch, for the amount of powder and the weight of bullet to which he was limited. In modern rifles a rather more rapid twist is

spin would damage the bullet in its passage through the barrel, and even may cause it to jam tight before it reaches the muzzle.

BULLETS.

The rifle bullet of to-day has a body or core of heavy metal to give the necessary weight, and an envelope of stronger metal to give such hardness as will ensure the penetration of the target. Out of this arises most, though perhaps not all, of the charges and counter-charges brought by one belligerent against another as to the use of "expansive," or "explosive," or "dum-dum" bullets—terms which are often erroneously supposed to be synonymous. The bullet made of pure soft lead flattens out when it meets much resistance. On that account it cannot penetrate far, but it makes a relatively large and ragged wound. A hard-cased, sharp-nosed




(Birmingham Small Arms Co. Ltd.)

The British Service Rifle.

The British Service Rifle is the Lee-Enfield Magazine Short Mark III. pattern. In spite of its comparatively short barrel it gives the same velocity to the .303 service bullet as the longer and old pattern of service rifle, and it is fitted with better sights. These allow fine vertical and lateral screw adjustments.

found to answer better for the longer ranges made possible by more powerful explosives than were used in Whitworth's time. The greater the spin the greater the gyroscopic effect, and the straighter the flight of

bullet may go through several men in succession, leaving each with such a clean and painless wound that they may not know for some little time afterwards that they have been hit. The legitimate field for the "expansive"



(Birmingham Small Arms Co. Ltd.)

The Breech and Action of a Lee-Enfield Magazine Rifle.

When the magazine, L, is detached (the catch, G, having been released by finger pressure) by pulling it downwards, 12 cartridges are inserted. To accommodate them as they are pressed in by hand, the platform J, recedes downward against the pressure of the spring, K. With the magazine in place again, drawing back the bolt, I (by means of a handle - not shown—on the cocking piece, C), allows the cartridges to be raised by the spring K, so that the uppermost one comes in line with the axis of the barrel, Q. On returning the bolt to its original position the cartridge is thrust into the chamber, R, the nose of the bullet reaching the chamfered ends (R¹) of the rifling (R²). The striker, A, however, does not return with the bolt, but is retained in a rearward position by the upper extremity of the sear, D (thrust upwards by the spring, F), engaging with the recess in the under part of the cocking piece, C. Pressure on the trigger, E, overcomes the resistance of F, and releases the sear from the cocking piece. This, together with the striker, A, which is fixed to it at the right-hand end, is at once driven smartly forward by the coiled spring, B, and the point of the striker fires the cartridge (position as shown).

T is the wooden handguard round the barrel; P, the fore end; S, the action body; U, the screw retaining the magazine by means of the loose link coupling; V, the trigger guard, which is extended forward around the magazine and secured under the head of the screw U; O, the wooden stock or butt; N, the bolt securing the rifle to the stock; A¹, the striker keeper-screw; and M, the charger guide bridge.


the bullet. The limiting conditions to the rapidity of spin are that it must not impose too severe a strain upon the rifling or upon the bullet itself. Too much

bullet is in the shooting of big game, but unfortunately anyone can make such a missile by taking an ordinary hard-cased bullet and stripping off the case at the

point, so that the soft metal is free to expand or "mushroom" when it hits a bone. In the East such bullets, under the name of "Dum-dum," where they are supposed to have first been made, have been used against wildly charging fanatics, who would fight furiously perhaps for hours after being struck by the ordinary hard-nosed bullet unless it had reached a vital organ. Another way of producing an expanding bullet is to drill a small hole axially into the point. This device produces little effect when used against hard substances, but where, as in the human body, the target is mostly composed of fluid, the hydraulic pressure acting inside the hole conduces to the spreading out of the nose. Bullets treated in these ways, either by authority or surreptitiously, may easily open out so much in the flesh as to cause wounds which nurses, and sometimes even doctors, think could only be caused by "explosive" bullets. These, sometimes a necessity for the hunter, have probably never been used in warfare between civilised people. They are simply small shells containing a charge of explosive to be detonated by contact with the target in the same manner as a familiar class of big-gun shell. They certainly cannot be produced privately by a soldier in the field.

attached to it. Again it fell into disuetude, and so remained until at last the Prussian military authorities took it up in earnest. At the outbreak of war in 1914 it was the standard missile for field artillery, but after some months of trench fighting it became evident that an ordinary high-explosive shell had a greater use. It can destroy trenches, while shrapnel cannot.

There, then, are the two main types of explosive shell. The shrapnel so far has not been sub-divided into any distinct classes, but the ordinary kind takes on three forms which are properly recognised as distinct in function. There is the common hell, which has a certain penetrating effect and a certain bursting effect. It is varied in one direction by increasing the penetrative effect at the expense of the bursting effect, and is then known as an armour-piercing shell. In the other direction it is varied to have a relatively small penetrative effect but a very great bursting effect, and is then known as a high-explosive shell. The reason that the bursting effect is small in the armour-piercing shell is because, in order to make the walls of this shell strong enough to hold together on meeting an armour plate, the space for the bursting charge is necessarily made small. And the reason the high-explosive shell has relatively little penetrative effect is because, used as it



SHELLS.

We saw at the beginning of this chapter how cordite permitted a greater weight of projectile, and how for reasons which were then explained this increased weight was associated with increased length. By making the projectile hollow, the increment in length is greater than that in weight. This, unless qualified in some way, would, on the balance, reduce the destructive power of a projectile; but by filling the hollow space with a high-explosive substance, the destructive effect is actually increased. The shell explodes either on hitting its objective or just before. In the former case the pieces of the broken shell add to the destruction already wrought by the impact of the shell as a whole; in the latter case the destruction is wrought by a number of bullets, included in the hollow space together with the bursting charge, which fly on, exploding as they go. This is shrapnel, and is used against troops in the field. The ordinary bursting shell is used against gun positions or fortifications of one kind or another. Curiously enough, shrapnel was not first invented by the general officer of that name, with whom it is popularly associated. So far as the records tell us, it was used first in an improvised form by a Captain Mercier at the siege of Gibraltar; but though it was largely, if not wholly, instrumental in turning failure into success there, it did not meet subsequently with official favour. Later on, General Shrapnel, probably ignorant of Mercier's work, revived the idea, at any rate sufficiently to have his name


is against unarmoured positions, it is best to make its walls thin, and so to contain a greater amount of explosive for a given diameter.

It is interesting to observe how the development of these three types of shell has pushed the old solid shot out of existence. At one time the solid shot, whether of spherical or ogival shape, was invaluable for piercing armour. It can pierce armour still, but the destruction it causes may be limited to a hole only slightly bigger than itself. It might go right through a ship or a fort and do no significant damage whatever, whereas an armour-piercing explosive shell bursts while it pierces, doing much more damage to the armour, and probably dealing direct destruction to personnel as well.

In recent years armour-piercing shells have been greatly improved by placing on the nose a cap of relatively soft metal. Often this cap is not itself of pointed shape. Its action is curious. When the efficiency of armour plate had been improved to a point at which it scored a complete victory over the projectile, the maker of these found himself in this dilemma: if he made his noses harder than the armour plate they became too brittle, and shattered under the shock of impact; and if he tried to toughen his noses they became softer than the plate. One naturally asks why it should be possible to get a combination of hardness and toughness in a plate which was impossible to get in a projectile? It is because the plate is a compound affair, with a hard metal layer to the front and a tough metal

layer behind it. The problem was solved by accident in 1878. A compound armour-plate target was inadvertently erected with its soft side forward. The projectiles fired at it not only penetrated the soft layer, as they might have been expected to do in any case, but successfully broke down the hard metal behind. The phenomenon suggested to Captain English the plan of putting a comparatively soft-metal cap over the nose of the projectile to act as a sort of buffer between it and the hard surface plate. His experiments were immediately successful;

but, history repeating itself, the authorities were unsympathetic, and the idea was dropped until it was taken up seriously by the Russian authorities about sixteen years later. Now the cap is virtually a standard part of all armour-piercing projectiles. It distributes the shock of impact instead of allowing it to be concentrated at the very point of the nose, and it holds the nose together so that the tip of it is not driven backwards in the form of a conical wedge, tending to split the shell.



BRITISH 18-POUNDER GUN.

The gun barrel, 1, consists of an inner tube, wire wrapped for about two feet of its length at the hind or breech end, and an outer tube embracing the whole length. To each side of the outer tube is rigidly attached a guide rib, 2. These ribs support the gun in the cradle, preventing it from dropping, but allowing it to slide backwards under the recoil shock of firing. The backward movement is controlled and limited by the springs and hydraulic buffer contained (the buffer in the centre and the springs coiled concentrically around its whole length) inside the cylindrical case, 3. The cradle, 4, has trunnions projecting from it, one on each side, which engage in bearings in the carriage body, 9, so that the gun can swivel in the vertical plane; and the carriage body in turn is attached underneath to the axletree in such a way that it is free to be swivelled from side to side. The combined movements allow the gun to be pointed, within limits, in any direction without moving the trail, 10. Attached to the breech, 5, which is of an ordinary "interrupted screw" type, is the firing gear, 6. Pulling back the handle fixed to the curved rod fires the gun, and the spring, 7, afterwards restores the gear to its original position. The plate, 8, shields the gun-layer from the movements of this mechanism while the gun is in action. The spade, 11, by its hold in the ground prevents the carriage from moving back when the gun is fired. The wheel brakes, applied by the handle, 16, help in this. If necessary, the carriage, as a whole, can be swung round by the traversing lever and lifting handles, 12 and 13. The shield, 14 and 15, protects the men working the gun from hostile rifle fire.


Traversing, *i.e.*, swivelling the gun in the horizontal plane, is effected by the handwheel, 21, attached to a screw running through the hind end of the carriage body, 9, which is thus caused to move to either side as required. The mechanism for elevating the gun, *i.e.*, swivelling it in the vertical plane, is not quite so simple, although it also is a screw and nut combination. The complication is caused by the requirement of having the sights, to some extent, independent of the gun. The handwheel, 17, works, through bevel gearing, a nut on the lower part of the elevating screw, 18, the upper extremity of which is attached to the cradle of the gun and whose lower extremity is protected by the case, 19. From the middle portion of the elevating screw a connecting rod, 27, is taken to the rocking

bar, 22, which carries the sights. The forward end of the rocking bar is, like the cradle, pivoted to the carriage body. Hence, turning the handwheel, 17, alters the elevation of the gun and the sights simultaneously. In this way, with the elevating wheel, 17, and the traversing wheel, 21, gun and sights are aimed in the first place; and if the target were so close that the trajectory of the projectile would be quite straight, the gun might at once be fired. But it is virtually always necessary to give the gun some additional elevation; and it is here that the upper part of the elevating screw, 20, which can just be seen behind the connecting rod, 27, functions. The upper end of this screw is not attached unalterably to the cradle of the gun. The connection is made through a nut and bevel gear in much the same way as at 17, except that turning 17 moves the screw bodily up and down, while turning the upper gear (by a handwheel to the right of the gun, and consequently not shown in the drawing) does not move the screw, but moves the cradle up or down on it. It is clear, therefore, that any elevation given to the gun by the upper gear does not affect the position of the sights, which is controlled by the position of the elevating screw only. It saves confusion if this upper elevating gear is called the ranging gear. Its object is to give the gun only the extra elevation necessary to agree with the range, and for this purpose the operating hand-wheel is provided with a graduated disc and pointer (not visible in the picture). The gun-layer, therefore, can aim the gun as he likes with the elevating and traversing wheels, keeping his sights always on the objective, while another man at the ranging wheel receives telephonic, or other, instructions as to the distances of the objects aimed at, and so puts the correct "range" on the gun.


The sights mounted on the rocking bar consist of ordinary open sights fixed to the tubular bar, 26, the foresight, 24, being of the adjustable acorn pattern and the hind sight, 25, of the ordinary notched leaf pattern, roughly similar to rifle sights; and the alternative telescopic sight, 23. The latter is the most used. It is very accurate, and has the great advantage that it does not tire the eye through the effort, unavoidable with open sights, at focusing the vision on near and distant objects simultaneously. Both types of sight are carried on the rocking bar, 22, to which is added a clinometer, or spirit level, and certain minor but very necessary appliances.

ARTILLERY.

Artillery may be horse artillery, in which the guns are comparatively light and mobile; field artillery, which is larger and more powerful; heavy artillery, more powerful still, and used against the enemy's guns as well as against his personnel; howitzers and siege guns. The first two kinds of guns were usually considered to be shrapnel-firing weapons before the war; but, under the need for damaging trenches before they could effectively reach the men in them, all the belligerents soon turned to high-explosive shells for guns of all sizes.



In the war the most used piece of artillery has been the quick-firing field gun. The most interesting example of it is the French 75 millimetre (bore), the famous *Soixante-quinze*. It is not a new gun. According to *The Engineer*, to which journal we are also indebted for our illustrations of the mechanism of this and some of the enemies' guns, two such famous artillerists as Depont and Sainte-Claire Deville had a hand in its design, which was completed in 1897. It represented the first real attempt to produce a field piece that could be truly called a quick-firer. According to *The Engineer*, it can fire twenty rounds a minute, a speed not exceeded much, if at all, by any later gun. The breech is unusual, as it is not closed in the familiar way by an "interrupted" screw thread, nor by a sliding block. It is closed by a revolving block, the axis of which does not coincide with the axis of the gun. At one place a deep notch is cut in this block, and when the block is revolved into a certain position the notch coincides with the bore of the gun, and so allows the cartridge to be passed in. Half a turn of the block moves the notch away from the gun bore and closes the breech. As shown in the figure, the block is rotated by a hand-lever.




["*The Engineer*,"]
Breech block of French 75 mm. field gun.

The most typical British field piece is the eighteen-pounder quick-firer, which has a bore of 3.3 inches and a length of 92.62 inches. The length of the rifled part of the barrel is 80.232 inches, and the rifling consists of eighteen grooves, each 0.384 inch wide, 0.04 inch deep, and having a continuous uniform twist at the rate of one complete turn in 99 inches. The breech mechanism is of the familiar interrupted-screw type. That is to say, the block, instead of being screwed into the breech, as a bolt is screwed into a nut—which would be a very slow process indeed, and would make the gun the very reverse

of a quick-firer—is locked into position by a quarter-turn. The recoil cylinder is placed above the gun, and contains the hydraulic buffer which takes the force of the recoil and the spiral springs which thrust the gun forward again ready for the next shot. The gun is provided with both open and telescopic sights, as shown in the illustration. The general method of sighting this, or any gun of the sort, is the same as for sighting small arms, with the important reservation that in the small arm the sights are subject to any change in the vertical or horizontal attitude of the piece, and in the field gun they are not. The gun can be elevated or depressed without elevating or depressing the sights, which can thus be kept continuously on the target while any necessary change of elevation is being made. This is shown in a diagram. The gun itself consists of an inner and an outer steel tube, the inner one being wire-wound for some little distance at the breech end. It weighs, with its breech mechanism, 9 cwt.

A TYPICAL ENEMY GUN.

The chief piece of light artillery in use against us, at any rate in the earlier stages of the war, was the very mediocre German fifteen-pounder quick-firing field gun.



["*The Engineer*,"]
Time and Percussion Fuse for Shell.

The drawing is diagrammatic only, but it shows the relationship of the several essential parts of a shell nose fuse better than a perfectly correct drawing would. The fuse proper is a filament of slow-burning mixture, O, laid spirally round the hollow conical-shaped metal chamber at the nose of the shell. The hammer, M, being only held in the position shown by a light spring, drags behind when the shell is fired and, compressing the spring, strikes the detonating mixture at C, which inflames the ring of compressed powder, X. The flame from this ignites the fuse at the point Y, where the metal has been previously punctured and burns round the spiral, the bottom extremity of which is in communication with the main explosive charge in the shell. The time between the firing from the gun and the bursting of the shell is regulated by the position of the puncture, Y, which is made by the gunners before the shell is placed in the gun.

The remaining pieces of mechanism are for the purpose of bursting the shell by percussion when it strikes an object, if it has not already burst through the action of the time fuse. When the shell is fired the short tubular piece, m, by reason of its inertia, compresses the spring R, and the pawls, G, inside m, engage with the notched teeth outside the fuse tube, B. During the flight of the shell, therefore, m, R, and G behave virtually as one piece. On the impact of the shell with any hard body, the inertia of these parts carries them forward, compressing the light spring R', so that the point of S strikes the detonating cap a, and the m, act fuse in B is ignited.

The particular shell to which these details apply is the French 75 mm.

According to *The Engineer*, it gives a muzzle velocity of only 1,525 feet per second, which is more than 200 feet per second less than the comparable French "*Soixante-quinze*." This low speed entails a highly-curved trajectory for the shell, and that, in turn, means that when using shrapnel the bullets are not projected so far forward after the shell has burst as they are from a shell travelling more nearly in a horizontal direction. They do not "spray" over so great an area of ground. But it is a strong and simple gun. The breech closes on the principle of a simple wedge. The recoil cylinder is below the gun barrel.



Two photographs of British wounded returning to a dressing station after an attack.

(Official photographs taken by permission of the Commander-in Chief, British Expeditionary Force, and passed by the Chief Field Censor for publication.)
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A Red Cross steamer at sea.

[Central News.]

CHAPTER XVI.

THE CASUALTIES.

THE UNPRECEDENTED MAGNITUDE OF THE WAR—THE BRITISH CASUALTIES ON THE SEVERAL FRONTS AND THE SEVERAL PERIODS—THE LOSSES OF OUR ALLIES—ESTIMATES OF GERMAN LOSSES—THE WAR OF ATTRITION.

THE hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Waterloo, which occurred on July 18th, 1915, passed almost unnoticed in this country, for every one felt instinctively that he was living in the midst of events which, in the magnitude of their terror, surpassed anything ever known in our history, or in the history of the world. The size of the armies engaged dwarfed even the wildest exaggerations of Herodotus. A very moderate estimate would make the total number of troops at the front, as distinguished from those in training at the bases, nearly sixteen millions, made up as follows:—

	Millions.
Russia	3
Austria	2½
Germany	4½
Italy	½—¾
France	3
The Eastern Powers	1
Great Britain	1
Belgium	¼
	15¾

The number of Russian troops has certainly been exaggerated, and it is very doubtful whether she ever had more than two million troops at any one time actually fighting on her European frontiers, but, including her Caucasus front and her strong reserves behind the fighting line, the number assigned must be well within the mark. If, again, the figures for Italy seem liberal, the figures for Austria, which are probably low, correct the excess. Add the numbers in reserve at any given time, and we cannot put the total at less than thirty millions. Nothing like these figures has ever been known before in the history of the world. And it must be remembered that the figure of fifteen millions is only the number of men engaged at any given time. Most of the armies used up their quota of the total at least once, Russia and Austria perhaps oftener. With all the countries, the numbers of men engaged were out of proportion with anything known before; and with our own country monstrously so. At Waterloo there were fewer than 24,000 British troops engaged, and the casualties amongst them, which made Wellington weep,



Red Cross workers at Nish with Serbian wounded.

[Central News.]



The Russian Minister of War inspecting a Red Cross train leaving for the front.

[Underwood and Underwood.]

were less than 7,000. At Neuve Chapelle we lost nearly as many men as survived at Waterloo. The total number of British lives lost in action in the Crimean War was less than 3,000, a figure which was exceeded in a single month of the Dardanelles campaign.

BRITISH LOSSES IN OFFICERS.

No nation has been so frank in its statements of its casualties as this country, and it would be possible by a very careful study of them to approximate to a fairly accurate calculation of the casualties in the reported battles. But the War Office obviously, by its system of issuing the casualties, did not wish to make these calculations easy, and it is not advisable that curiosity should take advantage of official frankness in publishing complete lists. Sometimes, though rarely, the figures for a complete action, or a series of operations, have been given. In the retreat from Mons, for example, our casualties were given as 15,142; in the month of September 12th to October 8th, which included the Battle of the Aisne, our losses were 561 officers and 12,980 men; at Neuve Chapelle, in the three days' fighting, the casualty lists contained the names of 572 officers and 12,239 men; and the losses in the landing in Gallipoli were 602 officers and 13,377 other ranks. The losses in these battles were on the scale of the big battles of the American Civil War—at Gettysburg, for example, the Federals lost about 13,709 officers and men, and the Confederates about a thousand more—but in these the numbers engaged were considerably larger. In all the major battles there were regiments which lost half, or even three-quarters, of their men. The following table, abstracted from the day-to-day casualty lists for the first three months of the war (down to November 19th), will give some idea of the drain in officers, and will explain a difficulty which became greater as the war progressed, for the lives lost at the beginning of the war were those of men who had made the army their professional career, and could not, therefore, be replaced by officers who though equal in valour could not be equal in experience.

	Killed.	Wounded.	Wounded and Missing.	Missing.	Prisoners.
Army Service Corps	—	3	—	—	4 (1)
Army Veterinary Corps	2	2	—	—	—
Royal Field Artillery	36	104	2	2	14 (3)
Royal Garrison Artillery	4	6	—	—	—
Royal Horse Artillery	8	8	—	1	1 (1)
Royal Artillery	1	2	—	—	1
Bedford Regiment	20	21	2	4	1
Berkshire Regiment	5	9	—	—	1
Bucks. Yeomanry	—	—	—	—	1
Border Regiment	10	6	3	—	1
Cheshire Regiment	6	7	2	7	14 (6)
Cambridge Regiment	—	—	—	—	1
Duke of Wellington's	4	5	—	—	4 (2)
Derbyshire Yeomanry	—	1	—	—	—
Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry	6	16	1	5	3 (1)
Durham Light Infantry	10	13	—	1	—
Dorset Regiment	10	11	—	5	6 (3)
Devon Regiment	7	13	—	—	—
Royal Engineers	13	25	3	2	2 (1)
Essex Regiment	4	6	—	1	1
Lancashire Fusiliers	5	13	3	2	2
Northumberland Fusiliers	10	14	2	2	—
Royal Flying Corps	4	3	—	1	1
Royal Fusiliers	8	23	5	4	2 (1)
1st Royal Dragoons	3	3	—	—	—
2nd Dragoons (Scots Greys)	2	5	—	1	—
1st Dragoon Guards	2	1	—	—	—
2nd Dragoon Guards	4	13	—	1	—
3rd Dragoon Guards	—	—	—	1	—

	Killed.	Wounded.	Wounded and Missing.	Missing.	Prisoners.
4th (R.I.) Dragoon Guards	6	13	—	—	3
5th Dragoon Guards	6	9	—	—	1
6th Dragoon Guards	1	5	—	2	—
7th Dragoon Guards	—	2	—	—	—
Royal Horse Guards	5	5	—	1	—
Coldstream Guards	18	48	—	10	—
Grenadier Guards	15	20	4	4	—
1st Life Guards	3	9	1	1	—
2nd Life Guards	3	10	—	—	2
Gloucester Regiment	11	17	1	3	—
3rd Hussars	1	10	—	1	—
4th Hussars	5	5	—	—	—
7th Hussars	—	2	—	—	—
10th Hussars	2	4	—	—	—
11th Hussars	3	11	—	—	1
13th Hussars	2	3	—	—	—
14th Hussars	—	1	—	—	—
15th Hussars	3	3	1	—	1
18th Hussars	2	8	—	1	1
19th Hussars	2	1	—	—	1
20th Hussars	4	3	—	—	1
Hampshire Regiment	7	10	2	1	2
Intelligence Corps	2	4	—	—	4
West Kent Regiment	14	9	1	1	1 (1)
East Kent Regiment	6	11	1	4	—
West Kent Yeomanry	1	—	—	—	—
Leicester Regiment	6	11	—	1	—
Lincoln Regiment	6	21	3	1	2
5th (R.I.) Lancers	3	6	—	1	1
9th Lancers	8	14	1	1	1
12th Lancers	6	5	—	—	2 (1)
16th Lancers	2	9	—	—	—
21st Lancers	—	5	—	—	—
East Lancashire Regiment	6	7	2	—	2
South Lancashire Regiment	9	10	1	5	3 (1)
Loyal North Lancashire Regiment	11	17	—	9	2 (1)
King's Own Royal Lancasters	10	19	1	2	3 (2)
Liverpool Regiment	10	17	—	2	—
Manchester Regiment	7	10	—	8	4 (3)
Middlesex Regiment	12	19	3	3	9 (1)
Norfolk Regiment	3	10	2	2	3 (2)
Northumberland Yeomanry	—	5	—	—	—
Oxfordshire Yeomanry	1	—	—	—	—
Northampton Regiment	11	17	—	1	—
Oxford and Bucks. Light Infantry	10	12	—	—	2 (2)
R.A.M.C.	22	20	2	14	44 (2)
Rifle Brigade	5	21	3	1	—
K.R. Rifle Corps	11	35	—	10	2 (1)
Somerset Light Infantry	1	10	5	—	2
West Surrey Regiment	12	37	2	1	1 (1)
East Surrey Regiment	6	20	—	—	3 (2)
Suffolk Regiment	3	3	—	3	21 (9)
Sussex Regiment	13	13	1	1	—
Shropshire Light Infantry	4	8	—	—	—
South Stafford Regiment	9	21	1	2	—
North Stafford Regiment	8	5	—	—	—
Warwickshire Regiment	9	17	—	8	12 (5)
Wiltshire Regiment	10	12	—	10	11 (2)
Worcester Regiment	20	23	—	2	2 (2)
K.O. Yorkshire Light Infantry	5	6	—	2	2 (2)
York and Lancaster Regiment	3	11	—	—	—
Yorkshire Regiment	6	11	3	2	1
West Riding Regiment	—	6	—	—	—
West Yorkshire Regiment	13	9	—	2	7 (3)
East Yorkshire Regiment	8	9	—	5	—
Sherwood Foresters	7	12	—	7	5
Army Chaplains' Department	—	1	—	—	—

WELSH REGIMENTS.


Welsh Fusiliers	15	18	1	—	4 (1)
South Wales Borderers	10	11	—	1	—
Welsh Regiment	8	17	1	2	1 (1)

SCOTTISH REGIMENTS.

London Scottish	1	8	—	—	—
Scots Fusiliers	8	23	6	8	1
Gordon Highlanders	11	23	1	10	14 (3)



German prisoners marching past General Joffre on their way to the rear of the French lines.
[Central News.]



A German ambulance corps with their dogs.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

	Killed.	Wounded.	Wounded and Missing.	Missing.	Prisoners.
SCOTTISH REGIMENTS— <i>continued</i> .					
Scots Guards.....	20	19	—	10	1
Argyll and Southern Highlanders ..	2	4	—	13	1
Black Watch.....	9	23	3	4	—
Cameron Highlanders	9	21	7	2	1 (1)
Royal Scots.....	6	18	—	1	5 (2)
Highland Light Infantry	5	13	—	—	—
Cameronians	3	4	—	2	—
Scottish Borderers	10	9	1	4	5 (2)
Seaforth Highlanders	4	14	—	1	—

IRISH REGIMENTS.					
Connaught Rangers	16	11	1	2	5 (1)
Dublin Fusiliers	2	3	—	—	8 (3)
Munster Fusiliers	2	2	—	9	10 (2)
Inniskilling Fusiliers	8	18	—	1	1 (1)
Irish Fusiliers	3	8	1	—	1
Irish Guards	8	18	2	1	—
Leinster Regiment	4	10	—	—	3
Irish Regiment	4	12	—	13	7 (4)
Irish Rifles	8	18	—	2	4 (1)
North Irish Horse	—	—	—	1	—

NOTE.—The figures in parentheses in the last column indicate that of the number reported prisoners these are wounded.

This drain of officers was accelerated in the later quarters of the first year.

A CONSPECTUS OF BRITISH LOSSES.

From time to time official totals of the casualties were made public in answer to questions in Parliament, and these summaries, though they were not compiled on any uniform system that would make exact comparison easy between the losses in various places and periods, are still very instructive. The figures in the following table are not to be read as the losses in the periods between the dates, but stand for the total losses up to the date of the entry, and include the previous figures :—

LOSSES IN KILLED, WOUNDED, AND MISSING.

By September 7th	18,729	
October 31st	57,000	
February 4th.....	104,000	
April 11th	139,347	
May 31st	258,069	
		(Dardanelles only.)
June 30th	—	42,434
July 18th	330,580	46,622
August 21st	391,088	—

These figures are all compiled on the same basis, except that the last two totals include 9,106 naval casualties which are not included in the earlier figures. The only total in which the various items have been given completely are those for July 18th, which is made up as follows :—

FRANCE.			
	Officers.		Men.
Killed	3,293	..	48,402
Wounded	6,807	..	156,435
Missing	1,207	..	53,375
	11,307	..	258,212 = 269,519
DARDANELLES.			
Killed	562	..	7,537
Wounded	1,375	..	28,508
Missing	154	..	8,486
	2,091	..	44,531 = 46,622

OTHER THEATRES, EXCEPT SOUTH-WEST AFRICA.


	Officers.		Men.	
Killed	145	..	1,445	
Wounded	248	..	3,247	
Missing	22	..	641	
	415	..	5,333	= 5,748
NAVAL.				
Killed	489	..	7,430	
Wounded	87	..	787	
Missing	29	..	274	
	615	..	8,491	= 9,106

It will be noted that the proportion of officers killed to men tends to be higher than the proportion wounded. In France it is one officer to fifteen men killed, and one officer to twenty-two men wounded. On the other hand, it is lower among the missing, which is what one would expect, for the surrenders are commonly of men who have lost their officers. A further examination of the figures shows that in the army the proportion of killed to the total casualties is roughly one in five, and of killed and missing together to the total casualties about one in three. Of the two-thirds of the casualties from wounds, from a quarter to a third may be reckoned as permanently lost to the army, though exact figures are very difficult to obtain. To estimate the net permanent loss to the army in casualty figures, one should add to the numbers of killed and missing, say, nine in twenty-four of the wounded. These proportions do not apply to naval losses, where, as might be expected, the proportion of killed to all casualties is more than seven-eighths. It is to be noted, too, that these figures do not include casualties from sickness. In most modern wars these have vastly exceeded the casualties in action. In the numerous British wars, from the Ashanti Expedition in 1873 up to and including the South African War, it has been calculated that for every man admitted to a hospital for a wound or injury, twenty-five have been treated for disease, and five have died of disease "for every one that has died from wounds or injuries." In the last German War the French army lost more men from small-pox than from the enemy's shells, bullets, and bayonets combined. This war seems, except for dysentery in the Dardanelles, and on parts of the Austrian frontier where cholera has been reported, to have been comparatively free from epidemical sickness.

THE BLACK MAY.

The rise of the totals in the table of British casualties set out above is interesting. In France, the most destructive period in relation to the numbers of men engaged was the first month. The number of casualties up to the eve of the Battle of the Marne was 18,729. It is a very small total compared with that which has since been reached, though it must be remembered that the number of troops engaged was small, and the proportion of casualties must be at least one in five, and possibly one in four, of the total fighting strength of the army for most of the time. At this rate the army would have been completely destroyed twice over in twelve months. Our total casualties up to the end of the first year represent perhaps a third of the total numbers sent to France up to that time, which, spread over the twelve months, is a striking retardation of the rate for the first month. But so far as the total casualties go, this first month was the least expensive in the war.

The period in which our losses took the greatest leap was between the middle of April and the end of May. In the two months ending April 11th, our losses were



A British dressing station in Gallipoli in the shelter of a rock cliff. Just over the top of the crest can be seen the smoke from a bursting Turkish shell.
[Central News.]



The Dardanelles operations: Slightly-wounded men waiting in a gully near an advanced dressing station.
[Central News.]

only just over 35,000, although this included the Battle of Neuve Chapelle. But in the next six weeks our losses rose from 139,347 to 258,069, an increase equal to the whole of our losses in the first six months of the war. The later figure, it is true, includes the losses incurred in the landing on Gallipoli (April 23rd), and the fighting for the possession of Krithia and Achi Baba in May, but even when a liberal deduction has been made on their accounts, the remaining losses were not far from 100,000, nearly all of which were incurred in the fighting round Ypres, and in supporting as well as we could the first French offensive towards Arras. In other words, the defeat of the second German attack on Ypres in the spring cost us as much as the autumn campaign from the time that we left the Aisne, the whole of the winter campaign, and the advance on Neuve Chapelle combined. Before the fighting at Ypres began, our mood was one of great confidence; these losses, though the extreme gravity of the military situation was not realised at the time, changed it to one of anxiety. After the end of May, the rate of our losses in the west declined very sharply. June and July, with a rapidly increasing army, each added no more than we had lost in the first month of the war in an army one-tenth of its size. On the other hand, the casualties in the Dardanelles were approaching 50,000 by the end of July, and in August they took a great upward bound. It is probable that, taking into account the cases of sickness, which do not appear in the casualty lists, the Dardanelles, after the beginning of August, was the most costly campaign in relation to the numbers engaged. But in the gross number of casualties, nothing in the war approached the fighting round Ypres, beginning with the attack on Hill 60, on April 17th, and the fighting for the Aubers Ridge.

THE FRENCH AND RUSSIAN LOSSES.

Neither the French nor the Russians have published lists of their casualties, and attempts to estimate their number are little better than guess-work. But the French losses were undoubtedly heavy, especially in the first

month of the war, when they suffered a series of heavy defeats. Up to the end of October they cannot have been far short of half a million killed, wounded, and prisoners, or more than ten times the casualties of our own army. The rate afterwards slackened, but the French attacks during the winter were usually costly. The fighting in Champagne, for example, in February, cost 40,000 casualties, and the cost of General Foch's first offensive from Arras was much higher. At the end of the first year of the war, these losses must have been approaching two millions, which, however, was not all real loss. The Russian casualties were much heavier, especially in prisoners. Before the German advance from Warsaw had been checked, their losses in prisoners

alone must have been over 1,500,000, which, on the British proportion, would represent an incredible number of total casualties. If we accept the view, for which there is some support, that the strength of the Russian army in the fighting line in Europe never exceeded two millions, this army must have been lost and re-created twice over, at least, in the first thirteen or fourteen months of the war.

THE GERMAN LOSSES.

At the beginning of the war the German newspapers published full casualty lists, which, though often very belated, were a model in their arrangement of what those lists should be. After that, the Government forbade the publication of complete lists, or any attempt to estimate

in print from the local lists what the total German casualties were. In trying to form an estimate of what they amounted to in the first twelve months, it is best to begin by setting out the figures which are based on the addition of the numbers published in the various official lists. These original lists (except such as were published in the newspapers at the beginning of the war) have not, of course, reached this country, and we are dependent for our knowledge of them on calculations made in various neutral countries. Official neutral calculations seem to have yielded very different results, but, such as they are, we reproduce them. It should be noted that the figures are of little use in



German prisoners captured by the French being marched to the rear of the lines. [Central News.]



French wounded being removed during an attack to a farm in the rear of the lines.

[Topical Press.]



British wounded being conveyed from a French hospital train to a general base hospital.

[Central News.]



Dutch soldiers firing a salute at the funeral of 29 British sailors, whose bodies were washed ashore in Holland after the torpedoing of the *Aboukir*, *Hogue* and *Cressy*.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

estimating the casualties in any given period, and still less in any given action, for the successive lists bear very small relation to the chronological sequence of the actions in which the losses were incurred. Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, and Württemberg all publish separate lists. The word in brackets after the totals gives the source of the calculations.

CASUALTIES REPORTED.

October	7	Killed	36,531	
		Wounded	153,165	
		Missing	55,622	
			245,318	(Zurich).
October	31	(Prussian only)	601,438	(Copenhagen).
December	16	(Prussian only)	717,319	
		(Prussian & Bavarian)	1,000,000	
		(Saxon & Württemberg)	200,000	
			1,200,000	(Copenhagen).
December	20	(Lists 96, 97, 98 and 99)	22,601	(Amsterdam).
		(Yser losses only)	30,000	(Amsterdam).
February	21	(Prussian only)	1,250,000	(Copenhagen).
March	31	(Prussian only)	1,500,000	(Copenhagen).
May 1-July 1		(Eastern front only)	260,000	(Copenhagen).
June	30	(German)	1,672,444	(British Press Bureau).
July	31	(German)	2,178,683	(Land & Water, Sept. 14th).
August	24	(Prussian only)	1,740,836	(Rotterdam).
September	28	(Prussian only)	1,916,148	(Rotterdam).

The dates on the left of this table are the dates of the last casualty list included in the calculation of totals,

and the figures opposite them do not, therefore, give the total casualties up to that time, as the British totals do. On the basis of the figures given by the Copenhagen calculation of December 16th, the proportion of Prussian to total casualties would seem to be seven to twelve, but it is hardly safe to accept this proportion as one that favourably holds, for Prussia or the other States may have been prompter in publishing their returns. It is better, perhaps, to calculate the proportion of Prussian losses as two-thirds of the whole; and on that basis, the grand total of German casualties announced in casualty lists by the end of the first year would be 2,611,254 (1,740,836 Prussian plus 870,418 Saxon, Bavarian, and Württemberg). Inasmuch as the German lists are usually very belated, it would be safer to take the figures for September 28th as the figures for the officially announced casualties in the first year's fighting—say, in round numbers, 3,000,000. That is to say, the German casualties for the first year were from seven to eight times as heavy as our own in the same period.

We have now to take note of calculations other than those based on the German official lists. There have been several official French calculations and one British calculation of a semi-official character. The English writer who has given most study to the question of German losses is Mr. Belloc.

THE FRENCH OFFICIAL CALCULATIONS.

The official French estimate of German losses is 260,000 a month, which would give for the first twelve months

3,120,000, much the same figure we have reached from the German casualty lists. The French Official Review of the First Six Months gives some interesting particulars of losses in certain regiments which are obtained from note-books and documents found on officers killed or taken prisoners.

"The 13th Bavarian Regiment in a month and a half (August to September) lost 3,250 men. The 171st Regiment, from the middle of August to the middle of November, lost 2,500 men and 60 officers. The 99th Regiment in the same period had equal losses. The 15th Regiment on the 18th October alone lost 1,786 men and 37 officers. The 132nd Regiment lost, on November 16th, near Ypres, 1,390 men. The losses were still higher in the new formations. The 205th Regiment had 2,040 men *hors de combat* in one battle on the Yser. The 235th Regiment lost 1,320. The 244th Regiment 2,150. The 247th Regiment, in that same battle, 1,900. The 248th Regiment 1,800. The 17th Bavarian Reserve Regiment lost, at Messines and Wyt-schaete, 30 officers and 2,171 men."

The total losses in ten days fighting on the Yser front at the end of October and the beginning of November are estimated by the same authority to have exceeded 150,000 men, and may perhaps have reached 200,000 men.

A BRITISH ESTIMATE.

In a Prize Court Case heard before Sir Samuel Evans, in August, an affidavit was put in evidence by Major Eric Dillon, of the War Office General Staff, in which the number of German troops under arms at the two fronts was estimated at 4,000,000, the number in training at 750,000, and the casualties at 2,000,000. By "casualties" in this connection seems to have been meant the number of men off the strength of the army at one time through sickness or wounds; the figure excludes prisoners and killed. On August 25th there was published "from a well-informed quarter" an estimate, evidently semi-official, of the German casualties. After putting the strength of the German and Austrian armies on the two fronts at rather more than 4½ millions (1,800,000 on the west front, and 2,520,000 on the east)—a very low figure—the compilers of this estimate proceeded:—

"From soon after the outbreak of war the Germans have supplied losses in their first-line and reserve troops by men from second and even third line troops (Landwehr and Landsturm), and it is no longer possible to speak with accuracy of German first-line troops as distinguished from second and third line troops. It is safer to regard all the German troops in the fighting line as of much the same quality, for whilst the original first-line has been largely supplied from the second and third lines, the two latter classes contain a considerable leavening of first-line and reserve troops.

"In the first few months of the war it is calculated that the first-line troops lost about 50 per cent in casualties and the reserve about 25 per cent. Their places were taken by the recruits of 1914 and by men from the other categories. The re-formed units (including now the 1915 class of recruits) have since then again lost about 50 per

cent in casualties, so that it is probable that there remain only about 25 per cent of the original first line troops, to which must be added men slightly wounded who have returned to the fighting line.

"The German casualties in killed, wounded, and missing, officially reported up to the 30th June, totalled 1,672,444 men. Of this number, 306,123 were killed, 15,808 died of disease, whilst 540,723 were either missing, prisoners, or so seriously wounded as to be put out of action for the rest of the war.

"There has been very heavy fighting on both fronts since the beginning of June, and a large proportion of the casualties for June, as well as the whole of those for the later period, are not included in the 1,672,444, because they have not yet been reported.

"Estimating the total loss for the twelve months, provisionally, at 2,000,000 (if we accept the official statement of 1,672,444 in ten months as correct), and assuming that something like 500,000 were only slightly wounded

and have now recovered, the effective loss (men who can never fight again) may fairly be taken to reach 1,000,000. In addition, there are probably 500,000 wounded who are absent from the front on leave, in hospital, &c. This makes a total net loss of 1,500,000 in the twelve months, and of these at least 400,000 to 450,000 have been killed.

"There are no data on which to make, with any degree of accuracy, a calculation of the number of Germans taken prisoners by the Allies."

These figures are probably too low. The proportion in the British army of killed to total casualties is about one in five, which would give 600,000 Germans killed in the first twelve months. The number of German



A monument erected at Barcy to fallen French soldiers.

[Photopress.]

prisoners is less than with the Allies, and may, at a guess, be put at 250,000. That leaves 2,150,000 wounded, which, in the British proportion of nine-twenty-fourths for permanent losses, would give a total permanent loss to the German army in the fighting of the first twelve months of 1,650,000 (600,000 killed + 250,000 prisoners + 800,000 disabled from wounds). Those figures include a number of deaths from disease, but do not include permanent losses to the army by sickness other than those who have actually died. And this estimate of permanent loss is more than 50 per cent higher than the British official estimate. Adding 500,000 for those in hospital from wounds (which is a fairly constant total), the permanent deductions from the military strength of Germany by the end of the first year is over two millions, or more than two-thirds of the total casualties.

THE AUSTRIAN LOSSES.

The one established fact about the Austrian losses is that by the end of July—considerably less than a year of war, because the announcements of losses are always in arrear—the number of Austrians killed in the war (including deaths from sickness) was 501,000. The number of prisoners was officially put at 600,000. The British proportion of killed and missing to the total casualties is one in three. That would give a total number of casualties of 3,300,000, but as the number of Austrians taken prisoners was exceptionally high, we may perhaps reduce this total to 3,000,000. The total is much the same as the German, and Mr. Belloc, who has done a great deal of work on the casualty statistics, has, on the Austrian basis, worked out the German casualties to a slightly higher figure than that given here, but the difference—some 300,000—is not so great as to influence conclusions. Adding

together the German and Austrian totals, we get a gross total of 6,000,000 as the losses of the German Alliance in the first year of the war. The permanent losses of the Austrian army are greater than those of the Germans, owing to the much larger number of prisoners and the prevalence of disease on some sections of their fronts. We shall not be far wrong in putting the permanent reduction of the Austrian military strength in the first twelve months at two millions and a half. This figure, added to the German total, makes a net permanent reduction for the two Powers of four millions and a half.

THE WAR OF ATTRITION.

These are enormous losses, but from the strictly military point of view they do not favour the theory that the attrition of casualties is necessarily in favour of the Allies. The losses of the Allies in the first year almost certainly exceeded this figure; and though the vast numbers of Russia give the Allies much greater reserves of strength than Germany, it is doubtful to what extent these reserves can be mobilised and equipped, and it must not be forgotten that the German alliance with Turkey counterbalances the effects of the accession of Italy to the Entente Powers. Attrition, moreover, is an unsatisfactory way of winning a war, because it is so ruinously costly, and the theory of attrition, though popular with a certain school in this country, is, for these and other reasons, the reverse of attractive. There is, however, some reason to think that Germany at the beginning of the second year of the war was gravely alarmed at its frightful costliness in men. The enormous numbers of Russians oppress her even in peace time, and even victory, if it is postponed long enough, would leave Germany weaker in the competition with her neighbours than she was before the beginning of the war.



A modern battlefield: On the road to Loos after the British advance.

(Official photograph taken by permission of the Commander-in-Chief, British Expeditionary Force, and passed by the Chief Field Censor for publication.) [Sport and General. Crown copyright reserved.]



Lord Kitchener making a recruiting appeal at the Guildhall.

[Central News.]

CHAPTER XVII.

OPTIMISTS AND PESSIMISTS.

THE TWO-PARTY HABIT OF MIND—THE GENESIS OF THE PESSIMISTIC POLICY—REASONS FOR ITS RISE—ITS INJURY AND SERVICE TO THE COUNTRY—STAGES OF FEELING ABOUT THE WAR—THE BLACK MONTH.

THE war, as it progressed, divided the British into two parties, the optimists and the pessimists, and this division, which oftener than not was due to differences more of temperament than of opinion, quite superseded the ordinary division into political parties. No nation has retained its attachment to the two-party system so faithfully as England, and it almost seemed as though the bifurcation of opinion were ingrained in the national character, and, denied its usual expression by the political truce, must needs find expression in another form. You may drive out nature with a fork, but it will always return. However that may be, this division of the British into optimists and pessimists was one of the most remarkable facts of the war, and one in which future generations will be most interested. How interested we should be now if we knew the real (as distinguished from the official) thoughts of the country during the progress of the struggle with Napoleon.

Some causes of this temperamental division into optimists and pessimists which replaced the old political

differences have already been touched upon. The Englishman's idea of war is (or was until this war) fundamentally different from that of any other country. He conceived of war as a purely political and professional state. It was a condition involving politicians and the military and naval classes and their relatives, but not affecting the life of the nation as a whole. It was half like a general election, half like bad weather, but in either case something that the citizen had to go out to meet, and which did not pursue him past the front door to his fireside. This view of war was not accidental to the British, but so much a matter of course that it was hardly recognised as the privilege that it was. Sea-power made us the "dread and envy of them all"; the "dread" everyone understood, but the meaning of "envy" in the song was not realised until the war came, and we presently found ourselves fighting on land in our millions, just as other nations "not so blessed as we" were doing, not from choice, but from the hard necessity enforced on them by having land frontiers. Nor, even in our case, could this participation on so great a scale in Continental land operations

be said to have been due to deliberate choice. No doubt, had everything been thought out before the war, we could have seen the two alternatives that would lie before us. We could have said to our Allies that we were a naval and not a military power, and that any assistance that we rendered on land over and above the limit of our existing military resources must, being outside our contract, be accounted to us for virtue; or, recognising that there was no such thing as limited liability in a serious war, we might have made ourselves a great military power in anticipation of the struggle. As it was, we slipped without realising what was happening into the greatest revolution that has ever taken place in our policy. For the change of a ruling dynasty, or a great measure of electoral enfranchisement, is the merest trifle in its effect on the life of the people compared with that produced by our entry into the war on the wholly unprecedented military scale of this war. It was a plunge into the unknown, made not only without reflection, but without realising that anything very remarkable was happening.

EFFECTS OF THE CENSORSHIP.


It was inevitable that the old critical habit of mind which is the Englishman's political genius should come back to us. It came back not as regrets for the policy which the country had decided upon—there never was a war in which opinion was so nearly unanimous as in this—but as a vague feeling of unrest and bewilderment. How should it be otherwise? We found ourselves in a military world that was absolutely unfamiliar to us, with our fixed insular notions of war. This feeling was increased by the severity of the censorship, which came as a great shock to a people to whom absolute freedom in the expression of opinion and the supply of news were as essential a part of their scheme of the world as they are to the American. The opera-box view of war, which had been both our shame and our privilege, was suddenly interrupted. There were other reasons, too, why the censorship was felt in England more than elsewhere. We were not fighting alone, and therefore we had to think what publication was desirable not only in our own interests but in that of our Allies too. Moreover, censorship was a trade to which no one in this country had served an apprenticeship, and it was by general consent done extremely badly. Apart, however, from the general question of the censorship, and its wisdom, its effects were serious on opinion both at home and abroad. The change from an England which was the headquarters of free speech and free writing to an England in which news was scanty and the official policy was obscurantist, did us no good in neutral countries, and particularly in the United States of America. It had, moreover, a most chilling effect on sentiment at home. We became the prey of rumours, good and evil. So long as things were going well, it mattered little. But, when the reverses came, the censorship gave wings to every lying rumour, and made a certain depression of spirits the mark of the patriotic and the well-informed man. The unknown by broad daylight may be a sufficient trial; in the dark it is a far more serious test of resolution and faith.

In the first few months of the war the chief mischief done by the lack of frankness was to engender an excessive confidence, and, what was worse, a lack of appreciation of the great work done by the French army. The military might of Russia was almost a superstition with the average Englishman; he never had the least doubts of her success, though the war with Japan might have

taught him that much more goes to victory than the endurance and valour of troops. But the work of the French army, on the other hand, was not properly appreciated. The average Englishman thought, and perhaps still thinks, that it was the 60,000 British troops who fought at Mons who saved France from crushing defeat. There is no doubt that the First Expeditionary force was the finest army for its size that ever fought in Europe, and its services to France were exceedingly great. But the prevailing notion that it was the pivot of the operations in France was as false to perspective as the other strange legend that the defence of Liège saved Europe. It was not the fault of official England that the early work of the French army, unfortunate as much of it was, was not duly appreciated, but of the French censorship, which concealed early reverses. But the result was to produce a type of optimism which did much mischief. In the first winter, when Germany was bracing herself to a struggle far more serious than she had ever thought likely, English opinion was unduly self-satisfied. It failed to realise that the struggle in Western France and Flanders was only a small section of the French front. It knew of the French reverses, and of some instances in which French generals had been at fault. It knew little or nothing of Castelnau's great achievements in the Nancy region, of Sarrail's fine defence of Verdun, and of Foch's brilliant tactics on the Marne—all of which were every whit as important in checking the German invasion as the successes of the British on the left wing. Nor did it realise in the winter how splendid was the work of reorganisation that was being accomplished by General Joffre. Our own War Office knew, and it did not waste its time. But it could have done far more had it had behind it the driving force of a thoroughly instructed public opinion. As it was, public opinion passed the first winter in a dream.

DEPRESSION AS A CULT.

The reaction came very violently in the spring, after the news of Neuve Chapelle had shown us how much remained to be done before victory was in sight. In May, depression became a cult. The political forms taken by the agitation that arose have already (Vol. II., Chapter XXXI.) been described. Here we are concerned rather with its psychology than with its politics. The inwardness of the agitation seems to have been as follows: There had, for long before the war, been a small but active party that wanted universal and compulsory military training. They had not succeeded for a variety of reasons, chief among them being that people did not understand that there was any justification in the policy of the country abroad for a change so revolutionary; and after the war began these efforts had been silenced, partly by the political truce and still more by the extraordinary success of voluntary recruiting. But when things began to go ill, and it was apparent that fresh efforts would have to be made, they reverted to their former belief, and were now reinforced by many who had been converted by the war. The chief obstacle was the success that had attended the voluntary recruiting, and accordingly it became necessary for them if they were to recommend their case to depreciate the work that had already been done, to dwell upon the magnitude of the task, and even to magnify the prescience and the power of the enemy. In that way, pessimism became almost an article of faith with a section of the people.



Mr. Lloyd George addressing a "Women's Right to Serve" demonstration in London.

[Photopress.]



Mr. Churchill addressing a war meeting at Dundee.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

The depreciation of what we had done, or could do, under the existing system did us much harm abroad. It was natural that our Allies should take us at our own valuation. Their own sacrifices were visible, and the enemy was on their soil. Our sacrifices were at any rate less obvious, and the work of our fleet was invisible. It was not to be expected that a Frenchman, burning with anger at the presence of the enemy in his beloved land, not knowing the limitations of sea-power and not seeing its very real achievement, should take an impartial and philosophic view of the situation. If we did not remind him, he was not likely to think for himself how great was the breach with our past tradition made by the multiplying of our army tenfold, and how serious, because it was unexpected and unprepared for, the interference with our ordinary life. If he read denunciations in the English Press of the slackness and apathy of the people, it was natural that he should estimate at their face value, and as literal truth, statements which the Englishman, accustomed to the exaggeration of our methods of political controversy, would naturally discount very liberally. Thus our early over-confidence and lack of perspective led us to undervalue the achievement of the French nation; and later, our self-depreciation and cultivated gloom led the French nation, or a large part of it, to undervalue our own achievement.

THE DISEASE AND ITS SYMPTOMS.

But there was more in the view of the pessimistic school than desire for conscription or political intrigue. Large numbers of the people saw that the nation was sick, but failed to diagnose the true cause, though its symptoms were evident enough. The true cause was that we were trying to extemporise within a year the military organisation which it had taken our Allies and our enemies a generation to organise. This, the plainest fact of the situation, was very seldom indicated, because to do so might imply a censure on policy. The Ministerialists could not stress the fact, because to do so would have been to invite the demand why, as they had pursued the policy, they had not prepared for its material support. Nor could the official Opposition put the fact very bluntly, because the majority of them had not, any more

than the Government, foreseen the cost of their country's foreign policy, or, if they foresaw it, had not taken the people frankly into their confidence. And so the country, when the disappointments came, was left without real guidance as to their true significance. They looked round for a panacea, and people naturally tended to find it in the directions in which they were most interested—now root and branch temperance reform, now high explosives and munitions, now abolition of party government and substitution of a Coalition, and so on. All these reforms and methods had their value. But they were none of them a panacea, for there is no single prescription for doing the task that we had set ourselves as easily and well as it might have been done had the whole vast

question been carefully thought out beforehand. What was wrong was that we had stumbled unconsciously into a revolution. No other word fits the change accomplished within a year by a nation which had never in its whole history known war in the Continental sense, and was now engaged in extemporising the means of war, both on land and sea, on a scale like nothing previously experienced, and doing it in face of the enemy, in the shade of a censorship, and by purely voluntary appeal. When the future history of the war comes to be written, the accomplishment of the British nation in the first year of the war, with due deduction made for avoidable blunders, and for lamentable improvidence, will still



Lord Kitchener leaving the War Office.

[L.N.A.]

remain as the most stupendous achievement of faith in modern history.

If the professional pessimist did harm, so also did the professional optimist. It is the great vice of British public life that it deals only with blacks and whites, and knows no greys and browns. If one side says anything very strongly, the other side is sure to say the exact opposite with equal insistence, and the mere fact that there were some anxious to draw the very worst picture of our conditions was in itself enough to produce, if it did not already exist, a rival school which cultivated complacency as the chief of the patriotic virtues. Of the two schools the complacent school was the less adapted to the conditions of war. Mr. Lloyd George has made

mistakes, and his gifts of administration are not equal to his powers of persuasion; but he has done one great service to the country in shattering the merely complacent and self-satisfied view of the war which, if it had continued, might have ended in national disaster. "It doesn't matter," a Liberal Minister is reputed to have said after a Council, "what we do say, but let us all say the same thing." With far more truth it may be said that in war what is done matters much less than that what is done should be single-minded and whole-hearted. There is virtue in compromise in dealing with peace problems; but it is nearly always deadly in war. The art of war is not deliberative, and does not consist in choosing a course of action which best reconciles opposing views. In war, it is an invariable rule that of two alternatives either is preferable to a combination.

The conflict between the optimists and the pessimists went through three well-marked stages. In the first, which may be said to have lasted till the spring, the optimists were in a great majority; in the second, from the battle of Neuve Chapelle, the two parties were about evenly balanced; and in the third stage, which began with the Russian defeats in Galicia, pessimism became the fashion. It may help to a clearer idea of these various stages to remind ourselves of the hopes and fears of the future course of the war that were entertained at each of these periods.

AN EARLY FORECAST OF THE WAR.

In the first months there were no pessimists, although Lord Kitchener, when he made his early estimate of a three years' war, was evidently under no misapprehension of the gravity of the task before us. Both Mr. Asquith and Sir John French (if rumours are to be trusted) were much more confident of an earlier end. And in spite of the heavy defeats suffered by the French, confidence certainly seemed justified when the Battle of the Marne brought the first German plans to failure. At that time the situation looked very promising indeed for the Allies. The whole theory on which the German plans had been built up had broken down. Paris had survived, and the French armies had won a strategic victory of the greatest importance. In the week of the Marne, perhaps, a majority of the British people expected the war to be over by spring at the latest, and, indeed, had we had a large army to join with the Belgians at that time it probably would have been. It was not until the fall of Antwerp and the mismanagement of the British relief expedition that any doubts began publicly to be expressed of a fairly speedy victory of the Allies. Certainly at this time there was no conception that this war was destined to be different, except in degree, from any war in which this country had ever been engaged. The first unpleasant shock came with the rapid advance of the Germans through Flanders towards the Straits—a crisis, however, which the country had passed safely through before it realised how serious it was. Then succeeded the long winter campaign in the trenches, in which each engagement was a fresh demonstration of the extraordinary strength of the German positions. Already, before winter came to an end, there were many who thought that the German positions in the west had been made impregnable, that the end of the war could not be reached there, and that our best chance of early victory lay in the crushing of Austria by Russia. An article which appeared in a newspaper while the Battle of Neuve Chapelle was being fought, but before the news

of it arrived, though much less confident than general opinion, is worth quoting as an example of the hopes which sustained the more critical minds at this time. The title of the article was: "How Long will the War Last?"

"Prophecy is the most gratuitous form of error, but the question asked at the head of this article is so often asked that even at the risk of indulging in prophecy it is worth while to attempt an answer. But there is really neither need nor excuse for prophesying. No one can say what will or may happen. What may happen will depend on the following amongst other considerations:—

- "(1) What other Powers come in;
- "(2) whether the 'sentimental' or the practical strain in the German character gets the upper hand; whether the German Government makes up its mind to be extinguished in a great conflagration, or whether, having made up its mind that it cannot win, it decides to liquidate its affairs; and that in its turn depends on
- "(3) what the Allies want and what sort of terms they will demand;
- "(4) what the effect of the economic pressure on Germany will be;
- "(5) what sort of progress is made in the western theatre of war.

This consideration is put last not because it is the least important, but because it is the most incalculable. It is assumed, it will be observed, that the Allies are to win and that the war will not end in a deadlock, and the main ground for that assumption is the weakness of Austria and the excellent prospects against Turkey.

"(1) It is in the highest degree improbable, after the failure of the submarine blockade, that the United States will come in; President Wilson's main anxiety is to avoid a racial split in the United States, whose nationality is not a fixed thing like that of European nations, but is always in a process of formation. He will therefore concentrate his efforts on shaping a distinctively American policy, and seek for opportunities of mediating for peace. But Roumania, Greece, Bulgaria, and Italy may all come in, and perhaps in the order named. The key to what they may do is the success of the operations in the Dardanelles. If all goes well our fleet may be off Constantinople in another month, more or less, and by that time either hope of sharing in the gains or some definite offer from the Allies may have induced Bulgaria to commit herself against Turkey, and so save them the necessity of extensive land operations against the remains of the Turkish military power in Europe. It is conceivable that when the Dardanelles are open Russia might, if Greece consented, send a contingent round to help Serbia by way of Salonica.

"The connection of events would thus be the forcing of the Dardanelles, the consequent strengthening of Russia, the development of a campaign against Hungary, and the formation of a third and southern front of war against Germany. If and when the campaign against Hungary had made such progress as to cut off Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to produce a rebellion in those provinces and serious unrest in the maritime provinces of Austria, Italy might then intervene on the ground that it was necessary for her to save the eastern shores of the Adriatic from anarchy. Things may conceivably reach this pass by next July.

"(2) A grand operatic conflagration is very well as an artistic climax to a Ring tetralogy, but the *Realpolitik* which has governed Germany's action in peace time will see the desirability on all grounds of making peace on the most favourable terms as soon as her Government is convinced that she is sure to lose.

"(3) It is important, therefore, that the Allies should be agreed as to the minimum that they want, so as to be prepared to take advantage of any change of mood in Germany and spare effusion of blood beyond what is necessary for the political objects that they have in view. This, however, is mainly a political question with which the writer is not concerned, except to remark once more that there is no hard and fast division between politics and strategy.

"(4) There is plenty of evidence that Germany is feeling the economic pressure of our blockade keenly. It may, however, be doubted whether it will be enough in itself to induce Germany to sue for peace. But the blockade, in conjunction with the loss of any of Germany's existing sources of food supply—Hungary, which normally is an exporting country, Silesia, or East Prussia,—might be decisive in inducing Germany not to face the trials of another winter unless there were solid grounds for hope elsewhere, or unless the terms of peace were regarded as so humiliating as to justify in German eyes the prolongation of the war after all hope of victory had disappeared and in defiance of all reasonable considerations.

"Subject to these reserves, and to the observations that will presently be made on (5), we seem to get a date between late summer and early winter as likely for the first serious talk of peace.

"(5) What will happen in the western theatre is very incalculable. Germany still retains on this front nearly two-thirds of her army, and she will continue to retain this proportion there until the Russians are within reach of the Oder defences and Berlin itself is menaced. Long before that happens, Austria will have been overrun. Italy, if she comes in, will be useful mainly by threatening Vienna and so drawing off Austrians from the defence of Cracow and their advanced positions in Southern Poland. Austria, it will be seen, is performing for Germany in the east the same function of keeping the war off her own territory that Belgium is performing in the west. And of the two advance bastions of Germany, Austria is much the weaker. Moreover, apart from Germany's desire to keep the war off her own territory, her vital spot is much nearer the western than the eastern front. Essen and Westphalia, not Berlin, are the heart of military Germany. Therefore, as far as we can foresee, the Germans are likely to keep very much the larger half of their forces in the west.

"The secret of the British plans has been well kept, and no one can say which of the several obvious alternative plans is the most likely to be adopted. There are certainly no signs as yet of a renewal of the attempts to break the German left flank in Belgium, and one German critic has persuaded himself that the main attack by the British reinforcements will not go through Belgium at all, but 'from the south,' by which he presumably means through Alsace. This uncertainty (provided that there is a real plan behind it) is a very healthy condition for the Allies, and it is important that it should not be disturbed. All that we are concerned about for the present is the effect that victory or a failure of the attack on this front—whatever be the main points of concentration—would have on the duration of the war. Belgium for the Germans is not only an advanced fortress for the defence of Westphalia, but its retention is her main diplomatic lever. Whatever she can retain of Belgium she would use as an offset against demands made by the victors elsewhere.

"The conclusions reached then are these:—

"(1) If the Allies win before next autumn a decisive victory in the west—and decisive victory we should define as the expulsion of the Germans from Belgium, or at the least the driving of them back to the line of the Meuse—Germany will have nothing left to bargain with, and the beginning of winter should see, if not the end of the fighting, at any rate serious proposals for peace; (2) if the fighting is indecisive, and Germany retains any considerable part of Belgium besides the Ardennes, she may decide to go on through another winter; (3) if the fighting in the west goes against the Allies the war will last into next spring, for although armies do not go into winter quarters now, winter is most unfavourable for active offensive operations. In any case it seems possible that the war will end before the Rhine is crossed (except possibly on its upper reaches)."

THE BLACK WEEK.

It was after the German gas attacks at Ypres, and the failure of the British attacks towards Lille in May, that the gravity of the situation came to be widely realised. Of the actual defeat of Great Britain in the

sense in which France was in danger of defeat if she failed to carry the German positions there was no question. The war at sea had been decided definitely in our favour, and the main hopes which France and Russia had in view in seeking our alliance had been fulfilled. But our credit was bound up with our securing victory on land as well as on sea, and it was not till now that people in this country began to suspect what that might ultimately mean. The pessimists (they themselves would have called themselves the realists) were convinced that a problem that was so new in our history, and so unexpected, could only be solved by a complete breach with the old tradition of voluntarism, for this and nothing else was the issue between the new parties which now began to emerge. On both sides the issue was stated with a great deal of exaggeration and misrepresentation of each other's position. What the pessimists would have said had they been quite frank, and avoided the imputation of motives and the levelling of charges against whole classes of the community, was something like this: "For good or evil we are in a Continental war, and all that that implies. Our enemies have organised their whole resources for the one object, and we cannot expect to win unless we do the same. The voluntary system was not made to stand such a strain as is now being put upon it. It has lost its virtue when it has to support a whole nation at war. Only by compulsion in some form or other—compulsion not confined to the troops in the field, but also extended to industry, for the man in the factory may be just as necessary to success as the infantryman—can we attain the necessary organisation." The other party criticised the schemes that were brought forward, argued that a Government which had failed in a lesser task was hardly to be trusted in the much greater task of organising the whole manhood of the nation for war and warlike industry, stressed the value of the British ideal of voluntary service, and generally put the best face on the achievements of the Allied armies in the field. The quarrel between the two schools was not settled by the formation of the Coalition Government, but prolonged or driven underground.

The defeats and retreats of the Russian armies in Galicia and Poland once more brought into the open a controversy which had been conducted in private since the formation of the Coalition Government. By far the frankest statement of the case for drastic action, and, if necessary, for a complete breach with the voluntary tradition, was that of Mr. Lloyd George, in an introduction to a book published in September:—

"For over twelve months Russia has, in spite of deficiencies in equipment, absorbed the energies of half the German and four-fifths of the Austrian forces. Is it realised that Russia has for the time being made her contribution—and what a heroic contribution it is!—to the struggle for European freedom, and that we cannot for many months to come expect the same active help from the Russian armies that we have hitherto received? Who is to take the Russian place in the fight whilst those armies are re-equipping? Who is to bear the weight which has hitherto fallen on Russian shoulders? France cannot be expected to sustain much heavier burdens than those which she now bears with a quiet courage that has astonished and moved the world. Italy is putting her strength into the fight. What could she do more? There is only Britain left. Is Britain prepared to fill up the gap that will be created when Russia has retired to re-arm? Is she fully prepared to cope with all the possibilities of the next few months—in the west, without forgetting the east? Upon the answer which Government, employers, workmen,

* "Student of War," in *Manchester Guardian*, March 10th.

financiers, young men who can bear arms, women who can work in factories—in fact, the whole of the people of this great land—give to this question will depend the liberties of Europe for many a generation.

"A shrewd and sagacious observer told me the other day that in his judgment the course pursued by this country during the next three months would decide the fate of this war. If we are not allowed to equip our factories and workshops with adequate labour to supply our armies because we must not transgress regulations applicable to normal conditions, if practices are maintained which restrict the output of essential war material; if the nation hesitates, when the need is clear, to take the necessary steps to call forth its manhood to defend honour and existence; if vital decisions are postponed until too late; if we neglect to make ready for all probable eventualities; if, in fact, we give ground for the accusation that we are slouching into disaster as if we were walking along the ordinary paths of peace, without an enemy in sight, then I can see no hope; but if we sacrifice all we own and all we like for our native land, if our preparations are characterised by grip, resolution, and a prompt readiness in every sphere, then victory is assured."

Some of the passages in this appeal—notably the references to Russia—were evidently thought to be indiscreet, and Lord Kitchener, speaking in the House of Lords a few days later, on September 15th, was at pains to correct any false impression that might have been drawn. He spoke of the Germans having shot their bolt in Russia, and Mr. Lloyd George himself, a few

days later, made an attempt to define his position more exactly. The whole issue, he pointed out, was not one of principle but of fact.

RISE OF A MIDDLE PARTY.

So far the agitation and the controversy between the optimists and the pessimists had been sterile of actual effect on the war except for the institution of the Ministry of Munitions and the improvement in the supply of shells, which might or might not have taken place in any case. But a middle section of opinion was now arising which promised to resolve the barren conflict between the pessimists and the optimists. The key of its policy may be expressed in the phrase of Mr. Lloyd George that the issue was not one of principle but of fact. This middle party waived the objections to compulsion which were based on principle, and quite frankly laid it down that if the war could only be won by compulsion, compulsion it would have to be. At the same time, most of its adherents remained quite unconvinced that compulsion was either necessary or even a practical contribution to the problem in hand. Its object was to contrive a system by which the whole strength of the State could be organised efficiently for the prosecution of the war without breaking with the voluntary principle. The details of the plan and its execution must, however, be reserved to a later chapter.



The conference of British and French Ministers at Calais on July 6th: Lord Kitchener and Mr. Asquith entering the motor in Calais which bore them to the meeting place. [Record Press.]



The King inspecting troops of the New Army at Glasgow.

[Central News.]

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE CITIZEN ARMY.

A TREMENDOUS TASK—THE COUNTRY'S EFFORT—THE PROGRESS OF RECRUITING—THE SPIRIT OF THE NEW ARMY IN THE FIELD.

THE outbreak of war left Great Britain faced with a truly terrific problem. The old Expeditionary Force which sailed for France in August, 1914, was undoubtedly, in point of quality, the finest fighting force in the world. Whatever part economic pressure may have played in recruiting it, such pressure, as was explained in an earlier chapter ("The Spirit of the Army," Vol. I., Chap. XVIII.), would not apply itself to those who had no aptitude at all for soldiering. Whatever else it may have been, the old army was certainly not a refuge for the poor in spirit. And whatever may have been the various agencies which recruited for it, the general result was abundantly plain in a picked body of highly-trained men—more highly trained than the conscript armies of the Continent—and all, in varying degree, with a real temperamental aptitude for arms and adventure. It was a professional, long-service army, and the last of its kind in this war. But from its very nature it was hopelessly too small for the task which confronted it from the beginning of the war onwards. The immense problem which lay before this country was to create its far larger counterpart in the shape not of a professional but of a citizen army.

THE BREAK WITH OLD IDEAS.

The task was very much greater than has, perhaps, been generally realised. As compared with both our Allies and our enemies on the Continent, we are not a military nation. The whole tradition of a citizen army, and the vast and far-reaching changes which such a practice and tradition imply in the life and outlook of a nation, were unknown to us. All the exploits of British arms and all the military traditions which we possessed were inseparably bound up with the ideas belonging

to a professional army. The Volunteer movement of the last century—and, of course, to a much greater extent its descendant, the Territorial Force—had done something to acquaint us with the idea of a fighting force with a citizen and unprofessional basis; but it had not done very much. The value of the Territorial army was persistently challenged by those whose dearest hope it was to see its principle extended by the application of compulsion; and in denying the value of the principle of the citizen army, as far as it had then been applied in this country, the hostile critics of the Territorial Force were inevitably doing something which, in the eyes of the ordinary man, seemed not very distinguishable from denying the value of the principle itself. The only army which he had been taught to take seriously was the old regular army, and when he thought of that army he thought of it as a class and profession as specialised, and as much removed from his own life as that of any other trade or profession apart from the one that he happened to have adopted as his own. To think of the old army was to think of the Mulvaney, of the men who could say with him, "I'm a born scut av the barrick-room. The army's mate and dhrink to me . . . an' the pipe-clay's in the marrow av me." It is not a literally accurate conception of the old army, for such an inveterate aptitude for military life as Mulvaney's was a long way from being the general rule. But it well illustrates the conception of the professional army and the immense gulf which divides it from the conscript armies of the Continent, where military training is an inevitable and accepted part of every citizen's duty, and where, in the vast majority of cases, the pipe-clay is as little innate and in the marrow of a man as the obligation to pay his income tax or poor rate.



An open-air lecture in the Parks, Oxford.

[L.N.A.]



Recruits learning the use of the bayonet.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

A COMPARISON OF EFFORTS.

It was this new conception of the army—the conception of an army for which every physically-fit citizen is eligible and may be required—with which the country was now suddenly faced. There will be very few observers of any judgment who will deny that, in the circumstances, the response was very wonderful indeed, and the most extraordinary tribute to the spirit and determination of the British people. Not only was this conception of the army something in which the Englishman was very inexperienced, but the war was not being fought on British soil. Let strategists and statesmen proclaim the impossibility of making war on a limited liability as clearly as they will, and as forcibly as is undoubtedly necessary; yet, in considering the recruiting for our new armies, it cannot be overlooked that our undefeated navy was the greatest assurance of the safety of these shores, and, further, that in any event, the Germans had no men to spare from Continental engagements for a serious invasion of this country. When, bearing these considerations soberly in mind, we consider what was done during the first year of the war towards the raising of the first citizen combatant army that these islands had known, the result assuredly denotes a national endeavour that cannot be paralleled in any period of our history. At no time during the Napoleonic campaigns, when the danger to these islands was more imminent than any that the present war has offered, had we more than 300,000 men under regular arms, both abroad and in this country. The Militia Ballot Act was in operation, and from the militia, so compulsorily raised under that Act, the armies on the Continent were fed and reinforced, largely by indirect compulsion, which lay in making the service and discipline in the militia—which was raised for home service—so harsh that the troops serving in it accepted foreign service in the regular army as a welcome escape. Yet even with this important element of compulsion added to the dangers which threatened, the total number of men under arms—300,000—represented only about one out of 43 of the total population. But within one year of the present struggle the voluntary system, with no element of compulsion save the subtle one provided by the pressure of public opinion, had yielded an army which, from the figures that are known, it is quite safe to say amounted to five men for every two, in proportion to the increased population of the country, raised during the Napoleonic wars.

In considering the recruiting and composition of the new citizen armies, the Territorials must at once be taken into account. In character and moral the Territorials can be considered as the advance guard of what very soon came to be known as "Kitchener's Army"—an advance guard recruited and partially trained long before the war was thought of, but with the greatest part of its training still to be undergone. Indeed, the Territorials, who were embodied on the eve of war, were probably more truly typical of the citizen army than the majority of the men who made up the first great rush to the recruiting offices at the very beginning of the struggle. To a very large extent the men who then presented themselves would be of pretty much the same stamp as those from whom the original Expeditionary Force had been drawn. The sum total of the forces which were recruiting the new armies can be conceived as a mesh which grew steadily finer as the war went on. In the first few weeks it was sufficiently loosely drawn to catch only those men with some natural aptitude for adventure and more than usually free from civil ties and responsibilities, including,

as in peace time, a good percentage whose civil ties had been arbitrarily severed for them, for in the early days of the war there was considerable unemployment, and the apparent promise of more. Thus the embodied Territorial Force was the first and truest example of the citizen army in being. Its members had been recruited in time of peace from the public-spirited of all classes. To the majority of its members the possibility of active service had been a remote one—there were men in its ranks with very real and onerous civil ties and responsibilities. Moreover, the Territorials had been enrolled originally for home defence only. Simultaneously with the embodiment of the force its members were asked to do vastly more than was contained in their original undertaking. They were asked to volunteer for service abroad, and the response to this request—seventy per cent of the embodied Territorials volunteered at once—represented a spirit very much more significant and prophetic of the later developments of recruiting than the boom enlistment figures of the first few days of August, 1914. It was the forerunner of the spirit which a year after was to bring a nation, that had been slowly awakened to a full realisation of the task and responsibilities which it had undertaken, to accept willingly the National Register, and, as its later outcome, the recruiting scheme which Lord Derby was appointed to direct—a scheme in which the voluntary system was transformed out of all recognition from anything which had previously been understood by the term.

THE AWAKENING OF THE COUNTRY.

Collectively, the awakening was slow, and, from the considerations which have been presented above, and by reason of the complete break with all our national traditions which it implied, it was bound to be so. There have been many journalists, and behind them many more private individuals, who have made this slowness a matter for bitter complaint. How they would have quickened it is not apparent. In pure theory, compulsory military service from the moment the war began would have quickened it, but in practice to have imposed compulsory military service upon a nation to whose general traditions and life it was utterly unfamiliar—and which for the great part had not realised or been prepared for its need—would have been almost certainly disastrous in the dissension and social disorganisation which it would have caused. Rightly or wrongly—with that point this chapter is not concerned—the public attitude of the Government before the war had not prepared the people of this country for a Continental struggle of the kind with which they were now faced; and any consideration of the conduct of that struggle must be conditioned by a full appreciation of that fact. Mr. Kipling, in much the finest poem which he has given us for some years, describes the outlook as it had presented itself to many at the beginning of the war in very stirring lines:—

Once more we hear the word
That sickened earth of old:
"No law except the sword,
Unsheathed and uncontrolled."

Comfort, content, delight
The ages' slow-bought gain,
They shrivelled in a night;
Only ourselves remain
To face the naked days,
In silent fortitude,
Through perils and dismays
Renewed and re-renewed.




The King at a review of New Army troops in Cambridge.

[Central News.]



Recruits at physical drill in the snow.

[Central News.]



Improving the chest measurement of the New Army.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]


The problem was how to make this point of view appreciated by a democracy which had not been prepared for the war, and whose own soil was in no apparent danger. It was a very great problem, and one which time alone could solve with safety; for though in a democracy the pace of the fleet may not be quite the pace of the slowest ship, it is sufficiently so to make all attempts which do not pay any regard at all to this principle matters of great hazard and possible disaster.

One attempt was made by the recruiting authorities in the early days of the war to speed up the process whereby the idea of a citizen army was being gradually brought home to the whole nation—that is to say, an attempt of more significant novelty than the ordinary recruiting appeals, of which the fullest use and extension were being made. Early in November, 1914, a voluntary canvass of the men eligible for military service was undertaken, and under the same scheme such men were invited either to enlist at once or to register themselves as willing to do so on being notified that their services were required. The intention of the scheme was to ensure a steady stream of recruits in such quantities and at such times as the military authorities could conveniently deal with them. Except by virtue of the indirect influence which it brought to bear on recruiting, the scheme was a failure. It was entirely voluntary, and its results, both in the number of available recruits which it revealed and the response to the conditions of deferred enlistment, were very disappointing. At the same time the progress of the recruiting for the new citizen army was very creditable, and the mere fact that the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee had considered such a scheme advisable undoubtedly contributed very importantly to the general awakening of the country to the task that lay before it. In the early months of the war the recruiting organisation, overpowered by the problem of dealing with the great numbers of recruits, had adopted for a time the desperate remedy of raising the minimum physical standard for the new army to a pitch which would obviously prevent great numbers of recruits from presenting themselves, and still more from being accepted. The dropping of the standard

was followed by the scheme for a voluntary register; henceforward it was obvious that every available man was needed and could be used.

The recruiting for the new citizen army was now in full swing. And for the first year of the war it is safe to say that the unaided voluntary system was yielding all the men which the military authorities could train and equip, though, inevitably, it was not yielding them with all the steadiness and convenience which were desirable. Within the first three months of the war 700,000 men had enlisted in the new armies. And after this first skimming of the cream of the voluntary system the yield was still more a remarkable tribute to the spirit and determination of the British people. In the Manchester district—the

recruiting returns from which were among the steadiest and most satisfactory of any district in the country—within the third week of November two complete service battalions of the Manchester Regiment were raised. And each new recruit for the citizen army brought home to those who remained behind the need for their help—for the force of example naturally proved one of the most potent of recruiting agencies, and when a man saw his civil friends and associates in the army it became increasingly difficult for him to give himself an honest reason why he should not be there as well. A new responsibility was attached to British citizenship, and the acceptance of it was creating for the first time a



Machine-gun practice.

[G.P.U.]

British citizen army for service beyond our own shores.

THE CITIZEN ARMY IN THE FIELD.

To the fighting capabilities of the new armies, whether in Flanders or the Dardanelles, full tribute has been paid by all the commanders under whom they served. In the measured phrases of a despatch from Sir John French:—

"It is evident that great trouble and much hard work have been expended on these units during their training at home, and it is found that they have received such sound teaching that a short period of instruction in trench life under fire soon enables them to take their places with credit beside their acclimatised comrades of the older formations."



The headquarters of a new division of the Royal Field Artillery, where a number of old tramcars have been turned into divisional offices, etc. [Central News.]



The members of an Officers' Training Corps on parade. [Newspaper Illustrations.]



A battalion of the New Army on the march. [Central News.]

Nor, in every case, were the new troops given much opportunity to "acclimatise" themselves to the full and terrible rigours of modern warfare. The same blind chance to which each individual soldier commits his life is incalculably at work with the destinies of his regiment; and with the best of plans a tiny accident may leave raw troops receiving a "baptism of fire" from which few will emerge, while more acclimatised units are in reserve and comparative safety. In the Second Battle of Ypres some of the Territorial battalions engaged had landed in France barely a week before they found themselves involved in the most desperate trench fighting. Yet they "acclimatised" themselves and bore their part with admirable fortitude. And when one realises the accumulated horrors which make up the "climate" of a modern battle, there is not much reason to doubt the existence of the old manly virtues among the men from whom Britain's first citizen army was recruited. The overwhelming concentration of artillery fire, the poison gas and asphyxiating shells, and the close quarter fighting with hand grenades and flame projectors, present a combination of scientific terrors to which no warfare of old can offer a parallel. Armageddon has been complicated by all the "many inventions" of the Preacher, and in face of them man may well seem little more than the helpless victim of his own ingenuity.

There is little enough opportunity for the picturesque in such fighting as this. "That was a fine bit," wrote a soldier wounded in the retreat from Mons, after he had watched from a distance the spectacle of a victorious charge by British cavalry. There speaks the professional soldier of a war episode of the older style. But in the fighting to which the new citizen army came out there were no spectacles of this kind. And the true measure of the spirit of the citizen army lies in its frank recognition of the change. In the letters home from the new army one finds over and over again not a tribute to the pageantry of war, but an acceptance of its new hideousness. "However men can possibly live against modern methods of war is indeed wonderful," writes a corporal in the Sherwood Foresters, "as the most fiendish

things possible are employed." Or an officer writes of the preliminary bombardment which prepared for the Battle of Neuve Chapelle: "I heard one of my men say, 'Bill, is this the end of the earth?' I don't blame him for thinking so; it seemed to me as if it was. We could see in the distance great masses of flame, smoke, earth, and brick, all ascending together as the great shells screamed over our heads and burst among the German entrenchments and the houses of the villages." And the same writer's acceptance of the situation is conveyed in the reflection, "Modern warfare is such an infernal business that any man who isn't killed ought to be cheerful." "It is nothing but hell here," says another

letter. "The days are just spaces of time followed by nights wherein so many shells can be hurled across from one line to the other." In the official reports such a period would be blandly described by the remark that "there have been artillery duels," or "on the rest of the front there is nothing to report." Only when an attack has developed have the official communications anything of importance to report. And here is, in brief, the soldier's account of a successful German attack:—"Just as we returned to the line after a short rest the attack was made to retake this trench. First, there was a terrible bombardment by guns, bombs, rifles, and machine-guns, and then they sent streams of flaming liquid into our trench.

It was impossible to live in it, and the boys were forced to retire."



The New Army in billets.

[Central News.]

THE STICKING POWER OF THE NEW ARMY.

This was the kind of fighting in which the soldiers of the citizen army found themselves, and this was their recognition of it. And yet they withstood these terrors, and the courage which enabled them to do so is all the greater for clear appreciation of them. Precisely what those terrors amounted to, even in the military estimation, is shown in a letter from one of the officers attached to the staff of an infantry brigade during the fighting round Hooze: "Theoretically, the battle was won and lost many times during the day. Judging by text-book standards of losses that troops will stand, our attack was




The New Army in training: A rest by the roadside.

[Topical Press.]



Royal Army Medical Corps recruits take a meal in the open.

[Topical Press.]



An R.F.A. divisional headquarters.

[Central News.


destroyed at various points during the day, and the Germans on at least three occasions submitted to losses out of all proportion to those that men are supposed to be able to suffer without loss of moral." With the Loos fighting and the advance at the end of September, 1915, came, for the majority of the new army in the field, their first experience of anything approaching the mobile warfare of older days, and the difference was at once recognised and appreciated. "It was splendid," writes one soldier. "Line after line of them went up the hill in open order. It was quite a treat to see it after being stuck in the same place for months past, and then to be able to go ahead into, as it seemed, new country. . . . I have experienced real open fighting this time, and like it much better than trench fighting."

But the greatest difference of all between the new citizen army and the old professional army which it replaced lay, naturally enough, in the way the new army, in its letters home, leaned on the life and England which it had left behind. To the "born scut av the barrick room" active service is the natural and acceptable fulfilment of the career and training he had chosen. To the soldier in the citizen army it was an unanticipated interlude in the world which he had been called so suddenly to abandon, and which he hoped to regain. A London Territorial, writing home in the winter of 1914-1915, described the men of his regiment, when they left their billets in a village behind the lines, as setting out for the trenches very much in the same way as they had set out for their old civilian jobs in the city, giving

and receiving the greetings of their French host for all the world as if their safe return was a matter of time alone, and the task before them no more hazardous than those attached to the office stool and its routine. In action it is the comparisons which are suggested by the old life that present themselves. The London soldier thinks of the illuminations at Earl's Court, and his northern comrade of the fireworks at Belle Vue. "They started firing soon after dawn," writes a north-country Yeomanry officer, of the Turkish attack in Gallipoli. "For all the world it looked like a Belle Vue firework show." And when, a day or two later, he finds a Manchester Territorial, who minds his clothes whilst bathing, "we both recognised the similarity and wished we were there!"

THE UNPROFESSIONAL SOLDIER.

There is extraordinarily little of any conventional parade of courage in the letters home from the new army in the field. The courage is there, but out of all the ways in which it finds written expression the praise of war and the joy of battle is conspicuously absent. The courage of the citizen army is more than ever the courage of men standing up to a thoroughly bad job and pretty well aware both of the badness of the job and the demand which facing it puts upon them. Sometimes it is accepted with that brave gaiety which declines to regard the badness of the job at all, and, flying to the other extreme, persists that it is more tiresome than terrible. The trenches are a weariness, and the daily bombardment a spectacle which has lost all interest. It is all "billets, trenches; trenches,



The New Army in training at the Farriers' School.

[*Sport and General.*



A lecture on the anatomy of the horse.

[*Sport and General.*



Canadian cavalry cheering the King after being inspected by him at their training ground in England.

[Central News.]

billets--on, on, on--and nothing bores me so much. And when once a shell has burst twenty yards away you have seen all that you will ever see in a trench." That is one way in which a man may "carry on" in face of the naked days, when all that is ordinarily meant by "comfort, content, delight" seems to have left the world for ever. Another will write home quite frankly that, when the orders for the advance at Neuve Chapelle were received, "the mere idea of attacking sent cold shivers down my spine, and I don't think any of the other spines were much warmer than mine." Yet the writer, until he was wounded, led his men through some of the heaviest fighting of March 10th and 11th with the greatest courage and determination. One finds this full realisation of the horrors of war side by side with a determined acceptance of them again and again in the letters home from Flanders and the Dardanelles. It is rarely expressed with such clearness as in the following extract from the letter of a Manchester officer serving in Gallipoli; but the passage is a very significant illustration of how deep and vital may be the difference between the outlook of the citizen and the professional soldier:--

"There are none of us here who have seen war can ever desire another. I hate it, and everything belonging to it. It all seems so inadequate that might should be right, or, shall I say, that right has to prove itself might to gain the victory? Very few can face such a crisis with equanimity. I cannot, and never shall. Perhaps men who are born soldiers can laugh at death and revel in war; but I, who am only a poor lawyer, who has temporarily doffed the robe to don khaki, must confess that I prefer the robe. I do not say that I am not taking pride in doing my work--I take an immense pride in my work because it is my duty, and I like to do my best. But the work gives me no pleasure of itself."

The "born soldier" who comes to acclimatise himself to the ordeal of modern warfare is at any rate not likely to find it complicated by such reflections as these; but the citizen turned soldier has a bigger task before him, since he carries perpetually with him the ideas and comparisons of his old life. The young officer, journeying to the Flanders front for the first time, cannot "quite get over the feeling of being a tourist." And with a certain pathos he remarks that he is glad that the country is flat and ugly and the weather dull, "as it would be a pity to see beautiful country laid waste, and fine weather makes one think of other things than fighting." Yet man is an organism with a wonderful spiritual capacity for adapting itself to its environment, and many members of "Kitchener's army" seem to have acclimatised themselves to their new life with a thoroughness which could hardly be improved on by the most high-spirited man-at-arms. Bravery and high spirits are, after all, at least as contagious as timidity or panic. And if one soldier is in a mood to write, after a day or two away from the trenches, "it did me good at --- three days ago to hear the snipers' bullets smacking into the parapet behind. It sounds funny, but it is a fact," his attitude is not likely to be without its effect on the men in contact with him. Among the first troops landed at Suvla Bay in August, 1915, was one of the many service battalions of the Manchester Regiment. Although it was night, they were under fire from the Turks, and a difficulty arose in getting the machine-guns ashore. A sergeant of the machine-gun section jumped into the sea--there was nearly six feet of water to be got through--holding his gun above his head. He was out of his depth, and the gun was too heavy for him to swim with it. He tried to walk under the water, but fell, and with him the gun. He reappeared



Cavalry in training: Bringing the horses down a difficult descent.

[Topical Press.]



Teaching trench digging to the men of the New Army.

[Whitlock, Birmingham.]

without it, but, not to be defeated, dived again and again in the darkness until he had found his gun and carried it to the beach. Here, again, the force of example must have been of great value to the other men; and the citizen soldier who set it had certainly had little enough time to "acclimatise" himself to active service. Collective and individual instances of courage and devotion could be multiplied without end; in truth, the essential spirit and determination of the new citizen army are no more in question than those of the original Expeditionary

Force. The moral which is to be drawn from the disappointments on the British fronts during the period that the new army was coming into action at any rate conveys no reflection on the spirit of the troops. It lies rather in the fact that, great and unexpected as had been the break with national traditions involved in the raising of a British citizen army for service abroad, we had found it easier to raise that army than to train up staffs capable of directing its great numbers with complete success.



Rifle practice "under fire": Harmless bombs are being exploded in front of the trenches so that the recruits may become accustomed to noise and smoke, and not be put off their aim by them.

[Central News.]



The despatching room of one of the great Government stores of soldiers' clothing, etc. *[Photopress.]*



Germany's war supplies : Grain in store on Hamburg harbour. *[Underwood and Underwood.]*



A Munitions Court in session at Glasgow: Lord Balfour of Burleigh and Mr. Macassey, K.C., are conducting the enquiry.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

CHAPTER XIX.

ECONOMIC REACTIONS.

THE DISLOCATION OF FOREIGN TRADE—CHANGES IN COMMERCIAL LAW—THE DISPLACEMENT OF CAPITAL AND LABOUR—THE NEW RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATE AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE—THE WAR AND FISCAL POLICY.

THE war is not only a great military fact, but it is also a great economic fact. Certain economic aspects have been discussed elsewhere in this history—notably finance, and the reaction on labour. The object of this chapter is to consider other features of the economic influence of the war, both immediate and possibly ephemeral, and remoter and more probably permanent. We may roughly indicate the scope of this inquiry by premising that the war has affected the economic life of the belligerent countries primarily in the following ways: (1) by interference with their trade markets—in other words, with their foreign trade; (2) by dislocating their commercial law, and, consequently, the industry and commerce housed within that framework of commercial law; (3) by displacing labour and capital; (4) by altering the ideas and principles governing industry, and chiefly by modifying the traditional or conventional relations between the State and private enterprise; (5) by modifying taxation and the economic system bound up with fiscal policy. Let us consider these various influences in succession.

EFFECTS OF THE BLOCKADE.

(1) The opening of war closed all enemy markets, in theory at any rate, to British trade, and closed British markets to enemy trade. This is not the

place to consider the relation of these various changes to international law, but only their economic consequences. It is obvious that they affected English industry and commerce in four ways: by depriving them of certain markets; by denying them certain commodities; by deranging the complex system of international adjustments by which the business accounts between nations are settled; and by reducing the amount of apparatus (chiefly shipping) available for international commerce. The shutting of belligerent markets to British trade was a more serious blow in the early weeks of war than later. Such great labour forces were diverted from normal production, either to the army or to supplying the army, that our export trade had a restricted need of the lost markets; but it probably played an obscure but important part in accentuating the evil of the high rate of exchange with the United States, by depriving us of much of the Continental machinery with which in normal times we help to balance our accounts with America. It was felt more severely in relation to our imports than in relation to our exports. But it is interesting to observe how rapidly industry accommodated itself to the changed conditions. This was not due to the loudly-trumpeted campaign for "capturing German trade," of which much was heard in the early days of the war. To some extent British manufacturers took to making



French troops beginning to construct a new railway line.

[Central News.]



First steps in repairing the havoc of war: Temporary buildings erected in a shattered French village, from which the Germans had been driven out.

[Central News.]

substitutes; to some extent they sought substitutes in new markets, notably in the United States and Japan; and to some extent, under licence or with the tacit sanction of the authorities, supplies were allowed to enter this country which, directly or indirectly, came from the old enemy source.

Prices, of course, rose, but the rise was not confined to those commodities for the supply of which in peace time we were largely dependent upon enemy production. It seriously affected, among other things, foodstuffs. The outbreak of war put out of trade, as a result either of capture or of internment, all enemy merchant ships except those which could still ply in the Baltic. This meant a very serious diminution of the world's available tonnage, which might have been corrected to some extent had the United States Government been able to carry out its project of buying interned enemy steamers and running them under the American flag. The Allies, however, announced that they would not recognise such transfers, and later an Order in Council was issued exposing to capture all ships, even though under a neutral flag, in enemy or partially in enemy ownership. As a result of these measures all enemy merchant ships (except prizes) were lost to the commerce of the world. The consequent deficiency of profit was accentuated by losses in the course of warlike operations, and by heavy requisitions for naval and military purposes. At the beginning of 1914 there were over eleven millions of steam and sailing tonnage employed in trading. The Admiralty requisitioned about 800 ships, twenty per cent of all above 1,000 tons, of which 250 were liners and 550 general traders. They later on took up nearly 300 trading steamships of under 1,000 tons, and many tugs, yachts, and trawlers. It has been estimated that owing to losses and the requirements of the Admiralty, there was a net diminution of about twenty-five per cent of the number of vessels available for the ocean overseas trade. There was also a reduction of the foreign shipping available by thirty-five per cent.

THE WAR AND FREIGHTS.

The volume of British imports was almost maintained, and, if account be taken of imports of Government stores, was largely exceeded, though, of course, exports fell heavily. The average freight in wheat in 1915 as compared with 1914 was nearly trebled, and the freight in other commodities went up even more. These averages conceal a good deal of the fluctuation, and the freights varied greatly from market to market. Without doubt, the profits of shipowners increased enormously, and the hunt for the largest profit created other problems, which will be considered elsewhere. True, the rise in freights was not exclusively responsible for the increase in freights, but it was one factor, and not an inconsiderable one.

How far are the war changes which have been sketched above likely to be permanent, and to survive peace? Some are obviously ephemeral. The railways and the ports will, with peace, return to the normal. British shipping, which, in spite of losses, is being increased by new construction, will, when the Admiralty releases it, speedily reconcile itself to more natural conditions. But will certain industries, which have been temporarily built up, here or in neutral countries, or crippled in enemy countries, return with peace to pre-war conditions? Will the old lines of commerce, twisted by war out of the straight, return? We may take, as the industry having a very great interest for Englishmen, that of shipping.

The war, by eliminating the German shipowner (the British shipowners' most serious competitor), and by giving the British shipowner unparalleled prosperity, has given British shipping a greater pre-eminence than ever. Will the German shipowner return to his old place, or will any neutral take it? It is highly improbable that any neutral will take it, for President Wilson's efforts to restore the American mercantile marine have failed badly, in spite of the Panama Canal. If we were to accept Herr Ballin's words at their face value, it is equally improbable that the German shipowner would return. Herr Ballin argued that the war, by showing the uncertainty of the economic basis of the German shipping industry, would prevent capital from flowing into it, unless the war closed with guarantees for the future. The particular guarantees indicated by Herr Ballin—the equivalent of German naval supremacy—may be excluded, though it is just possible that the Powers may take up with a new mind the question of "the freedom of the seas"—in other words, of the status of peaceful commerce during war. But even if it be assumed that the distribution of sea power remains unchanged in any way after the war, it is probable that the German mercantile marine will fight hard to recover, and even extend, its old position. A repetition of the present war during the next fifty years is highly improbable, and that is sufficient security for capital. It should be noted that the great German shipping companies are reported to be ordering ships for the future.

COMMERCE AFTER THE WAR.

One factor which may play a part in determining the future of commerce is sentiment. The intense antipathy between the Allies and the Central Powers may result in efforts, either private or public, to prevent the renewal of the old commercial relations between them. The sentiment of individual traders is not likely to be as powerful a factor as some apparently believe. It may well operate where it involves no monetary loss, but where it does involve loss a private boycott is hardly conceivable in our Western world.

The general conclusion would seem to be that international commerce is not likely to be seriously transformed by the war. There is a further question, whether the world will take long to recover the economic wastage of the war. The most serious elements of this wastage are the loss of arms and the loss of brains. The fine intelligences which have been blotted out, and the labour forces which have been ruined, cannot be replaced speedily; but scientific knowledge, and the mechanism of production which it brings into being, are preserved in the modern world even though the individual perishes. It is reasonable to conclude that the actual material wastage will be made good speedily enough, but the future rate of expansion will be checked by the loss of brains and arms. The world may soon be as rich as it was, but it will never be as rich as it would have been but for the war.

(2) Some reference has already been made to legal changes affecting the conduct of commerce and industry. The Courts and the Legislature interfered radically with contract. Of the moratorium established at the beginning of the war an account will be found in an earlier chapter, but it is possible that the moratorium may be revived and extended in connection with rents. It has been complained that landlords have been raising the rents of workers and the dependants of soldiers, and the Government has promised action if no voluntary remedy is found. There is also at the time of writing much discussion of a moratorium for rent in the event of Lord Derby's



New workmen's dwellings being built at Woolwich, a task undertaken by the Government in order to provide accommodation for the greatly increased number of workmen at the Woolwich Arsenal.

[Record Press.]



Enrolling volunteers for munition work: A group of workmen waiting outside the Manchester Town Hall to be enrolled.

[“Manchester Guardian.”]

scheme, or some system of compulsion, sweeping yet larger numbers of men into the army. In France, such a provision was made at the beginning of war.

SUSPENSION OF PATENTS.

Of more directly commercial importance is the suspension of enemy patents. It was found that the patent law put the manufacture of some essential and many important commodities under enemy control. A number of private persons saw in the suspension of enemy patent rights the possibility of making large profits, but the administration of the law was more equitable than their imagining. The Controller of Patents was appointed as a tribunal to advise the Board of Trade. The practice adopted was not to grant patents but to grant licences, and, rather than monopoly licences, to make the protected article or preparation the subject of open competition. There were till October 387 applications for licences under 294 enemy-owned patents; 243 licences were granted, and two patents were declared void on the ground that there was no subject matter for patent rights. Three patents were suspended without the grant of a licence, and in thirty-one cases applicants were refused as not competent to carry on the manufacture of the article. No monopoly licences were issued. In some cases branches of enemy firms were allowed to continue the manufacture of patented commodities under the supervision of a receiver. The number of applications does not seem very large, but they covered important commodities, and it was discovered that the Germans had developed a system of protecting by a chain of patents.

The question arises what will be the future of the industries which have been built up on the suspension of German patent rights. One may presume that the importance of the capital converted in this way should not be exaggerated. The Board of Trade's present intention is to make the licences granted to British traders permanent if satisfactory terms can be made with the German owners after the war. In the meantime, the royalties are being collected by the Public Trustee. It should be remembered that whether it is worth while for a British firm to continue manufacturing after the war depends on whether it is cheaper to make the article here or import it, and that is in part affected by the refusal of the Board of Trade to grant monopoly licences. There ought to be no excessive expectations of great permanent changes in British industry as a result of this suspension of patent rights, especially as the total amount of royalties received by the Public Trustee is at the date of the last report only £1,000; the royalties average five per cent on the selling price. Partly this is to be explained by the claims of war work, which is so profitable as not to make speculative new ventures equally attractive; partly it is due to the conviction of manufacturers that war conditions are ephemeral, and the law that the race is to the swift will assert itself once again when the war ends.

Reference may be made to another legal change, which, though limited in its influence, illustrates how lightly the law of contract may be regarded when it stands in the way of State war interests. It was found that German firms had obtained practically a monopoly of the output of spelter in the British Empire, and that in particular the extensive Australian producers of spelter were bound to a German firm. The result was that, while the German firm could not take delivery, the metal (necessary in the manufacture of munitions) was not available for British consumption. An action was brought

to have the contracts with the German firm declared not only suspended, but null and void, and a decision to this effect was obtained. The law, it will be seen, can be far less rigid than is commonly supposed.

The war also involved the suspension of the protection of enemy copyright. It cannot be said, however, that this produced notable changes. The general antipathy towards things German prevented any public demand for translations from general German literature, but there were a number of translations of special books bearing upon the war. Most of these, however, were of no literary value, although a few were. The sociologist who is anxious for evidence of the literary reactions of war must look rather to the growing familiarisation with Russian writings, though there, too, he will be disappointed if he sets his hopes too high.

THE MUNITIONS ACT.

The chief interference of the law with industry was by executive act under legislative authority. It affected both distribution and production. Under the defence of the Realm Acts, the Munitions Act, and other statutes—and the regulations made under these Acts—the Government took power to prohibit or control the whole of the export trade, and to control the manufacture of munitions. Under Section 10 of the Munitions of War Act, the Government has the right—

"to regulate or restrict the carrying on of any work in any factory, workshop, or other premises, or the engagement or employment of any workman or all or any classes of workmen therein, or to remove the plant therefrom with a view to maintaining or increasing the production of munitions in other factories, workshops, or premises, or to regulate and control the supply of metals and materials that may be required for any articles for use in war."

Other very extensive powers over industry, and those engaged in industry, are given by the Munitions Act and other statutes. These will be discussed later. For the present it should be noted that the Government has an absolute control over the plant premises, and, to a lesser extent, the workers in any factory which might conceivably be used for the manufacture of munitions, as well as power to start wholly new factories.

A succession of proclamations controlled the export trade. The export of certain classes of goods—mostly those of direct utility in war—is prohibited to all destinations. The exportation of another class is prohibited to destinations abroad other than British Possessions and Protectorates. Another class of goods may be exported not only within the British Empire, but also to certain foreign countries. These prohibitions are not so rigorous as they may seem, for, in many instances, export is allowed under licence, although the procuring of a licence is often a cumbrous procedure, and complaints have been frequent of too numerous changes in the lists of goods and in the mode of administration. The object of all these provisions is not only to prevent contraband trade, but to give effect to the blockade of German commerce aimed at. The same object is furthered by a law requiring declarations as to the ultimate destination of exported goods, and by the restriction of export to certain prescribed channels. It has been the aim of the British authorities to have set up in the neutral countries in contact with Germany Trading Trusts, which should control the import and export trade of that country. The British Government allows consignments to and from these trusts, and these trusts are under an obligation to prevent contraband trade with Germany. Such trusts



A "bread line" of German civilians outside one of the Municipal Stores in Berlin.

[Photopress.]

have been established in Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, and Norway, but efforts to establish one in Sweden broke down. No account of the procedure of these trusts has ever been given to Parliament, and their effectiveness as machinery for harmonising neutral rights with the blockade of Germany must remain, in the absence of full information, a subject for speculation.

It has been complained that this machinery and the blockade generally, have been used to monopolise international trade in British interests, but there is no evidence to justify such a charge. On the contrary, not only has the normal trade of neutrals with neutrals been maintained, but certainly for a long period these neutrals acted as agencies for Germany. One may quote the evidence of a writer in *Die Neue Zeit*, who says that "from neutral and even from enemy lands many bales (of wool and cotton) reached Germany, so that up till now there can be no talk of a real scarcity in raw material." Here, again, the question arises how far all this dislocation of commercial intercourse is likely to have permanent results. Will the neutrals who now export so much to Germany, which normally comes through England, retain this profitable business after the war? The commercial intercourse between Germany and her immediate neighbours was always very close, and it will doubtless not be less close after the war. It is conceivable that the agency business which England, as an emporium of the world, carries on, may in part be diverted to other countries, who are learning how the business is conducted.

Doubtless in these matters the tearing of the veil of mystery counts for something. But against this should be set certain circumstances—the financial pre-eminence

of Great Britain, her extensive empire, her pre-eminence in shipping, her central position, her long tradition of authority. All these make for the retention of an agency business, which is probably more complicated than it appears.

THE FALL IN THE MARGIN.

(3) The displacement of labour and capital may be considered under three aspects—the passage of men out of industry into the army and the navy; the transference of labour and capital from one industry to another; the influx of new forces of labour and capital. The number of men transferred from industry to military or naval duties is hardly likely to amount to less than 4,000,000 by the close of the war. Both absolutely and relatively this figure exceeds anything produced by any previous war, for we are for the first time in our history waging war not only with our full resources of ships and gold, but also with our full resources of soldiers. A variety of circumstances has prevented this loss of labour power from being immediately disastrous—it has been gradual; in the early weeks of war it helped to absorb the unemployed; it has come under a voluntary system which allows of industrial adjustment far better than any other system, for the notion that a Government can dictate the proper distribution of labour forces better than individual self-interest presupposes an intimate knowledge and an efficiency difficult to credit to any existing Government. Nevertheless, the drafting of millions from productive to unproductive employment has had serious consequences, not only in reducing the total national income, but in producing a serious shortage of labour which has mani-

fested itself not only in higher wages, but also in higher prices, in most instances more than counterbalancing higher wages. The reduction of national production has expressed itself most plainly in the decline of our export trade with the serious complication of the exchanges.

The loss of 4,000,000 men—if it be not made good in other ways—is equivalent to a reduction of the national income by some £400,000,000 annually, allowing an average earning capacity of £100. But that does not represent the whole economic loss. Mr. Asquith estimated the cost to the Government of the average soldier, and presumably also of the average sailor, at from £250 to £300 a year. It is not clear whether this estimate is meant to include each soldier's share of the cost of equipment and munitions. What is evident is that where there is a fall in earning power the only way to compensate for it is a corresponding economy in expenditure. These 4,000,000 fighting men, however, who have ceased to earn at all have trebled their expenditure. Has civilian economy made good the deficit? The evidence points the other way, although such matters are very difficult to determine, and the significance of the more obvious signs of extravagance can very easily be overrated. Still, there is no resisting the conclusion that while the national earning power has been lessened by the war there has been no corresponding economy through thrift. The nation is probably not only not saving, but is actually drawing upon its capital—the nation as distinguished from the State, for that the State is living on capital is too obvious to need demonstration. This living on capital expresses itself in a variety of ways: loans to, and other investments in, foreign countries, decline or vanish; apparatus, such as railways, roads, and much machinery,

is not maintained in proper repair; considerable stock disappears; loans are incurred; securities are sold abroad. The pace at which this is going on is difficult to estimate, and neither the Government nor any competent economist has investigated the matter.

THE EFFECT ON CAPITAL.

Has it already gone so far that there is a manifest shortage of capital for carrying on British industry and commerce at present?

Although there is visible a certain tendency to allow fixtures to waste, still there is no evidence that industry is starved for capital. Two circumstances help to explain this phenomenon: The checking of the export of capital has bridged over much of the deficit that might be created by the excess of national spending over national earning; the reduction in labour force means inevitably a reduction in the industrial machinery employed and in the demand for new capital. The uncertainty of the economic situation and the high rate of interest have checked venturesome new undertakings, and probably the vast majority of new ventures have been made in direct relation to war needs. It is plain, however, that the danger of an actual famine in capital comes nearer as the number of men called to the colours grows, for this means an increased wastage, coupled with a diminution of the economic forces which create capital to meet demands. Should that situation arise, it would be accompanied by a rapid depreciation in the economic apparatus, and an under-feeding and under-clothing of the population. If this last phenomenon has not yet shown itself, it is because not only is the country managing by one device or another to acquire what is needed to satisfy current wants, but there has been a temporary redistribution of the nation's revenue. The wages of



Dr. Emil Rathenau.

[E.N.A.]



Herr Ballin.

[E.N.A.]

some classes have risen, the dependants of soldiers belonging to the working classes are in many instances better off than before the war; employment—owing to the drawing of labour to the army—is better and steadier. But all this will be changed when peace comes, and the working classes will be burdened with heavy taxation to pay the interest on loans, while employment and wages will (probably after a period of collapse) have returned to the normal.

A subject for inquiry would be the amount of fixed capital (machinery and the like) which has been wasted as a result of the war, not destroyed in the course of military operations, but rendered useless by the economic dislocation consequent on war. Fixed capital has certainly not been rendered unproductive to the same extent as labour, but waste there has been on a fair scale. Those businesses specially adapted for enemy markets now closed can have been adjusted to new conditions only with loss. Far more important is the transformation of industries adapted to the needs of peace to war needs and the erection of new works for the manufacture of munitions. There will be a double loss—at one end in the change from peace conditions to war conditions, and at the other end in the change from war conditions to peace conditions.

Unfortunately, there are no statistical data of the transference of labour and capital from one industry to another, but the reality of the phenomenon is sufficiently evidenced. Fishermen, for instance, have gone into the coalmines; servant girls have become tramguards; porters have become munition workers. The operations of the Minister of Munitions give the most striking illustration of this phenomenon. This department undertook to form a kind of army of volunteer munition workers out of skilled artisans not already engaged on such work. These volunteers were to work in any factory selected for them. The army actually enrolled did not turn out to be very large, but that was because private enterprise had already drawn heavily on mobile labour. This process of transference when it has been studied will throw a new light on the whole problem of the mobility of both labour and capital. That capital, in the sense of savings, is mobile has always been understood; but it has been generally assumed that fixed capital, in the sense of plant, is specialised in its use, and therefore largely immobile. It would appear that this latter assumption has been too unqualified. Many works and much machinery intended for one purpose has been adapted with relatively slight change to new purposes. For instance, a factory engaged in making furniture has found itself playing an important part in the making of rifles. This extension of the mobility of fixed capital is an economic fact of importance. In the same way, labour has acquired a new mobility. Men and women have discovered that processes are much easier to master than they had imagined, and that in this world of tool-minding the boundaries between trade and trade are often imaginary and artificial. The employers of labour and the owners of capital have learned a similar lesson.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CHANGE.

This psychological change in capital and labour, employer and employed, should prove very fruitful in the future. The most serious cause of economic crises, and, therefore, of unemployment, is the rigidity of industries, which fail to respond quickly to change and to correct miscalculations. The chief cause of this rigidity is the conservatism of employers and employed,

which induces them to persist in a trade or a form of production when it would be wise to alter. This conservatism ought to be undermined as a result of the teachings of the war. The workman has discovered that he may, with no excessive effort, pass from a suffering trade to one that is prosperous; the employer has found that there are no insuperable obstacles in the way of adapting a factory to a variety of purposes. We ought, therefore, to expect in the future greater flexibility in meeting economic rises, and consequently less acute economic crises. Not only this, but it would be natural to expect a greater alertness, boldness, originality, and general openness of mind in the future conduct of industry. If these anticipations should prove correct, some economic compensation will have been found for the economic waste of the war.

From the nature of the case, while there has been no little mobility of capital as between industry and industry, and while capital which would, under ordinary conditions, have gone abroad has remained here, there has been little influx of capital. That could only come about as the result of foreign loans, or as the result of investments of foreign capital in British industry. The only loan we are known to have raised abroad is the one for 500 million dollars in America, while there is no evidence of any movement of foreign capital towards investment here. On the other hand, there has been a notable influx of new labour forces into British industry. Such labour forces may be of three kinds—imported from abroad, the return of retired workers to industry, the employment of natives not hitherto engaged in industry. Under all three heads there have been reinforcements of the army of labour. Probably the most notable of foreign recruits were the Belgian immigrants. At first they constituted a source of apprehension, as it was feared that to give them employment would throw British workers out of employment; but the increasing scarcity of labour removed such hesitations, and gradually many thousands were absorbed into British industry as munition workers or in other capacities. In the pursuit of skilled artisans for munition making, these were sought in the Colonies, and apparently even in the United States, though it is not likely that the total thus obtained was considerable.

There is plenty of evidence that the demand for labour, and the higher wages of labour, recalled to the business of production many who had retired from it. These were of two classes. Oldish men and women who on marriage had abandoned the factory. The second class belonged chiefly to the textile trades. These reinforcements constituted an increase in the labour army, but it was not without its darker side. Many women were tempted from the home to the factory who, in the interests of the future of the State, had better been left to the care of their families.

The new recruits to productive industry were of three kinds—persons previously engaged in parasitic occupations, men who had not hitherto worked with their hands, and women who had not hitherto worked. High wages caused a marked movement from the parasitic to the productive occupations, and patriotism induced a number of persons (though not a considerable number) hitherto engaged in professions or idling to labour with their hands. But the great new source of labour was the influx of women. It is difficult to say how far it was an influx of women hitherto not engaged in production, how far it was a transference of women from parasitic industries or domestic service, and how far it was the promotion of women from less skilled and responsible to more skilled

and responsible work. No reliable statistics exist of the number of additional recruits to the army of labour from all these various sources, but it has been estimated that it may have amounted altogether to an addition of ten per cent to the labour forces.

The changes in labour produced very difficult problems, and it cannot be said that at the time of writing they have been either solved or even seriously grappled with. The Government demanded of the Trade Unions that they should abandon for the period of the war all their rules devised for the protection of the standard of life which might restrict output. These rules embrace, among other matters, the relations between Union and non-Union labour, between skilled and unskilled workers, between craft and craft. In addition, there were complicated questions as to the delimitations of various Unions and as to rates of wages. The importance of this obscure code of regulations, vast though it is to labour, is not readily appreciated by outsiders, and the official tendency has been to give not much attention to the difficulties of the present, and no thought at all to the problems accumulating for the future. Some regulations were made by the Ministry of Munitions for the fixing of a minimum wage for women workers in controlled factories, but they are so vague that their effectiveness has been disputed.

Two important questions have been raised by this newly-discovered fluidity of labour, which has, in large measure, broken down the old barriers between skilled and unskilled labour, and which has introduced women to an unprecedented extent into the labour market. Are these changes likely to be permanent? If they are we may expect from the first, in the beginning, a lowering of wages, followed, however, by a transformation in English Trade Unionism. English Trade Unionism, in contradistinction to Australian, has hitherto been aristocratic, resting upon and perpetuating a hierarchy of trades and workers. With the boundaries between skilled and unskilled in large measure eliminated or disputed, there will come about a uniformity of interest and sentiment among English working men, expressing itself in comprehensive labour organisations. This should strengthen labour in its conflict with capital, and it may conceivably give labour a power in politics and the Legislature far greater than it has hitherto enjoyed; for undoubtedly one secret of the political strength of Labour in Australia has been the democratic character of Australian Unionism. In guessing at the future of women in industry, it is as well not to exaggerate the degree of the change which the war has already brought about.

THE STATE OF COMMERCE.

(4) The most notable change in the relations between industry and the State has been the extension of State interference, which has affected finance, commerce, employers and employed. It began with the taking over of the railways by the State and the requisitioning of mercantile ships for Admiralty purposes. The next

step was to suggest, though not to fix, maximum prices for certain foodstuffs. The Government then, in order to keep prices down, entered into considerable purchases of sugar, and later bought up the Indian wheat crop, while under its instructions the Australian Government bought up the meat output. Another step was the limitation of coal prices. Then the State gave assistance on a large scale for the encouragement of the manufacture of dyes in this country. It assumed complete control of public appeals for capital, but it also raised a loan of 500 million dollars for the adjustment of the rate of exchange. It established a system of State insurance—first for the mercantile marine, and later against damage to property caused by aircraft and bombardment. It took powers to requisition ships to maintain the trade with certain markets inadequately supplied, because freight rates in other markets were more profitable, and to regulate trading between foreign ports. But the greatest changes were made in connection with the Ministry of Munitions. The profits in munition factories were limited (after a fashion), and workmen were practically bound to their employers. Special courts were set up for their disciplining, and very drastic regulations were set up for the control of the liquor traffic. The State even began to experiment as a liquor dealer.

An adequate discussion of all these numerous and revolutionary activities would fill a volume, and here we must be content to consider how far what has been done is likely to mean a permanent advance towards State Socialism. It cannot be said that all the Government measures have been well conceived. The Munitions Tribunal and the restrictions upon the liberty of labour have provoked much bitterness, and if anything have made the idea of State Socialism (at least as developed in England in war time) unattractive to working men. The transactions in sugar were so managed that in order to prevent a heavy loss to the State the price of sugar was kept artificially high—a form of taxation bearing with peculiar harshness upon the poor. The handling of the problem of coal prices was timorous, and hardly intelligible. The handling of financial problems left room for criticism. If the degree of success attained be the proper test of permanence, then nearly all the war experiments in State Socialism are not likely to outlast the war, or to encourage similar ventures for the future. This does not mean, of course, that the experiments could not have been more skilfully made, but that distinction will probably be lost sight of. Nor need it be supposed that the talk of the State giving every one his orders and allotting every one his work and his place in society will leave much sediment behind.

(5) In an earlier chapter the introduction by Mr. McKenna of the beginnings of a protective tariff was discussed. Efforts are being made to extend that tariff, and there is some discussion of the possibility or advisability of the perpetuation after war of the Alliance against Germany in the form of a tariff league against Germany. But the project is too visionary.



Trebizond, showing the East Wall and Citadel.



The main business street of Trebizond.



A view in the Trebizond district.

CHAPTER XX.

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE TURKISH ARMENIANS.

THE ARMENIAN QUESTION ONCE MORE—EFFECTS OF TURKISH INTERVENTION IN THE WAR—THE FORMER MASSACRES—ARMENIANS AND THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN—A POLICY OF EXTERMINATION—MASSACRE AND EXILE—SOME INSTANCES OF RESISTANCE—GERMAN RESPONSIBILITY—THE WORLD AND THE TURKS.


THE intervention of Turkey in the war promised ill for the Armenian people. All the reasons which had created the "Armenian question," with its history of persecution, massacre, and unfulfilled schemes of reform, persisted still, and were now aggravated by a war with Russia, which would be conducted in the Armenian borderland, and among the Armenian population.

The Armenians had always been a suspect nation in the eyes of the Turks. They were small enough to persecute, but not too small to fear. They were a subject people of capacity and intelligence, peaceful and industrious, anxious to learn. They were material which might have been of great use to the Turkish State had the Turk known how to use it. But the Turkish conqueror, always accomplished in the use of the sword, had added little in course of time to this primitive equipment for statesmanship. A Turkish historian might well reflect on the diverse qualities and capacities of the peoples who had at one time or another been incorporated in the Ottoman State, and how greatly they might have enriched it had the Ottomans known how to tolerate their diversity and employ it to a common end. But

in this respect Young Turk and Old Turk were alike, except that the younger type was more energetic and systematic in his repression of the non-Ottoman elements in the Empire. Of these, the Armenians, with their ancient Christian civilisation—its organised existence went back some fifteen hundred years—were the most conspicuous example.

THE EARLIER MASSACRES.

There had already been two great periods of Armenian persecution. In 1895-1897 Abdul Hamid had tried the policy of massacre on a generous scale, both in Asia Minor and in Constantinople. From one hundred thousand to a quarter of a million Armenians in all had perished. It was said at the time that he had declared that he would exterminate the race, so far as it was to be found in Turkey. But there were difficulties in the way of such a policy of thorough. It required a certain amount of organisation, time, and security from interruption, and though Abdul Hamid took great pains to cut off the Armenian regions of Asia Minor from the outer world, and succeeded in destroying a large section of the population, the eyes of the world were on him, and so



many foreign powers were hostile that he would no doubt have found himself embarrassed had he attempted to carry out the complete plan of extermination for which he certainly had no lack of inclination. "The way to make an end of the Armenian question," he had said, "was to make an end of the Armenians." The Young Turks had not failed to pick up this crumb of statesmanship which fell from the old Sultan's table. They had, indeed, made an experiment on a small scale in 1909, when massacres took place at Adana, in Cilicia. These, like the Hamidian, were done under orders. By whom exactly they were ordered, and precisely why, is still a matter of debate. Some would make the Young Turk party in general responsible; others, among whom is Sir Edwin Pears, ascribe the responsibility to the Young Turk extremists at Salonica. The reason offered is that the Armenians, interpreting too largely the coming of self-government to Turkey, had read into it a measure of equality and fraternity for the smaller nationalities which the Ottomans observed with astonishment and anger. The blood of the Armenians, they argued, must be cooled; and cooled it was by the time-honoured process of wholesale massacre.

The Armenians had welcomed the fall of Abdul and the grant of the Constitution, and even after Adana there was a party among them which continued to pin its faith to, and to work with, the Young Turks. This was the Dashnakzutiun, who argued that the Young Turk *régime* had come to stay, and that it would arrest the decay of Turkey. Abdul had been weak, and had only held his ground by playing off the foreign Powers against each other, but Turkey, under her new masters, would hold off all foreigners alike, and the Armenians had therefore more both to hope for than to fear from the Young Turks. In the meantime, a new scheme of reform in the administration of Armenia, which involved a certain measure of instruction and control by European officials, was accepted by the Porte, and was about to be put into operation when Turkey entered the war. It was at once cancelled, but for the time the Turks did not attack the Armenians. They were occupied in preparing their campaign against the Russian Caucasus and Egypt, and in organising their armies against possible attack in Europe.

THE ARMENIANS AND RUSSIA.

But the position of the Armenians was clearly critical. They had not always looked towards Russia with confidence, for Russia's Armenian subjects had had their grievances and discontents, but the Liberal administration

of Vorontzoff-Dashkoff, recently Viceroy in the Caucasus, had given them fresh hopes, and in any event the system of government by massacre, handed on by Abdul to his successors, inevitably led them to look to Russian arms for their deliverance. The Armenians, it has been said, are used to persecution. But there is no credible evidence that massacre, rape, and pillage become acceptable by repetition, and we shall not wonder if the only division of opinion among the Armenians, when they learned that Turkey was at war with Russia, was as to whether it would be better for Armenia (with an opening on the Mediterranean at Alexandretta) to become an autonomous State under the protection of Russia, France, and England, or an autonomous element in the Russian Empire. But whatever Armenians at large thought about these questions, to which only the course of the war could give an answer, it is quite certain that they were much too circumspect

to take sides openly against the Turks. The ox does not offer his throat to the butcher's knife. On the Armenian border, beyond doubt, the Armenians waited eagerly for the Russians' coming, and, on their retreat, saw them departing with a sinking of the heart. The Russian Armenians, aided by the community in foreign countries, had given great assistance to the Russian army, hoping thereby to deliver their fellow-countrymen in Turkey, and for this aid the Young Turks took a fearful revenge.

Already, by the beginning of 1915, the Volunteer Armenian regiments serving with the Russians numbered from 8,000 to 10,000 men, and it was estimated that by the time spring came, and the contingents had gathered from overseas, there would be twice that number, or more, available. Some of these were men who had themselves lived in Turkish Armenia in their youth, and had been

driven out by the Hamidian persecutions. Such a man, for instance, was Hamazasp Servantzian, one of the leaders of the Volunteers, who had escaped into Russian Armenia in 1895, and later organised armed resistance to the Moslem mobs who fell on the Armenians in the Caucasian rising of eight years ago. Such men, knowing perfectly the people and the topography of the borderland which the Russians invaded, were undoubtedly of service to the Russian cause. But in this the Turks were only paying the penalty for their gross incompetency as a governing people, and they did not, in fact, allege the activity of the Russian, the foreign, or the refugee Armenians, as the reason for their attempt to destroy their own Armenian population. It was, however, the disasters of the first campaign, culminating in the severe defeat of Sarikamysh, which seems to have



Talaat Bey.

[E.N.A.]



Mersina : The water front.

[E.N.A.]



A general view of Erzerum.

[E.N.A.]



Armenian children in the refugee camp at Port Said.



Distributing soup to some of the Armenian refugees in camp at Port Said.

decided the Young Turk leaders to carry out a policy on which, in principle, they may have decided earlier in the war. As the Turkish troops and the Kurds invaded the Russian Caucasus and North-Western Persia they had sacked and destroyed the Armenian villages as they went. But these were either on enemy or neutral soil. In the spring of 1915 the Turks began work within their own borders. They put into execution a systematic plan to make an end of the Armenians.

TALAAAT'S SAYING.

Talaat Bay, the Young Turk leader who had been president of the Relief Committee at Constantinople, after the Adana massacres, was the leader in this scheme. When Mr. Morgenthau, the American Ambassador at Constantinople, went to see him—"I am taking the necessary steps," said Talaat, "to make it impossible for the Armenians even to utter the word autonomy during the next fifty years." The policy was carried out with a degree of success in organisation which the Turks seem rarely to attain except in massacres. In April, orders were sent to all the governors of provinces, chief military commanders and heads of police that the Armenian population was to be disposed of. Some general principles, apparently, were laid down, but the details could safely be left to officials not unaccustomed to the execution of such projects. The orders were carried round the countryside. Says a letter from Van:—"On the day before the massacre which took place in the region of Van, couriers on horse visited all the Turkish villages situated far from the telegraph lines, and took the firman of Sultan Mehmet ordering the massacre of all the Armenians."

The Turks have offered certain pretexts for their conduct, but without industry or show of anxiety lest the world should not accept them. The commonest is that the Armenians were guilty of a revolutionary movement, which aimed at setting up a separate independent State, though the truth was that, except in the

border zone which the Russians for a short time occupied, the Armenian villagers were only anxious lest they should be suddenly fallen on by their Moslem neighbours. This pretext, however, was for the foreign public. In the vilayet of Van the reason offered was that some of the able-bodied Armenians had deserted after being called up for service. Doubtless, elsewhere there were other explanations; but it matters little what they were. This was not a case of executions of conspirators, though certainly many Armenian notables were executed; nor even of massacre of the male population, though the males were massacred. It was an attempt to destroy a whole people by murder, outrage, and starvation, without distinction either of age or sex.

THE FIRST STEP.

The able-bodied males were called up for service. Those of them that bore arms were disarmed and employed as workmen on the construction of roads and the like tasks. They were moved from their own districts, and little authentic information about them was afterwards received. Such as reached the outer world declared that they had all been killed. "We learn from a sure source," runs one letter, "that Armenian soldiers of the Erzerum province, working on the Erzerum-Yerzhingha road, had all been massacred." Equally, those of the province of Diarbekir had been massacred on the Diarbekir-Urfa and Diarbekir-Kharput road. From Kharput alone 1,800 young Armenians were sent off as soldiers to Diarbekir to work on the roads there. All of them had been massacred. We have no news about other localities, but there can be no doubt that the soldiers there have been made to suffer the same fate." Had there been even less information, it would have been safe to assume that, in their determination to break up the structure of Armenian society, the Turks would not have spared the young Armenian men.

The men who were not called up for service and afterwards despatched were disposed of in various ways.

A general disarmament first took place, and for the purpose, as for that of guarding their prisoners, the Turks organised a special gendarmerie of released criminals. Large numbers of imprisonments took place; sometimes without pretext, sometimes on the allegation that the possession of books or literature betokened revolutionary designs. Sometimes the accused were executed in prison. Some were tortured. Some were sent from prison to exile and disappeared. The manner of death of this or that notable would be afterwards reported; others were simply not heard of again. At Diarbekir the prisoners were all killed, and the Bishop, refusing to sign a certificate saying that they had died a natural death, committed suicide. His deputy was beaten to death. Many of the bishops were handed over to court-martials, and nothing was learned of their fate. At Constantinople twenty well-known Armenians were hung, and many more were carried off and seen no more. The Armenian members of the Chamber of Deputies were not spared, friends though they might have been of the Young Turk leaders, or Dashnakists, who had worked with the Young Turk party. Zohrab, perhaps the best known of the Armenian deputies, was sent off into Anatolia and murdered—one account says burnt. Haladjian, formerly Minister of Public Works, and a friend of Talaat Bey, was sent on a similar journey and disappeared. Other deputies and notables were sent with Zohrab, and are believed to have died with him. But these were

only individuals whose prominence drew special notice to their fate. Along the shores of the Black Sea, in Eastern Asia Minor, and in Cilicia an identical policy was followed. One place differed from another only in the mode of murder. At Trebizond, as the Italian Consul bore witness, a large part of the Armenian population, which was from 8,000 to 10,000 in number, was put into boats, taken out to sea, and drowned; the rest, according to the evidence of Armenians, were sent into exile. At another place, some sixty of the citizens were rushed through a court-martial, and at once shot outside the town. At a third, the men were pole-axed in front of graves already dug for them. So, for the

most part, all the male population was dealt with. The old men were sometimes spared an immediate death, to be reserved for longer suffering.

THE FATE OF THE WOMEN AND CHILDREN.

With the women and children were adopted other methods, the key to which is the determination of the Turks that the Armenian nation should be disrupted so that it could not again be made whole. Says Lord Bryce, in a compendious summary on this point:—

"The fate of the women was, if possible, worse. A large proportion, including most of the younger women, were driven from their houses into the streets. Turkish officials picked out those whom they wished to be sent to their harems, and

others were taken to the markets and sold into slavery, into the worst kind of slavery, a life of prostitution. The children shared a similar fate. The elder ones were mostly killed. The younger ones were taken to the market and sold at prices which ranged from eight to fourteen shillings. They were sold only to Mussulmans, and on the condition that they should be brought up as Mohammedans."

The women that were taken to Turkish harems were also forcibly converted to Islam. But for the Armenians generally there was no such freedom to escape death by professing conversion to Islam, as there had been in the massacres of Abdul Hamid. The Turks were not now seeking converts, nor did they take the trouble to pretend it.

THE EXILE.

Death for the men; the harem for the younger

women; the market for the younger children. But there were still large numbers of women and children to be removed. Orders were sent that they should be driven from their homes towards the Euphrates and Tigris, into the deserts that lie to the south of the Armenian vilayets. At the outset of the journey their treatment varied according to the character of the officials. In some places they were given a few days' notice of expulsion, permission to attempt to sell their property, or to hire a waggon for the journey. In others they were told that they could carry with them what they liked, and that their escort would furnish them with food. In all cases their end was the same. No sooner were they well on their



Turkish reserves in Palestine marching to join the colours.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

way than they were robbed of their property and money. The escorts joined in the pillage with the Moslems by the wayside and the bands of robbers who came down to share in the spoil. The women were maltreated by their guards or carried away. A survivor of one caravan told how at every village the women and children were paraded, so that the local Mussulmans might make their choice. Food was denied these miserable people, and, added to all, came the terrors of the desert. Of their journey into exile, as piteous as any that history has recorded, we have the narratives of eye-witnesses—the statements of some of the victims and the reports of missionary workers, including Germans, who were on the spot. "They go on foot," says one account. "The women with child are drowned in crossing the rivers. Fathers, mothers, children are separated in different directions. Nothing is more horrible than the sufferings of the girls, who are exposed to the worst outrages imaginable on the part of the gendarmes escorting." The children died by the wayside. "We have discovered fifteen babies," wrote a German missionary. "Three of these are already dead; the others were all terribly emaciated. Oh! if we could write all we see." Another German missionary worker saw and described some of the Armenians when already in the desert:—

"For these mountaineers the desert climate is terrible. I reached a large Armenian camp of goat-skin tents, but most of the unfortunate people were sleeping out in the sun on the burning sands. The Turks had given them a day's rest on account of the large number of the sick. It was evident from their clothing that these people had been well-to-do; they were natives of a village near Zeitun, and were led by their religious head. It was a daily occurrence for five or six children of these people to die by the wayside. They were just burying a young woman, the mother of a little girl of nine years of age, and they besought me to take this little girl with me.

"Those who have no experience of the desert cannot picture to themselves the sufferings entailed by such a journey—a hilly desert without shade, marching over rough and rugged rocks, unable to satisfy one's scorching thirst from the muddy waters of the Euphrates, which winds its course along in close proximity.

"On the next day I met another camp of these Zeitun Armenians. There were the same indescribable sufferings, the same accounts of misery. 'Why do they not kill us once for all?' asked they. 'For days we have no water to drink, and our children are crying for water. At night the Arabs attack us, they steal our bedding, our clothes that we have been able to get together; they carry away by force our girls, and outrage our women. If any of us are unable to walk, the convoy of gendarmes beat us. Some of our women threw themselves down from the rocks into the Euphrates in order to save their honour—some of these with their infants in their arms.'"

The homes of the dispossessed Armenians were filled by Moslem immigrants.

CASES OF RESISTANCE.

Not all the Armenians were led like sheep to the slaughter. Well organised and quickly executed as was the Turkish plan, warning of it was received in some districts, and a defence was rapidly arranged. In a number of villages spoken of by refugees resistance was offered, but the silence which followed was sufficient evidence of the result. Such was the case of Shanan, twenty miles south-east of Trebizond; the last that was heard of it, months ago, was that 800 men were holding it against a Turkish siege. At Karahissar 4,000 Armenians entrenched themselves in the town and held out for a fortnight. Ammunition ran short, and the Turks, bringing

up heavy reinforcements, captured the place and put the population to the sword. So also Vartemis, in the region of Lake Van, where 2,000 Armenians are said to have been burnt to death in the church—a deed that recalls one of the worst horrors of the Hamidian massacres, when the church at Urfa was burnt, together with all the women and children seeking refuge in it. A splendid resistance was offered in the Sasun region, west of Lake Van, where there are forty Armenian villages surrounded by Kurdish tribes. Here, some 15,000 Armenians gathered together in May, and for some months beat off the Turks. At the close of the summer it was reported that the Turks had brought up large forces, and that communication with the district was cut off. The Armenians had retreated to the mountain tops, where they hoped to hold out, if they could still succeed in manufacturing their ammunition, and winter did not drive them into the hands of their enemies in the plains or destroy them with its rigours. Most successful of all was the resistance of the Armenians near Antioch. Hearing of the Turkish plans, they retired into the mountains between Antioch and the sea, and were there joined by a number of refugees from the Cilician towns. They were poorly armed, but for almost two months they repulsed a Turkish force of over 3,000 men. Fortunately, when their ammunition was running low, they were able to signal to a French cruiser off the coast, which, with two others, came to their aid. The Armenians, it was found, were anxious only to get more ammunition and continue the struggle, but were finally persuaded to go on board the ships, and, to the number of nearly 5,000, were carried off to safety. Alas! that the gallant resistance of this brave race should elsewhere have been hopeless.

THE REFUGEES.

Only in one district did large numbers of Armenians succeed in making good their escape. In May, the Volunteer Regiments which accompanied the Russians captured the important town of Van and held it until July. Under their protection gathered many Armenians, who would otherwise have fallen in the general massacre. But in July the Turks sent fresh forces against the Russians, who were compelled to fall back to the frontier, and took with them the Volunteers. A great mass of refugees, estimated at about a quarter of a million in number, joined in the retreat—to remain meant certain death—and set out on a painful journey of over 100 miles to safety. "There are no railways nor even good roads in Turkish Armenia," says one account, "the means of transport are very scanty and slow, so that the thousands of sick women and children, exhausted by the sufferings of the last five months, could hardly move on without help. Hard pressed by advancing Turks, who wished to cut off the line of retreat, the Armenian Volunteers fought several bloody rearguard actions to hold back the Turks, and to secure the safety of these 250,000 refugees." The sufferings of many of these hapless people were scarcely less than those of their kinfolk deported to the desert. Hunger and thirst afflicted them, and disease took toll among them. At one time, it is said, there were in Erivan (just over the Russian frontier) more than 3,000 children below ten years of age waiting to be cared for; most of them were orphans.

In all, however, from Van and the northern border regions, over a quarter of a million Armenians are believed to have reached safety in the Russian Caucasus, perhaps many more, for the stream of refugees was flowing across

the frontier before the Turks had given the order for extermination. But apart from their exodus to the Caucasus, it is impossible to speak with certainty of any large body of Armenians as having escaped. A few thousands were carried off from Syria by the French cruisers; some reached Bulgaria from Constantinople, where, since no general massacre broke out, part of the Armenian population probably remained; in other places, as at Smyrna, they profited by the rare leniency of their Moslem neighbours; and we must allow for certain fractions which either maintained themselves, as at Sasun, in the mountain regions, or survived the journey to the desert. But it is estimated that between half a million and eight hundred thousand Armenians perished in the persecution, and by the time that they had made an end the Turks had probably done almost all that lay in their power to destroy the Armenians within their borders.


THE RESPONSIBILITY.

Communication with Constantinople during all this time was fitful and uncertain, except through the German Press, which remained almost completely silent on the massacres. It is not possible, therefore, to say whether Talaat and Enver met with any opposition to their schemes in the ranks of the Young Turk party. If there was any opposition it was again, as in the days when Turkey was carried into the war, invertebrate and without effect on the execution of their plans. But the reports may be set on record. Ahmed Riza, formerly President of the Chamber, is said to have made the massacres one of the counts in his indictment of the Government on the opening of the Parliament in the autumn of 1915, and the Sheikh-ul-Islam, who resigned his office, is said to have done so on this ground. But that is about all. So far as is known, the Turks, Young and Old, leaders and led, exhibited no squeamishness about the destruction of over half a million people, most of whom could, by no stretch of imagination, be suspected of any crime, political or other.

It is necessary, also, to record what can be said about the part played by the Germans at this time. There is no evidence that they exerted themselves in any way, official or unofficial, to stay the hand of the Turks. Formal representations they may have made in the hope of saving their face before the world in later days. The correspondent of the American United Press, in one of his August messages from Constantinople, stated that the American Ambassador had asked the assistance of his German and Austrian colleagues, and that "they had been successful to the extent of securing definite promises from the leading members of the Young Turk Government that no orders will be given for massacres." Unless this referred to Constantinople alone, the appeal to the Turks came much too late to save the Armenians; and if it was limited to the capital, the German-Austrian Ambassadors are sufficiently condemned. But at the end of August, as details accumulated of the horrors which had taken place in the interior, the Ambassadors apparently

became alarmed, and are said--the report is unconfirmed--to have made a protest against the massacres (then almost consummated), and to have asked for a declaration that they were free from responsibility. No declaration of that kind could save them. The one Power which could exercise influence with Turkey at this time was Germany. Whether her influence would have been effectual it is impossible to say, but she made no serious effort to exert it. It was said that when Mr. Morgenthau urged the German Ambassador to intervene, he got the answer, "We are very sorry, but we cannot interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey." The answer may never have been made, but there is little doubt that it faithfully represents the official German attitude. The unofficial mind, as represented by Count Reventlow, adopted it fully and frankly, adding only that the Armenians were a disorderly and rebellious people, who deserved what they had got. A nation, like a man, must be content to be known in some sort by the companionship it keeps. A Power that needed Turkey's military assistance as badly as did Germany would, perhaps, have been slow to antagonise her ally, but it was not a mere accident that the Power which trampled on the Belgians and murdered civilians at sea should have been linked with another which destroyed a helpless people wholesale. At the bottom of all these crimes alike was the naked brutality of the conquering savage. The spirit of Genghiz Khan united German and Turk congenially.

The Entente Powers could not stop the Turks; the Central Powers would not. It was hoped in England that the neutrals, led by the United States, might raise their voices so loudly that Germany would hear and go beyond formal protestations of regret and innocence. The hope was vain. The smaller neutrals, who had been unable to protect even their own citizens from German attacks on the high seas, could scarcely be expected to risk offending her on behalf of the Armenians in distant Anatolia. The generous feelings and humanity of the Americans might have been thought to hold out a better prospect. But popular sympathy found no adequate reflection in the Government's official policy. The President's policy was the defence of American interests, wherever they were threatened, but he was in no way disposed to head a League of Humanity, or make himself the mouthpiece of the civilised neutrals of the world. No doubt, from the standpoint of the difficulties of her domestic politics, and the anxiety of the great mass of Americans to keep out of the war, he could say a good deal on behalf of his policy of caution. But there was no risk here of going to war, or even of severing diplomatic relations. It would have been a great deed in the world's history had the United States, leading the neutrals, laid the fate of the Armenians before the German Government and appealed for its assistance. Who can say positively that Germany dare altogether have rejected the appeal? But the attempt was not made.



Taking in shells on a British warship.

[Central News.]


CHAPTER XXI.

THE FAILURE OF THE SUBMARINE BLOCKADE.


INCIDENTS OF THE SUBMARINE BLOCKADE—ITS FAILURE AND THE CAUSES—THE NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE BALTIC—OUR NAVAL POLICY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN—MR. CHURCHILL AND LORD FISHER.

THE Battle of the Dogger Bank (Vol. II., pages 48-53) was not so disastrous for the Germans as seemed probable at one stage in the action, but it was decisive enough to prevent the German battle fleet from again raiding the British coasts. It was fought on January 23rd, and, so far as is known, the German battle fleet did not again venture out in force into the North Sea. There were reports of heavy firing off the coast of Norway in the first week of April, and the Germans later announced, on the authority of documents alleged to have been captured, that British cruisers had fired on each other in the night, thinking that they were Germans attempting a sortie, and that one ship had been sunk. The Admiralty, however, denied the reports of fighting, and there seems to have been no foundation for the stories of mishap. On April 24th, the German Admiralty issued a boastful declaration that the German High Seas Fleet had been out cruising in the North Sea, and had failed to find the enemy; and there were frequent rumours at the time of a small fleet of German warships having been sighted. It was in this month that a German submarine was said to have brought into port a small trader captured

off the coast of Aberdeen. These rumours caused some speculation in this country on the chances that the German High Seas Fleet might, after all, come out and risk an action. At the end of July, again, the captain of the Danish trawler, *Nogill*, sunk by shell fire, in the course of evidence at an enquiry held at Copenhagen, said that he had been stopped by a German flotilla of seven large torpedo boats (presumably destroyers), 125 miles from the Farne Islands, off the coast of Northumberland. There seems little doubt that squadrons of destroyers, and possibly occasional cruisers, were out from time to time in the summer. Our patrols were not very close in-shore, and they were not, of course, continuous; nor for that matter was it any part of our policy to deny access to the North Sea to German warships. On the contrary, nothing pleased our navy better than the chance of an action. But these stolen cruises only illustrate the determination of the German Admiralty to avoid fleet action. This policy being what it was, the Dogger Bank Battle may be said to have closed the North Sea to the surface craft of the German navy. The Atlantic and Pacific were closed by the victory off the Falkland Islands.



A British monitor in harbour at Dunkirk.



On board a British monitor during a bombardment of the Belgian coast : Preparing to fire on a German aeroplane. [Central News.]

THE GRAND FLEET.

All through the year the Grand Fleet, under Admiral Jellicoe, lay waiting in our northern seas. Of all the fleet of the Dreadnought battleships only one had ever been in action—the *Queen Elizabeth*—and she against Turkish forts, not against German battleships. (The Dreadnoughts that fought the German High Seas Fleet in the Dogger Bank action were cruisers.) The major operations of the navy were like nothing that had been forecasted. They were in effect a blockade of the enemy's fleet at a distance of four hundred miles or more, with all the watchfulness and preparedness for instant action of the real blockade such as had worn out Collingwood in the Napoleonic Wars, and without even the relief of the occasional incidents of chase and search. This fleet was like the capital of some great concern, of which even such incidents as the Dogger Bank Battle were only the petty cash. Its stations were never mentioned, though they must have been perfectly well known to the enemy; it sought no advertisement and attained none; its very existence was completely forgotten for weeks together by the average Briton, though he owed to it life and livelihood. This secrecy had its dangers, for it made it easy for our Allies to forget how much they owed to British naval power, even when it was least in evidence. Without the British fleet the French left wing must inevitably have been turned by overseas expeditions, communications between Marseilles and her African colonies must have been severed, no supplies could have reached France from abroad, and the whole foreign trade of France would have been lost. Russia was less dependent on the sea, and British supremacy did not reach the Black Sea and the Baltic. But even Russia owed it to our navy that she could import through Archangel and Vladivostok the munitions without which her defeats in May must have led to her capitulation. Without our supremacy at sea, neither Italy would have come into the war nor Japan; nor would Serbia have been able to prolong her resistance. Even if we had employed no larger army than the original Expeditionary Force, our services to the cause of the Entente would still have been indispensable, and made all the difference between the probability of victory and the certainty of defeat. The criticisms occasionally heard in France and Russia that this country was lukewarm in the cause, because she had not enlisted every man of military age, ignored the services of our fleet, without which victory would have been out of the question; but their injustice was due not to malice, but to lack of knowledge, for which the suppression of all information about the movements of our war fleet was very largely responsible. A welcome change came in September, when M. Stephen Pichon, M. Mille, and M. Joseph Reinach returned to France from a visit to the Grand Fleet and wrote articles describing their impressions. "It has been a great object lesson to me," wrote M. Pichon, in the *Petit Parisien*, "after seeing the British army which is on guard on part of our northern front, to watch the navy which assures the liberty of our communications, the security of our coasts, and the final restoration of Belgium, her independence, and the fullness of her rights." Another member of the party of five was Mr. Palmer, representing the American Press, whose articles did much to enlighten American (and also British) opinion. Later in the year permission to visit the fleet was given to some English journalists, and much fine writing resulted, without much addition to information. The following, by Mr. Archibald Hurd, is an example:—

"The train carried me to the Nowhere of naval war, where the ships are. How they are disposed, what they look like, when and where they cruise are all secrets which the enemy would give a king's ransom to share. Those secrets must be guarded. But there is much which can be revealed in order that the British people throughout the world may understand that they are not as persons without the complete assurance of victory which the sea has always yielded to us.

"When the morning was well advanced I stepped from the train, and was confronted with the vision splendid—the sight of our ships and men. My visit to the Grand Fleet had begun.

"This unparalleled instrument, in which are embodied all the broad lessons drawn from the past and in which reside our hopes for the future, has been fashioned as though we were giants in the world and not pigmies. It stands for dominating power—world-wide in its influence, and beneficent. This country is the sea Power by which all other nations measure their strength and their efficiency. Its ships are legion; its sailors are counted by tens of thousands. Anyone who set forth really to inspect the men-of-war which constitute the Grand Fleet under the supreme orders of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe would have to devote from two to three years to the task of inspection, even if he set aside only one day to each vessel.

"But the Grand Fleet does not stand alone as representing the striking power of the British people. It has its antennæ, scores upon scores of special craft, which, day by day and night by night, whether the weather be fair or foul, are continually feeling for the enemy and defeating his designs. There are 2,300 of these auxiliary craft, mine-sweepers, patrol vessels, and others. But even that does not exhaust our naval resources. Every soldier who confronts the enemy has been carried to the scene of action in France, Gallipoli, Serbia, and elsewhere on the broad backs of the sailors. That is not all. Every sailor and every gun must be fed. There are about 2,000 transports and store-ships of one description and another, which, under the protection of the navy, perform multifarious duties which are essential to our success."

The record of naval happenings in the North Sea in the spring and summer of 1915 would be very short but for the attacks of the German submarines on ships of commerce. A few isolated incidents, however, should be cited in passing. On May 1st, a German submarine sunk H.M.S. *Recruit*, a destroyer, near the Galloper Lightship (between Flushing and Harwich), and later in the afternoon two torpedo boats, which approached her from the west without hoisting their colours, sunk a trawler, but were themselves chased and sunk by a division of British destroyers, which had been summoned by the trawler *Daisy*. On May 8th, the British destroyer *Maori* was mined off Zeebrugge. In the middle of June, the *Roxburgh*, an armoured cruiser of the County class, struck a torpedo, but was able to reach port safely under her own steam. Another destroyer, the *Lightning*, was damaged off the East Coast by mine or torpedo early in July, and on August 8th, the *India*, an auxiliary cruiser, was sunk by a German submarine in Norwegian waters—an infraction of the laws of neutrality against which the Norwegian Government suitably protested. On the other hand, British successes against submarines were for the most part unreported by the Admiralty, in pursuance of its fixed policy of not enlightening the enemy about their fate. One or two, however, of the successes of our own submarines were reported. British submarines were constantly in the Bight of Heligoland, and on July 26th one of them sunk a destroyer "near the German coast." This destroyer may have been one of the flotilla sighted by the Danish captain off the Farne Islands. On August 8th, the German auxiliary *Meteor*, after sinking the *Ramsey*, a small patrol vessel, was herself abandoned by her crew and blown up on the approach



The Bombardment of the Belgian coast: A ruined street at Westende.

[Photopress.]



German troops in a wrecked house in Westende.

[Photopress.]

of a British squadron. The loss in May of the *Princess Irene* by explosion should also be recorded.

THE SUBMARINE BLOCKADE.

The "submarine" blockade, of which the beginnings and motives have already been discussed (Vol. II., pages 105-115), continued through the summer. The sinking of the *Lusitania* (Vol. II., pages 347-352), though its most notorious crime, was not more cruel than others. The sinking of the *Falaba* (Vol. II., page 114) was, in some of its incidents, worse, although the loss of life was less. "I do not desire," said Lord Mersey, in a judgment delivered after a long enquiry into the circumstances of her loss, "nor am I in this case to find whether the submarine was within her rights in sinking the *Falaba*. In any event she was bound to afford the women and men on board a reasonable opportunity of getting to the boats and of saving their lives. Those in charge of the submarine did not do this, and so grossly insufficient was the opportunity afforded that I am driven to the conclusion that the captain of the submarine designed and desired not merely to sink the ship, but, in doing so, also to sacrifice the lives of the passengers and crew."

Much of the destruction among fishing craft, too, was merely inhuman and unintelligible by any rational motives. A very bad case was that of the *Vanilla*, a trawler sunk by fire in April. When another trawler, the *Fermo*, launched a boat to rescue the men, a submarine came alongside and attempted to torpedo her, although it must have been obvious that her sole object was rescue. All hands on the *Vanilla* were lost. "This killing of fisher folk," said an Admiralty statement, "for no military purpose should not escape attention. It is the second murder of its kind within a week." It added significantly that a "careful record is kept of these events." A gross example of callousness was reported by the captain of the *Chateaubriand*, of Nantes, who declared that when his steamer was attacked a cinematographic apparatus was put on the platform of the submarines which followed, and recorded all the incidents from the first summons to the sinking of the ship. It is, however, just to add that in many cases the submarine officers behaved as humanely as was possible under the circumstances, and the instances in which they seemed to take pleasure in destruction for its own sake were, after all, rare, and sometimes the inventions of excited imagination. By British ideas of law, which refuse to accept the order of a superior as a justification of illegal acts, the unlawful killing by submarine commanders was undoubtedly murder. There was, therefore, a legal justification for the action of the Admiralty in subjecting the captured crew of the *U 8* (Vol. II., page 115) to differential treatment in captivity. It was, however, unwise; for the Germans could, and did, retaliate; and Mr. Churchill's successor at the Admiralty had to abandon the discrimination against captured submarine crews in the interests of British officer prisoners in Germany.

The chronicle of the vessels shelled and torpedoed belongs to a history of the merchant marine rather than of the war, for it can hardly be called fighting in which one side only is equipped to fight.* Not infrequently however, the crews of the merchant ships attacked showed very great resourcefulness, and even heroism. One of the best documented of these instances is that of the *Anglo-Californian*, which was attacked off the South of Ireland by the submarine *U 39*, but managed to make

Queenstown. Her fine management has been described by an American sailor lad on board the submarine. The submarine had discharged her last torpedo and missed.

"Shortly before sighting the *Anglo-Californian* we went for her without a single torpedo in our tubes and with but a handful of shells for the deck gun. That meant surface work. We fired into her rudder hoping to disable her, but she kept on steering in circles. The *U 39* was doing almost trial speed. The gun was eating up our last shells, but the wily commander on the *Anglo-Californian's* bridge kept working spirals to escape. So our captain ordered the gunner to aim at the bridge and sweep the deck underneath.

"The lookouts noted that the steamer's skipper had fallen, and that someone was steering the ship on his stomach. Meanwhile the boats were being lowered, but it was a mystery how they were kept from being swamped, as the *Anglo-Californian* never slowed once. We were ordered to count the few remaining shells and aim accurately. We riddled the bridge and funnels with a furious fire, but the last round of ammunition was gone, and there was no surrender of the *Anglo-Californian*, which was still zigzagging. As a last resort a Maxim was brought on deck and clamped to the conning tower. It began to fire bullets by the beltful less than a couple of hundred yards away. We picked off the *Anglo-Californian's* crew whenever a head showed itself. Our fire was returned, rifle shots dropping on the deck and spattering our conning tower.

"She had cried for help over her wireless, and we had been hard at it for over two hours, and assistance was coming to our prey. A grey patrol yacht turned up behind her bow, followed by a swarm of destroyers. Like lightning we scattered pell mell for the conning tower hatch, and we were unshipping the Maxim and handing the rifles below just as a shell whipped over our heads and struck the water within fifteen feet. We dropped below the surface like a rock, and we could hear the sound of the propellers of our pursuers overhead. The crew agreed that the *Anglo-Californian's* captain ought to have had the Iron Cross."

Other examples of escape by skilful manœuvring were given by the *City of Cambridge* and by the *Megantic*, outward bound from Liverpool, at the end of May. Less fortunate was the *Arabic*, of the same line, sunk in August.

Although the records of destruction by submarines filled much space in the newspapers, the losses were not great proportionately to the volume of shipping. At a meeting at which a presentation was made to the captain and crew of the *City of Cambridge*, Sir Norman Hill gave some striking figures illustrating the relative smallness of our shipping losses. In the first six months of the war the value of the cargoes carried in British ships exceeded £650,000,000, and the losses of cargo in those months were not more than £4,250,000. In the first two months of the submarine blockade the losses were about one million from a total of 250 millions, a rate of less than a penny in the pound. The diagram which is given on page 231 exhibits week by week the losses of British shipping for the first seven months of the blockade. They show that by far the worst week was that of August 18th-25th, in which the *Arabic* was sunk. The decline that began in September was continued, and by October the destruction of shipping in the North Sea had almost ceased.

GERMANY'S CHANGE OF POLICY.

On September 1st, in the week after the torpedoing of the *Arabic*, Count Bernstorff handed the following Note to Mr. Lansing, the American Secretary of State:—

"MY DEAR SECRETARY. In reference to our conversation of this day, I beg to inform you that my instructions concerning our answer to your last *Lusitania* Note contain the following passage:—

"Liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning, and without ensuring the safety of the lives of non-

* *Si rixa est ubi tu pulsas, ego vapulo tantum.*—Juvenal.



Rifle drill on board a British battleship.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



British sailors at revolver drill.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]




Diagram of British Losses in the Submarine Blockade.

combatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance.

"Although I know you do not wish to discuss the *Lusitania* question until the *Arabic* incident has been fully discussed, I desire to inform you of the above, because this policy was decided upon by my Government before the *Arabic* incident occurred. I have no objection to your making any use you may please of the above information.—(Signed) BERNSTORFF."


The publication of this Note in America was almost if not quite the first information that reached this country that any change of policy was projected by Germany. It was hailed in the United States, and even in some quarters in this country, as a success for American diplomacy. The facts hardly justified that view. The full text of the undertaking given by Herr von Jagow, the German Foreign Secretary, which was published some three weeks later, showed that it was hedged about with restrictions that destroyed its value as a vindication of the principles for which President Wilson had contended in his first despatches on the sinking of the *Lusitania*. It promised that American merchantmen should be exempt from "interference," except when they were carrying contraband; and that "enemy" passenger ships were not to be attacked "without warning," provided that they respected the international code, and would be sunk only when "opportunity for the safety of the passengers and crew" had been given. This was not by any means an unequivocal abandonment of the submarine campaign. Only "passenger steamers" were to have warning, so that the promise asserted the right to sink without warning British merchantmen—in which there might,

for all the submarine captain knew, be sailors who were American subjects, and whose lives had just as much right to protection as the life of an American millionaire in the *Lusitania*. Again, what was sufficient "warning?" In some conditions of weather no warning could be sufficient. The concessions to the protests of the United States that followed the sinking of the *Lusitania* fell a long way short of the original demands of President Wilson. "The United States," he wrote on June 12th, "is contending for nothing less high than the right of humanity" (Vol. II., page 352). The promises now given failed to recognise that right.


And in truth, the despatches of President Wilson had grown progressively weaker in tone. In his first despatch he had argued that it was "practically impossible" to employ submarines in the destruction of commerce without disregarding the rules of "fairness, reason, justice, and humanity" (Vol. II., page 351). That was in accord with the contentions of the German naval critics themselves. But in his last despatch, published at the end of July, to which Count Bernstorff's Note of September 1st refers, he wrote:—

"The events of the past two months have clearly indicated that it is possible and practicable to conduct such submarine operations as have characterised the activity of the Imperial German navy within the so-called war zone in substantial accord with the accepted practices of regulated warfare. . . . It is manifestly possible, therefore, to lift the whole practice of submarine attack above the criticism which it aroused and to remove the chief causes of offence."

The passage materially weakened the American case, and in effect invited some such compromise as Germany



Shell hits on a German cruiser driven ashore in the Baltic by the Russians. [Sport and General.



The British submarine E13, which went ashore off the coast of Denmark, being raised by the Danish navy. [Sport and General.

in fact offered. That compromise, however, expressly reserved rights to the belligerent which President Wilson had begun by disputing.

THE TRUE CAUSES.

It is arguable, therefore, that, so far from winning the argumentative duel, President Wilson was in fact worsted. No doubt he had, through the American Ambassador in Berlin, more exact information of the opinions among the members of the German Government than are as yet available here. It is known, for example, that there was a strong opposition in the German Government to the beginning of the submarine blockade, and that Admiral von Tirpitz had a hard struggle to get his policy accepted. Among his opponents is believed to have been the German Chancellor. No doubt the Notes of the United States on the sinking of the *Lusitania* would revive the old opposition to the "blockade," and it may be that President Wilson, knowing the details of the struggle between the two factions in the German Government, wrote with the deliberate desire of providing it with as soft a fall as possible, and so making the defeat of the Tirpitz faction certain. All through the war there is visible in German policy a see-saw between the Western and the Eastern schools—a Western school which looked for expansion to the west and to the sea, and made in the invasion of Belgium and the sinking of the *Lusitania* two infamous contributions to that end, and an Eastern school, which looked rather towards Russia, the Balkans, and Constantinople. Admiral von Tirpitz belonged to the first of these schools; the Chancellor, in all probability, and Von Hindenburg to the second. President Wilson may have had exact knowledge of this contest, and shaped his policy accordingly. He may have been wise; but he can hardly claim the credit of having won a diplomatic victory for the cause of humanity and of international law.

In fact, the practice of Germany within the war zone went far beyond the promises given to the United

States. In the North Sea and the Atlantic the submarine campaign against merchant shipping practically ceased after October. Two explanations are possible. Either it was impossible to carry on effective submarine war against merchant shipping if it was necessary to give warning in accordance with the promise to the United States, or there were reasons for the raising of the "blockade" other than those given in the diplomatic Notes. The second is the true explanation. In a letter to a correspondent, written on September 5th, Mr. Balfour, the new First Lord of the Admiralty, asked why the sinking of the *Lusitania* was welcomed throughout Germany with a shout of triumph, and the sinking of the *Arabic* accepted with melancholy silence:—

"Is it because in the intervening months the United States have become stronger or Germany weaker? Is it because the attitude of the President has varied? Is it because the arguments of the Secretary of State have become more persuasive? Is it because German opinion has at last revolted against lawless cruelty? No. The reason is to be found elsewhere. It is to be found in the fact that the authors of the submarine policy have had time to measure its effects, and that deeds which were merely crimes in May, in September are seen to be blunders."

ANTI-SUBMARINE DEVICES.

The fact was that the British navy in the summer was able to take the measure of the "blockade," and to devise measures


for combating its effects. By the end of August the Germans knew that their submarine campaign was doomed to failure, and they hastened to cover its abandonment under cover of concessions to the United States. About this time Admiral von Tirpitz took a long holiday, and two important members of his staff, Admiral Bachman, the Chief of the War Staff, and Rear-Admiral Benecke, his chief assistant, were replaced, the first by Admiral von Holtzendorff, the second by Rear-Admiral von Koch. Earlier in the year Admiral Ingenohl had been succeeded by Admiral von Pohl in command of the High Seas Fleet.

It was an open secret in this country all through the summer that a number of protective devices were



A German mine being blown up by a British destroyer.

[Central News.]



The Baltic coast from Libau to Petrograd.

being successfully employed against submarines in the North Sea, and there were many rival guesses at the number of submarines that had been sunk. The Admiralty refused to commit itself publicly to any estimate, nor did it issue any official information of the nature of its anti-submarine devices. The only systematic account that has been made public appeared in the American papers, and was based on reports made by United States agents to the Navy Department. The following appeared in the *New York World* of October 2nd:—

"While the greatest secrecy is thrown around the means employed, the United States Government has information concerning the principal methods which have been successful in meeting the German war zone campaign. Submarine telephony has been developed by which sounds from observation boats or stations planted off shore communicate with points in the mainland.

"For the capturing of craft whose presence has not been detected or even suspected, the Government's reports describe how huge nets have been stretched across the channels through which the submarines may be expected to attempt to pass; and in open waters, near steamship lanes or in the vicinity of warships, nets suspended between floats have been spread broadcast, armed patrol boats watch, and when the floats disappear beneath the water, showing that a submarine has become entangled, the patrols congregate at the place, and when the victim comes to the surface, as it inevitably must to disentangle itself, it is destroyed by gunfire or captured.

"A special type of mine also has been devised, which is laid in large fields, that have proved particularly dangerous to submarines approaching steamer lanes.

"The German methods of supplying submarines with oil and provisions, either at sea or from concealed places along the coasts of the British Isles, have been overcome. The

stations have been ferreted out and practically disposed of. This compels the boats to return to their bases at more frequent intervals, and leaves them only a comparatively short time in position and equipped for effective duty.

"Destroyers, the reports declare, become expert in the game of submarine-hunting, and armed trawlers also have proved very effective on account of their speed and ability to get quickly within easy range of their victims. But the greatest single factor, it is said, has been a newly-designed and built fleet of small seagoing motor-boats, armed with one or two 3-inch guns, and possessing very high speed.

"These boats literally swarm over suspected expanses of the waters, and by an effectively worked-out system of patrol cover almost every mile of the surface in the channels of commerce adjacent to Great Britain.

"As a submarine must frequently rise to renew its air supply and recharge its storage batteries by which it is propelled when submerged, any in the territory covered by the scouts are almost certain to be eventually detected and destroyed. These small boats have been built in large numbers in England, and it is reported that about 500 of them are being constructed in the United States and Canada to be shipped in sections to Great Britain.

"Aeroplanes are described as exceedingly useful in locating and following the trail of submarines. They can detect one even a hundred feet beneath the surface.

"It is the habit, the report says, of the German submarines to slip into favourable position along the steamer lanes and lie on the bottom for long periods, rising occasionally to the surface for observation and other purposes.

"Undersea boats adopting these tactics have been the most difficult to catch. Here the aeroplane has shown its greatest usefulness, as the comparatively shallow water along much of the British coast makes it possible for the aeroplane operators to see the boats lying on the bottom. The aeroplane notes the position and notifies the nearest destroyer or patrol boat, which speeds to the spot and waits for the submarine to rise."

A few additional details have appeared in various quarters which may probably be accepted as authentic. One of the nets mentioned was stretched across the Channel, between Dover and Calais, and the date of its laying down may be inferred from the sudden cessation of the submarine attacks near Beachy Head. Another net is believed to have crossed the Channel between Portland Bill and Cherbourg, and yet a third, which gave much difficulty in fixing, between the nearest points on the coasts of Ireland and Scotland. The chief credit for the small high-speed motor boats, and also for other successful devices, is probably to be given to Lord Fisher, the ex-First Lord of the Admiralty, who has a mind remarkably fertile in mechanical ideas, and is quick to see the value of a new suggestion. At the beginning of July an Inventions Board was formed at the Admiralty, of which Lord Fisher was Chairman—one of the happiest appointments of the war. In August, the Minister of Munitions followed this excellent example by constituting a Munitions Inventions Branch, with Mr. E. W. Moir as Comptroller.

THE NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE BALTIC.

A good commentary on the British naval operations in the North Sea, and one that places our small mishaps in their true proportion, is supplied by the German naval operations in the Baltic. The numerical superiority of the German over the Russian navy is much greater than that of ours over the Germans, and the conditions were, on the whole, much more favourable to success, for the Russian warships showed themselves much more frequently than did the German in the North Sea. Yet, from beginning to end, the German record is one of failure unredeemed by a single considerable success. The naval—like the military—policy of Germany towards Russia at the beginning of the war was purely defensive. She was content to watch the Russian naval movements, and to sow mines off the Russian ports and in the Gulf of Bothnia by way of substitute for a blockade. The engagements offered more than once in the first months of the war by the Russian fleet were declined; but,

unenterprising as the Germans were, they managed to lose a cruiser, the *Magdeburg*, by running her on the rocks in a mist. Early in September, the *Augsburg*, which had been engaged with a Russian submarine off Windau, mistook her own torpedo flotilla in the dark for Russian ships, and shelled it vigorously, crippling eight. Later in the month two German submarines were sunk. On October 11th, the Germans sunk the *Pallada*—their first success—but continued to lose small craft right up to the end of the year and the closing of Russian waters by ice. The Germans, it is true, were not able to use their main naval strength in Baltic waters for fear of the British, but they made singularly little use of their

superiority in older ships, and their whole conduct of the campaign compares very unfavourably with that of the British navy in the North Sea, even when full weight is given to the criticism of some undeniable errors of judgment. The campaign gives the impression that the Germans in the strategy and tactics of their Baltic operations had no clear plans, and were waiting until they saw how the British navy worked out its not very dissimilar problems in the North Sea.

The German campaign in the following year was even less successful. By July, the Germans had begun serious operations in Courland, and it was important that their armies should have the co-operation of the fleet. The occupation of Libau, their most southerly



A diver attached to a British cruiser going down to examine the ship's bottom.

port in the Baltic, was a serious loss to the Russians, but its naval effects were to be counterbalanced by the activity of a British submarine, the *E 9*, the precursor of many others. It is not known when the *E 9* first entered the Baltic, and the first news of it was the statement in a Russian Admiralty bulletin that a British submarine had sunk off Danzig the *Pommern*, a pre-Dreadnought battleship of the *Deutschland* class. The British censor struck out the word British, and it was not until some days later that it came out that the successful submarine was the *E 9*, under Commander Horton. In August, the Germans began an attempt to gain control of the Gulf of Riga from the sea, hoping thereby to turn the Russian defence of the city and the Dvina

river. (See Chapter XXIII.) The Gulf is entered by two narrow channels. On August 17th German mine-sweepers and small craft took advantage of a fog to begin clearing the mines from the eastern entrance. The work seems to have been done with great skill, and the mine-fields were cleared, though not without some loss. The German fleet then began a series of reconnaissances in the direction of Riga, at the head of the Gulf, which is a very extensive sheet of water. The fog seems to have continued, and apparently affected even the Russian reports of the action that followed, which, in spite of several attempts, still remain exceedingly obscure. Apparently, the Germans hoped to effect a landing under cover of the fog, and after a passage was made through the mines transports entered the Gulf, and, according to the stories of refugees, a landing was attempted at Pernau, on the east shore. The German account, which is likely to be more trustworthy than that of refugees, is that the transports were barges, which they proposed to sink in the fairway to prevent the Russian ships using Pernau. If a landing was attempted, however, it failed disastrously, and, whether from mines or from gun fire from the shore, a number of the small craft were either put out of action or sunk. Meanwhile, the supporting squadron of battle-ships outside in the Baltic was attacked by the *E 9*, and one of them—believed to have been the *Moltke*—was either sunk or more probably disabled. In consequence, the entire fleet left the Gulf. Obscure as the details are, it is evident that the whole enterprise ended in a disastrous failure. (See page 255.)

By this time other British submarines were making for the Baltic, and on August 18th, in the middle of the operations in the Riga Gulf, one of them, the *E 13*, grounded on the island of Saltholm, in the Sound between Copenhagen and Sweden. Early next morning a Danish torpedo boat appeared, and told her that she would be given twenty-four hours' notice to get afloat, after which she would, if she was still aground, be interned, as she was in Danish territorial waters. At nine in the morning two German destroyers approached, and one of them launched a torpedo at the *E 13*, and then opened fire with all her guns. The Danish ship lowered her boats and removed half the crew, but the remainder perished. The incident excited very deep feeling in Copenhagen, which condemned the action of the German destroyer, not only for its inhumanity to a defenceless ship, but also as a breach of Danish neutrality which must have been quite deliberate.

The British submarines were exceedingly active in the Baltic in October, and for a time completely held up communication between Germany and Sweden. In the week ending October 10th, fifteen German merchant vessels, 35,000 tons in all, were sunk. In addition, a number of transports and a cruiser of the *Prince Adalbert* type were torpedoed. The rules which the British submarines followed in their attempt to establish a blockade of the German Baltic ports have not been published; but they seem to have been singularly successful in avoiding injury to neutral ships. Passenger ships were not attacked. But the propriety of attempting to establish a blockade by submarine—except avowedly as a measure of retaliation—is open to criticism.

THE NAVAL WAR IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

The view taken in this chapter that the virtual abandonment by the Germans of their submarine blockade was due not to American diplomacy, and still less to a spirit of repentance, but to the efficiency of the

British counter-measures, is confirmed by the enemy's activity in the Mediterranean. On November 7th, the *Ancona*, an Italian steamer bound for New York, was sunk off Sardinia by a submarine flying the Austrian flag. Over 200 people lost their lives. The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a statement issued to neutral Governments, declared that no warning was given before the cannonade was opened, and that it was continued after the steamer had stopped to launch her boats. The Austrian defence, given out from Berlin, was that the steamer was given forty-five minutes to get her passengers into her boats, and that the steamer was shelled because she attempted to escape. The *Ancona* was only one of many ships sunk in the Mediterranean by submarines in the autumn. So far from revising their policy, the Germans had merely transferred their campaign against shipping from the North Sea, where it had become too dangerous, to the Mediterranean, where, in the absence of special precautions, it could indulge for a time, at any rate, with some degree of immunity.

MR. CHURCHILL'S DEFENCE.

The part of the navy in the operations in Gallipoli has already been described in former chapters (Vol. III., pages 10-45). But this is a convenient place to notice Mr. Churchill's account of the genesis of the Dardanelles operations. This was given to the House of Commons in a speech of very remarkable ability, made on the eve of his departure for his regiment in France after his resignation from the Cabinet. It appears that as long ago as December, 1914, the Russian Government, anxious to relieve the pressure on the Caucasus, asked whether some action could not be taken against Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, and Mr. Churchill began to direct the attention of the First Sea Lord (Lord Fisher) and of other naval advisers to the Dardanelles. Already, in November, the Admiralty had obtained from the War Office estimates of the number of troops necessary for a joint naval and military attack. The number in the estimate was 40,000, and on November 30th Mr. Churchill sent a Minute to Lord Kitchener offering to collect transports for that number. Every one was agreed that a surprise attack by sea and land was the best plan, but it appeared to be the opinion of the War Council that no army was available, and that even if it were it might be better employed elsewhere. The plan of a joint attack being out of the question, Mr. Churchill fell back on the idea of a purely naval attack. Admiral Carden (commanding in the Mediterranean) and Sir Henry Jackson were both asked whether in their opinion it was possible to force the Dardanelles by ships alone, and both agreed that the Straits could not be rushed, but might be reduced by a sustained naval bombardment. Other advisers concurred under reserve, and though Lord Fisher still held to his old preference for a joint attack by sea and land, he did not, according to Mr. Churchill, actually oppose the scheme of naval attack in the Dardanelles, but objected on general grounds to using fighting ships in bombardments except in conjunction with military operations. On January 28th, after exhaustive discussion, the plan was sanctioned by the War Council. The operations against the outer forts were successful. Then, as has already been described, the difficulties began to grow, and it was decided to give Admiral Carden encouragement "to press hard for a decision, and not to be deterred by inevitable loss." Both Admiral Carden and, when he fell, his successor, Admiral de Robeck, concurred. That was the genesis

of the general naval attack of March 18th, a plan of attack which it will be observed differed materially from both the alternatives discussed earlier before the naval expedition was decided upon. Mr. Churchill insisted in his speech that the First Sea Lord concurred. "There is no important act of policy, no scheme of fleet distribution, or of movements of ships or plans of war which were acted upon during my term of office in which the First Sea Lord had not concurred in writing." Even after the failure of the attack of March 18th, Mr. Churchill was prepared to renew it, but then—and according to Mr. Churchill not till then—Lord Fisher resolutely opposed the continuance of the purely naval attacks. "I endeavoured to persuade the First Sea Lord to send a telegram ordering the resumption of the naval attack, but we could not reach an agreement." The stages are thus: First, a general agreement that a joint military and naval attack would be best—an agreement, however, that was barren, because the army was not to be had. Secondly, a decision in favour of a purely naval attack, which, however, was not to be rushed. Thirdly, the substitution of forcing measures for the plan of gradual reduction. And, finally, the substitution for this modified plan of a joint military and naval attack.


That Mr. Churchill was right throughout no one could possibly maintain. The main object of his speech

was not to prove the soundness of his views, but his contention that the plans were made after long discussion, and after consultation with the highest naval authority. "I will not have it said," declared Mr. Churchill, "that this is a civilian plan foisted by a political amateur upon reluctant officers and experts." That contention Mr. Churchill may be said to have established, though it is but just to add that Lord Fisher's side of the case is as yet withheld. That a surprise attack by army and navy would have led to victory if begun early in the year is not to be doubted; that of the two naval plans, the plan of brusque attack offered better chances of success than a slow and gradual advance by successive bombardments is very arguable, in spite of the defeat of March 18th; and that from the beginning of the year till the end of summer the best chance of a decisive victory lay not in the west but in the east was proved by events, and in justice to Mr. Churchill it should be recognised that he was the first to see it. "All through this year I have offered the same counsel to the Government—undertake no operation in the west, which is more costly to you in life than to the enemy. In the east, take Constantinople; take it by ships if you can, or take it by soldiers if you must. Take it by whatever plan, military or naval, commends itself to your experts, but take it, and take it soon."



A British monitor firing her big guns at a German battery on the Belgian coast.

[Central News.]



A cutter from a British patrol vessel going alongside a merchantman to examine the ship's papers.

[Sport and General.]

CHAPTER XXII.

THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS.

WHAT IS MEANT BY THE PHRASE?—THE GOVERNMENT'S DILEMMA—HOW IT ESCAPED—CONTINUANCE OF CRITICISM—COTTON AS CONTRABAND—THE AMERICAN NOTE ON BLOCKADE—THE FUTURE.

TO the average Englishman sea-power and freedom are the obverse and reverse of the same medal, and it puzzles him very much to understand why other countries should refuse to identify ideas which he connects so naturally. That Germany should pose as the champion of the freedom of the seas he regarded as mere cynical perversity, and with reason, for there never was such a tyranny of the seas as she attempted to set up in her submarine "blockade." But the attitude of the United States was not so easily explained. It was thought that the United States, at any rate after the *Lusitania* outrage, would see that her interests at sea coincided with ours, and that she might even make common cause with us. Instead, what happened was something very different. The third despatch of President Wilson on the *Lusitania*, to which reference was made in the last chapter, after admitting that a submarine blockade could be humanely conducted—which he had denied before—went on to hold out the prospect that, if Germany met American wishes, the two countries might join hands and work together for the realisation of ideals which they had cherished in common since the days of Benjamin Franklin and Frederick the Great.

"The Government of the United States and the Imperial German Government, contending for the same great object,

long stood together in urging the very principles on which the Government of the United States now insists. They are both contending for the freedom of the seas.

"The Government of the United States will continue to contend for that freedom without compromise and at any cost. It invites the practical co-operation of the Imperial German Government at this time when co-operation may accomplish most, and this great common object can be most strikingly and effectively achieved.

"The Imperial German Government expresses the hope that this object may in some measure be accomplished even before the present war ends. It can be. The Government of the United States not only feels obliged to insist upon it by whomsoever it is violated or ignored in the protection of its own citizens, but it is also deeply interested in seeing it made practicable between the belligerents themselves. It holds itself ready at any time to act as a common friend, who may be privileged to suggest a way."

The passage was one of the most remarkable in the whole of the diplomatic correspondence of the war. That the United States, in a correspondence arising out of the deaths of her citizens in the sinking of the *Lusitania*, which many in England expected would lead to war between the United States and Germany, should admit that she and Germany were pursuing the same object, namely, the "freedom of the seas," and propose to work with Germany to that end, was surely one of

the paradoxes of the war. How came this paradox about? What was this "freedom of the seas" which was to bridge over the dispute between America and a country which had unlawfully and tyrannically done to death her citizens? And how came the people of this country to be so ignorant of the facts as to expect that a controversy in which such extremely friendly and conciliatory sentiments as those we have quoted were expressed would issue in war between the United States and Germany?

The mistakes made by German diplomacy in the United States were colossal, but Count Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, must have convinced the President that Germany attached a definite meaning to the phrase "freedom of the seas" such as the United States could approve of, or President Wilson would never have written as he did. That in itself was a considerable diplomatic success, especially at a time when Germany was engaged in drowning American citizens on the high seas. No definition of what she meant by the phrase was published by the German Government, and some of the unofficial spokesmen of Germany seemed to interpret it as though it meant that Germany was to do as she pleased at sea. What the United States meant by the phrase, however, is not obscure. They meant that neutrals should be free from the operations of the belligerents, and also, if it were possible, that even among the belligerents none but the armed forces should be directly involved in the operations of war. Take all the principles that Britain appealed to in her protests against the violation of Belgian neutrality, and against the German outrages on non-combatants, and apply them, as far as they can be applied, to the operations of war on sea, and especially to the operation of blockade, and we may begin to put ourselves in the position of President Wilson when he wrote the words we have quoted to Germany and his despatches criticising our measures against the sea-borne commerce of the enemy. His ideal was to confine the operations of war behind a barrier, with all neutrals and non-combatants on the safe side of it, and the phrase in which he expressed the ideal, so far as maritime operations were concerned, was this of the freedom of the seas. It is odd to find this ideal coming out in a despatch on the sinking of the *Lusitania*, and expressed in such friendly language; but it is necessary to understand it, for it is the key to everything written by the United States on the naval operations of this war in its despatches alike to Germany and to this country.

It is unjust to the United States Government to suppose, as is so often done, that its policy was governed merely by considerations of money, or by an inglorious love of ease. Rightly or wrongly, it was working for a principle, and one that had its roots deep down in the nation's history. And this principle had on sea a distant relationship to the principle which we proposed to defend in going to war, primarily, at all events, on behalf of Belgium. For what was that principle but this, that a nation should be allowed to remain neutral if it wished, and not have another's war fought out on its own territory, and that non-combatants should be spared the horrors, and, as far as possible, the sufferings of war?

THE GOVERNMENT'S DILEMMA.

If the trend of international civilisation be towards the recognition of this principle, it must be acknowledged, even by its severest critics, that our own country

had done much for it. The Declaration of Paris, in 1856 (Vol. II., page 99), by its abolition of the right to capture enemy property under a neutral flag, was the greatest surrender of belligerent right to a principle that any great nation had ever made. It can never be said of this country that it has been unwilling to make sacrifices for what it held to be a principle of justice and right. And this tendency persisted right down to the war, for the Declaration of London made further surrenders of belligerent rights at sea which would make it seem, on looking back upon them, as though its authors never contemplated that this country would ever be engaged in a great European War again. So remarkable were these surrenders, that even acute and learned students of naval war like Mr. Gibson Bowles are found to represent all the changes made in the laws of war at sea during the last hundred years as a deliberate conspiracy of a peace party to make war impossible for this country by hamstringing its naval power. The much-criticised Declaration of London applied at sea all the principles of the rights of neutrals and the immunity of non-combatants for which we contended in Belgium. Had Germany fought a naval engagement and been beaten, we might perhaps never have suspected how great a surrender of power was made by these diplomatic instruments. As it was, with Germany declining a fleet action and forcing us back on to the slow strangulation of a blockade, it soon became apparent that under the Declaration of London we could not use half our power. It is not to the credit of the Government that it should not have foreseen these consequences. It is to its credit that when the war began it made an honest effort to carry out the laws of war at sea as the Declaration of London had formulated them. For that Declaration, though it had never been ratified by Parliament, had been signed, and our Government no doubt felt that, having begun the war by denouncing German's disregard of treaties, it would never do to tear up the Declaration of London, invalid though it was, to say nothing of the Declaration of Paris. Both those documents committed us to a very sensitive respect for the rights of neutrals. But it was soon obvious that those rights were going to be extremely inconvenient to us. How were we to bring pressure on Germany so long as she had a backdoor through Holland and other neutral countries through which she could import what she wanted, even though her own ports were blockaded? Yet, if we began to interfere with neutral trade and neutral rights, was our action—however different it might be in degree and by the test of humanity—different in principle from the German violation of neutral rights in the invasion of Belgium? Would not such interference be a pale reflection in international economic relations of the glow of the burning towns of Belgium?

It was a painful dilemma for the Government. On the one hand, if it asserted its full physical strength at sea, it might weaken its case as the defender of neutral rights, give offence to neutral Powers, and in particular to the United States, with whom, just before the war, we had been preparing to celebrate the centenary of the hundred years' peace following our last war with America, which had arisen out of dispute between belligerent and neutral rights at sea. On the other hand, if we refused to injure neutrals in pursuit of our quarrel with Germany (and international trade being a transaction that requires at least two parties, it is impossible to hurt the one without also hurting the



The effect of a torpedo: A great hole in the hull of a vessel (seen from inside) which had been struck by a torpedo. [Central News.]

other), we could not use our naval supremacy to the full, but must fight at sea with one hand tied behind our backs. It was because it felt itself on the horns of this dilemma that the Government's policy in regard to contraband and the rules of capture was so weak in the opening months of the war. The Declaration of London had put cotton on the free list, and because our Government, anxious to appear as the protector of neutral rights and the champion of the sanctity of treaties, declined to make a "scrap of paper" of it—which it would have been justified in doing, inasmuch as it had never been ratified by Parliament—cotton could be imported freely by Germany through Dutch ports, and even through her own, so long as no blockade was declared. Another example of the same tenderness was the allowing of German reservists to pass under the safe protection of a neutral flag, under the very bows of our ships of war, on their way to join the enemy's armies. Some modifications of the provisions of the Declaration of London we did make, as has already been explained (Vol. II., pages 99-101), and they were sufficient to provoke protests from the United States, but not to enable us to use our full naval power against Germany.

ESCAPE IN REPRISALS.

Had Germany kept within the law in her conduct of the war our position would have remained a very difficult one, and it is doubtful whether we should ever have been able to extricate ourselves from the entanglements of these Declarations. Fortunately on the whole for us, Germany was not content to let well alone, but by beginning the submarine blockade, and committing a

hundred acts of illegal tyranny, presented us with an opportunity of escape. The Orders in Council of March (Vol. II., page 3) prohibiting the whole import and export trade of Germany were in form a measure of reprisals on Germany for her illegal acts. Reprisals are not bound by the forms of law, and Mr. Asquith's object in making them in the form in which he did was to cut this country loose from entanglements which hampered the exercise of our naval power. It was a bold measure, and it gave our navy powers against the enemy's trade comparable with those exercised by it in the Napoleonic Wars, before railways made all Europe one in an economic sense and submarines were invented to make a close blockade impossible.

COTTON AS CONTRABAND.

This action, though it increased so greatly the rigidity of the blockade, did not stop criticism in England. In particular, the provision of the Declaration of London observed by the Government which placed cotton on the free list greatly incensed popular opinion, and an agitation arose for declaring cotton contraband. In vain the Government pleaded that as all trade with or from Germany was now banned, the practical effect of making contraband would be *nil*. The agitation persisted, and finally the Government yielded, making another breach in the Declaration. The declaration of cotton as contraband did make this difference, that a cargo of contraband consigned to a neutral port, but really meant for Germany, could be confiscated, whereas the practice of the Government with regard to other than contraband cargoes was not to confiscate but to "requisition" until the end of the war, to divert

to other ports, or even in many cases to buy. The declaration of cotton as contraband, therefore, placed an additional risk on the trade, and so discouraged shipments. It is very doubtful, however, whether any appreciable quantities of cotton reached Germany through neutral countries after the Orders in Council of March; and it is to be feared that the mischief of allowing Germany supplies of cotton had been done in the first six months of the war, and was now beyond repair. It was one of the great mistakes made in our conduct of the war; but it was due—and the fact has never been duly credited to us, either at home or abroad—to the Government's regard for neutral rights and for its promises, even though those promises subscribed in the Declaration of London were not ratified by Parliament, and were therefore not legally binding.

The Government was now committed to a relentless war on German overseas trade. The distinctions between contraband and non-contraband (except for the different penalties in the two cases), and therefore between absolute and conditional contraband between goods intended to help the enemy in his military operations and those required for his purely commercial activities, had now completely disappeared. They had all rested on the theory that war was an activity of States alone, and that it was possible to differentiate between what was for warlike and what for peaceful use between belligerents and non-combatants. That theory was incompatible with the conditions of war as introduced by Germany and forced on the other countries of Europe. If Mr. Lloyd George could say of Englishmen that they were all combatants, if not in the firing line then in the munition factories, and if not there then as sources of taxable wealth, and as strengtheners of the sinews of war, Germany certainly had no right to plead the protection of rules of war distinguishing between combatant and non-combatant uses of articles of trade. For no one had done more than she to destroy that distinction, not merely in her conduct of the war but in her whole theory of the State even in time of peace.

But what view would the neutral countries take, for it was impossible to hurt Germany through her international trade without hurting those with whom she traded? The principal rules of law governing the right of a belligerent to inflict incidental injury on a neutral was that the neutral had a right to trade with the enemy in everything except contraband unless there was an effective blockade of the enemy's ports, and that such injury must be governed by the rules, not of municipal, but of international law, administered by Prize Courts. Strictly, those rules would have made a blockade of Germany impossible, for it would also have been easy for her to import what she wanted through neutral countries which could not be blockaded. And, in fact, partly for that reason the British Government never troubled to declare a blockade even of the German coast. How far would neutrals consent to abate their strict legal rights out of consideration for the equities of the case?

Of all the neutrals, Holland was the country which showed most consideration for our difficulties. A Netherlands Overseas Trust was formed, to whom imports were to be consigned under a guarantee that they would not be re-exported to Germany. A further test of what a country might reasonably be said to require for its normal use was the statistics of trade before the war. Neither Holland nor Denmark nor Norway placed any difficulty in the application of these tests. But both Sweden and the United States denied their validity.

THE AMERICAN VIEW.

In November, the American Ambassador in London, acting on the instructions of his Government, presented a long protest against the practice of the British Admiralty, and the policy of the Orders in Council on which it was based. Some of the criticism in this document was of form rather than of substance. It was objected, for example, that the Orders in Council of March were municipal regulations, which, in so far as they were inconsistent with international law, could not bind any one but the subjects of the Power making them. These formal objections would have been surmounted by a different procedure; and the technicalities of the subject need not detain us. The practical questions were these: (i.) Would the United States recognise as binding a blockade of German ports, if one was proclaimed, under the conditions in which we were able to enforce it? (ii.) Blockade of neutral ports connected with Germany being in any case out of the question, would the United States consent to such restrictions being placed on trade with neutral countries as would prevent the blockade of German ports from becoming a dead letter, and enable us to use our naval forces to the full? On neither of these questions did the American Note give the least ground for hope of an arrangement satisfactory to both countries.

With regard to the blockade of German ports, the Note concluded that a legal blockade could not be established under existing conditions. By the Declaration of Paris, blockade to be binding must be effective, that is to say, maintained by force really sufficient to prevent access to the coast of the enemy. It should also be impartial—that is to say, apply to the ships of all countries alike. But, argued the Note, it was common knowledge that German ports were open to traffic with the ports of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. "Furthermore," added the Note, "from the recent placing of cotton on the list of contraband, it appears that His Majesty's Government have been themselves forced to the conclusion that the blockade is ineffective to prevent shipments of cotton from reaching their enemies, or else that they are doubtful as to the legality of the form of blockade which they have sought to maintain." One can hardly regard the argument as anything but special pleading, for it will surely not be denied that a nation can declare a blockade of some of the enemy's ports and not of others, and therefore, even if we were not in a position to enforce a blockade of Germany's Baltic ports (other than through submarines) we could still establish a perfectly legal blockade of Germany's North Sea ports.

Secondly, the United States, while not contesting that we might be justified in checking the importation through neutral countries of supplies for Germany, did contest the only means by which the stoppage could be made effectual:—

"The further contention that the greatly increased imports of neutral countries adjoining Great Britain's enemies raise a presumption that certain commodities, such as cotton, rubber, and others more or less useful for military purposes, though destined for those countries, are intended for re-exportation to the belligerents who cannot import them directly, and that this fact justifies the detention for the purpose of examination of all vessels bound for the ports of those neutral countries, notwithstanding the fact that most of the articles of trade have been placed on the embargo lists of those countries, cannot be accepted as laying down a just or legal rule of evidence. Such a presumption is too remote from the facts, and offers too great opportunity for abuse by the belligerent, who could, if the rule were adopted, entirely ignore neutral rights on the high seas and prey with impunity upon neutral commerce. To such a rule of legal presumption my

Government cannot accede, as it is opposed to those fundamental principles which are the foundation of the jurisprudence of the United States and Great Britain.

"When goods are clearly intended to become incorporated in the mass of merchandise for sale in a neutral country, it is an unwarranted and inquisitorial proceeding to detain shipments for examination as to whether those goods are ultimately destined for the enemy's country or use. Whatever may be the conjectural conclusions to be drawn from trade statistics, which when stated by value are of uncertain evidence as to quantity, the United States maintains the right to sell goods into the general stock of a neutral country, and denounces as illegal and unjustifiable any attempt of a belligerent to interfere with that right on the ground that it suspects that the previous supply of such goods in the neutral country, which the imports renew or replace, has been sold to an enemy. This is a matter with which the neutral vendor has no concern, and which can in no way affect his rights of trade. Moreover, even if goods listed as conditional contraband are destined to an enemy country through a neutral country, that fact is not in itself sufficient to justify their seizure."

The United States Government gave notice, therefore, that it could not recognise the *de facto* blockade of the Orders in Council as a legal blockade, and declared that it unhesitatingly assumed "this task of championing the integrity of neutral rights which have received the sanction of the civilised world against the lawless conduct of belligerents."

* A clear though an extreme statement of the American position is the following, from the *New York Evening Mail* of November 11th, 1915:—

"Speaking for the best-informed British public opinion, the *Manchester Guardian* says that 'the issue raised by Mr. Lansing's Note to Great Britain is somewhat clouded. If that issue,' continues the *Guardian*, 'involves an insistence upon our right to trade with Germany, the British answer, regardless of international law, must be a decisive No. If, on the other hand, the United States merely seeks to carry on an unrestricted trade in non-contraband with neutrals, strictly for consumption by neutrals, the question would resolve itself into a minor matter of practice, and doubtless some arrangement could be made.'

"Such a presentation of the case by a responsible English newspaper discloses the immensity of the divergence between the English conception of the situation, even after the presentation of our Note, and the actual interests of American producers and importers. To the average man reading that document the main point of emphasis appears to lie in our demand that we be permitted to carry on trade free from molestation with neutral countries surrounding Germany, in goods actually destined for consumption in those countries. The emphasis is misplaced.

"The briefest reflection will show that this point is so simple and self-evident that it should not need to be made. The fact that Great Britain and Germany are at war has no bearing whatever upon our trade with Sweden or Holland. With Germany shut out of the markets of the Scandinavian countries as a seller by the exigencies of war, we are entitled to our share of the enlarged demand in those countries, no matter how much our sales there under the new conditions may exceed our exports to the same territory last year or two years ago. That is a trade opportunity that belongs rightfully to the American business man more than to any other. For England to limit us to the quantities we sold last year, while her own commerce is profiting by larger exports to those very nations, constitutes a most unwarranted use of naval power, to which we cannot submit.

"Sales for home consumption to Holland, Sweden, or Denmark are minor matters compared with the main issue, which urgently needs to be brought out in its full force. Unless an actual and effective blockade of all German ports is established, there is no warrant in international law for shutting off the exportation from Germany of any and all articles that we may need. Our farmers must have potash; our textile industries are hampered by the lack of dyestuffs; other industries of the country require other products of German industry. Our importing houses, engaged in this trade, have built up vast organisations representing years of effort and the expenditure of large capital. This business could be closed down legally by no other means than an effective blockade, and even then the way through Holland would remain open to us of right.

"The main questions in the controversy—its heart and its essence from the point of view of legitimate American interests—range as follows:—

"1. Not whether, but how soon are we to be allowed to trade directly with the central empires in non-contraband goods? For fifteen months Britain has held up this trade.

"2. Not whether, but how soon will the embargo on our trade in non-contraband with the central Powers be lifted in cases when such shipments are sent by way of adjoining countries? For fifteen months this interference has been kept up by Britain.

"3. Not whether, but how soon shall we be permitted to trade with the merchants of neutral countries in goods that they may have purchased from Germany? For fifteen months has Britain withheld that right from us."

PRESIDENT WILSON'S REAL OBJECT.

It is quite evident that in the whole of this argument President Wilson was not concerned at all to hold the balance evenly between the two sides. If that were his object, he would hardly have urged objections which, if they prevailed, must inevitably operate to the grave disadvantage of the sea-Power. In his argument with Germany over the *Lusitania* and with Great Britain, he is preoccupied most of all with the furtherance of his ideal of the freedom of the seas, the establishment of a state in which naval operations cannot injure neutrals, or even, since trade in other than contraband is with non-combatants, the non-combatants of the belligerent State. In other words, President Wilson was anxious to continue the traditions of last century, which increasingly favoured neutral and non-combatant rights at the expense of belligerent Power—traditions with which the hardness of the struggle with Germany and the desire to make reprisals on her excesses compelled the British Government very reluctantly to break.


Perhaps the breach need not have been so violent as it in fact was. It is arguable that if we had formally proclaimed a blockade of German ports, announced that in respect of importations through neutral ports we meant to extend the doctrine of continuous voyage, which the United States had used against us in her own Civil War, so as to cover transport which was continued not in another ship but in a railway truck; and if, further, we had revised the list of contraband so as to bring within it articles of undeniable military usefulness in a war of this character, though not ordinarily regarded as contraband, we might have obtained much the same results as under the Orders in Council without departing so far from the generally accepted rules of naval war. However that may be, and even though the military value of strict blockade were much less than it is commonly supposed to be, President Wilson could not seriously have expected that we should not make the fullest possible use of our naval power, and it would have been more helpful to American rights, and perhaps in the long run to his ideal of the free sea which he has so much at heart, if his criticisms had not been purely destructive, but had made positive suggestions for minimising the injury to neutral rights.

On August 19th, the German Chancellor, speaking for his country, said that "for our and other people's protection we must gain the freedom of the seas." He may have meant no more than freedom from the naval power of England. But even on the American interpretation of the phrase as a state in which neutrals and non-combatants are exempted from the operations of naval war—a doctrine parallel to that which this country is anxious to see accepted on land—it is obvious that it would involve the abandonment of much of what is generally understood as legitimate naval war. For example, if neutrals were to be exempt, there could be no blockade of Germany at all, for the back door would always be open. Again, if non-combatants were not to suffer, that necessarily implied the abolition of the right of capture at sea. These might or might not be the directions in which to look for future progress, but such considerations could have no immediate relevance while the war was in progress. "Freedom of the sea," said Sir Edward Grey, replying to the Chancellor, "may be a very reasonable subject for discussion, definition, and agreement between nations after the war." It would necessarily depend on what progress was made in freeing the continent of Europe from the burden of its

militarism. Until that time came the ideal of the freedom of the sea was no more achievable on sea than the corresponding ideal on land. The ideal was certainly not a war measure, and so long as the war lasted only war measures could have a chance of receiving practical consideration.

There were only two directions in which it was possible to look for change in the conduct of the naval war as it affects neutrals. If the principle of the right to control imports through neutral countries that may be ultimately intended for the enemy were admitted, it is possible that some good might come at a conference representative both of neutral interests and of Britain as the only belligerent capable of interfering, except by outrage, with neutral rights at sea. The Government was not committed to

any single plan, and, provided they did not destroy its belligerent rights, was always, no doubt, willing to consider any proposed modifications of its methods. But should the system which it was driven to adopt be wrecked by neutral opposition, it was clear that the only available alternative while the war lasted would be a return to the practice of the Napoleonic Wars. (See Vol. II., pages 97, 99.) That would mean the denunciation of the Declaration of Paris and the resumption of our power to seize and confiscate enemy's property even under a neutral flag, and it was argued by some—Mr. Gibson Bowles, for example—that such a system would inflict less injury on neutrals as well as more injury on the enemy. The United States, it should be remembered is not a signatory of the Declaration of Paris.



In the Eastern Mediterranean : Going alongside a dhow to search for contraband.

[*Sport and General,*



The fall of Brest-Litovsk: German soldiers endeavouring to save some bags of grain from the citadel, which was fired by the Russians as they evacuated the city. [*Newspaper Illustrations.*]



The ruins of the Arsenal, Brest-Litovsk.

[*E.N.A.*]



German troops entering Novo-Georgievsk with a band at their head.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE FALL OF THE RUSSIAN FORTRESSES.

SITUATION AFTER THE FALL OF WARSAW—THE RUSSIAN SECOND LINE—GERMAN POSITIONS AND PLANS—HOPES OF A TRIUMPHANT ADVANCE FROM KOVNO—FALL OF NOVO GEORGIEVSK AND KOVNO—EVACUATION OF BREST LITOVSK.

AT the beginning of August, 1915, the Russians had abandoned their positions on the Vistula. They had been driven in on north and south.

On the south, Lublin had fallen on July 28th, and Cholm on August 1st, and with these places had gone the possession of the line of railway leading from the fortress of Iwangrod into the interior. On the north, the fortresses on the Narew had been taken, and the Germans were advancing against the railway which connects Warsaw and Petrograd. The armies on the Vistula were in great danger, and the question was not so much whether they should be withdrawn as whether they would be able to escape. Warsaw and Iwangrod were evacuated on August 5th. Only the great fortress of Novo Georgievsk, lying at the junction of the Vistula and the Narew, held out.

The Russians proposed to fall back towards their second line of defence, although it was doubtful whether they would now be able to make a decisive stand on it. The new line began with the fortress of Kovno, on the Middle Niemen, and followed the course of the river up to Grodno; thence it bent westward along the upper waters of the Bobr to Ossowiec, and then, turning southward, ran through Bielostok to Brest Litovsk on the Bug, and Kovel and Rovno in the south. From Ossowiec to Rovno this front was served by the trunk railway which runs from north to south. This was the front which the more cautious exponents of Russian strategy had always suggested should be held in the first instance by the Russian armies. It contained in itself considerable elements of strength. Its northern section had a strong


support in the Niemen; and had it not been for the rapid fall of important fortresses earlier in the war, Kovno would have been regarded as a formidable obstacle to any German advance. Ossowiec was not in itself a powerful fortress, but it lay in country that presented great difficulties to the attack, and it had already resisted more than one German advance. The left flank of the northern Russian line rested on the Pripet Marshes, a vast area of swamp and sluggish streams stretching to the east of Brest Litovsk, on either side of the River Pripet. The marsh region was traversed by three railways running eastward, and by another line running from north to south. The Germans might, by advancing south of the marshes, divide the Russian armies into a northern and a southern group and deprive them of the means of reinforcing each other, but they could scarcely in this marsh region carry through a flanking movement which would endanger the general position of the retreating forces. The marshes might be regarded from two aspects. They were a weakness to the Russians, inasmuch as they divided up their forces into two sections, which could only communicate with difficulty. But they were also a strength, because they guarded the flank of each group of armies; they were easily defensible, and they were not at all unlikely to bring the German advance to a standstill by involving it in serious difficulties of transport.

There was, however, one drawback to any satisfaction with which the Russians might contemplate their second line of defence. Throughout July, General Below's army, which was operating north of Kovno and the Niemen,



One of the blown-up forts at Novo-Georgievsk.

[E.N.A.]



The railway bridge at Brest-Litovsk destroyed by the Russians on their retreat.

[E.N.A.]

had been drawing nearer to the line of the River Dvina, between Riga and Dvinsk, and to the main Petrograd railway. By the time that Warsaw fell Below was not more than twenty miles distant from Riga, and about fifty from the railway, and it seemed possible that his army might be greatly reinforced and thrown forward with the purpose of forcing the Russians to fall back from the line of the Niemen. This threat was not actually carried out, but it was sufficiently serious to compel the Russian commanders to keep large forces on the Dvina.

THE GERMAN PLANS.


It is not yet known what controversy, if any, there was in the German councils of war after the fall of Warsaw. The southern group of armies, under the command of Mackensen, was now moving east and north-east from the Lublin-Cholm railway, had partly crossed the Bug, and was directed towards Brest Litovsk from the south. In front of the Vistula was the group of armies now commanded by Prince Leopold of Bavaria, and including the troops of Von Woyrsch, who had operated against Iwangrod. This group was intended, if a further advance was decided on, to march eastward from Warsaw, and to come down on Brest Litovsk from the north-west. Next on the north was Von Gallwitz, who had crossed the Narew, and would now move towards the railway at and to the south of Bielowostok. On his left was Von Scholtz, who had still to dispose of the fortress of Ossowiec, and to descend in co-operation with his neighbour towards Bielowostok. Next in order came Von Eichhorn, with the army of the Niemen, whose main duty it would be to capture Kovno and march on the great railway junction of Vilna. Last, in the far north, came Below. This northern group of armies was under Von Hindenburg.

The hopes of peace which the Germans had undoubtedly built on the capture of Warsaw had failed. There is reason to believe, from reports published in the Scandinavian papers, that the German Government had made some informal overtures for peace to Russia. The

most likely accounts declared that Russia had been offered a tempting bait in the form of freedom to pass her warships from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and that Turkey, whose interests were thus disposed of by her Ally, was promised various compensations at the expense of other Powers. However that may be, not only were the German hopes deceived, but it was discovered that the Russian Government had behind it both the people and its representative organs in the firm determination not only to continue the war, but to pursue it with more vigour and efficiency.


THE LINE OF THE RIVERS.

Such being the situation, the German Staff might have decided to make themselves masters of the line of the Niemen and the Bobr by capturing Kovno, Grodno, and Ossowiec, and then to plant themselves firmly on the defensive line formed by the great rivers—the two already named, together with the Narew and the Vistula. They might have argued that with these rivers and their strong places in the hands of the Germans, the Russians would not recover from the crushing blows dealt them so rapidly as to be able to make any attempt to retrieve the situation until the next spring, and that, when the moment came, the Germans could either await the attack with complete confidence or, if the moment was propitious, once more pursue their advance. From private reports which came from Germany it was known that there



German soldiers at the door of a cafe in Brest-Litovsk after the fall of the city. [E.N.A.]

were those who favoured this course, and regretted the decision of the Staff to pursue the Russians into the interior. The critics were not thinking of the disasters of Napoleon's campaign. What they felt was that the continuance of the pursuit offered comparatively small gains and very serious risks. The great advantage which the Germans had, as compared with Napoleon, was that their armies stretched from the shores of the Baltic right down to the River Dniester and the mountains beyond. The line would move forward or fall back as an unbroken whole, and its connection with its bases would be maintained intact. On the other hand, the strain of



Kovno: Factories set on fire by the Russians as they retreated.

[E.N.A.]



A general view of Kovno, showing the emergency pontoon bridge built by the Germans to replace the one destroyed by the Russians in their retreat.

[E.N.A.]

supplying an army of one-and-a-half or two million men was bound to be enormous, however strenuous the exertions made by the Germans to diminish it by the construction of field railways and temporary roads. The rivers, the critics felt, gave the Germans an immensely strong position. If they pushed on they might find themselves eventually in difficult country with a front much less defensible, with much longer and more unsatisfactory communications, and with the Russian armies still as strong as, or possibly even stronger than, they were when Warsaw fell.

HIGH GERMAN HOPES.

The German Staff were impressed less by the dangers of a further advance than by the possibilities of decisive gains which it held out. They had scotched the enemy, but they had not broken him. They believed, however, that their position was so favourable and their superiority so firmly established that, if they held on, they might break him yet. If this was their belief it justified a pursuit which the mere occupation of additional territory would not have made worth while. There was something like a necessity upon them to reduce the armed strength of Russia, if they could, by some great and crushing blow delivered at comparatively light cost to themselves. They had made very large captures of men and material since the beginning of May, but they had had severe losses themselves, and they must reckon with the certainty that Russia could call up—if she could only equip—larger reserves of men than Germany could raise. The writers in the Press might depreciate the Russians as half-trained, but that was a quality that was likely to be common to the troops of most of the belligerents in the coming year. What the Germans aimed at was a masterstroke by which one of the Russian armies or, better still, groups of armies would be cut off and disposed of—a comparatively cheap victory, which might easily lead to other successes no less great. In this hope, they pushed on all along the line.

The Germans were not unreasonable in their expecta-

tions. There were large numbers of Russian troops crowded in the Warsaw salient and falling back towards Brest Litovsk. There was only one railway to facilitate the retreat, and few good roads, while the whole pressure of the Germans, both from the north and the south, was directed against the flanks of the retreating force, so as to push them in on the centre, impede their transport and communications, and prevent their escape into the interior beyond Brest Litovsk. There was another string also to the German bow in the shape of Von Eichhorn's army on the Niemen. If Von Eichhorn could carry Kovno summarily, a prospect of brilliant successes opened out before him, for sixty miles east of Kovno lay Vilna, and about one hundred miles to the south-east of Vilna was Minsk, on the railway from Brest Litovsk to Moscow.

But it was precisely along this line, lying to the northward of the Pripet Marshes, that a large part of the Russian armies must retreat from Brest Litovsk, so that if Von Eichhorn could reach Minsk without undue delay he would be far in the rear of the retreating Russian armies, would have placed himself exactly on their line of retreat, and would certainly have inflicted on them much the worst disaster that they had yet experienced. Everything depended on the degree of resistance which the Russians could make at Kovno and about Vilna. In mere distances, Von Eichhorn had a great advantage. He began the attack on Kovno immediately after the fall of Warsaw, and some 160 miles lay between him and Minsk. The




Kovno: The Old Cathedral and Nicholas Memorial.

[E.N.A.]

Russian troops retreating from Warsaw, on the other hand, had to cover over 100 miles in order to reach Brest, while Brest itself was 200 miles from Minsk.

The Russians, as events showed, were thoroughly alive to the danger which threatened them from Kovno, and opposed a most obstinate and successful resistance to Von Eichhorn after he had captured the fortress, but undoubtedly the scheme for a great and decisive encircling movement from this quarter formed the most important part of the German plan of pursuit. It was this that accounted for the extraordinary attempt to carry Kovno by immediate assault, since the success



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE RUSSIAN RETREAT IN AUGUST, 1915.

of the whole plan depended on speed of execution. Had it succeeded, the story of the retreat would have had a different ending. Even as it was, an attempt which was made after the fall of Vilna to throw strong forces of cavalry south-eastwards towards Minsk placed the Russians in a situation of greater peril than at any other period of the retreat. The situation will be more easily understood if a large part of the Russian forces be regarded as lying within the triangle Kovno-Brest-Minsk. From the western side of the triangle (which runs from Kovno to Brest through Grodno and Bielostok) the Russians—if all went well with the German plans—would be retreating eastwards across country, and north-eastwards from Brest towards Minsk. Then Von Eichhorn was to move swiftly along the base of the triangle from Kovno to Vilna, and from Vilna to Minsk, and the Russians would either be completely cut off or thrown back, in immense confusion, on the Pripet Marshes. It was a bold, but not too bold, scheme, and it gave the promise of some smaller successes if the great victory escaped the Germans' grasp.

The first task that lay before the Germans, then, was to dispose of the two fortresses that barred their way: Kovno to a great strategic victory, Novo Georgievsk to a successful pursuit of the army retreating from Warsaw. It has been much discussed whether the Russians really meant to defend Novo Georgievsk, or whether they intended to abandon it as they had done with Warsaw, but had not had time to carry out the evacuation. The probability is that they had determined to defend it. Its existence was a menace to Von Gallwitz's army on the Narew. It protected the withdrawal of the Warsaw army, and so long as it held out it detained large German forces which would otherwise have been engaged in the pursuit. Besides, the Russians had at this time no reason to suppose that a place reputed so strong would not hold out for a long time. They could not be expected to argue that their own fortresses would collapse like Antwerp and Namur, and all the fortresses which they had hitherto lost—Przemysl, Lemberg, Warsaw, and Iwangrod—had been abandoned without a serious defence. From Novo Georgievsk, as from Kovno, they probably expected a stout resistance.

THE FALL OF NOVO GEORGIEVSK.

Novo Georgievsk was completely surrounded a few days after the fall of Warsaw, and within a week the outer positions began to fall. The whole fortress was taken by August 19th. The Germans pursued what the war has established as the orthodox method for the successful capture of a great fortress. Having brought up their siege train, they directed it against a particular section of the fortifications, with the intention of breaking right through to the centre of the fortress and taking the remaining works from the rear. By August 18th, thanks to their "hurricane of projectiles"—as the Russian report put it—they had virtually destroyed one large fort and twelve small works around it. Through this gap they penetrated, and the Russians were compelled to fall back to their inner line. Here, again, the Germans chose two forts in the rear of those which they had already captured, battered them with their heaviest artillery, and carried the ruins by storm. On the 19th, all the defences which had not been carried surrendered.

In all, about seven hundred guns were taken with Novo Georgievsk, and, according to the German statement, the whole garrison, amounting to almost ninety thousand

men. Some of the Russian reports declared that only one army corps, or a little less, had been left in the fortress. The point is interesting, since we must interpret the plans of the Russians with regard to the fortress according to the number of men whom we suppose them to have left in it. If we believe that they left only the one corps, then we should infer that they had intended to evacuate the fortress as they had done with Warsaw, and that they were prevented from doing so only by the impossibility of withdrawing such large armies under the pressure of the German advance. If, on the other hand, as the Germans asserted, the full garrison was left, we must suppose that the Russians desired to give the Warsaw army all the assistance possible in its retreat by detaining a large German force before Novo Georgievsk. The Russian commanders were so completely successful in clearing Warsaw of men, guns, and all useful military material, that it seems unlikely that they could not also have withdrawn the Novo Georgievsk garrison had they desired to do so. Their hope and belief was, no doubt, that the fortress would bar the road, railway, and river to the German armies for a considerable time. In this they had miscalculated.

THE ASSAULT ON KOVNO.

The German order was now full steam ahead, and nowhere more than on the Niemen. In duration the siege of Kovno was like that of Novo Georgievsk. It began on August 7th, and was over in ten days. Kovno, the key of the Russian defensive line in the north, was captured on August 17th. The achievement caused something of astonishment even in Germany, where it seems to have been regarded popularly as a great feat of improvisation. Herr Michaelis, a German special correspondent, who visited this quarter, took occasion in his descriptions to correct the error. The actual siege, when it began, was carried out at a furious pace, but the most methodical preparations had been made for many months before. "I need only mention," he wrote, "that from July 19th onwards a division of soldiers was employed in clearing away the Kovno forest in order to provide the gigantic siege guns with suitable emplacements for the bombardment of the fortress. A week later the army was constructing a special road in order the more easily to bring the great guns into position. The transport of other pieces of heavy artillery had been undertaken long before, at a time when even the commanders of the troops who were to take part in the siege had no idea that such operations were to be undertaken against Kovno. Some time before, when I was away in the southern area, infantry troops had informed me that they were to be sent off immediately to the north, but their officers did not know for what purpose, and quite suddenly the troops and siege material which had been used in another area appeared before Kovno. Long before it was possible to think of crossing the Niemen, large numbers of pontoons had been collected on the Kovno road. This minute and methodical preparation permits us to profit immediately from any success. The perfection of our preparations at the desired moment was the secret of our victory."

This was, however, only a small part of the story. Hindenburg was prepared to make large sacrifices in order to get to Vilna without loss of time. If he could do so, the greatest success of all the war was possible; if he failed, the Russian armies would escape the trap which had been preparing for them.



The ruins of one of the Kovno forts after the German bombardment.

[E.N.A.]



Wreckage in Fort No. 6, Kovno.

[E.N.A.]

For two or three days, therefore, a furious and sustained attempt was made to carry Kovno by assault, after a comparatively brief bombardment. According to one account, these attacks were made without the assistance of the heavy siege guns. Here, again, an attack was directed against one section of the defences—that lying to the south-east of Kovno, where the River Niemen makes a deep loop and receives the waters of its tributary, the Jesia. At this point the railway from East Prussia crosses the Niemen. The first bombardment began at 1 a.m. on August 8th, and lasted for two hours. At 3 o'clock an infantry assault was made in dense columns, and ceased after two hours without any appreciable success; some Russian positions had been captured, only to be lost again. At 10 o'clock the bombardment was renewed, and lasted until the evening, when the infantry took up the attack and continued it until the early hours of the next morning. This procedure, with alternate bombardment and infantry assault, went on until the 10th, by which time the Germans had suffered extremely heavy losses, and had gained only a little ground among the outer positions. For the next week they kept up a tremendous bombardment from their heaviest guns, including the 16-inch, and by August 16th they had reduced to ruins some of the inner defences in this south-east sector, and had broken through between others. As in other cases, the whole fortress fell with the capture of a section, and on the 17th the Germans were in possession of Kovno, were free to cross the Niemen, and to begin their advance on Vilna. The commander of Kovno was afterwards tried by court-martial, and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for his failure to hold out.


The position now was that the army groups of Mackensen and Leopold of Bavaria were closing in on Brest Litovsk and the railway running northward through Bielsk and Bielostok. The fall of Lomza, the last of the Narew fortresses, was announced on August 10th, and as the Germans approached Bielsk and Bielostok, it was clear that the Russians in and around Ossowiec, who were now in a dangerous salient, would be compelled to withdraw. The siege operations which had been in progress since the time of the fall of Warsaw had not had much success, though they had been distinguished by a new method of attack, for the Germans are said to have sent into the fortress several hundred balloons filled with asphyxiating gas. But by the end of the third week in August it was useless to hold out further, and the garrison, having blown up the forts and destroyed all military material with great thoroughness, succeeded in withdrawing. This was on August 22nd. The line was now gradually straightened out between Grodno and Bielostok.

THE RUSSIAN GENERALSHIP.

In the general retreat, from the fall of Warsaw on August 5th to the fall of Brest Litovsk on the 25th, the Germans concentrated their main forces on the hundred miles of front stretching southward from Ossowiec. They had no difficulty during these three weeks in driving the Russian rearguards from position after position, and they inflicted on them from day to day very severe losses both in men and guns. But they did not at any time succeed in so grappling with the retreating armies as to bring them to a standstill and compel them to fight out the battle. Nothing done in the war up to this time was more creditable to any army than the smoothness and precision with which the Russians

gradually withdrew their forces from the dangerous positions in which they had lain between Warsaw and Brest. It may be said with justice that in the last three weeks of August the Russian commanders out-generalled the Germans, and not least in the measures which they took for the re-grouping of their forces. They were to some extent assisted by the character of the country towards which they were retreating. For as they withdrew towards the region of the Pripet Marshes, they were naturally compelled to divert the bulk of their strength in a north-easterly direction. At the same time, from whatever source they obtained the troops, they put very strong forces forward between Vilna and Kovno. The ten days' resistance which that place had made, small as it seemed, was none the less of the greatest usefulness in assisting the retreat of the central Russian armies. But when Kovno had fallen, and Hindenburg was ready to launch Eichhorn's army towards Vilna, and then towards Minsk and the Russian rear, he found that an opposition of unexpected strength lay in front of him. If any error could be charged against the German dispositions at this time, it would be that they had not weakened their forces in the centre in order to strengthen the advance from the Middle Niemen, on which they were relying for the destruction of a large part of the Russian army.

The decision of the Russians to re-group their strength towards north and north-eastward from Brest without loss of time was an act of great military foresight. They held off the pursuit of the superior German armies in the centre, while they divined the blow with which Hindenburg was threatening them, and parried it skilfully. It was clear that they would not now defend Brest Litovsk, nor allow a strong army to be cut off there or to be driven back after a hurried evacuation into the impassable tracts of the marshes. Brest was scarcely defended. By August 18th, the Russians had been driven into the outer works, and the place was completely surrounded on the west; Mackensen's army was across the Bug on the south, and was pushing up towards the north-east; Leopold of Bavaria had crossed the railway on the north and was coming down on the fortress from the north-west. As the Austro-German armies approached the place, their hopes arose high. The avenues of withdrawal were few, and the Austrians at least, to judge from their official reports, believed that large numbers of Russian troops were huddled within the fortress area, and would probably be unable to escape by the few roads and railways through the marshes. "The advance of the Allies towards Brest Litovsk," said an Austrian *communiqué*, "has crowded together within the precincts of the fortress a considerable portion of several of the Russian armies. In order to enable the withdrawal in a north-easterly direction of troops and supply columns, whose ways of retreat are restricted to a few crossings, the enemy is offering a strong resistance, especially to the west of Brest Litovsk, on both banks of the river." These hopes were disappointed. The Russians had laid their plans for the evacuation of Brest as soon as they had decided to abandon Warsaw. The troops that remained in the fortifications were only the minimum required to put up a rearguard fight, and the attackers had no difficulty in breaking through first the outer and then the inner line. They found next to no spoils in the place, and reported no captures. The Russians had destroyed almost every place and thing in the town that was of military value, although the Germans contrived to rescue some stores from the fires



A task for the German Engineers: A railway bridge blown up by the retreating Russians.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



German engineers repairing a destroyed railway bridge.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

that were still raging when they entered. "Throughout the greater part of this large town," ran one account, "everything is reduced almost to ruins. All along the road, from the outer works of the fortress to the centre of the town, there rose only ruins. The forts of the inner line are destroyed, the handsome railway station is a mere confused heap. On the sites where formerly were the different quarters of the town, all is burnt."

This policy of devastation was everywhere pursued by the Russians. Wrote a German correspondent:—

"The Russians are retreating, and behind them follows the great fire. The dark columns which are withdrawing along unutterably bad roads are followed by the fiery trail of the conflagration of towns, villages, and farms, and frequently fields.

"Infinitely sad is the picture presented by the Volhynian plain. General Mitschenko's army is followed by incendiary detachments of Cossacks. The beautiful little town of Krylov on the Bug fell a victim to them. Of all the houses only the church and two small lodgings remain. The same fate has overtaken Vladimir Volynski. The place was destroyed without reason. The entire central part of the town was burned down, and when the German cavalry entered only the suburbs and the wretched houses of the Jewish quarters were untouched. When I drove beyond Vladimir Volynski, Verba was already burning, and in the immediate neighbourhood I could see no less than seven further conflagrations. Our airmen informed me that a great and devouring fire was spreading even further in the direction of Kovel."

Brest was abandoned on August 25th. Two days earlier an Austro-German force had entered Kovel, an important junction where the lines from the Vistula and from Brest Litovsk meet on the southern margin of the Pripet Marshes. The Russian second line was now abandoned.

THE FIGHTING IN COURLAND.

It had been the main object of Hindenburg to dash forward from the direction of the Niemen and reach out behind the Russian armies. In order to do so, he had to secure himself against disturbance farther north, and this was the function of Von Below and the army operating from near Riga down towards the Niemen. Below's army was described by some Russian writers as being eight corps strong at this time, but it is not clear either that it was anything like so powerful as this, or that it was intended during the middle of August to seize the line of the River Dvina. It was not possible for even the Germans to be overwhelmingly strong at all points, and their chances of success depended on their putting their weight at the points where they hoped to make the decisive stroke. On the Riga front they could be satisfied for the present to hold their ground, and this, substantially, they did. For the second and third weeks in August the Russians were attacking, and gained some slight successes, which, however, had no effect on the general military position. In the last week of the month Below was reinforced. Kovno had now fallen, and Hindenburg was about to make his thrust for Vilna and Minsk, so that it was desirable that Below should get well forward to Riga, Dvinsk, and the River Dvina in order to protect the left flank of Eichhorn's advance. In face of the reinforcements the Russians fell back to the river, and at Friedrichstadt and Linden were actually driven over to the eastern bank. They speedily recrossed, but their bridges behind them were shelled by the German guns, and when the month closed the Germans were still in possession of a strip of a few miles along the western bank. These were the opening moves of a determined attempt to gain the line of the Dvina.

NAVAL ACTIVITY.

The movements of Von Below in Courland were accompanied by German naval activity in and around the Gulf of Riga. It is not clear what was the precise object of these excursions, in which German warships of various types and sizes were prepared to try conclusions with submarines and mines, not to mention any Russian vessels which might be found in the Gulf. The Germans would certainly have attempted to obtain command of the sea route to Riga had the place been in their hands, but they had neither gained possession of it nor made any serious land attack on it at this time. They may, however, have aimed at clearing the Gulf of Russian mines and warships in order that their ships might later join in a combined land and sea attack on Riga; or they may have wished to prevent the Russians from attacking the German coast defences to the west of Riga, or merely to clear the Russians out of the Gulf and prevent their communicating with Riga by sea. On August 8th, at all events, they sent nine battleships, twelve cruisers, and a force of destroyers to the entrance of the Gulf, but the squadron withdrew, after suffering some slight losses in the minefields, without making a serious attempt to force its way into the Gulf.

On August 16th the Germans began a more ambitious enterprise. They turned up at the entrance to the Gulf with a force of cruisers and destroyers, supported by heavier ships, and set to work to clear a way through the mines and net defences. They were favoured by thick mist, and after two days they succeeded in penetrating the entrance, and began to reconnoitre in the Gulf. Scattered engagements followed, in which the Russians lost the gunboat *Sivoutch*, which sank, fighting to the last; according to the Germans, they lost also the gunboat *Koreets* and some torpedo craft. The Germans, on their side, admitted that they had suffered damage from mines; one torpedo boat, they said, was sunk, another ran ashore, a third was got away to port. The Russians asserted that the German losses were much heavier, and that they included two cruisers and eight torpedo-craft sunk or put out of action. Also, the *Moltke*, a battle-cruiser, was torpedoed at this time by a British submarine; the exact position of the ship was not stated, but it was apparently co-operating with the movements against the Gulf of Riga. The *Moltke* did not sink, and was towed back to harbour. On August 21st the German squadron suddenly withdrew from the Gulf, and abandoned its operations. There was no apparent reason why it should have done so except, as the Russians said, the losses which it had suffered and the barrenness of its efforts. The whole episode is, however, a little mysterious. The German Admiralty cannot have been expected to brave minefields, submarines, and the Russian warships in the Gulf without suffering considerably, and the object which they had in view was presumably thought to be worth the cost. They may have lost more ships than they expected, and have found their position when inside the Gulf uncomfortably exposed to attack. Certainly, they sunk one or two small Russian ships, but otherwise they gained nothing from the expedition. Russian reports spoke of an attempt to land troops on the east coast of the Gulf, but there was no confirmation of this, and certainly there was no movement of importance.

A CRITICAL STAGE OF THE RETREAT.

The fall of Brest marked a definite stage in the retreat. The Russians had withdrawn their centre, so

far, successfully. The great bulge of the Warsaw salient had gradually disappeared. The difference in the extent of ground covered during this part of the retreat by the armies of the centre and the north will be seen by a glance at the map; while the centre was retreating rapidly from Warsaw and the Narew towards Brest and Bielsk, the Russian right on the north had scarcely fallen back at all—this was a necessity if the centre was to make its escape. But a critical time was approaching. There were, it is true, distinct elements of encouragement in it. East and north-east of Brest Litovsk both armies were about to enter the marsh region. The rate of progress would slow down, but the Germans, with their superiority in men (who could not manœuvre here in masses) and in

heavy guns (which could not be readily handled) would suffer most. At this moment, too, it was first announced that the Russian scarcity of munitions was being overcome. On the other hand, it would be many days before the Russian central armies could be regarded as finally out of danger, and Hindenburg, with Kovno cleared out of the way, was still in a most threatening position. The period of ten days during which Kovno had resisted was invaluable to the Russian commanders, but it was much less than they had counted on, and at no time can they have been so uneasy as to the future. The contest had for the time become a race between the Russians retreating eastwards towards Minsk and Hindenburg making for the same goal by a shorter route.



The retreat from Warsaw: Russian guns being hurried out of Warsaw before the Germans arrived.

[Central News.]



A general view of Riga.

[E.N.A.]

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE ESCAPE OF THE RUSSIAN ARMIES.

THE TSAR TAKES THE FIELD—THE SUPERSESSION OF THE GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS—RENEWED OFFENSIVE ON THE SOUTHERN FRONT—THE RETREAT IN THE NORTH—HINDENBURG'S GREAT STROKE—RUSSIAN ARMIES IN PERIL—THEIR ESCAPE.

WITH the fall of Kowno and Brest Litowsk, the second line of Russian defence had fallen. Nothing, apparently, remained except a retreat to be indefinitely prolonged until the lengthening of the German communications, the devastation of the country, and the increasing difficulties which nature threw in their way should compel the Germans to call a halt. Poland was entirely lost to Russia, and almost the whole of Courland. From the occupied territories great hordes of fugitives, soon to number between twelve and thirteen millions, were drifting by all the available roads into Central and Eastern Russia; no adequate provision had been made for their support, and the great majority subsisted only on what charity could provide.

In England, attention had been fixed too much on the skill with which the Russian commanders had conducted the retreat. It was, indeed, the greatest retreat that had been known in history, and so far had been conducted without any great disaster to the Russian arms. But it was also, especially from the point of view of the Russians, who saw the whole of their western provinces seized by the enemy, a very great defeat. The situation had been met, to the disappointment of the Germans, by a resolution on the part of the whole Russian people

to make a new and greater effort, and, as the symbol of the national determination, the Tsar now put himself at the head of his armies in the field. "To-day," he declared, "I have taken supreme command of all the forces of the sea and land armies operating in the theatre of war. With firm faith in the clemency of God, with unshaken assurance in final victory, we shall fulfil our sacred duty to defend our country to the last. We will not dishonour the Russian land." The Grand Duke Nicholas was relieved of his post as Commander-in-Chief of the Russian armies, and at the same time General Yanushkevitch, his Chief of Staff, was superseded. The Grand Duke was appointed to a post which, though not unimportant in itself, was almost purely honorific by comparison with that which he had held. He was made Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief in the Caucasus. General Yanushkevitch, who had been closely associated with him in the conduct of the war, and was a personal friend, went with him as Assistant Viceroy. In taking the command, the Tsar expressed in a rescript his thanks to the departing General:—

"At the beginning of the war I was unavoidably prevented from following the inclination of my soul to put myself at the head of the army. That was why I entrusted you with the Commandership-in-Chief of all the land and sea forces.



German engineers building a railway line to support their troops advancing through Russian Poland. *[Newspaper Illustration.]*



A German motor transport in difficulties on a Polish road. *[Sport and General.]*

"Under the eyes of the whole of Russia your Imperial Highness has given proof during the war of steadfast bravery which caused a feeling of profound confidence, and called forth the sincere good wishes of all who followed your operations through the inevitable vicissitudes of fortune of war.

"My duty to my country, which has been entrusted to me by God, impels me to-day, when the enemy has penetrated into the interior of the Empire, to take the supreme command of the active forces and to share with my army the fatigues of war, and to safeguard with it Russian soil from the attempts of the enemy.

"The ways of Providence are inscrutable, but my duty and my desire determine me in my resolution for the good of the State.

"The invasion of the enemy on the western front necessitates the greatest possible concentration of the civil and military authorities, as well as the unification of the command in the field, and has turned our attention from the southern front. At this moment I recognise the necessity of your assistance and counsels on our southern front, and I appoint you Viceroy of the Caucasus and Commander-in-Chief of the valiant Caucasian Army.

"I express to your Imperial Highness my profound gratitude and that of the country for your labours during the war."

MEANING OF THE CHANGE.

The removal of the Grand Duke Nicholas was, on purely military grounds, a not unnatural step. Although the Russian defeats were in part due to the failures of the War Office—the Minister of War, it will be remembered, had been changed some time before—and in part to natural difficulties and lack of railways, for which the Grand Duke could not be held to blame, yet, as the supreme commander in the field, he was naturally to be held mainly responsible for the result of the first year's fighting, and as he had received credit for the successes won by the Russians in the earlier stages of the war, so also the blame for the later failures fell on him. There was, however, very much more than this in the change of command. Throughout August, Russia had been declaring with many voices that the war was to be waged till victory was won. At the first meeting of the special conferences which had been held to discuss the organisation of a proper supply of munitions, the Tsar had declared that Parliament had given him resolutely, and without the least hesitation, "the only reply worthy of Russia, the reply which I have expected of them, namely, 'War until victory is complete.'" The Grand Duke might possibly have been given a position as assistant to the Tsar, but those who were responsible for the change desired to signalise the fact that a new era was to be opened, and they thought it better, no doubt, that the Grand Duke, who, whatever his personal merits, was associated with a long series of defeats, should be removed to another sphere.

THE GERMAN VIEW.

The Germans were not able, however, to find any comfort in the deposition of the Grand Duke. In their mind he stood for the most bitter and most unrelenting opposition to Germany and German claims; under him, if anyone, they would have expected Russia to persevere with the war till the bitter end. The *Berliner Tageblatt* called him the chief representative of the "forcible, aggressive, determined policy of war," and sought to suggest that his departure might weaken Russia's warlike resolution. But this was clearly a misreading. The irony of the situation from the German point of view was that the chief enemy of Germany and the chief supporter of the war was only superseded in order to


proclaim, in the most striking and solemn manner possible, Russia's determination to pursue to the end the policy of the Grand Duke himself.

With regard to the character of the Grand Duke as a soldier there was little disagreement either in friendly or in hostile countries. He was a good soldier, with many difficulties to contend against, and he had succeeded not ill until the Germans had made up their mind to stand on the defensive in the west and throw against him all the available weight both of Germany and Austria. He was a man of strong will and ruthless methods, as was shown both by his expulsions of the Jews and by the orders which he gave for the general removal of the whole population from the occupied regions. "One eminent quality of a great leader," wrote the military critic of the *Vorwärts*, "no one will deny him—namely, the iron resolution with which he established order in the army, and ceaselessly demanded the very best of it, and the determination with which he fought for victory, and was never daunted by mischance." "A mighty man," another German writer (who was no favourable critic) called him—"a man such as Shakespeare would have wished for his dramas." It is not unreasonable to believe that it was from his strong and unrelenting will that the decision sprang to abandon provinces and fortresses, to devastate the country, and to retire before the enemy into the interior of Russia. The full results of that decision lay in the future, in the strain and stress of campaigning so far from their own country which would be imposed on the Germans, and in the greater ordeal which would await them if ever the reorganised Russian armies should be able to compel them to retreat through the desolate country which was being prepared for them.

The new general of the Russian Staff was General Alexieff, who had been assistant chief of staff. General Ruzsky now returned to his post as chief of the northern armies. General Evert became the leader of the central armies, and in the south General Ivanoff remained in command of the army which had been driven back through Galicia and had fought well and stubbornly after the initial defeat on the Dunajec at the beginning of May.

GENERAL OFFENSIVE IN GALICIA.

With the fall of Brest Litowsk the Austro-Germans on the southern front awoke to fresh activity. Immediately after Lemberg fell they had driven the Russians back to the River Strypa, a tributary of the Dniester, and there they remained for two months, while the army on their immediate left had advanced north-eastwards to the Brest Litowsk railway and captured Kowel, on the southern border of the great marshes. It was now decided that the offensive should be renewed. The positions which the Germans held on this front were strong, and, it might have been supposed, would have satisfied their commanders while the great task of crushing the main Russian armies was being completed in the north. It is essential to the understanding of this part of the campaign to remember that the great trial of strength was certain to take place in the triangle Dwinsk-Brest Litowsk-Minsk. The Russian Minister of War himself announced about this time that the main forces of both Germans and Russians were concentrated in the neighbourhood of Wilna. It was there, and not in the south, that the Germans had their chance of a really decisive victory. It is, perhaps, a little surprising, therefore, that they did not content themselves with a



continued defensive in the southern area while reinforcing their northern armies to the utmost of their power. They would be careful, in any event, not to weaken themselves too much in the south, for General Ivanoff had proved himself a thoroughly tough opponent, and he had had two months' breathing space in which to restore and refit his battered armies. But if they had steadily maintained the defensive, they would have had a good many men to spare for the all-important operations in the north.

The Germans decided otherwise, and at the end of August took up the attack. The precise end which they had in view—the extent to which they meant to press their advance, whether they had in their minds a strong defensive line which they intended to reach and occupy until the spring—remains uncertain. In Russia much discussion took place as to the likelihood of an advance on Kieff, just as it was industriously debated whether the Central German armies meant to march on Moscow, or Von Below on Petrograd. Probably these schemes, so large and hazardous, and involving so tremendous an extension of the German front, did not enter at all into the calculations of the German Staff, who must have been sufficiently occupied with the thoughts of the increasing difficulties which would beset them if, without securing the resounding victory for which they sought, they were compelled to follow the Russian armies farther and farther into the interior.

It is probable that the renewed advance in the south had a much more modest object. The great Petrograd railway, after reaching Dwinsk, runs southward to Wilna, Lida, and Baranowitchi (see the map), and then through the centre of the Pripet Marshes to Rowno. The possession of this railway was one of the minor aims of the general German advance. At present it was an important line of supply for the Russians, running behind the greater part of their front, and the Germans designed to seize it and convert it to a similar purpose for themselves. As part of the general scheme it was necessary that they should secure that portion of the line which ran through the marshes to Rowno. This would strengthen their position in two ways. It would give them the necessary connection with their armies on the north side of the marshes, and it would provide them with a satisfactory system of communications in the rear. For at Rowno the northern Petrograd line is joined by the railway from Warsaw, while a few miles distant is the junction with the line from Lemberg. If the Germans, therefore, could establish themselves at Rowno, their southern armies would be very satisfactorily placed, both for their own security and the support which they could give to the general strategic plans. The importance of the region was recognised by the Russians, who had established there three fortified positions—

Rowno, Dubno (on the Lemberg line), and Luck (just west of the Warsaw railway). These were the fortresses of the "Volhynian triangle."

RUSSIAN SUCCESSES.

The German offensive was launched in the last week of August, and for some days prospered. In Galicia, the Russians retired over the Strypa, and fell back on the Sereth; farther north, the Germans captured Luck. Then events took a sudden turn. The Russians sallied out in great strength from two points on the Sereth line—Tarnopol, on the railway to Lemberg, and Trembowla, farther down the river. Both German and Austrian forces were driven back, and a large number of guns and many thousand prisoners were taken. The Russians exercised a wise restraint, and ran no risks in following up their victory. In eight days, however, they took

25,000 prisoners, and by September 12th the number had risen to 40,000. The Germans countered by advancing in the Luck region, where they had formed a fresh army under General Puhallo, and they captured Dubno, the second of the fortresses. But they failed to secure Rowno, and the Russians from time to time dealt them some shrewd blows. The fighting swayed to and fro, without decisive issue. In all the September fighting in the southern area it was clear that General Ivanoff's orders were that he should not attempt a general advance, for which he had not the strength and the situation was not ripe, but should lay his plans for a succession of local attacks which should cause the enemy considerable losses, use up his reserves, and draw off troops from other and perhaps more important fronts. In that task he succeeded, and undoubtedly during this period he held the upper hand.



General Evert.

[E.N.I.]

THE CRISIS APPROACHES.


In the north, the Russians were approaching the crisis of the retreat. From the line of the Niemen southward to the region of the marshes beyond Brest Litowsk they were pushed steadily back. Rowno had fallen on August 17th, and Von Eichhorn was beginning his advance on Wilna. He had crossed the Niemen farther up at Olita also, and, advancing towards the main Warsaw-Petrograd railway, was threatening the fortress of Grodno from the north. At the same time, another German army was working past Grodno on the south, so that it was soon outflanked on both sides, and nothing remained but to abandon it. This was accordingly done in the opening days of September. The Russians withdrew the garrison without serious loss.

The dangerous position of the central Russian armies, numbering between a quarter and half a million, may best be explained by a brief account of the railways on which their retreat largely depended. Immediately in



The Kalkstrasse, Riga.

[E.N.A.]



The Railway Bridge Riga.

[E.N.A.]

their rear, and running behind their front, was the trunk line, the importance of which has already been described in relation to the Rowno region. This was the Petrograd line, running through Dwinsk, Wilna, Lida, and the junction of Baranowitchi into the heart of the marsh region west of Pinsk. The cutting of it, however, by the Germans, was not likely to be fatal to the Russians. It would compel them to fall back still farther at the threatened points, and would break up and impede their lateral service of supply, but it would not place the enemy on their line of retreat, nor obstruct the natural course of their withdrawal to the east and north-east.

A second railway, not of the first importance at this moment was that which ran due east, from Brest Litowsk towards Pinsk and the waters of the River Pripiet. This line traversed the centre of the marsh region, through which no great number of troops could travel, and it was not, therefore, one of the main avenues of the retirement.

THE THREE CHIEF RAILWAYS.

There were three other railways, and on them depended the security of the Russian armies. It is important to remember that the Russian retreat was directed rather to the north-east than the east. This was due to the configuration of the marshes, which stretched out north-eastward towards Minsk. The railway from Brest Litowsk to Minsk and on to Moscow ran roughly along the northern border of the marshes, and it was, therefore, by this line and in this direction that a large part of the Russian central armies was withdrawing. Roughly parallel with this line was another, which ran from Lida north-eastward towards Polotzk and on to Petrograd; not far from the village of Molodetchno it crossed the third railway with which we are concerned—the line which runs from Wilna south-eastward towards Minsk.

Since the Russian retreat was inevitably pushed towards the north-east by the barrier of the marshes, the German strategy was obviously to strike in towards the south from their flanking position, somewhere south of Dwinsk. In proportion as they could drive the Russians southward away from the natural line of their retreat, they would throw their armies back one upon another, create congestion and confusion in the supply, and bring within sight large captures of men and material, if not the destruction of whole armies. Clearly, also, there was marked out for them one particular line along which, if they could reach it, they might strike at the Russians—that is to say, the railway from Wilna to

Minsk. If they could, either by taking Wilna or by passing round it on the north, place themselves astride of the Minsk railway, they might hope to push the Wilna army southward, and there to entangle it with its supporting armies, or to drive the whole of them towards the railway between Brest and Minsk. If they could carry their stroke still further and reach Minsk itself, then there was virtually no chance of escape for the Russian forces. They must surrender, or be driven into the marshes. In brief, the struggle was a duel between the Germans seeking to reach and to hold either part or the whole of the Wilna-Minsk line in order to shut the door of escape to the retreating Russians, and the Russians trying to head them off, or at least to recover any part of the line that was lost before the means of escape was completely taken from them.

HINDENBURG'S CHOICE.

The point which Hindenburg chose for his blow was the railway between Dwinsk and Wilna. He had in mind here a triple stroke. In the first place, by cutting the Dwinsk-Wilna line, he broke the connection between Russia's northern and central armies, severed an important line of supply, and threatened to outflank Wilna on the north. Secondly, he was within seventy miles of the Lida-Polotzk line, which, as has been said, supported the Russian army south of Wilna, and was a line of retreat almost as important as that of the Moscow railway. Most important of all, he would be within striking distance of the line to Minsk, on the seizure of which, more than on anything else, the German hopes depended. Hindenburg's plans, therefore, fell into three parts. Southward from Wilna, down to the Brest Litowsk railway, the armies of Sholtz, Gallwitz, and Prince Leopold of



General Yanushkevitch. [E.N.A.]

Bavaria were to press the retreating Russians as hotly as possible in order to hold them in their positions; the decisive thrust was to be made against the Russian front on the railway north of Wilna, and a determined attack was to be made west and south of Dwinsk in order to prevent General Ruzsky coming down and cutting off the German forces which had broken through.

The Russians were well aware of the danger which threatened them in the neighbourhood of Wilna, and after the fall of Kowno they for some time conducted an offensive on the right bank of the Wilia, which flows from the east through Wilna, and then turns to the north and makes a loop northward of Kowno. The object of this offensive, as of the resistance of Kowno fortress, was to delay the German advance in the most dangerous quarter, and for some time it succeeded. For about a




Russia draws on her reserves : The medical examination of some of her new recruits.

[Central Press.]



A group of Caucasian soldiers after the call to the Colours.

[Central Press.]



The German enveloping movement east of Wilna.

fortnight Von Eichhorn advanced at the rate of only three miles per day. By the second week in September, however, the Russian attack had come to a standstill, and the Germans began to draw near to Wilna on both the north and south of the city.

THE GERMAN STROKE.

On the 12th, Hindenburg suddenly launched an attack towards Nowo Swentziany, a point lying some fifty miles north of Wilna, on the railway. Here he broke the Russian front, and threw through the gap a large force of cavalry, accompanied by infantry in motor cars. These columns spread out in three separate directions. Part of them turned north-eastward and threatened Dwinsk with an enveloping movement from the south-east, while at the same time a vigorous attack was made by Von Below towards the west of the fortress. It is improbable that the Germans hoped to capture Dwinsk at this time. Their primary object was certainly to interpose a barrier between the Russian army on the Dwina and the German raiding forces, which were now operating on a more important mission farther south. Other portions of the German cavalry pushed almost due east towards the Lida-Polotzk railway. They made their way over seventy miles of the lake country lying east

of Swentziany, and at one point actually crossed the railway and penetrated a short distance beyond. The attack was pursued even more successfully towards the south-east, where cavalry appeared at several points on the Wilna-Minsk railway, the farthest (at Molodetchno) being seventy miles from Wilna— a good deal more than half the distance to Minsk. Other detachments of the same column seized the Lida railway at Wileika, which lies not far from its junction with the Minsk line.

This startling achievement exposed the Russian armies to the gravest peril of the war. It is difficult to understand the ease with which Hindenburg apparently succeeded in throwing a force of cavalry that was estimated at twelve divisions across so great a stretch of country. Neither German nor Russian reports spoke of any heavy fighting having taken place before the Russian line was broken at Swentziany, and it would seem that Hindenburg had once more succeeded in quietly collecting a largely superior force at a decisive point, and in launching it at the enemy with unexpected rapidity and decision. The situation was now that the Russians had not only lost the Petrograd railway north of Wilna, but that they were deprived of two out of the three lines on which their chances of a successful retreat depended. In times of peril official reports of whatever nation, rarely admit the



A general view of Wilna.

[E.N.A.]

degree of danger in which their armies stand, but on this occasion the Russian Staff were courageous enough to admit the truth. "The Russians," ran their report, "continuously show their high military virtues and maintain a demeanour of calm confidence in circumstances of the utmost gravity." As a raid, Hindenburg's stroke was already brilliantly successful. The question was whether it was only a raid or whether it was to be backed up by strong infantry forces which would hold the points that the cavalry and motor detachments had already seized. If that could be done, it was almost impossible that the Russians should escape disaster. If, however, it was only a raid, even though a formidable one, that was to be dealt with, the Russians might still be able to brush aside the raiders. They might perhaps be able to repair the damage done to the railways, and at all events would be able to draw off their armies past the points which the raiding troops had blocked.

THE RUSSIAN REPLY.

Whatever the weakness which had led to the breaking of their line near Swentziany, the Russians now strained every effort. Time pressed, for the raiding Germans were certain to be followed at no long interval by infantry, which would be much more difficult to dislodge. The Russians attacked the new menace from several quarters. From the direction of Dwinsk they made comparatively little impression on the screen thrown out against them, but they attacked the forces which had reached the

Minsk railway on the line Wornjany-Smorgon-Molodetchno both on the front and on the northern flank, while from Minsk they hurried up reserves who attacked the detachments that had reached the Lida railway at Wileika and Kriwitschi.

The Germans found themselves attacked also from another and perhaps unexpected quarter. It had been the whole aim of their stroke against the Wilna-Minsk railway to force the Russian Wilna army away to the southward of the line, and if they could have substituted a strong force of infantry and artillery for their cavalry they would probably have been successful. But their infantry did not arrive, and the Russians found that they had to deal not with the unbroken front of an enveloping army, but with a number of scattered detachments of cavalry and motor units, which had either reached the Minsk line or were still coming down towards it from the north. Part of the Wilna army was ordered, therefore, to march not southwards away from the threatened envelopment, as the Germans had hoped it would, but eastwards, and to fight its way through the outflanking detachments as it met them. The position of the Germans was not altogether agreeable. The Russians had met them in the front, and were pushing them back from Molodetchno; they were attacking them also on the flank from across the Wilia; and the Wilna army began to take a hand and threaten them from the west and south-west. The German cavalry leaders must have looked anxiously in these days for the support which was required to crown

their opening success, but which was mysteriously lacking. The raid remained a raid, and the Russians gradually gained the upper hand. The Germans were driven off the Iida railway with the loss of guns, and were gradually pushed back from the Minsk line. The Russian armies drew away gradually into safety, escaping the trap which had been laid for them. In the battles round Wilna they lost some 20,000 prisoners to the Germans—a large number in itself, but insignificant compared with the catastrophe which at one time seemed to threaten the whole of their central armies.

AN ESTIMATE.

These operations of Hindenburg were among the most remarkable of the war. They were the end to which the German armies were steadily working from the moment when Warsaw was abandoned and the retreat towards Brest Litowsk and beyond was entered on. It was the weakness of the Russian position, and the good fortune of the Germans, that from the vantage-point of Kowno Hindenburg should be able to take a short cut to the rear of the Russian armies, and that by one blow north of Wilna he could sever three out of the four main arteries of the Russian communications. At the finish everything depended on the degree of surprise with which he dealt the blow, and here, as in earlier engagements, he showed himself a master. But the direction in which the attack would be delivered could not have been unexpected by the Russians, and their comparatively weak resistance requires explanation. In the second stage, Hindenburg failed to complete the success on which he had embarked so fairly, and his failure to make more of the brilliant opening secured for him by his light squadrons is puzzling. The Russians deserve high praise, alike for the promptitude and vigour with which they met the emergency and for the admirable calm and resolution with which they declined to be intimidated by the danger in which they stood. The Wilna army, when it refused to bear away to the south, might easily have been held up by the Germans who were round it on the west, north, and east; but, if this had been its fate, its resistance would have enabled the other Russian armies to pursue their retirement unimpeded. This capacity to keep a cool head and make sacrifices for some larger end was not the least distinguished of the characteristics of the Russian command.

THE RETREAT DRAWING TO A CLOSE.

With the escape of the Wilna army the Russian retreat began gradually to draw to a close. The Germans, for all their many successes and huge captures of men and guns, had failed in their hopes of destroying a large part of the Russian armies. Their advance became slower, especially in the marsh region, where they had reached Pinsk, and where they had eventually to draw back their front before the Russian attacks and the difficulties of the country. It was, indeed, like the whole region north and south of the River Pripiet, an ill country to

fight in or to winter in, as the Germans (and the Russians) were to do.

"According to the figures almost half of the territory is covered by wet, impassable, and uncultivated forest, wooded territory, most of it being useless, bushy, and impenetrable. The ground itself is divided into different kinds of marshy lands, impassable muddy districts, immense weedy and grassy territories, also regions covered by some kind of more solid grassy substance, and other thousands and thousands of acres of land perpetually under water.

"The resources of this gigantic wilderness are naturally very scanty, and the number of inhabitants very small. One may not even think of any military comfort of billeting or the kind, and camping in the open air, on account of the climate, the lack of water, and owing to the milliards of most dangerous insects and snakes, seems to be an impossible undertaking. How an army of many hundred thousands of men could undertake an advance movement on this marshy ground covered with thick forest, mud, and water is almost unimaginable, for only the hilly districts contain roads used by pedestrians or the Russian ponies used to these kinds of roads. The climate itself is unbearable for those used to healthy and dry districts; the vapourings of the marshes are liable to cause fever and typhoid."*

Correspondents with the German and Austrian armies sent home gloomy accounts of the conditions prevailing in this desolate region.

"Every tree is a little islet standing out of the gloomy marshland, and shallow lakes which extend for mile after mile. The roads are inundated by the water, which has risen high owing to the floods of rain, and from the miserable cottages, which at intervals are to be seen partly submerged along the highways, strange looking men with long beards and thick, matted hair, mostly woodcutters and others earning a precarious living from the products of the surrounding wilderness, creep out and stare with amazement at the Austrian and German cavalrymen."

The Germans in these wastes lost their advantages over the Russians. Their heavy guns were useless because they could not be dragged through such a country, and motor transport was almost impossible. "Generally," said the *Russkoe Slovo*, "the Germans had to be satisfied with horses, or even with their own hands and feet. The contest here is not one of nerves, of which Hindenburg once spoke, but of physical endurance." The policy of retreat, whatever was to be its ultimate result, at least put Russians and Germans on an equality in the region of the marshes. While something like a balance now came to be established over a great part of the front, fighting still continued fiercely round Dwinsk and on the Dwina, where the Germans had apparently not given up all hope of establishing themselves for the winter on the north side of the river, with Dwinsk and Riga for their quarters. Elsewhere the question was how far the Germans were satisfied with the defensive line that they had gained, what policy they would follow throughout the winter, and with what plans they would meet the spring, when the Russians hoped to meet them with armies strengthened and refitted.

* A Hungarian correspondent in the *Pall Mall Gazette*.



The main street in Loos, photographed immediately after the village had been captured by the British, and showing in the distance the famous "Tower Bridge" of Loos.

[Official Photograph: Crown Copyright Reserved.]



A nearer view of some of the ruins in Loos and the "Tower Bridge."

[Official Photograph: Crown Copyright Reserved.]



A German trench captured by the British during the advance near Loos, showing the effect of heavy shell fire.

[Official Photograph : Crown Copyright Reserved.]

CHAPTER XXV.


THE VICTORY OF LOOS.

THE POLICY OF A GENERAL ATTACK IN THE WEST—THE ALLIED PLANS AND DISPOSITIONS—THE BRILLIANT EARLY SUCCESS—THE FAILURE OF THE RESERVES—THE GUARDS' ATTACK AND THE GERMAN COUNTER-ATTACKS—COMMENTS ON THE BATTLE.

BY September the project of a great attack in the West was well forward. Since the trench warfare had begun General Joffre had been "nibbling" at the German lines, and there had been heavy fighting in Alsace, in the Woevre, in Champagne, and also in Artois, on the western section, but there had been nothing that could be called a general attack. The Battle of Neuve Chapelle in March had been an isolated action by the British alone, and was not, so far as can be discovered, part of a concerted plan. A scheme had evidently been prepared for joint action between the French and British armies in Artois in May, but it broke down, so far as we were concerned, through the German gas attacks on Ypres (Vol. II., pages 289 to 312). It is therefore true to say that the first anniversary of the Battle of the Marne had come and gone before any joint general attack on the German lines had been delivered. This delay was of enormous advantage to the Germans, who, recognising that the real military capital of their country, Essen, was vulnerable through Belgium, had spared no labour and ingenuity to make their lines on the West impregnable.

General Joffre had interrupted from time to time the fortification of these lines, but in the main they remained in the moulds in which the arrival of the first winter of the war had frozen them, and had all the time been growing steadily stronger. It was the perception that the German lines in the West were only to be forced, if at all, by an overwhelming superiority in artillery that led to the munitions crisis in England. Neuve Chapelle had shown how the lines might be forced, but further long delay was necessary before the Allies felt themselves in a position to apply those lessons on the scale of a general attack. By September they believed themselves to be fully prepared.

It is known that in England there were two schools of military thought on the strategy of the campaign. There were those who held that the decision must be reached in the West, and that, difficult as the problem of forcing the German lines was, nowhere else could anything like the same results be obtained. Although an attempt to force a settlement there meant delay, the initial loss of time it was thought would be compensated for by the magnitude of the success when it did come. On



FROM LA BASSÉE TO VIMY.

the other hand, there were others, and among them Mr. Winston Churchill, who held that in the West we ought to confine ourselves to the defensive, and make our great effort in the East. The one school aimed at delivering a blow at the heart of German power, the other hoped to find a joint in her harness in South-Eastern Europe. Doubtless there were similar divisions of opinion in France. And it is not unlikely that these divisions among the political directors of the war found their counterpart in the armies of both countries. It is a curious fact that this same division of strategical opinion into eastern and western schools also arose in Germany, but in Germany it was fought out during the winter, and ended, broadly speaking, in the defeat of the western school. Among the Allies, however, the division of opinion seems to have persisted through the summer. In the main, however, the western school triumphed in England and France. Our campaign in the Dardanelles was never more than subsidiary to what was regarded as the important campaign in the West. The result was that the whole summer was spent by the Allies in preparations for an attack which they were not in a position to deliver, and opportunities in the East, to which their resources were quite equal, were allowed to slip by. Germany used this summer, as has been described, in driving the Russians out of Galicia and Poland. The failure of the Allies to form to the new front an adequate force was the most serious mistake they had yet made in the war, and its consequences will pursue us through many of the following chapters of this history.

In justice to the Western Allies, however, some facts which may well have disturbed cool judgment should be borne in mind. France was invaded, and for a French soldier to postpone the deliverance of his country to any other object, or to find hundreds of miles east the way round his difficulties at home, argued a detachment of mind which was almost more than could be expected of human nature. This country might have been expected to see more clearly, for we had enormous interests in the East, and we might have realised first the full significance to us as the greatest of Asiatic Powers of what might happen in Turkey and the Balkans. But our vision, too, was clouded. We had made Belgium and France the occasion of our entry into the war, and for months even after Turkey had come in we failed to recognise that though the war grew more menacingly towards the West, its main roots were in the East. Both in Britain and in France there was an exaggerated faith in Russia, a disposition to leave to her everything in the Eastern campaign. Lastly, in deciding our own military policy, we felt ourselves bound in the first instance by our obligations to France. All these facts made us put forward in France surplus energy which, as it turned out later, might probably have been more usefully employed in the East.


THE ATTACK IN MAY.

The attacks of the French in Artois in May had not had the assistance which had been counted upon from the British, because the British left had been engaged in desperate fighting for the defence of Ypres. Nevertheless, the French made considerable progress. The whole of the German lines in Artois are to be regarded as a bastion for the defence of Lille, the most important railway junction in France, and the key to all Flanders. The nearest point in the Allied lines to Lille on the north-west was at Armentières, on the River Lys. From

Armentières the British could see the smoke of the Lille factories, and sometimes, when all was quiet and the wind was in the east, hear the bells. But an advance from Armentières was impossible, with the Germans in occupation of the Messines ridge on the north side of the Lys and between it and Ypres. West of Lille were the Heights of Aubers, overlooking the valley of the Layes and running to La Bassée. In this valley were fought the Battles of Neuve Chapelle in March and Aubers in May, both of which failed to make a serious breach in the German defences. A frontal attack on La Bassée was out of the question. The possibilities of successful attack on Lille from the north and west thus seemed to have been exhausted. To the south-west the position earlier in the year had been even more unpromising, for the German positions, still following the direction of the hills which is south-west, formed in front of Lens a great salient, which even crossed the road between Bethune and Arras, the first in British, the second in French occupation. The Germans attached great importance to the possession of this stretch of road, and the whole of the French operations in Artois in spring and summer were devoted to the one object of expelling them from it. By June they had succeeded. First fell Notre Dame de Lorette, then Carency and Neuville, then the so called Labyrinth, an underground fortified city below the Heights of Vimy, and corresponding in relation to the German defence system on the south-west of Lille to Aubers on the west. At Souchez, where the roads from Bethune to Arras and from Lens westwards cross, the struggle was particularly fierce and prolonged, and for a fortnight or more the French and Germans obstinately disputed the possession of a sugar refinery in the town. These operations were exceedingly costly, but though the French failed (as we did at Neuve Chapelle and Aubers) to establish themselves on the hills, they secured freer possession of the valley. This was the position in September, when it was decided to make an attempt to break the German lines. Whether the attempt would have been made just then if the Western Allies had been free to choose their time is perhaps open to doubt; but the military position of Russia was now alarming, and it was thought necessary to do whatever was possible to relieve the pressure upon her.

THE ALLIES' PLANS.

The German lines of occupation of France ran roughly north and south as far as Noyon and then east and west (see map, Vol. II., 143.) The new plan was to attack simultaneously in the middle of these two sides of the triangle, in the hope that if either of them gave way the whole triangle would collapse on to its base. The main French attack was to be delivered on Champagne; its fortunes are described in the next chapter. But the attack on the west side of the triangle, with which we are now concerned, was even more important; for if complete success in Champagne promised the liberation of almost all France from the German invasion, the breaking of the line near Lille would mean the liberation of Flanders too. The operations in the direction of Lille were Anglo-French. The British line had been extended a considerable distance to the south of Arras in the late summer, but a French army still held the positions about Souchez which had been so hardly won in May and June. This French army formed the extreme right of the attack that was now to begin. The whole of the rest of the attack from Souchez to the sea was in the hands of the British. The plan was discussed at numerous meetings between



A remarkable war photograph, taken in a German trench which had been mined and captured by the British. The photograph was taken immediately after the capture of the trench and before the wounded or prisoners had been removed. [Central News.]

General Joffre and Sir John French. "I have had constant meetings," writes Sir John French, "with General Joffre, who has kept me informed of his views and intentions, and explained the successive methods by which he hopes to obtain his ultimate object. After full discussion of the military situation, a decision was arrived at for joint action, in which I acquiesced." The phrasing of this passage is somewhat peculiar, and the use in this connection of the word "acquiesced" by some despatch writers would imply that the writer had no hand in framing the scheme, or that he was not convinced of its soundness. It is very doubtful, however, whether Sir John French's despatches should be made to bear any of these subtler inferences that might be drawn from the words of other more practised writers. The writing of despatches is not his strong point, and it is probably unsafe to read more into them than their plain surface meaning.

It was desirable that the enemy should be kept in ignorance of the exact point at which we meant to deliver our chief attack, and accordingly for a full week before the attack began a general bombardment was opened along the whole Allied front in the west. In addition, two subsidiary attacks were made by the British, with the object of deceiving the enemy and preventing him from concentrating troops at the real point of attack. One of these attacks was east of Ypres, another near Armentières, at Bois Grenier, where our trenches were within six miles of Lille, and a third further south.

AT YPRES.

At Ypres, our lines had moved slightly backwards and forwards since the heavy fighting in May. In the first week of June we took over from the French their trenches to the north of Ypres, as far as Boesinghe (opposite Pilkelm, on the west bank of the Yser Canal)—an extension of our line to the north corresponding to the extension already mentioned to the south. The centre of the Ypres fighting in the summer was at Hooze, on the Menin road. On June 2nd, the Germans made an attack on our positions which failed, and a fortnight later the Fifth Corps captured the enemy's first line near the Bellewaarde Lake; and though they were unable to maintain their advanced position, the net result was to force back the German trenches along a front of 1,000 yards. There was stiff fighting north of Ypres in July, in the course of which the 135th Battery of the Field Artillery did fine work. "To reach its position the guns had to be taken over a high canal embankment, rafted over the canal under fire, pushed up a bank with a slope of nearly 45 degrees, and then dragged over three trenches and a sky-line to its position, seventy yards from the German lines." In this fighting, a frontage of 500 yards was gained, but Pilkelm, lost during the first gas attacks, remained in German hands. At the end of July the enemy used a contrivance for driving burning liquid into our trenches with a strong jet, and in the surprise our first-line trenches at Hooze were lost, but ten days later they were recovered, with the addition of some 400 yards of German trenches north of the Menin road. On the whole the Ypres fighting since May had gone in our favour, though the gains had in no sense modified the general situation. The part played by the forces holding Ypres in the general attack was to contain the enemy's forces in front. A determined attack was made by the Fifth Corps on Bellewaarde Farm, near Hooze, on the morning of the great attack. It made some progress, and is believed to have compelled the Germans to draw on their troops in other parts of their lines. But

the attack (if it was meant to be more than a demonstration) broke down under the enemy's concentrated artillery fire, and the ground gained had to be abandoned.

DEMONSTRATIONS SOUTH OF THE LYS.

A second set of demonstrations near Armentières followed much the same course. Just south of Bois Grenier our trenches make a great bay, the headlands at each end very close to the German trenches, the hollow in the middle nearly half a mile distant from the corresponding projection in the German lines. An attack made early in the morning of September 25th carried every point of the German trenches except in the centre of the bay, where a searchlight chanced to turn on the attacking troops just as they were crossing the open. Forewarned, the Germans in the centre held their ground, even after the rest of their line had been carried; and as neither rifle fire nor bayonet was of much avail in the deep and narrow trenches, they had to be bombed out, which took till five o'clock in the afternoon, so obstinate was the resistance. A portion of the enemy's second line in this section was also occupied for a time, but could not be held owing to the difficulty of getting supplies over the exposed ground between the first and the second line. Nor, if the attack were meant merely as a demonstration, would it have been wise to take risks that were not part of the scheme. In the fighting on this section of the line, the Lincolns and Berkshires distinguished themselves. The Germans are said to have brought up their reinforcements in motor buses.

A still more important demonstration was made further south, in the direction of the Moulin du Piètre (memorable in the Battle of Neuve Chapelle), and against Givenchy. Here a division of the Third Corps and the Meerut Division of the Indian Corps were engaged. No ground was permanently gained, but there is some reason to believe that the Germans for a time mistook the advance north of the La Bassée Canal for the main attack. Herr Kellermann, the correspondent of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, in an article, in which he confessed his failure to construct a consistent plan of the whole battle, found the fighting hottest at Fromelles (near Bois Grenier), Aubers, Festubert, and Givenchy. All those attacks we know to have been, if not mere demonstrations, at any rate subsidiary to the main attack south of the La Bassée Canal; and it is evident that the multiplicity of attacks caused the utmost confusion in the German lines, and was of material assistance to the rapid success of the operations further south. It is to be regretted that they could not continue their assistance by keeping up their attacks on successive days, but the cost was probably prohibitive.

THE ALLIED DISPOSITIONS.

The objective of the main attack south of the Canal was the road running from La Bassée to Lens. The loss of this road would have gained us access to the Douai Plain and opened up the way to an attack on Lille from the south, and would probably have rendered La Bassée itself untenable, and with La Bassée would have fallen Lille, and the whole of the German line north into Flanders and south to the Aisne would have been broken. At the point where this road was crossed by the road from Bethune to Douai stands Lens, the key to the Douai Plain. The scheme of attack was that the French should advance in the direction of Lens from Souchez to the south-west, while the British should gain access to the plain from the west and north-west. The German defences of the approaches to the plain were formidable. South



A view in the quarries of Hulluch.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



German troops in the shelter of the Hulluch quarries.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

of the Canal the Hohenzollern Redoubt was thrust forward 500 yards in advance of the German lines, almost under the nose of our trenches at Vermelles. Behind the Redoubt were two strong flanking positions, Fosse No. 8, a high slag heap, on its right rear, the Quarries on its left. Here the German line crossed the road from Vermelles to Hulluch, and curved outwards in a projecting salient that passes between Grenay and Loos, through Augres and in front of Souchez to the wooded Heights of Vimy. The distance between the Allied and the German trenches varied from 100 to 500 yards (see map, page 270).

The disposition of the Allied troops before the battle was as follows:—

INFANTRY.

RIGHT (at Souchez) ... The Tenth French Army.
CENTRE (at Grenay) ... The Fourth (British) Army Corps, consisting of the Forty-seventh Division (right) and the Fifteenth Division (left).
LEFT (at Vermelles) ... The First Army Corps, consisting of the First Division, the Seventh Division, and apparently also of the Ninth Division.
IN RESERVE The Eleventh Corps, consisting of a Guards Division (at Lillers), the Twenty-first Division (at Beuvry), the Twenty-fourth Division (at Nœux-les-Mines), the Twenty-eighth Division (at Bailleul).

CAVALRY.

British Cavalry Corps... St. Pol and Bailleul.
Indian Cavalry Corps ... Doullens.
Third Cavalry Division .Grenay District (supporting Fourth Army Corps).

The posting of the reserves is somewhat curious. The infantry were towards the northern end of our line. Lillers is some distance west of Bethune, and Beuvry is near the La Bassée Canal, and even Nœux-les-Mines lies on a line somewhat to the north of Loos. Sir John French, in describing the disposition of his reserves, explains "that the corps operating on the French left had to be directed in a more or less south-easterly direction, involving, in the event of our success, a considerable gap in our line." The passage is not very clear, but it would seem that Sir John French was somewhat apprehensive of a German counter-attack along the line of the La Bassée Canal working around the left of our attack. In fact, nothing of the kind seems to have been attempted, but evidently before the battle Sir John French's principal anxieties were about the safety of his left. The re-appearance of the cavalry is very notable. They were posted in the south "in order to co-operate with the French cavalry in exploiting any success which might be attained by the combined French and British Forces." The Germans in Champagne also noted the presence of cavalry in the French lines, which their Headquarters' Report sarcastically observed was a misapprehension of the situation. No occasion for cavalry work arose; but had the success gained been more decisive, they would have had excellent opportunity for very effective action. The hopes that cavalry might have the opportunity for which they had waited for so long were not by any means idle, for there seems no doubt that the Germans were so alarmed by the shock of the general attack that they began to make preparations for removing even their Belgian headquarters back, in anticipation of the necessity for a general retreat. It was in view of such possibilities that the cavalry prepared for action.

The battle, which began in the early morning of November 25th, is like the Battle of Neuve Chapelle in many respects, but especially in this, that it divides itself into two very disproportionate parts, a brief opening lasting for a few hours in which we gained successes that vastly exceeded our highest hopes, and a later period in which our high hopes were reduced to modesty. Like Neuve Chapelle, again, the Battle of Loos has dark and 'obscure passages—perplexities about which the tongue of rumour has been exceedingly busy, but which evidently are not to be cleared up until the end of the war, and can only be treated for the present with a somewhat embarrassing reserve.

THE BOMBARDMENT.

The bombardment which preceded the attack was the longest and the heaviest that had yet taken place, and over a great part of the front was continuous for three or four days and nights before the morning of the 25th. "It is a mistake," wrote a German witness in the course of a description of this bombardment, "to believe that a man can do no more than die. He can undergo a hundred times the agony of death before death takes him." Even the side from which the bombardment comes has its minor sufferings—the inability to settle down to anything, the sense of straining at a leash, the suspense of waiting for the signal to attack. These things recur constantly in the descriptions of the bombardment, of which there have been many in soldiers' letters. The signal for attack came early in the morning. Just before the attack the British discharged gas. It was not the yellow chlorine gas that the Germans used at Ypres and elsewhere, but something that blew across in white clouds and suffocated, but, it is said, did not torture. Immediately behind the gas clouds followed the bombers wearing masks. There is little evidence that the gas contributed much to our early successes in the attack—in the opinion of at least one competent officer it hindered us—but the wearing of masks added a fresh terror to the attack.

"Whitish fogbanks began to creep slowly nearer. The landscape consists of flat meadows and fields, and in these months a mist hangs over it morning and evening. Thus it happened that our men at first thought the approaching whitish bank of vapour was mist. But very soon they knew what was the matter. It was a gas attack, and the order was issued: 'Put on the gas masks.'

"The bank of fog passed over our trenches. Then came a low bank of smoke creeping towards us, black grey; then again another bank of gas some ten minutes behind the first. Altogether three or four double waves of whitish gas and smoke gas swept over our trenches. There was nothing else to be seen. Some men coughed and fell down. Others stood at the ready as long as possible. The English artillery at the same time fired gas shells on our trenches.

"Behind the fourth gas and smoke cloud there suddenly emerged Englishmen in thick lines and storming columns. They rose suddenly from the earth, wearing smoke masks over their faces, and looking not like soldiers but like devils. Wire was no longer there to hold them back.

"Shortly after seven o'clock no more news reached the divisional fighting headquarters to the rear. Telegraph and telephone wires were shot to pieces, and communications had to be restored by despatch-riders and motors."*

The bombardment had been much more successful than in March, and had destroyed the wire entanglements at all points except one. This was near the junction of the two attacking army corps, between which the road from Vermelles to Hulluch was the boundary. Here the right brigade of the First Division was held up for some

* Kellermann in the *Berliner Tageblatt*.

time—apparently, though this has not been expressly stated—by the wire entanglements, and the delay enabled the Germans to bring up reinforcements. The left brigade, however, in spite of the menace to its flank, managed to force its way through to the western outskirts of Hulluch. Further to the left, the Seventh Division captured the quarries, the Cité St. Elie, and even reached Haisnes; and on its left again the Ninth Division carried the Hohenzollern Redoubt and Fosse 8. The Twenty-eighth Brigade, brought up from reserve, advanced across the Vermelles railway and stormed the German trenches on the east side, but had to fall back. On this extreme left on one line our troops were under the fire of the defences at Auchy and La Bassée itself. The fighting at Fosse 8, too, had been extremely heavy, and our hold on it, under the guns of Auchy, was very precarious. But in spite of everything, the advance on this wing was as great as was expected, for the main object of the fighting north of the Hulluch road must have been to secure the flank of the Fourth Corps attacking in the direction of Lens to the south of that road. It was here that the prospects of decisive victory were brightest.

THE BRILLIANT SUCCESS ON THE RIGHT.

The attack of the Fourth Corps opened brilliantly. On the right the Forty-seventh Division, composed of two London Territorial Brigades, stormed the Double Crassier—a huge slag heap—and pushed on to the south side of Loos, where they captured the chalk pit and the cemetery, and established a strong defensive position on the flank before noon. The French on the right, owing to unexplained delays, were not able to begin their advance until one o'clock, so that for the greater part of this advance the right flank of the London Brigades was unsupported. The Germans, however, either failed to realise their advantage or were unable to use it, and no attack was delivered. Later in the day the French advanced from Souchez up to the Vimy Heights, and this right flank was made secure.

But finer even than the advance of the Forty-seventh Division was that of the Scottish Territorials (Fifteenth Division) to the left. With bayonets fixed, they charged across the half-mile of open ground which separated them from the enemy's trenches, carried their first line, streamed out into the open again, carried the second line of trenches just in front of Loos, then into Loos, out again, up Hill 70, down on the far side of the hill into the Douai Plain. And all by 9-30, three hours after the trenches were first left. Had the Scottish troops been supported at this moment, just as their attack was becoming exhausted, there is no setting a limit to the results of the day. But no support came. The Germans rallied as the morning wore on, pressed our troops back up the hill and over the crest, where their advance was stayed. By nightfall more than half the ground won had been lost again. Loos was ours, the western slopes of Hill 70, and the road from Hill 70 as far as Hulluch; but the entrance to the Douai Plain was barred, and the Germans had in some degree recovered from their surprise, and were preparing to counter-attack in strength.

THE RESERVES.

How came it that the Scottish troops after carrying Hill 70 never received any supports? Two whole army corps had been held in reserve for just such a reversal as this. One division—the Twenty-eighth—had come into action early in the day near Auchy, but the Twenty-first

and Twenty-fourth Divisions and the Guards were not used all day. At 9-30 in the morning Sir John French had placed the Twenty-first and Twenty-fourth Brigades at the disposal of the General Officer in command of the attack—presumably Sir John Haig. At half-past eleven the heads of the division were past Bethune and Nœux-les-Mines, not more than three miles behind our trenches. A couple of hours more and they might have been attacking the Germans—late, but not too late to save Hill 70 and its exits into the Douai Plain. It is possible that they arrived at Hill 70 in time to save the western slopes, but that has nowhere been stated, and the first mention in despatches of their coming into action is not till the evening of the following day, by which time the German counter-attacks were in full progress. The Fourth Corps were preparing to attack Hulluch and a redoubt just over the crest of Hill 70, when they were anticipated by strong enemy attacks. "These attacks," we are told by Sir John French, "drove in the advanced troops of the Twenty-first and Twenty-fourth Divisions which were then moving to the attack. Reports regarding this portion of the action," he continues, "are very conflicting, and it is not possible to form an entirely just appreciation of what occurred in this part of the field." There is no further mention of these divisions in Sir John French's despatch; and the only other official references occurred in the course of a debate in the House of Lords on the Staff work, which are discussed later in this chapter. Here it is sufficient to note that the failure of our reserves, first, to reach the front in time, and secondly, having reached there to make their influence felt, was the main cause that disappointed the hopes of a really decisive victory.

THE GUARDS ATTACK ON HILL 70.

On the third day of the battle—Monday—we lost possession of Fosse No. 8. Our hold from the first had been precarious, and the loss of this position did not materially affect the security of our right wing, where the best chances of winning decisive victory still offered. In the afternoon of Monday a determined effort was made by the Guards Division to recover the ground lost on the previous Saturday afternoon in the direction of Hill 70 and Lens. Their attack was, next to the advance of the Scotsmen on the Saturday, the finest military exploit—and certainly the most thrilling military spectacle—in the whole battle. The Guards had been out of the trenches for some weeks before the action, and at the beginning of the battle had been stationed at Lillers. Obviously, they were being kept back for the supreme effort which was now to be made. The Guards were in three brigades, of which the Second, including Grenadiers, Welsh, and Scots Guards, were entrusted with the direct frontal attack on Hill 70 and the positions commanding the road from Hulluch to Lens. The Germans had made good use of their respite to reorganise their positions, and no sooner had the Guards left their trenches than they were bombarded with shell-fire. They had not expected to be shelled so soon. The shells emitted poisonous fumes, and some of the men, among them the Colonel of the Grenadiers, fell wounded or choking with the gas before the gas helmets could be served out. Protected by their helmets, they delivered a brilliant attack on Hill 70 and stormed the crest, but were not able to capture the redoubt, which was some little way below on the reverse slope. Other battalions attacked the positions on the road.

"It was now that the number of casualties began to be very heavy. They were played upon by a terrible fire from

machine-guns concealed in Bois Hugo, the Keep, and Puits 14, and suffered a tragic ordeal. The colonel was wounded, and many other officers of the Scots Guards were wounded or killed. The assault upon Puits 14 was distinguished by extreme gallantry and self-sacrifice. The position itself was won by a party of Scots Guards led by Captain Cuthbert, D.S.O., which engaged in hand-to-hand fighting, routing out the enemy from the houses.

"Some companies of the Grenadiers came to the support of their comrades in the Scots Guards, but suffered heavy losses themselves. A platoon under Lieutenant Ayres Ritchie reached the Puits, and, storming their way into the Keep, knocked out a machine-gun mounted on the second floor by a successful bombing attack. The officer held on in a most dauntless way to the position until almost every man was either killed or wounded, unable to receive support owing to the enfilade fire of the German machine-guns.

"Night had now come on, the sky lightened by the bursting of shells and flares and terrible in its tumult of battle. Some of the Coldstreams had gained possession of the Chalk Pit, which they were organising into a strong defensive position, and various companies of the Guards Division, after heroic assaults upon Hill 70, where they were shattered by the fire which met them on the crest from the enemy's redoubt on the north-east side, had dug themselves into the lower slopes. Before the dawn came the Coldstreams made another desperate attempt to attack and hold Puits 14, but the position was too deadly even for their height of valour; and although some men under Lieutenant Riley pushed on into this very inferno of fire, the survivors had to fall back to the woods, where they strengthened their defensive works.

"The following day the position was the same, the sufferings of our men being still further increased by heavy shelling from 8-inch howitzers, and Colonel Egerton, of the Coldstreams, and his adjutant being killed in the Chalk Pit.

"It was now seen by the Headquarters Staff of the Guards Division that Puits 14 was quite untenable owing to its enfilading by heavy artillery, and the order was given for a retirement to the Chalk Pit, which was a place of sanctuary owing to the magnificent work done throughout the night to strengthen its natural defensive features by sandbags and barbed wire, in spite of machine-guns which raked it from the neighbouring woods.

"The retirement was done as though the men were on parade, slowly and in perfect order across the field of fire, each man bearing himself as though in the presence of the King. It was a wonderful tribute to the strength of tradition among troops. To safeguard the honour of a famous name these men showed such supreme contempt for death that even the enemy must have been moved to admiration. They held that place until relieved by the French; and when they came behind the lines again to wait until their further support was wanted in any hard-pressed place, they brought with them new honours which have added even to the glory of the Guards."

This was the last effort made to recover the lost ground. From now to the end of the battle we were engaged in repelling the obstinate counter-attacks made by the Germans, and on the whole with success. On the two last days in September the Germans recovered at great cost a portion of the Hohenzollern Redoubt, but were compelled later to relinquish most of their gain. The French, by taking over our gains further south, including the village of Loos, were of great assistance in helping us to retain our ground further north. The German attacks continued until the second week of October, and the last attack on October 8th was the most determined of all. The Germans succeeded in making some gains in the Hohenzollern Redoubt, and from the French in the Double Crassier, but only to lose them again, and on October 9th, when the battle may be said to have ended, their positions were exactly the same as they were before the attacks began. Sir John French estimated the German losses in this last counter-attack in killed alone at between 8,000 and 9,000.

COMMENTS AND CRITICISMS.

The successes gained in this battle were considerable. Along a front of four miles a double line of trenches had been carried to a depth at its greatest of four miles. The whole of this area, amounting to at least twelve square miles, was a network of trenches and bomb-proof shelters. Months of labour had been spent on the construction of the shelters, which were, many of them, more than thirty feet deep. Like the Labyrinth, captured by the French near Arras, they were a huge underground city, which the Germans were almost justified in regarding as impregnable. Fifty-seven officers and 3,000 other ranks were taken prisoners, together with 26 field-guns and forty machine-guns. Their losses in killed and wounded must have equalled and probably exceeded our own, which were grievously heavy. Our losses in the action, including the attacks made at Ypres and Givenchy, must have amounted in all to 50,000, among whom were a number of prisoners, though, as in the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, no accounts have made clear when these were taken. Greater, however, than the material losses of the battle was the evidence that it afforded that the German positions in the west were not impregnable. A very little more, and the whole German position in Artois and Flanders would have collapsed. As it was, the Germans received the greatest fright they had yet had in the war.

It is only when one turns from the actual achievement in this battle, which was considerable to what at one time we seemed to be on the point of achieving, which might well have brought the end of the war in sight, that the victory of Loos is seen as a magnificent facade hiding great disappointment. The main cause of this disappointment was the failure of the two reserve divisions to support the advance of the Scottish troops towards Lens, and their further failure, when they did come into action on the following day, to contribute anything. The failures of the artillery at Neuve Chapelle were not repeated; and though mistakes were made by the gunners in the later stages of the battle, their initial work was good enough to lay the foundations of a great victory upon. Nor was the general plan of the battle, so far as a judgment is possible, ill-conceived. The success that was attained showed that the central idea of forcing a way into the Plain of Douai was quite feasible, and that the main conditions of success had been apprehended. The plan may be open to criticism on some grounds. It may be that instead of the attacks at various points of the British front which were evidently not intended to be pressed, and yet were rather too serious to be regarded as mere demonstrations, better results might have been attained by a more concentrated effort at some one point in addition to that selected for the main attack. There are difficulties, again, in grasping the reasons why Sir John French distributed his reserves as he did. But these are matters on which no judgment is possible on the published information. The crux of the battle was in the handling of the two reserve divisions.

The blame of the failure to sustain our early success towards Lens has been sometimes placed on the excessive impetuosity of the Scottish advance, and it has been said that it would have been wiser to restrain its rapidity. It is a hard judgment. Experience in this war has that, though battles last longer than they did, it is the first few hours that are most likely to be decisive, and that the greatness of the victory will depend mainly on the rapidity with which initial success can be improved. To say that troops should not press forward as rapidly as possible when the road is open may be to

deny the first condition which deliverance from the trench warfare is possible. The initial success was evidently speedy beyond anticipation, and the reserves would seem to have been posted too far in the rear to intervene at the best possible moment. Rather than blame the Scottish troops for undue haste, it would seem juster to inquire whether our dispositions had not been unduly influenced by the idea that the decision must necessarily be slow. This battle has rather strengthened the opposite theory, that the really decisive moments of the modern battle are likely to be few in number and to pass with great rapidity.

It seems to be clear that, quite apart from their original distance from the scene of action, the divisions were unnecessarily slow in arriving, and that they failed even after they had arrived. For the delay in their arrival the blame has been put on the Staff work, as though instructions had not been properly framed, or were not delivered, or as though there had been some miscalculation of the distance which Lord Sydenham has urged would naturally seem to point to some Staff blunder. It certainly requires a great deal of explanation how it came about that troops, the need for which was so urgent, should have left Nœux-les-Mines at eleven in the morning on Saturday and apparently not have been deployed for action until the following day. The distance from Nœux

to the scene of action cannot be more than eight miles. The view of the Government, so far as it has been expressed, is that the Headquarters Staff was not at fault. Replying to criticisms by Lord St. Davids, in the House of Lords, on November 16th, Lord Haldane said :—

"Lord St. Davids was also wrong in thinking reserves were not ready to be sent forward on the occasion of the recent advance at Loos. They were ready, but did not succeed in what they ought to have done. It was a matter internal to the divisions, and was not due to want of care or attention on the part of the Commander-in-Chief."

In a later speech Lord Crewe declined to go into details, as the "whole business was *sub judice*, being the subject of close military inquiry by the highest authorities." For these reasons detailed discussion in this place is out of the question, even if the materials were available. But it is permissible to point out that quite apart from the question of the time at which these divisions arrived, is the further question as to the state in which they arrived, and the cause. If we may judge from what happened on the following day, they hardly seem to have been in a fit condition to go into action. These, however, are questions that await authoritative settlement, and it is not too much to say that on the character of the inquiry, and on the vigour with which its conclusions are acted upon, very much may depend.



All that remained of a bombarded German trench taken in the Loos fighting. The remains of a field telephone box can be seen in the photograph.

[Official Photograph: Crown Copyright Reserved.]



Three thousand of the German prisoners taken by the French during their advance in the Champagne.

[Topical Press.]

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE FRENCH ADVANCE IN CHAMPAGNE.


THE OBJECTS OF THE ATTACK—DESCRIPTION OF THE BATTLEFIELD—THE PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACK—THE BOMBARDMENT—THE MEASURE OF FRENCH SUCCESSES—THE BUTTE DE TAHURE AND THE MAIN DE MASSIGES—COMMENTS ON THE BATTLE.

THE ultimate objective of the simultaneous attacks in Artois and Champagne can be read from a glance at the map. The German lines in France run roughly from north of Nieuport at the sea almost due south to Compiègne, then turn almost at right angles to the Argonne. A serious break-through in Champagne, aided by a great holding attack north of Arras, or, better, a break-through north of Arras, would have endangered the whole salient, Arras-Compiègne-Rheims, and, more, would have meant almost inevitably the falling back of the German line as far as the defences of the Meuse. The damage and danger to the whole German invasion of France would have been incalculable. The eastern Champagne country presented other advantages for a grand attack. Its bare, undulating plains and uplands, with few villages and little agricultural ground, make it one of the very few parts of France where great armies can manœuvre on a wide front. For an immediate objective there was the breaking of the Bazancourt-Challerange railway and the capture of the Challerange junction, which would have completely cut off the supplies of the Crown Prince's army in the Argonne, for the other main railway from Germany passes through Verdun, and is, of course, in French hands. The capture of a range of low hills which stretches through the country here was another important consideration. There was, moreover, the vital necessity to compel Germany

to relieve her pressure on Russia, which was in severe straits at that time. But that probably affected the date rather than the operations themselves, the preparations for which must have been going on for months beforehand. In any case, the moral effect on France and on the enemy of an energetic offensive and the destruction of her elaborate defences here were doubtless felt to be a sufficient reason for the campaign. The result did not reach the distant hopes of a great break-through, but with the exception of the Marne fighting it was the greatest demonstration of the new French superiority in guns and men, and its material results were undeniable and impressive. We now know that after the first day the German staff were hurriedly perfecting their plans for the possibility of a great evacuation, and that even in Brussels the German documents and papers had been packed and ready for immediate transport, and all over the invaded territory the German civil government had everything ready for flight. France battered tremendously, and shook the walls of the German occupation, and her blows reverberated throughout Belgium.

THE NUMBERS ENGAGED.

The offensive in Champagne was carried out by the Second and Fourth French armies, part of the army group commanded by General Castelnau, whose defence



THE BATTLEFIELD IN CHAMPAGNE.

of Nancy, in September, 1915, at the time of supreme trial, was one of the great deeds of the war (Vol. II., page 131). The Fourth Army was commanded by a General who had long commanded the same army; the General of the Second Army was a recent appointment. Against them was a group of German armies under General von Buelow. Prussians, Saxons, Bavarians, Westphalians, Wurtembergers were all engaged (prisoners from fifty-six different regiments were captured), and when the attack on Le Main de Massiges had developed, reinforcements from the Crown Prince's army in the Argonne came to the relief of the beaten Germans, and fought with great desperation, refusing to surrender, and dying in companies. The numbers engaged in the Champagne battles on either side is not known, but the probability is that they reached a total of over half-a-million men, fighting on a front of only eighteen miles. The French Staff estimate the German losses to be about 140,000 men out of action, which is, roughly, an army of three army corps. The number of German prisoners captured on this front were 25,000, which is more than a sixth of that number. The Germans claimed on the 3rd October to have captured 10,721 Frenchmen, which, on the same basis of counting, would mean a French loss of about 60,000 in all. The French state, however, that the Germans have counted wounded and dead as prisoners.

It is useful to compare these figures with the results of other great battles fought by France. At the Jena the French took 15,000 prisoners and 200 cannon, while 12,000 Prussians were slain. At Austerlitz they took 12,000 prisoners and 186 cannon. Their enemies lost 25,000 men. At Saint-Privat the French lost 12,000 men, the Germans 10,000. At Freschwiller the French lost 5,000 slain and 9,000 prisoners.

We may take the French forces to be about 300,000 strong. According to the available information, the Germans had on this front seventy battalions, and to meet the attack twenty-nine battalions were added before the 25th September, which, with artillery and engineers, gives a total of about 115,000 men immediately engaged. The losses during the artillery preparation and the first fighting caused the German staff to gather from many parts all available resources, and ninety-three new battalions were added before the 15th October. This would mean a total German force of about 225,000 men, which is, according to authoritative French estimates, about an eighth of the entire German force on the whole western fronts. The victors captured ground along the whole front, varying from one to five kilometres deep. In all places the very elaborately fortified front lines were carried. The total ground conquered represented forty square kilometres. The spoils are announced in the following Order from General Joffre on the 5th October.

"GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
"October 5th.

"The Commander-in-Chief addresses to the troops under his orders the expression of his profound satisfaction with the results obtained in the attacks up to to-day.

"Twenty-five thousand prisoners, 350 officers, 150 guns and material which has not yet been enumerated, are the trophies of a victory measured by its renown through Europe.

"None of the sacrifices agreed to has been in vain. Everyone has contributed to the common task. The present is a sure guarantee to us of the future.

"The Commander-in-Chief is proud to command the finest troops France has ever known,

J. JOFFRE."

THE FIELD OF BATTLE.

The country of the battle is as suitable for warfare as any tract of land in a civilised country can be. It is, with a few breaks, rolling chalk terrain, with very little ploughed land, and even little pasture land—a quiet, desolate district, reminding one in many ways of Salisbury Plain, but broken here and there with clumps of pine plantations, which in some cases serve to hide the hangars of the observation balloons and aeroplanes, and provide concealment for the concentrations of huts and dug-outs, stores, ammunition trains, and all the elaborate accompaniments of modern armies in the field. These plantations furnished logs for shoring up and protecting the dug-outs. The villages are few and humble, with the exception of one in which there is a beautiful two-spire Gothic church that stands inviolate in the terribly mutilated village. The Germans spared it in their retreat, as they were using it as a hospital. There are no vines in this part. It is a Champagne very different from the vivacious ideas that the world has of the country. In the west the fighting took place just north of the Camp de Châlons, the desolate flats where Attila the Hun was defeated by the Gauls. To the east, the land is still chalky, but it is cut up with small ravines and little sharp hills, which provide elaborate dug-outs and difficult positions for the searching of the artillery. Vaudesincourt is the village at the extreme west of the attack, and Ville sur Tourbe at the extreme east, where the blue bulks of the Argonne begin to break the sky-line. Both forces were supplied by main railway lines running roughly parallel to one another close behind the front, and both had elaborate systems of field railways, the Germans being worked by horse or man power, and the French by little locomotives. After the victory the French were in possession of 240 kilometres of German railway, which they had to reconstruct to bear the additional weights of their engines. These railways are used not only to provide munitions, food and stores, but also to reconcentrate the troops at parts that are attacked. During the attack the French aeroplane corps heavily bombed the German railway line, and the junctions at Bazancourt and Challerange. The chalky soil differs in parts, at some places being both firm and porous, and dry in almost any weather, and at others of a soft cheamy character, making the trenches ankle deep in white mud, and the fields slippery and heavy under foot. On the day of the grand attack the weather, after a spell of dry, fine days, changed to rain and mist, unfavourable to artillery work, the shells bursting erratically and greatly delaying at many places the movements of the attacking forces in the open.

TRAINING AND WEAPONS.

The French preparations for the attack were characterised by extraordinary thoroughness in staff work, and in the actual training of the men. In Artois, in May, for the great assault on that tremendous maze of entrenchments and redoubts known as "the Labyrinth," the French front line troops (it may now be stated) who were to undertake the attack were taken out of the trenches and exercised for several months in attacking exercise against a series of works modelled on the actual Labyrinth. On the Champagne front the men were taken out of the trenches at the beginning of September, and practised their attack against field fortifications specially prepared for them. When the morning came each platoon knew exactly what it had to do and how to do it. The new steel helmet had been



The battlefield north of Perthes: The soldiers in the foreground are preparing new positions for heavy artillery in the advanced ground taken from the Germans.

[French Official Photograph, N.I.]



French Infantry passing into possession of what was once a German trench in Champagne.

[French Official Photograph, N.I.]

served out to all the troops engaged. It proved a very useful protection, and is believed to have decreased the casualties to a degree which some place as high as 15 per cent of the total. It is a headpiece finely designed to deflect bullets and pieces of flying explosives from many angles, and its thickness is sufficient to keep out a direct hit from spent bullets and shrapnel. It is particularly useful in the present combats by hand grenade. It is one of the few things where the Allies have an invention superior to that of the enemy. The comments of the German prisoners were sufficient to show the value of the headpiece by the envy it aroused amongst them. It is in shape something like the helmet of antique statues of Mercury, with a narrower brim, and it is coloured horizon-blue, like the new French uniform, and easily mingles with the colour of the country. Another addition to the equipment since the Marne was the trench knife, which the soldiers carry at the waist in front. It has a blade of about six inches long, and is for use when the soldier has jumped into an enemy trench and has to clear a space by fast "in-fighting," when the bayonet cannot be used owing to the confined movements. The soldier uses the knife dagger-ways, striking at the faces of his opponents, and its effect is terrifying, as well as destructive. The method of fighting is that the first wave of the advance breaks up the opposition in the trenches, and rushes down the communication trenches and on the top with bombs and bayonets until the next line is reached. The second and succeeding waves finish the fighting in the trench, call on the men in the dug-out to surrender, and unless they come out at once throw bombs into the dug-outs, where shelter is impossible. In the September offensive the French were well supplied with grenades, the common one being of the shape and size of an ordinary beer bottle, with a pin secured by a wire which has to be wrenched off before it can be used. In the fighting on Le Main de Massiges, where trenches in a steep hill had to be taken by immediate assault, the men at one point were in a line of about six hundred yards passing grenades from hand to hand, the front files of bombers having their places taken as they fell by the succeeding files. The most splendid fire and bravery were shown by the French infantry in these attacks. In one case, near Souain, the infantry took German trenches to the depth of two kilometres in under an hour, and at another point, in the same place, three kilometres were covered in forty-five minutes, which, even without any opposition, is fast going in a region so torn and seamed by heavy shell fire and wide trenches.

THE RECONNAISSANCE WORK.

The staff preparations were done with all the science and care which a year's experience had ripened. In modern war men have gone back to prehistoric devices of underground shelters and burrows; but modern science, in the form of the aeroplane and the camera, has made it possible to note and record the whole system of trenches and shelters so that each army is aware of every line and turn of its enemy, and so long as aeroplanes are not fought away from the lines it is impossible to conceal the vital fact of an entrenched position. The French aeroplane reconnaissance had been done with extreme care, and the photographs taken by their aerial spies showed not only every trench and communication, but in most cases every dug-out as well, the heads of the dug-outs showing black in the grey shadows of the trenches. The German reconnaissance was equally good, and one in a position to speak at this front said that the German

photographs which had fallen into their hands of the French trenches were better than those they had themselves, but that, of course, is explained by the fact that an army does not require to make very close observation records of its own trenches. The German reconnaissance, however, stopped short at a very important point, for the sufficient reason that in the last weeks before the attack they were beaten off from the French position by defending aeroplanes. In that time the French were busy in many parts of the front, especially in the Souain section, burrowing forward by new trenches and connecting up from part to part until, under the eyes and fire of the Germans, they had brought forward their front to within a striking distance of about 200 metres from the enemy. The preparations for the concentration and launching of the huge bodies of troops that had been brought forward for the moment of the great attack were ingenious, and very elaborate in scale. In all places special trenches of departure had been made. In the assault on the Le Main de Massiges nearly 2,000 men had been employed in making the way so that the troops could suddenly well up from their reservoirs and pour over irresistibly, and down the valley and up the fingers of the "hand." In another part of the line a hollow, protected by a palisade of tens of thousands of sandbags, allowed over a thousand soldiers to wait in safety for the moment of advance. This place was called the "Place de l'Opéra." In the modern attack out of trenches, surprise and speed after the artillery has done its work are, of course, the supreme factors.

The line of every trench and organised work being mapped down in the staff plans, it became necessary for convenience to give names to the various localities. These names (or nicknames) were conferred mainly by the French Intelligence Bureau, sometimes by simple extensions of actual places like "Ouvrage de Vederange;" others were imaginative, like "Tranchée des Vandales," "Tranchées des Satyrs," "Boyau du Harem," "Boyau de la Kultur," and "Le Poignard;" others more simply, like "Boyau de Guillaume," "Tranchée d'Hindenburg," and "Tranchée des Dardanelles;" others too highly flavoured with salt Gallic wit for everyday consumption. Nearly all these trenches with names are now in French hands, and some of them are re-christened; some of them are so smashed and flattened that they no longer can be recognised as trenches. They are like long graves filled in by a giant, who has tossed the earth anyway, and fringes of barbed wire, broken logs from the dug-outs, and smashed guns and trench shields stick up from the mounds. Underneath, in the deep shelters, hundreds of smothered Germans still lie hidden.

The same care and ingenuity shown in the methods for concentrating and launching the attack is seen in the plans for bringing the troops to the front lines. For two or three miles back the old roads and the many new roads that had been constructed were lined on the side next the enemy by tall wire frameworks, on which were hung branches of larch and pine and screens of rushes to hide the roads, so that the German observation balloons could not discern the movements of troops upon them. Strong portable bridges of light construction were prepared to set over the trenches for the speedy advance of the French artillery after the attack, and possibly also for the French cavalry. The Germans reported that the French, "misapprehending the situation," employed cavalry after the first attack, and that this cavalry was caught by the German fire and heavily cut up. The French state that the Germans were misinformed. At one part some



French troops passing through one of the bombarded towns in Champagne recaptured from the Germans.
[Newspaper Illustrations.]



All that remained of the windmill at Souain after the French bombardment. The size of the ruins can be measured by the men standing near and behind them.
[Sport and General.]

regimental cavalry was used to cut off German troops who had come into the open to flee from a position that was heavily shelled, and the cavalry were very effective in this way. After that, the cavalry were employed, but as infantrymen, and the horses were sent back. No brigades of cavalry were used at any point.

On the eve of the battle General Joffre issued this address to his armies:—

"SOLDIERS OF THE REPUBLIC.

"After some months of waiting, which have allowed us to increase our forces and our resources, whilst those of the enemy have wasted, the hour has come to attack, that we may conquer and add fresh pages of glory to those of the Marne, of Flanders, of the Vosges, and of Arras.

"Behind the hurricane of steel and fire, let loose by the toil of the factories of France, where your brothers have worked for us night and day, you will go to the assault all together along the whole front in close union with the armies of our Allies.

"Your dash forward will be irresistible.

"It will carry you in the first rush up to the batteries of the enemy, beyond the fortified lines which he opposes to you.

"You will not allow him truce nor rest until victory is achieved.

"Go forward with high heart to deliver the soil of your country, for the triumph of right and of liberty.

J. JOFFRE."

THE BOMBARDMENT.

The bombardment of the German positions began on the 22nd of September, and continued night and day without stop until a quarter past nine on the morning of the 25th. The Germans had been expecting the great attack, and in many of the trenches that were close together the German soldiers had put up notices, and shouted to the French that they would be ready for them "on the 21st," and asked them to come on and begin the attack before the day fixed. It was impossible to conceal the concentrations and the new railway developments. The Germans did everything in their power to strengthen their defences and to watch for fresh indications of the storm. The terrific scale and violence of the artillery outburst, however, seems to have taken them by surprise, and to have smashed their special arrangements for dealing with it. We now know that in many parts it was found impossible to convey food or stores to the front line, as communication trenches had been specially marked for destruction, and letters in the possession of prisoners show that whole divisions had been without food for forty-eight hours, and some regiments were deprived of food for a hundred and twelve hours. The artillery's first aim was the destruction of the barbed wire protections before the trenches. For this purpose their work was assisted by a new contact fuse, particularly sensitive, which caused an instant explosion at the first contact with the ground. Another shell of a special kind was also employed. The effect exceeded the Staff expectations, tearing the wire into useless fragments and leaving a clear way to the trenches. The usual difficulty, however, was found when the Germans had spread their wire cunningly on the far side over the crest of a height. These caused the French at some points to be hung up, but to meet such a possibility at suspected places plans were made to surround the position from easier approaches on either side.

At the same time the French heavy guns were bombarding the second position of the Germans, causing a barricade to prevent reinforcements for the first line; and the headquarters of the divisional staffs, the cantonments and stations, and the field railways were heavily assailed.

Some letters found in the captured trenches give an indication of the efficiency of the bombardment.

"24th September.

"For two days the French have been firing like madmen. To day, for instance, a shelter has been battered in. There were sixteen men in it. Not one of them pulled his bones out of it. They are all dead. Besides that, there are heaps of isolated dead and a great mass of wounded.

"The artillery fires almost as quickly as the infantry. A cloud of smoke covers the entire front of the battle, so that one can see nothing. Men are falling like flies. The trenches are nothing but a pile of débris."

25th September.

"A rain of shells is pouring on us. The kitchen and everything that has been sent us has been bombarded by night. Ah! if only the end were near! It is the cry that you hear everybody raising: Peace! Peace!"

THE ATTACK.

At a quarter-past nine on Saturday, the 25th September, the rain of shells, which had lasted three days and four nights, suddenly ceased for a minute; and before the ears of the Germans could identify the peace that followed, the French army from Massiges on the east to Saint Hilaire on the west had leapt out of their underground cities and were surging over the dead ground and into the trenches where the Germans had faced them for a year. Accounts differ as to how they charged. Eloquent descriptions have been published how they chanted the "Marseillaise," and cheered and sang, but if they did so it was against the army regulations, which demand silence, and to scramble quickly over the shell-ridden ground probably demanded all their breath. One staff officer who saw the advance said grimly that the only noise they made was the grinding of their teeth. When the front wave reached the German trenches they found nearly everywhere that the front line was in ruins, and the defenders killed or sheltering in the dug-outs. The succeeding wave cleared out the trenches, took the prisoners, and stuck the pennons they had brought into the parapets to signal their progress to the artillery. The charging of men with steel helmets and pennons was a sight that France had not seen since the seventeenth century. The flags were rags of red cotton on poles cut in the woods. They signalled great deeds, but after the battle they were trampled into the ground in the grim, unshowy way in which France now conducts her wars. Gas had been used in certain sectors, but not in others. None was used, for instance, at Le Main de Massiges, where the longest distance separated the forces. The long instantaneous attack made it impossible for the defending commanders to get support from the other sectors, and, in any case, the French, with a tremendous curtain of artillery fire, were holding the approaches to the first line. Portions of the first line held out in their second and third trenches, defended by machine-guns in steel casements, concreted in and covered with earth, the slot for the gun muzzle being within a few inches of the ground. This accounted for the prevalence of leg wounds at many parts. The assault on the second lines was more difficult, because the artillery had not the range to the same nicety, and, making the most of the run of the ground, the Germans had very strong barbed wire hedges on the far slopes of the inclines which the French fire had failed to cut. Very soon the French were facing in all directions, as the difficulties of the ground and the obstacles increased. Some troops were even facing south, for at some places what was virtually a field fortress was surrounded and carried from the back. Confusion occurred, units were



Immediately after the Champagne advance: French artillery which has just been moved up to its new position.

[French Official Photograph, S. and G.]



A German first-line trench in Champagne after the French bombardment.

[French Official Photograph, S. and G.]

broken and mixed, flanks "left in the air" and exposed to enfilading fire; but the fruits of the careful preparation were not lost, and units disengaged themselves and re-formed, and the new connections were made with a speed and steadiness that formerly would have been impossible. A year's war now makes a veteran.

THE ARTILLERY WORK.

Meantime, the artillery had rushed out from concealment and over the portable bridges on the French trenches, and up in the open as in a nineteenth century battle. Horses were killed and men took their places. Nothing can exceed the enthusiasm of the soldiers engaged when they speak of how the gunners brought up the guns on the great day, especially over the craters before l'Épine de Vedegrange. One battery of 75's, on the Saturday morning, were brought up close to the trenches of the first line, galloping in the open. They crossed over the crest of a hill and got to work on the German trenches 600 metres away. Then they lengthened their fire as the infantry advanced before them, and concentrated on a point four kilometres behind the German line to prevent the enemy's reinforcement of shells reaching the first position. At two o'clock they followed the infantry and destroyed some obstructions, shells falling around them all the time. The guns were turned on a little collection of farm buildings which the Germans had made into a blockhouse, the doors and windows being filled with sandbags cemented together. The enemy's machine-guns were turned on the battery, which, however, got into action so quickly that after twelve rounds from the battery the mitrailleuses were silenced, and the garrison raised the white flag.

Where the French artillery had made clear practice on the German trenches, the effect was tremendous. Parapets were smashed, and the solid roof protections of shelters tossed about and battered down. The Germans had very large dug-outs, capable of holding sixty and even ninety men, set as deep as thirty feet in the earth, elaborately strengthened with timber props and steel casings. Many of these now lie beneath tons of earth, with their occupants within. Large numbers of prisoners were taken from dug-outs in which they were surprised, without having word of the attack, the men in the trenches being all killed. In some places the men were dazed by the incessant bombardment and worn by lack of food and drink, the communication trenches being choked on the first days of the bombardment. They came out and surrendered gladly. The French do not speak with respect of the physique or fighting qualities of the German infantry over the main part of the line. At Le Main de Massiges, however, where strong reinforcements arrived from the Crown Prince's army in the Argonne, the Germans fought with tremendous bitterness and tenacity, and, refusing to surrender, died in hundreds. The prisoners wounded on the first day were over 16,000.

THE EXTENT OF THE FRENCH GAINS.

The offensive may be described as a series of assaults in five sectors, in which the fortunes of war varied considerably, and the influence of a notable victory in one part did not always sympathetically affect the adjoining operations. In the first two days of the attack the big successes were made in the district in front of the line Saint Souplet-Somme-Py-Manne. The extreme advance was made at the Butte de Tahure, where the French breached the third line of the Germans. At the Butte de Souain, and further west at Hill 193, a depth of about four kilometres was taken. At the extreme ends

of the district engaged the attacks were not pressed home, but the immediately adjoining parts at either end were bastions of enormous strength, and their capture by the French were great achievements.

In the sector l'Épine de Vedegrange to the west, which is immediately north of the Camp de Châlons, the attack of the French left was held up after a kilometre advance, but on the right the French rushed over fortified sloping approaches, and through woods, heavily defended by guns, capturing four trenches successively. In eighteen hours they were in contact with the German second lines. In this whole sector the offensive had carried fifteen square kilometres of ground by the 28th September. The prisoners numbered 3,000, and forty-four cannons were captured.

In the sector of Souain, further east, a great deal of new trench work had been done to carry the French parallels within striking distance of the German lines. The attack was made in three different directions, and the advance was extremely rapid, the centre penetrating to the extent of three kilometres in forty-five minutes. In ten hours they were on a height of the Navarin Farm, where some of the bitterest travails of this campaign took place. To the west, the Moulin de Souain, which had been strongly fortified at the point of the German salient, had been sapped and blown up by a powerful mine, by which the mill and its defenders disappeared, leaving a crater of over two hundred feet long by fifty feet broad. Aided by this, the French advanced over the German trenches to a distance of two kilometres in less than an hour. To the east, the Bois Sabot held out on the first night, but it was captured by encirclement. The Germans ultimately surrendered what was practically a field fortress, with a great store of materials, on the 27th. The fighting in this sector was very desperate. General Marchand, who came into history through the Fashoda crisis in 1898, himself led his Colonial troops here, and fell wounded on the parapet of a captured trench, where he had stood smoking his pipe and encouraging his men. Two brigade commanders fell close to him. By the end of September the French had a footing in the powerful second line west of the Navarin Farm. They finally broke through on a front of less than 500 yards, but the German artillery, concentrating on this narrow gap, were able to stem further French progress, and to give the Germans time to dig themselves in again. It was not till the 6th October that the French organisation was complete for a further attack here. The German reinforcements brought from the Russian front were heavily concentrated at this point, but the French artillery wrought havoc on the new entrenchments, preventing supplies coming through, and the evacuation of the wounded. In the fighting that took place on the 7th and 8th, they did not put up very strong resistance, and what remained of a regiment—482 men and ten officers—surrendered. The French, however, were held up by a series of formidable mitrailleuse redoubts on the north, and had to return with their prisoners to the trenches they had captured before the 6th.

The greatest advance was made in the sector of Perthes, where the attack penetrated to a depth of five kilometres, and established itself on Hill 192, the Butte de Tahure, a position which the Germans thought invulnerable. Its crest was taken on October 6th, after desperate fighting. On the 30th, the Germans, however, succeeded in reoccupying the crest, but the French held to their position on the slope a short distance down. Encircling movements in the first attack led

to the capture of strong positions in the woods and a speedy advance on the last trenches in the first line, where they so surprised the enemy that at one point they captured many officers in their beds in very comfortable dug-outs. Strong German attacks with gas-shells and liquid fire were made in this sector from the 25th October till the 2nd November, but apart from the recapture of the Tahure Hill crest they had no success.

In the sector of Mesnil the enemy was able to develop his strongest resistance. Little progress was made here after the first thrust, and the German line remained a peninsular extending south to the east of Tahure village to within a kilometre of the original front. In the sector of Beauséjour, however, the French attack was brilliantly successful. So curious was their rush that at one point they passed over the German trenches and surprised a battery of German artillery, killing the drivers and capturing the rest. This was near the hills called the Maisons de Champagne. The further point here they could get was the Ouvrage de la Defaite, which was lost and recaptured, and finally evacuated under a severe bombardment. Intermittent fighting continued here till the end of October, without material result.

THE CAPTURE OF MASSIGES.

Perhaps the finest achievement of the whole offensive was the capture of the series of four or five hills called Le Main de Massiges, which roughly resembles a human hand, and was thought by the Germans to be one of their firmest clutches on the heart of France. The German commander here had boasted to a neutral correspondent a few weeks before that one washerwoman with two machine-guns could hold Hill 191, the chief hill of this group, against a French army. The French were on a low hill, about 800 yards off, with a valley between. Very elaborate preparations had been made to launch the attack, two hundred workmen being employed to prepare the trenches of departure. The artillery work was very thoroughly done, but the German trenches here are very deep and well made. In a quarter of an hour the French infantry, with a tremendous dash, had carried the first works, and were on the summit of two of the "fingers," by a complete chain of soldiers, passing grenades from hand to hand. The combat continued from the 26th September to the 3rd October, the Germans rushing up all available reinforcements, which included several battalions from the Crown Prince's army in the Argonne, but without effect, the French capturing and consolidating Hill 191, which is the chief height of the district, and holding the "hand" to a depth of two kilometres.

THE GERMAN COUNTER-ATTACKS.

A striking feature about the operations in Champagne was the sporadic character of the German counter-attacks.

The utmost they could do in the week after the first attack was a series of local spasmodic counter-attacks, heralded by half-hour cannonades of asphyxiating and tear-compelling shells. It was not until the 18th October that the Germans attempted a general offensive, and it was then made in Eastern Champagne, between Rheims and Auberive-sur-Suippes, where the French line formed a salient. The German objective was evidently to throw the French back over the Rheims-Châlons railway and the Vesle river and canal, and thus to endanger the fruits of the victory in Eastern Champagne. The attack was made at night after three hours heavy shelling, the German offensive of several divisions concentrating upon a six-mile front. At dawn on the 18th, in four successive lines separated from each other by about three hundred yards, the third line reached the trenches and got a footing there, but were bombed out again. The fourth line managed to lodge at one place, but were expelled before nightfall, and the Germans retreated with heavy losses. A further attempt was made nearer Rheims, but the Germans were unable to get beyond the wire entanglements. On the 30th October, an offensive was attempted by the Germans over the line from the Butte de Tahure to La Courtine works, north of Le Mesnil-les-Hurlus, the fruits of which were the capture of the crest of the Butte and 1,215 prisoners, but the objective of attacking from their salient, which projected to near its original point of the line at La Courtine, and breaking the new French lines at Tahure, came to nothing.

The effect of the Champagne battles has already been told in terms of prisoners, spoils, and captured positions. Like the fighting in Artois, the offensive was brilliantly successful in the first day and the attack was pushed vigorously home, but the German third line held at all points where it was reached, and the break through, which was doubtless the ultimate objective, was not made. In reaching the crest of the Butte de Tahure the French hopes reached their highest point, and only one or two lines of trenches stood between them and the open country. The question why they did not succeed in pouring through must be answered in the same way as that of the other big offensives of the Allies that all but succeeded. Through the circumstances of the fighting, the advance bodies formed sharp salients in enemy ground, and by their excellent system of telephones and signalling, and very capable artillery work, the Germans were able to concentrate from different quarters so heavy a fire on these particular spots that the French were unable to make headway, and in some cases the front waves of the attack were captured and the succeeding waves could not get through the German fire curtain to their aid. The problem of the break through seems to be the problem of a level, continuous advance of a whole army in battle, or, at any rate, on a sufficient front to thin out the fire of the enemy artillery.



The married man in the army: A street in Swansea containing 39 houses from 30 of which the husband was either called up for active service at the outbreak of the war or enlisted immediately afterwards.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

CHAPTER XXVII.

PENSIONS AND ALLOWANCES.

FAULTS OF THE OLD POLICY—SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS—CONTINENTAL EXAMPLES—OUR RELIANCE ON CHARITY—THE RELIEF FUNDS—EMPLOYMENT SCHEMES—ON BEHALF OF THE TROOPS—HELP FOR ALLIES AND FRIENDS.

NO more striking evidence existed of the modest military pretensions of Britain throughout her history before the great war than in the absence of all State provisions not only for relieving war distress, but even for keeping from want the dependants of men on service. The deliberate policy of successive Governments concerned with a small army serving in remote outposts had been to enlist only single men, and to discourage matrimony by refusing recognition to the marriages of all save a very small percentage of the rank and file, who were allowed to take advantage of what was known as "marriage on the strength." This entitled the wife to live in quarters, rent free, with fuel, light, and furniture; or, if quarters were not available, to an equivalent money grant of 8s. 2d. a week. In the absence of the husband on service, if the wife remained in quarters she was given 4d. a day towards her food, if in lodgings she received 1s. 1d. a day separation allowance and 1½d. a day for each child.

There was clearly little inducement to marriage in such a system, even for the very few to whom it was allowed. Its obvious social dangers, which made most garrison towns notorious, brought it under increasingly severe criticism. As applied to an army of 200,000, recruited almost wholly from the poorer classes, it was,

however, practicable, if not wise. On the outbreak of the great war, and the raising of an army on the Continental scale, it fell to pieces.

In the matter of the rights of the dependants of men killed or broken in our wars, our policy had been scarcely more creditable. In the South African War the claim of a widow married "on the strength" to a pension was for the first time recognised by the State. It was fixed at a flat rate of 5s. a week, with 1s. 6d. for each child. Any supplementing of this meagre sum, as well as the granting of assistance to other wives and dependants, was done out of charitable funds. Large sums collected from the public during the Crimean War, the Indian Mutiny, the Zulu and Ashantee Wars, and other such times of crisis, had been entrusted to a body called the Royal Patriotic Commissioners to administer. They had carried out their work zealously and effectively, with the help of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families' Association, the Soldiers' and Sailors' Help Society, and other voluntary agencies, but the opinion was strongly held by critics of the system that the payments to the dependants of soldiers should be as rigorously freed from all suggestion of charity as, say, those made under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

A chance to end this antiquated and complex policy

of supplementing inadequate pensions by voluntary grants came with the Boer War, but the Government did not take advantage of it. Instead, they appointed a Select Committee of both Houses of Parliament to consider how best the voluntary funds needed to augment State provision could be administered. The Committee, over which Lord James of Hereford presided, reported in 1901, and as a result the old Patriotic Commissioners were replaced by a statutory body called The Royal Patriotic Fund Corporation. It was formed of the Lords Lieutenants of the Counties, the Chairmen of the County Councils, and the Mayors and Provosts, together with representatives of the War Office, the Admiralty, and the various charitable bodies concerned. It had on its Executive Committee only one representative of Labour, none of the Boards of Trade, Agriculture, or Education, and no women. Thus a system that was viewed with distaste by Labour, and indeed by all who felt that the care of soldiers' dependants should be stripped of all connection with patronage or charity, was perpetuated up to the brink of the European struggle, and, as we shall see, beyond.

SUBSTANTIAL INCREASES.

In August, 1914, the War Office had on its books some 1,500 wives married "on the strength." On the 10th of August the Prime Minister announced in the Commons that the distinction between marriage on and off the strength, which it had been a cardinal point of War Office policy to enforce, would be dropped. Within a fortnight 200,000 allowance claims had to be faced. The War Office had no machinery with which to meet this crisis, and recourse was therefore had to the Old Age Pensions Committees and the branches of the Soldiers and Sailors Families' Association in the various districts. They drew for immediate necessities upon the National Relief Fund, which had been opened by the Prince of Wales early in August, and upon the various local funds started in connection with it. Thus from the outbreak of the war the provision for the dependants of the army, admitted on all hands to be a right and not a charity, was made in the main through charitable and self-elected bodies, and met from funds subscribed for charitable purposes. It does not mitigate criticism of the principle involved to say that the means taken were probably the best possible to meet the emergency quickly, and that the work was for the most part extremely well done. Grave delays in payment of allowances were indeed at first caused by men being drafted to the front without declaring their wives, and by lack of local machinery and like causes; but in such vital matters as the provision they made for "unmarried wives" in cases where a real home had been kept, and in their extension of allowances to dependants other than wives, the bodies concerned earned general approval, and forestalled Government action.

Following on the announcement of the Prime Minister, to which reference has been made, a White Paper was issued in November, 1914, dealing with pensions and allowances. The official scale, which its provisions superseded, recognised, as we have said, only wives "married on the strength," and, in the case of the army, granted them a separation allowance of 7s. 7d. per week, with 1s. 2d. for each child, and in case of the soldier's death a pension of 5s. per week, with 1s. 6d. for each child. The wives of seamen and marines drew no separation allowance, but had pensions on the same scale as those of soldiers. The new provisions recognised

the right to pensions and allowances not only of all wives, but of other dependants, including a woman with whom the soldier had kept a real home, though unmarried. This latter concession, decried in some quarters as "putting a premium on concubinage," was generally recognised as some recompense for the old "on the strength" system which had penalised the legal relationship.

The new rate of separation allowance compelled the soldier to allot 3s. 6d. a week from his pay to his wife, to which the Government added 9s. a week, with 2s. 6d. a week for each child up to three, and 2s. a week for the fourth and successive children. The amount paid by the Government to other dependants varied with the contribution made by the soldier. If, for instance, he had allowed his mother 9s. 6d. a week when at home, and would now contribute 2s. 4d., the Government would make up the rest. The November White Paper also recognised for the first time the right of the wives and dependants of sailors and marines to separation allowances, the amounts being less and the compulsory allotment greater than in the case of the army. In dealing with pensions, it raised the weekly amount for the childless widow from 5s. to 7s. 6d., and for the widow with one child from 6s. 6d. to 12s. 6d., allowing 2s. 6d. each for the next two children, 2s. for each additional child beyond three, and 5s. each for motherless children up to three.

CONTINENTAL SYSTEMS.

These were the general terms of the first official economic recognition in this country of the armed forces, not as a class apart following a specialised trade under very heavy disabilities, but as engaging in the greatest of all national activities. The provisions of the White Paper took effect as from the outbreak of war; but it was recognised that they were not a final solution, and in November, 1914, the whole question of allowances and pensions was referred to a Select Committee, consisting of Messrs. Barnes, Chamberlain, Lloyd George, Bonar Law, McKenna, and T. P. O'Connor. They examined witnesses representing the War Office, the Admiralty, the Royal Patriotic Fund, the Chelsea Hospital, and other great war charities, as well as of the great Trades Unions, the Women's Labour League, and various bodies interested and expert in social work. Their deliberations, as published in their report, which appeared in April, 1915, showed how strongly the traditions of a voluntary and limited army could persist in times when our land forces approximated more and more to the conscriptionist scale. The nations engaged in the war provided the Committee with the widest imaginable differences of example in this matter. At the one extreme stood the French and German systems, in which relief to the dependants of men on service was a civil and not a War Office concern. It depended, that is to say, upon the existence of the woman, and not upon her ability to prove to the satisfaction of the army paymaster that she was the wife of a certain soldier. In Germany, the allowance was made partly in cash and partly in kind, and was not determined by an allotment from the purely nominal wage of the soldier. The dependant was assured of housing and food as a civil obligation. France adopted the device of a rent moratorium, which virtually relieved tenants from the payment of all house rents under £40, and business rents under £100, coupled with a small money grant to soldiers' dependants. In Switzerland, on mobilisation, the conscript was automatically relieved of all his civil obligations, and



The soldiers as family men: Highlanders returned from Flanders on leave, and with the mud of the trenches still on them, buying a Christmas turkey for the people at home. [Central News.

most Swiss contracts contained a mobilisation clause to this effect. In any case, the law put the onus on the creditor of proving that the soldier was in a position to pay.

The Committee were so far attracted by these necessary corollaries of a complete conscriptionist system as to consider making a rent allowance and maintenance grant to dependants from civil and not army funds.

" 'Would it not,' said Mr. Bonar Law, in examining a War Office witness, 'be a splendid thing for the War Office to be saved the constant attacks which this administration causes on the one hand, and would it not be a splendid thing afterwards if this were put on another estimate in the House of Commons, and did not appear as part of the army expenditure?' "—(*Minutes of Evidence of Committee on Pensions and Grants. Par. 122.*)

At the other extreme stood the examples given by our own Dominions, such as Canada and Australia, in paying their expeditionary soldiers a wage—6s. a day in the case of Australia—which made fighting a definitely attractive profession economically. The nearest any considerable body of opinion got to suggesting that system for this country was in the demand made by some 2,000 organisations representative of working-class opinion for a minimum separation allowance of £1 a week for wives of soldiers—a figure that made no real approach to, say, the Australian scale, but which would admittedly have raised the standard

of living in the homes of many of the ill-paid workers who had enlisted to a point at which it could not be kept on their return. The Committee considered also the possibility of securing, by means of a sliding scale of allowances, some approach to real "equality of sacrifice." Under any flat rate not dangerously high, the well-paid artisan or clerk with £6 a week could respond to the urgent appeals of his country only by breaking up his home, unless he applied for charitable help, or was aided by his employer. Yet the "moral obligation" to enlist had already extended far beyond the class to whom a separation allowance even of £1 a week would secure the integrity of the home.

Faced with these striking alternatives, the Committee steered a conservative middle course. Despite a growing tendency to regard Britain as "a nation in arms," they thought it best to perpetuate the old system, which clearly differentiated army dependants from other civilians to the extent of making the payment of their grants a charge upon the War Office. At the same time they fixed a separation allowance which, though generous compared with those of the past, entailed a heavy money sacrifice upon families whose bread-winner enlisted, unless they belonged to the less well-paid working classes. Finally they decided that in the many cases in which these provisions would manifestly be inadequate, recourse should be had to charitable funds.

CONTINUED RELIANCE ON CHARITY.

For the administration of pensions and allowances the Committee's report reconstituted the Royal Patriotic Corporation, with a Statutory Committee of twenty-five, of whom only twelve should be appointed by Parliament, and only the chairman paid. It should include representatives of Labour, of the War Office, the Admiralty, the Treasury, the National Relief Fund, the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families' Association, and not less than four women. The main functions of the Statutory Committee were defined as follows:—To decide questions of fact as to pensions payable to dependants other than wives; to decide the scale of such pensions, which would then be paid direct by the Naval and Military Authorities; and "in proper cases to supplement out of voluntary funds of a national character the separation allowances and pensions paid by the State."

When the Bill embodying these proposals was produced, it was met with strong criticism throughout the country, on the ground that it reduced to a minimum the responsibility of the State for what should be an entirely State concern. The Government, it was pointed out, intended to vest in a voluntary body, enjoying no special public esteem, the control of vast sums of public money, and to make it dependent for carrying out its work efficiently upon charitable funds subscribed for relief of distress. The new Statutory Committee of the Royal Patriotic Fund would, it was pointed out, include no representatives of the Boards of Trade, Agriculture, or Education, or of the Labour Exchanges; it proposed to work through the branches of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families' Association in the various districts, and they, however skilful and zealous, were inseparably associated with the traditions of patronage and charity. Worst of all, it would draw on the National Relief Fund to supplement the State grants.

The House of Commons contented itself with mild criticism. The Government, in supporting the Bill,

contended that if Parliament voted a sum of, say, £5,000,000 for the supplementing of pensions as an alternative to the use of charitable funds, "the stream of voluntary subscriptions would dry up," and that "if so, the whole business of supplementary allowances would assume a different and in some respects an unhappy aspect." This threat of a failure by the State to pay its debts to soldiers' dependants without charitable help did not deter the House of Lords from very drastically amending the Bill on the lines favoured by Labour and other critics. They substituted, for instance, for the Royal Patriotic Committee an independent National body, standing on its own foundation, appointed by Parliament and directly responsible to it. But when the Bill returned to the Commons the Government pleaded that it afforded means of immediately getting to work on a vital task, and they gave a vague promise of a more just and businesslike measure later. The Lords' amendments were not pressed, and the Bill became law.

THE RELIEF FUNDS.

Neutral observers, even in the advanced stages of the war, professed to be astonished at the small change that a world contest had made on the face of Britain, but in one way at least the chaos of Europe advertised itself continuously in this country. Day after day, for month after month, the non-combatant found himself urged in his morning mail, in his newspaper, on his tramcar, in the streets, and even at his entertainments, to give to all manner of war causes that ranged from hot baths for British soldiers to milk for Belgian babies. He might be excused, as the competition of appeals grew hotter, for feeling that his country's immunity from invasion had made him responsible for aiding half Europe from his private purse. The Belgians, the Servians, and the Armenians stood out among a host of stricken peoples that claimed his halfpence or his guineas. He was daily reminded that the "industrial north" of France was

TABLE SHOWING INCREASE IN PENSIONS AND ALLOWANCES.

I.—SEPARATION ALLOWANCES.

	PRE-WAR SCALE.		WHITE PAPER, NOV., 1914.		FROM MARCH 1ST, 1915.
Wife	7s. 7d.	Only if "married on the strength."	9s.	Irrespective of "marriage on the strength," + Compulsory allotment of 3s. 6d. from soldier.	12s. 6d.
and one child	8s. 9d.		11s. 6d.		17s. 6d.
and two children	9s. 11d.		14s.		21s.
and three "	11s. 1d.		16s. 6d.		23s.
and four "	12s. 3d.		18s.		25s.
Other dependants	Nil.		A sum determined by allotment from soldier, but not more than 9s.		Dependants of unmarried men can be rated as wife and children.

II.—PENSIONS.

Widow	5s.	Gratuity on re-marriage, £13.	7s. 6d.	Gratuity on re-marriage £39	10s.	Rising by 2s. 6d. at 35 and at 45.
and one child	6s. 6d.		12s. 6d.		15s.	
and two children	8s.		15s.		18s. 6d.	
and three "	9s. 6d.		17s. 6d.		20s. 6d.	
and four "	21s.		20s.	rates for 26 weeks from husband's death.	22s. 6d.	pension.
Motherless children	3s. each.		5s. up to three; 4s. thereafter.		5s. each for any number.	
Other dependants	Nil.		At discretion of Pensions Committee, but in no case more than a widow's.		Allowance for 26 weeks, then pension to be determined by authorities.	
Totally disabled soldier	Between 10s. 6d. and 17s. 6d.		Between 14s. and 23s., according to dependants, and 5s. National Insurance.		25s. and 2s. 6d. for each child, and 5s. National Insurance.	
Partly disabled soldier	Between 3s. 6d. and 10s. 6d., according to wage-earning capacity.		Between 3s. 6d. and 17s. 6d.		Difference between 25s. and what he can earn.	

in the enemy's grip; that Russia had saved Europe by her sacrifices early in the war; that Italian reservists had left many hard-pressed dependants in this country; or that Poland had been crushed and crushed again by the ebb and flow of battle. It seemed as though the Japanese alone of the friendly peoples concerned in the war had no claim to make on British generosity; and had a "Day" been set aside for the provision, say, of field ambulances for the besiegers of Kiao Chau, it is safe to say that few would have been surprised or have buttoned their pockets.

The stupendous stream of charity flowed along three main channels: in relief of general distress at home, in the provision of comforts and medical help for soldiers and sailors, and in aid of Allied and friendly peoples crushed by the war. We describe in another chapter the work of the Red Cross proper (Vol. III., Chap. XXVIII.), and the contribution made by Britain to the help of Belgium has been dealt with (Vol. II., Chap. XIX).

On the third day of the war the Prince of Wales issued an appeal in which he said that a National Relief Fund had been founded, of which he was "proud to act as treasurer." "At such a moment," he added, "we all stand by one another, and it is to the heart of the British people that I confidently make this most earnest appeal." The response was immediate, and in a week the Fund stood at £1,000,000. The impossibility of

administering the money from London was soon recognised, and, on the lines of a scheme designed by Sir Charles Macara at the time of the South African War, local branches of the fund were started throughout the country, to be administered by local committees, on the pledge that no penny of them should go to the Central Fund till the needs of the district had been met, and that the Central Fund would make good any deficit in the districts. The first use made of the relief funds was, as we have seen, to forestall Government payment of the allowances due to soldiers' dependants.

By October, 1914, the Central Fund, from the £3,000,000 subscribed to it, had allotted to its local agencies in

most cases branches of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families' Association—£600,000 for this purpose, and the local funds had been similarly employed. Despite the money available, there was much initial hardship. In September, 1914, a Manchester observer thus described the scene at the offices of the Charity Organisation Society, where applicants for relief were registered—a scene too common throughout the country:—

"The building is unsuitable for the purpose; the staff has been overwhelmed with work; hundreds of women have waited for hours in confusion and perplexity, and some have had to tramp back to their homes without being able to gain admission to the registration office. Although the need for immediate improvement of the machinery was apparent days ago, the scene yesterday afternoon outside this office

was intolerable to anyone who thought of the things which the husbands and sons of many of the applicants might soon be enduring on the battlefield. At half-past three there were more than 200 women still seeking admission, and some of them had waited patiently in the hot sun for four or five hours without food or refreshment. They sat on scaffold planks, many of them huddling babies, and one heard on all hands complaints of headache, and wistful longings for cups of tea. At intervals a group of a dozen or so was marshalled by a policeman into a dimly-lighted basement office, where the women had to stand until their cases could be dealt with by the harassed officials, who were doing their utmost to cope with the rush of work. One woman had travelled from Middleton for the third day, and she was still waiting her turn at half-past four."



A war charity "flag day" incident: A wounded member of the Canadian Scottish buys a buttonhole. [L.N.A.]

boom in employment which succeeded the early industrial crisis, these shameful scenes came to an end. In the spring of 1915, for instance, a local committee in a typical large industrial centre, which in the autumn had been meeting, say, 2,000 applications a week, had to face only some 300, and found its expenditure reduced from nearly £4,000 to under £1,000. In Manchester, up to March, 1914, the total number of cases assisted was 17,160, at an average cost of £2 17s. each. In Liverpool, in the same time, the number was 15,417, at a cost of £2 11s. 3d. Towards this, the War Office repaid £862, but the Committee submitted an account for £10,000, which they claimed was the amount advanced on separation allowances and not

With the raising of the Government allowance, and the

recovered through the army paymasters—a striking evidence of the inevitable confusion due to leaving the payment of the army's dependants for several weeks to voluntary bodies.

EMPLOYMENT SCHEMES.

Meanwhile, there were bitter complaints that the National Fund published no account of its stewardship, and that it was being used to relieve the State of its obligations instead of meeting the kind of cases for which it was subscribed. By the end of 1914 it had £4,430,000 at its disposal, of which it had spent only £1,420,000, and of that, £1,104,000 had gone to dependants of men on service, and only £186,000 to civil objects. By May, 1915, the Fund had reached £5,000,000, and had spent only £2,000,000. Some centres which had subscribed generously complained that they were being stinted of relief, and even, like Glasgow, went so far as to establish independent funds of their own. It was the deliberate policy of the Central Committee, chosen by the Prince of Wales in consultation with the Premier, to refuse direct money grants to relieve civil distress except in the last resort. They preferred to aid schemes of employment—and for this invoked the aid of the Royal Board and the Development Commission—or to set on foot plans for practical training to assist labour to move from one trade to another. In certain trades, where specialisation was too great to admit of the labour being readily turned into new channels, direct help had for a time to be given. But as the steady decline in unemployment which we have traced in an earlier chapter continued, the need for expenditure of this kind almost disappeared, and the Fund was left with valuable reserves.

Local voluntary help for soldiers' dependants took many forms besides that of subscriptions to the regular relief funds. The Pensions Committee, for instance, were much impressed by the example set in the mining districts of Yorkshire, where the workmen, by a voluntary weekly levy, augmented the Government allowance to the wives of their comrades who had enlisted from 12s. 6d. to 19s. 7d., because they regarded the latter as the minimum amount that would save the homes from deterioration. Similar plans were adopted in Herefordshire and elsewhere. Again, most public bodies and many private employers agreed to pay the wives of their enlisted men such addition to the Government allowance as would maintain the homes, and by these voluntary means enlistment was made possible for many well-paid employes to whom, on Government terms, it would have meant ruin. At the same time, however, it became clear that if middle-class married men were to be called upon to the extent that seemed probable at the end of 1915, some such rent provision as obtained in France would be necessary.

The Government, besides making it possible for the Trades Unions to reclaim a third of the money they disbursed in unemployment benefit, initiated many schemes which helped to lessen industrial distress. The construction of roads and parks, civic surveys, and other such public works were subsidised. The holiday resorts, which seemed likely to suffer fatally in their main industry—the letting of lodgings—were relieved by the sensible step of billeting on them the new army in training at fixed rates. Distress was, however, very acute in the Isle of Man, to which no troops could conveniently be sent. A brave attempt to start local industries proved insufficient to meet the desperate need caused by a curtailed steamer service and a dearth of visitors. The world-famous amusements of

Douglas dwindled to a few picture houses; hotels built to house hundreds dismissed their staffs and closed all but their bars; and in the autumn of 1915 the imminent starvation and bankruptcy of the island was the main topic in the House of Keys.

ON BEHALF OF THE TROOPS.

The excellent work of the Young Men's Christian Association, in erecting and manning recreation huts for the troops at home and abroad, should perhaps take first place among the many enterprises directed to the comfort of the forces. By the end of 1915 the Association had 800 recreation centres in the home camps, eighty in France, one in Gallipoli, eleven in Mudros, two in Mesopotamia, twenty-five in Egypt, eight in Malta, and one in Salonika. The huts were used as club-rooms for the men, where notepaper and light refreshments could be had, and where games and concerts were organised. In Britain they served to hearten the troops through the weary evenings of training. At the fronts their psychological value was enormous, and many soldiers bore grateful witness to the renewed courage and spirit they had gained from the brief return to the sanities of life which the huts afforded after the horror of the trenches.

While the V.M.C.A. took care of the social and spiritual welfare of the troops, a thousand organisations, ranging from small sewing parties to great funds organised by newspapers, provided for their material comfort. Wherever the War Office thought the regulation equipment might with advantage be supplemented, whether by portable hot baths or soup kitchens for Flanders, or by muslin head-nets to ward off the intolerable fly pest of Gallipoli, private effort rushed in to make good the deficiency. The first German gas attacks emptied the London shops of every foot of material from which respirators could be made. Many parts of the line soon suffered from an inevitable surfeit of woollen goods, and the replies to individual soldiers who had appealed through the Press for specific objects was found in many cases so to congest the military post that these private requests were prohibited, and the wiser plan adopted of ascertaining from quarter-master sergeants the needs of their companies. The requests from the firing line were a fair indication both of the rigours of the campaign and of the spirit of the men; and our enemies regarded the fact that mouth-organs, concertinas, playing-cards and footballs were eagerly demanded on our fronts, in addition to mittens and boracic powder, as further evidence of the soulless levity of the British "mercenaries." By the Christmas of 1915 there were few units either in training or abroad who could not rely on having their wants, from plum puddings to private correspondence, satisfied, so far as military necessity would allow. The Belgian army, too, with most of its families and friends behind the German ring of steel, was linked with British homes, and a number of bodies which sprang up with this object were combined under the chairmanship of M. Emile Vandervelde.

HELP FOR OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS.

Demands were made upon British generosity for foreign causes that could have had the success they did only in a country devoutly thankful for the integrity of its own frontiers. "Days" were allocated for street appeals for the French Red Cross, for Russian distress, for the Poles, for the Armenians, for the dependants of Italian reservists, and similar foreign, in addition to many

British, objects. They were marked by the selling in the streets of flowers, flags, or other emblems by women, and not the least interesting of many curious by-products of the war was the earnest controversy in the Press on the propriety of allowing girls to undertake such work. The critics contended that it gave opportunities for the forming of dangerous acquaintanceships. The defenders of the system considered this mere prudishness, and argued, as was true, that street collections obtained a more certain response than any other method of asking for money. The holding of "Days" became at one period so frequent that several Town Councils, headed by London, hastily framed bye-laws to regulate the collections so that they should cause the minimum of disturbance to traffic. But the device died of its own excesses; and it was a notable example of the charity which begins at home also ending there, that the "Our Day" of the British Red Cross, coming as it did after a host of others had wearied people of this mode of appeal, obtained a magnificent response.


The devastated districts of Northern France, which had suffered not less than Belgium, were made the object of at least two notable schemes of assistance. The Society of Friends gave general help in the repairing of homesteads or the building of huts, in assisting with farm work, and in providing medical skill and clothing. The Agricultural Relief of Allies Committee, initiated by the Royal Agricultural Society of England, was enabled, by the generous support of the British farming classes, to replace ruined agricultural implements and supply valuable breeding stock to districts that had been pillaged by the

invaders. The French system of communal farming enabled such goods to be held in common, and it was no unusual thing in the autumn of 1915 to find in Northern France Englishmen busily engaged in relief and restoration work, forming the centre of the gratitude of a devastated commune whose chief pet, as likely as not, would be a shearling ram presented by King George.

Probably no accurate estimate of the total amount of war-giving will ever be made. Mr. Ernest Dowding, an official of the National Relief Fund, in an article in the *Contemporary Review*, put it, up to November, 1915, at some thirty million pounds in money and kind. At that time the National Fund itself stood at five and a half millions, and over two and a half millions had been subscribed to the local relief funds. The joint fund of the Red Cross and St. John Ambulance had gathered nearly two millions in money and kind; the Belgian Relief Fund in Britain over a million; and the value of the comforts sent to the troops was probably not less than five millions. But these notable totals take no account of the money and goods given to a hundred other funds for the help of our people, our forces, and our friends. The expenses of collection in the case of most of the funds was commendably low—in the case of the National Fund, for instance, only .1 per cent, and in many others about 1 per cent. Whatever criticism might be made of our traditional policy of encouraging a flood of benevolence to relieve the State and the War Office of many of their responsibilities, the result was certainly an unparalleled example of the readiness of all classes to open their coffers to meet the great emergency.



Gifts for the troops at the front: Part of the parcel post for the Dardanelles being packed at the G.P.O., London.
[Newspaper Illustrations.]



The open-air treatment of wounded: A general view of one of the open-air wards at the 1st Eastern General Hospital, Cambridge.

[Central Press.]



Inside one of the open-air wards at Cambridge.

[Central Press.]



English Red Cross nurses arriving at Dieppe.

[Central News.]

CHAPTER XXVIII:

THE RED CROSS.

VOLUNTARY SERVICE IN WAR—MAGNITUDE OF THE WORK—THE FIRST WEEKS IN BELGIUM AND FRANCE—HOSPITAL TRAINS AND MOTOR AMBULANCES—HOSPITALS AND REST STATIONS—WORLD-WIDE CONTRIBUTIONS TO FUNDS—PERSONAL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN—ADMINISTRATIVE ECONOMY.


THE story of the Red Cross work in the first year of the war is one of the most wonderful in the history of voluntary effort, and that of our own Joint War Committee (which unites the resources and energy of the British Red Cross Society and the Order of St. John of Jerusalem) stands out conspicuously because of the world-wide field of service which it covers, the speed with which the machinery was adapted for an undertaking of enormously greater magnitude than had ever been contemplated, the bounteous response to appeals for financial help, and the spectacle which it reveals of humane activities linked up for a common purpose in every part of the empire.

That purpose cannot be stated better than in the words of the writer of the Memoir of Lord Wantage, the "Father of the British Red Cross Movement."

"What Lord Wantage saw and experienced during the Crimean War impressed itself deeply on his mind. He realised that however well organised an Army Medical Service may be, it has never been, and never will be, able to cope adequately with the sudden emergencies of war on a large scale, and he held that voluntary organisations, unimpeded by official restrictions, are alone capable of giving relief and of providing extra comforts and luxuries with the requisite promptitude and rapidity. He felt, moreover, that the British people would always insist on taking a

personal share in alleviating the personal sufferings of their soldiers, and that some recognised and authorised channel through which public generosity could flow was a matter of paramount importance."

The soundness of these ideas has been proved by the European War. When the official medical service of the British army was suddenly faced with the unexampled and unexpected demands imposed upon it by the retreat from Mons, it is not surprising that an urgent need arose for auxiliary help. That help was immediately forthcoming from the Red Cross Society and the Order of St. John—which were then working independently. Both the Royal Army Medical Service and the voluntary societies rapidly expanded their organisation and energy on a scale called for by the growing seriousness of the military situation, but the outside bodies scrupulously preserved their true function of auxiliary helpers. The relations between them and the official service grew close and cordial, the work of each was clearly defined, and at the end of the first year's co-operation Sir Alfred Keogh, Director General of the Army Medical Services (who in the early days of the war was chief of the Red Cross Commission in Belgium and France), warmly thanked the Joint Committee "for the loyal and devoted service" rendered to the R.A.M.C.



Wounded from the Dardanelles' operations being towed out to the hospital ship on barges.

[Universal]



Field surgery at the Dardanelles: One of the East Lancashire Territorial field ambulances at work behind the firing line. The operating surgeon is removing a bullet from the arm of a wounded soldier.

[Official Photograph (C.N.).]

Both the Red Cross Society and the Order of St. John had learned valuable lessons in the South African war. In fact it was the experience obtained during that war which led in 1905 to the amalgamation, under the title of the British Red Cross Society, of various bodies with the British National Society for Aid to the Sick and Wounded in War, founded by Lord Wantage in 1870. The St. John Ambulance Brigade, which was founded in 1878, and which numbered in its membership many thousands of miners and other industrial workers, sent a large number of orderlies to staff hospitals in South Africa.

URGENCY MEASURES.

In the intervening years both Societies improved their arrangements for war work, and the enormous expansion which became necessary with the departure of the Expeditionary Force to the Continent was facilitated by the administrative system which they had adopted. The first measures were necessarily dictated by the urgencies of the moment. A Foreign Service department of the Red Cross Society was established, and within a few days of the declaration of war doctors and nurses crossed the Channel to offer their services to the Belgian army. Other parties were quickly organised and sent out to Brussels, and they worked heroically amid the dangers and confusion created by the German advance.

Meanwhile, three Commissioners hurried to Belgium to study the position and inform the Society what further measures of assistance would, in their opinion, be needed. They were soon compelled by the German onrush to leave Belgium for France, and before many days they were grappling with the difficulties and problems of succouring the wounded who were saved from the battlefields of Mons and Le Cateau. Our own Army Medical Service was almost overwhelmed by the unprecedented burden suddenly thrust upon it. There were no specially-constructed hospital trains available; and in the confusion which prevailed on the congested railways, goods waggons had to be utilised sometimes

for the conveyance of wounded to the base hospitals. Only the old fashioned and slow horse-drawn ambulance carts were provided for road service, and owing to the uncertainty of the military situation it was hardly possible to fix upon permanent sites for the establishment of base hospitals.

The doctors and others responsible for the administration of the Army Medical Service laboured unceasingly to alleviate the sufferings of the wounded, while at the War Office preparations to meet the new needs were immediately set on foot. It was at this point that the value of auxiliary organisations, free from the traditions of official routine, and able to call up at a word a host of voluntary helpers, was demonstrated in a more convincing fashion than ever before. The Commissioners travelled along the lines of communication, guiding

observation by expert knowledge, and devising measures of relief which the Red Cross Society could undertake.

They made known to the Society the pressing need for hospital trains, motor ambulances, dressing and rest stations, additional hospitals, the organisation of staffs of doctors, nurses, and orderlies, and the provision of equipment, stores, and dressings. While the officials of the Society at home set in motion all the forces at their disposal to supply these needs, and to furnish the necessary financial means, the Commissioners devoted themselves at first particularly to the solution of the problem of transport. They realised that by the provision of speedy means of transit from the dressing stations and field




The interior of an ambulance train built by the L. & N.W. Railway Company. [*Manchester Guardian*]

hospitals to the base hospitals or hospital ships many lives might be saved, and that in thousands of cases the loss of limb and the misery of lifelong disablement might be prevented.


THE HOSPITAL TRAINS.

Therefore, one of their first tasks was to make up a hospital train by adapting ordinary passenger coaches as well as they could with the means at their disposal, and arranging for medical men and nurses to accompany the wounded. At home the Society, working in con-



An English hospital ship leaving a French port for England.

[Central News.]



Wounded sailors back from the Dardanelles' operations being landed at Plymouth.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

sultation with the War Office and the British and French Railway Authorities, arranged for the construction of a train which was described by a high military authority as "the finest hospital on wheels ever constructed." Princess Christian gave much help in raising the necessary funds for this train, which was named after her.

It is nearly one-seventh of a mile long, and carries 450 patients. Thirty-six beds are arranged in three tiers in each of the coaches for lying-down cases, and the beds are removable for use as stretchers. There are four coaches, in each of which fifty sitting-up patients are accommodated, sleeping and dining apartments for the medical and nursing staffs, a surgery with operating table and dispensary, and two kitchens remarkable for ingenuity and compactness of equipment. The change from the miseries of the battlefield to the warm comfort and brightness of the hospital train is for many of the wounded like passing to Elysian happiness.

Four of these trains were constructed under the supervision of the Society, transported in sections to France, staffed by Red Cross doctors, nurses, and orderlies, and presented to the War Office. Part of the cost of one was defrayed by the flour millers of the United Kingdom, out of a large fund subscribed by them for Red Cross work, and another was provided by Lord Michelham. A hospital train usually carried a medical staff of three, besides the officer commanding, a nursing staff of a matron and seven or more sisters, and non-commissioned officers, orderlies, cooks, dispenser and storekeeper, and clerk.

The trains are, in fact as well as in name, hospitals on wheels. The staffs live on them, and their work is organised as it would be in a stationary building. During a journey with wounded work goes on at high pressure. Blood-stained and mud-soaked clothing is removed, clean linen is provided, and warm woollen garments also if they are needed. Wounds are cleansed and dressed, and in urgent cases operations are performed.

MOTOR AMBULANCE CONVOYS.

After the desperate fighting which began at Mons the shortage of ambulance vehicles was so serious that motor luries which had taken stores to the front were requisitioned on the return journey for the conveyance of wounded. Within a few weeks a great change was in progress, and much terrible suffering—inevitable when unsuitable vehicles were used over the cobble roads of North France—was prevented by the Red Cross organisation of motor car services, and a little later by the provision of specially designed motor ambulances. Official recognition of the great pioneer work accomplished by the Society was placed on record by Sir John French in his despatch of February 2nd, 1915. He wrote:—

"The organisation for the first time in war of motor ambulance convoys is due to the initiative and organising powers of Surgeon-General T. J. O'Donnell, D.S.O., ably assisted by Major P. Evans, Royal Army Medical Corps. Two of these convoys, composed entirely of Red Cross Society personnel, have done excellent work, under the superintendence of regular medical officers."

Sir Frederick Treves expressed in less restrained terms his admiration for "the most valuable service ever rendered to the Army Medical Department in the form of voluntary aid." "These ambulances are everywhere," he added. "They are perfectly equipped and organised, and are always at work. In the saving of life, in the lessening of suffering, and in the securing of prompt surgical treatment of the wounded, these ambulances

have done a work the value of which can hardly be exaggerated."

In the second week of the September after the outbreak of war, the Army authorities gave permission for Red Cross motor cars to be landed in France to take part in the search work for wounded and missing, and several members of the Royal Automobile Club offered cars and personal service to the Red Cross Society. In a few days twenty of these cars were employed in the neighbourhood of Boulogne, and many wounded stragglers were rescued by them. Their operations placed beyond doubt the superiority and necessity for motor vehicles for this kind of work, and a few improvised ambulance cars were sent out. Experience soon made it clear, however, that if the cars were to stand the strain of the heavy roads in all weathers they must be specially constructed for the purpose, and that the design must allow for the overhang of the ambulance body without causing oscillation.

The motor ambulance department of the Society, in co-operation with the engineering staff of the Royal Automobile Club, held up the supply of new vehicles for a week, and in that period they designed a motor ambulance which, with few modifications, became generally recognised as the standard type. A few months later the Societies adopted a new pattern, based on experience of the work under all conditions, and although it cost £50 more than the first one the advantages more than justified the additional expense.

HOW THE FUNDS WERE RAISED.

The development of the service was accelerated by every possible means. Appeals for funds touched the imagination and sympathy of the nation. Within three weeks 512 contributions of £400, the amount then required to purchase an ambulance car, had been received, and the fund continued to increase at an amazing rate. Many novel schemes were devised for the provision of additional cars, and all classes of the nation contributed. Women raised a large sum for a fleet of cars which bore the Christian names of the groups of contributors. Mayoresses of many towns raised funds, a separate contribution of cars was made by Scotland, and the Order of St. John purchased about 200. Orders were placed with many manufacturers, who constructed the cars according to design, and in the early weeks worked night and day to effect all the deliveries that were urgently called for.

Volunteers for posts as drivers appeared by the hundred, and many declined to accept wages. The organisation of the service and the equipment of the cars was in itself a heavy task. On one occasion, within twenty-four hours, fifty ambulances were despatched from the garage in response to an emergency call. They were fully equipped, each car containing four stretchers, six rugs, four pillows, one first-aid outfit, a cask or bottle, a macintosh sheet, fire extinguisher, hurricane lamp, electric torch and refills, a canvas bucket, and a thermos flask. For six weeks a vessel was engaged exclusively in carrying motor ambulances, petrol, and supplies across the Channel.

At the end of a year of war over six hundred motor ambulances, and many other accessory motor vehicles, had been sent out by the Joint Committee, and the staff engaged in working them numbered over 1,200. Two perfectly equipped convoys of fifty cars each were with the British army, and two with the French, engaged in the transport of wounded and sick from the field hospitals to the clearing hospitals, and thence to the hospital trains. Other convoys were employed in running



The interior of what was once the gaming room, holding 12 baccarat tables. at the Casino. Le Touquet :
It is now a Red Cross ward holding 125 beds. [Topical.]



Wounded soldiers in a hospital at Boulogne listening to a variety show given by a visiting party of English music hall artistes. [Central News.]

between the trains and base hospitals or hospital ships, and these included a hundred cars at Boulogne, fifty at Étaples, and others at Rouen, Havre, and Calais. The total cost of carrying on the department at this period was about £4,500 a week, and projects for increasing the number of convoys were under consideration in the expectation of military operations on a vaster scale. At this time also the first of three convoys to be provided by coalowners and miners was completed. The scheme was started by Mr. Dennis Bayley, a Nottinghamshire coalowner, and under it the owners agreed to contribute £1 per thousand tons of their 1914 output, while the men levied themselves 6d. per week for twenty weeks, or 3d. for forty weeks, the total contributions of employers and workers being about equal.

A new form of hand ambulance, mounted on bicycle wheels, was devised for the removal of wounded from the first-aid posts, but sometimes ambulance car drivers braved the dangers of approach to these advanced positions under shell fire, and several were mentioned in despatches for gallantry. Great praise has been bestowed upon the drivers for their daily routine work. They have endured stretches of duty extending to forty hours at a time, and neither danger near the firing line, nor mishaps on the road, such as the sudden pitching of a car into a shell hole or ditch at night, daunted them or lessened their devotion to their merciful mission.

It will never be known how many lives were saved by the first convoys which were sent out, but some idea of the immensity of the task which had to be grappled with may be gained from the fact that between October 16th and November 16th, when the Germans were battering at the British lines in the effort to break through to Calais, no fewer than 41,000 wounded were dealt with in Boulogne and its neighbourhood. In one day 3,687 patients were moved by twenty-five cars from trains to hospitals, or from hospitals to ships.

WORLD-WIDE FINANCIAL SUPPORT.

While this supremely important work of the transport of wounded was being organised, the other departments of the Red Cross Society were busy at their respective tasks, selecting doctors and nurses, establishing and staffing hospitals, collecting and supplying stores, arranging for Red Cross service in all the distant fields of war in which British arms were engaged, and in providing help for our sorely-pressed Allies. This work could not have been accomplished without subdivision of functions, and the efficient co-ordination of the duties of an army of volunteers for administrative service.

The need for vast funds was immediately realised. Queen Alexandra, the President of the British Red Cross Society, issued an appeal to the nation, in which she said: "Much money will be needed and many gifts if we are faithfully to discharge our trust, and be able to say when all is over that we have done all we could do for the comfort and relief of our sick and wounded." At the end of August £60,000 had been received in response to that appeal. The seriousness of the war was now being realised by the public, and a further appeal by Lord Rothschild (Chairman of the Council of the Society), Sir Frederick Treves, and Mr. E. A. Ridsdale (Chairman of the Executive Committee), made through the *Times* newspaper, appeared at an opportune moment. In ten days £200,000 had been subscribed, and in twelve months the fund amounted to nearly a million and three-quarters, apart from special amounts which had been raised for hospitals, the provision of motor ambulances and hospital

trains, and for work in the Dardanelles, Egypt, and Servia.

The money was contributed by all sections of the population at home, and by both British and native inhabitants of the Colonies and Dependencies. Various classes of traders, manufacturers, workers, and societies of all kinds organised their own funds; famous singers and artistes gave their talents to the service; a remarkable sale at Christie's brought in nearly £40,000; a fund raised by farmers aimed at a final total of £250,000, and actually yielded £100,000 within a year; and the Headquarters' Collections Committee, under the chairmanship of Mr. Charles Russell, organised efforts in all parts of the country which produced close upon a million pounds. October 21st, 1915, was celebrated as "Our Day," and it was signalled by national collections, and by gifts of £5,000 from the King, £500 from the Prince of Wales, £500 from Queen Mary, and £100 from Queen Alexandra. The King wrote the following letter to Mr. Stanley:

"Ever since the beginning of the war the King has followed with interest and satisfaction the splendid work jointly achieved by the two organisations. His Majesty and his people gratefully recognise the relief and alleviation of suffering which has been so promptly rendered to the sick and wounded in the different theatres of war by the capable staff, and the medical and surgical appliances provided by the two Societies. It has been especially gratifying to the King to hear from the lips of many wounded soldiers testimony to the tender and devoted care bestowed upon them by physicians, surgeons, and nurses of the Red Cross and St. John of Jerusalem, and to the splendid work done by the ambulances of the two Societies."

The event commemorated by the "Our Day" collections was the first anniversary of the Joint Committee, which was composed of twelve representatives of each Society, with Mr. Arthur Stanley as chairman. The vice-chairman was Colonel Sir Herbert Perrott, who, with Lady Perrott, had been prominently associated with the work of the Order of St. John. The Duchess of Bedford, Lady Perrott, Lady Ripon, Colonel Sir Herbert Jekyll, the Earl of Plymouth, and Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Richard Temple were also among the representatives of the Order. The representatives of the Red Cross Society included, besides the Chairman, Princess Christian, Lady Lansdowne, Lady Dudley, Sir Frederick Treves, Mr. Charles Russell, Sir Robert Hudson, Mr. Ridsdale, and Surgeon-General Sir Benjamin Franklin.

Sub-Committees were formed to deal with finance, personal service, the motor ambulance service, the collection of funds, the administration of the King George Hospital, and the organisation of the work generally in France and the Near East. Members specialised in the work of one or other of these sub-committees, and in this way intense personal interest was fostered. As the work developed, and the band of helpers grew daily larger, it was found necessary, after one or two habitations, including Devonshire House, had been outgrown, to move into spacious premises which were lent by the Automobile Club in Pall Mall.

HOSPITAL ORGANISATION.

During the first year of the war the Societies established in France eight Red Cross hospitals for the British, and four for the Allies, with a total of two thousand beds, the largest being the St. John Hospital at Étaples, with 500 beds. Of the other large institutions, two were at Étaples, two at Wimereux, one at Rouen, one at Le Touquet, one at Calais, and one at Malo-les-Bains. Four of these hospitals were organised by the



The arrival and despatch of British wounded at a French port: An English doctor taking down particulars of the slightly wounded men. [Collection Tiranty.]




Removing the wounded from an ambulance train.

[Collection Tiranty.]



The "stretcher cases" laid out on the quayside before being embarked on the hospital ship.

[Collection Tiranty.]



Carrying the wounded on board a hospital ship.

[Collection Tiranty.]



President Poincaré visits a French hospital in order to bestow war decorations upon the wounded. *[Topical Press.]*



French Red Cross dogs leaving for the front after being reviewed in the Tuileries Gardens, Paris. *[Wyndham, Paris.]*



A complete motor ambulance convoy, including 41 ambulances, with stores, luries, and all other incidental cars on parade in London before being sent to the front. [Topical.]

Friends' Ambulance Unit, which worked in close association with the Red Cross. All the institutions established by the Societies were equipped and staffed by them, working in conjunction with the Army Medical Service.

This department of the work evolved steadily, and in the light of experience gained in the first weeks of turmoil and uncertainty, when, as was said by Sir Arthur Lawley, one of the Commissioners, "hospitals had to be improvised, equipment to be furnished, stores and rugs and implements had to be supplied, staff had to be found"—on several occasions at a few hours' notice. The Red Cross Society spared no expense to meet the emergency. Doctors, nurses, and orderlies were organised by Sir Frederick Treves, and from the Stores Department, which Mr. Stanley took under his charge, abundant supplies of the things that were needed were quickly sent out. Difficulties were encountered on every hand, but they were gradually surmounted by self-sacrificing labour, and with the end of the Aisne Battle it became possible to devise definite schemes for the establishment of permanent hospitals. Boulogne, which had been evacuated in the perilous earlier weeks, was now organised by the R.A.M.C. as a great hospital town, and the Red Cross not only helped to staff the hospitals both at Boulogne and at Calais, where the Belgian wounded were in a sad plight, but enormous supplies of equipment and stores of all kinds were sent over.


The importance of the work done by the Stores Department may be gauged from the fact that in the first year a sum of well over £150,000 was expended in

purchases, while gifts of the value of £225,000 were received. Sixty-eight thousand bales and cases were despatched overseas, and over two million garments were distributed by the two Societies. With the extension of the war the work of the department became continuously more strenuous and diverse, and supplies were called for from all parts of the world, including the Dardanelles, Egypt, Malta, Servia, Montenegro, Italy, the Persian Gulf, the Cameroons, East Africa, Northern Rhodesia, and China.

At the same time that the hospitals were established, rest stations were organised at Boulogne, Abbeville, Rouen, and other places, where Red Cross and St. John Voluntary Aid Detachment women served refreshments to passing sick and wounded, and in many other ways alleviated pain and hardship. Among other secondary activities of the Red Cross in France may be mentioned an advanced dressing station and vaccination station set up by the Friends' Ambulance Unit, relief work among civilians, and a nursing sisters' convalescent home.

VOLUNTARY WORK AT HOME.

The value of the scheme of Voluntary Aid Detachments, which had been developed by both the Societies before the war, was soon manifested in Red Cross activities all over Great Britain. An army of enthusiastic helpers was mobilised, the production and collection of comforts was organised, classes were started for training nurses and orderlies, preparations were made for the equipment and staffing of hundreds of auxiliary hospitals; and



Epsom grand stand as a Red Cross hospital: Convalescent wounded holding a Derby of their own to replace the one which was cancelled by the authorities. [Alferi Picture Service.]

ambulance car services for the removal of the wounded from railway stations to the military hospitals, and from military hospitals to auxiliary institutions and convalescent homes, were arranged in all parts of the country. Already the Red Cross Society numbered nearly 70,000 members in its 2,300 Voluntary Aid Detachments, all the men having first-aid certificates, and the women home-nursing certificates in addition. Many thousands of men were trained, and within twelve months 600 auxiliary hospitals, with over 20,000 beds had been staffed. The St. John Voluntary Aid Detachments numbered 650, with 14,000 members, who supplied staffs for 125 hospitals, containing over 4,000 beds. Many country mansions and large suburban houses were given over to the Societies by their owners for conversion into hospitals.

Efficient administration was secured by the division of the country into districts, in each of which the work is supervised by a director and committee, representing the two Societies. A statistical statement of the work of the East Lancashire Branch, with its headquarters in Manchester, from the outbreak of the war until the end of October, 1915, will give the reader some idea of the immense philanthropic effort which has been organised under the Red Cross banner in the whole kingdom. Sixty auxiliary hospitals, containing 2,637 beds, were established, and 14,325 patients were treated. By means of seventy-two ambulance cars and 450 motor cars, 80,000 wounded and sick were conveyed from ambulance trains to military hospitals, or from one hospital to another. At Manchester alone 189 ambulance trains were met, and on each occasion refreshments were served out by Red Cross

nurses. Nearly 300 classes were held for training men and women in first-aid and home nursing, and 7,500 certificates were issued, while in the comforts section over 300,000 articles were collected and distributed.

Outside this co-ordination of local activity stand several home hospital enterprises of considerable magnitude which were organised directly from headquarters. The Joint Committee co-operated with the Army Medical Service in converting the new Stationery Office, near Waterloo Station, into the palatial King George Hospital, which has 1,650 beds, a floor space of nine acres, and a roof area of 1½ acres. All the beds were endowed by private benefactors at £25 each. The Joint Committee decided to subscribe £500 per week towards the cost of the civil staff, and from the Farmers' Red Cross Fund six operation theatres, and a throat, ear, and special opthalmic departments were endowed.

At Netley the Committee provided and equipped thirty-three ward huts, accommodating 600 patients, in connection with the Royal Victoria Military Hospital, and at Brockenhurst Park, in the New Forest, the Order of St. John maintains the Lady Hardinge Hospital, where Indian wounded recuperate under ideal conditions.

IN THE NEAR EAST.

Apart from the work in France, the achievements of the Joint Committee in connection with the Near East campaign rank as the most notable of the overseas activities. The unexpected turn taken by the struggle in Gallipoli in its early stages created a need almost as urgent as that which had to be met in the first crisis in

Belgium and France, but it was of a different character. Fortunately, the Red Cross organisation had become so perfected by this time that it was able to support, with immediate and powerful aid, the efforts of the Army Medical Service to cope with the emergency. At first the transportation of the wounded from the peninsula to the hospital ships proved very difficult, and the Societies sent out, with the greatest possible speed, four motor launches, a picket boat, a lighter, and four motor ambulances and cars for the movement of wounded and the distribution of stores. In course of time depôts were set up at Malta, Alexandria, Cairo, Port Said, Suez, Mudros, Cyprus, and Cape Helles. Eleven Red Cross hospitals and convalescent homes, with a total of 2,000 beds, were established, and stores were despatched for use in the military hospitals, and on the hospital ships and trains, as well as in the Red Cross institutions. Fifty nurses and five masseurs were sent into the war zone, and over 500 other volunteers devoted themselves to incessant service for the many thousands who fell in the desperate battles or were stricken by disease. The cost of the whole work in the Near East was £1,500 a day until the extension of the fighting to the Balkans, when a large increase became necessary.

HELP FOR THE BLIND AND DISABLED.

Many subsidiary activities were undertaken by the Joint Committee. It was arranged that voluntary searchers should visit hospitals at home and abroad each day to obtain lists of patients and to make careful inquiries for news of missing men. In five months over seventeen thousand inquiries were received, and nearly as many items of information were gathered and transmitted to relatives or friends.

Within a year nearly thirty thousand packages of food were sent out to prisoners of war in Germany.


In conjunction with the National Institute for the Blind, the Joint Committee maintains at Regent's Park a hostel for blinded soldiers and sailors, in a Georgian mansion, with fifteen acres of grounds. Instruction is

given in Braille reading and writing, in ordinary type-writing, and in various handicrafts and gardening. Within a few months of its opening a hundred darkened lives were being cheered in this hostel.

From a large fund raised by the auctioneers and estate agents of the United Kingdom, the famous "Star and Garter" Hotel at Richmond was purchased and presented to the Queen, who asked the Joint Committee to take it over and maintain it as a permanent home for paralysed and totally-disabled soldiers and sailors. The Committee assumed this responsibility, and put in hand the necessary alterations and adaptations. On the ground floor 135 helpless men can be accommodated, and in the grounds cottages and bungalows are to be built for fifty others.

All this world-wide service would have been impossible but for the splendid response to the appeals for funds, and the eager and unwearying help of many thousands of voluntary workers. No praise is too great for the work of the doctors, many of whom abandoned lucrative practices, and of the nurses, orderlies, and ambulance car drivers. Labouring far away from the public gaze, they have at least the reward of knowing that they have aided in preventing immeasurable human suffering. Two thousand trained nurses were organised for service; 20,000 or more members of the Aid Detachments have gone out as hospital orderlies, and two thousand women members volunteered to work under the trained nurses in hospitals abroad. Later, arrangements were made for women members to undertake the duties formerly performed in the military hospitals by men, such as dispensing, laboratory work, cooking, and clerical work.

In all the administrative expenses the closest economy has been exercised, and this, in conjunction with the fact that so much of the work is voluntary, accounts for such a low management cost as 4d. in each pound expended during the first twelve months. It may be noted that during this period the motor ambulance fleet cost in round figures half a million pounds, that on the hospital and other work in Belgium and France a quarter of a million was expended, and that over £100,000 was spent in connection with the work in the Near East.



Two views of a great mill fire at Trenton, New Jersey, where a firm engaged on war work for the Allies was burnt out, as a result, it was suspected, of pro-German incendiarism. [Topical Press.



A quantity of explosive chemicals and mechanism seized by the American police at the house of a German-American suspected of being concerned in the plots against munition works and shipping. [Topical.]

CHAPTER XXIX.

GERMAN INTRIGUES IN AMERICA.

THE GERMAN AGITATION IN THE UNITED STATES—PRESIDENT WILSON'S REBUKE—THE ARCHIBALD PAPERS—RECALL OF THE AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR—A CRIMINAL CAMPAIGN.

IN his Annual Message to Congress on December 7th, Mr. Wilson condemned the activities of a section of his fellow-countrymen in as stinging a rebuke as has been administered by any American President since the Civil War. After declaring that there was no immediate or particular danger arising out of the relations of the United States with other nations, he continued:—

"I am sorry to say that the gravest threats against our national peace and safety have been uttered within our own borders. There are citizens of the United States, I blush to admit, born under other flags, but welcomed under our generous naturalisation laws to full freedom of opportunity in America, who have poured poison and disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life, and who have sought to bring the authority and good name of our Government into contempt, to destroy our industries wherever they thought it effective for their vindictive purposes to strike against them, and to debase our policies to the uses of foreign intrigue. . . . America has never witnessed anything like this before, and never dreamed it possible that men sworn into her own citizenship . . . would ever turn in malign reaction against the Government and people who had welcomed and nurtured them, and seek to make this proud country once more a hotbed of European passion."

President Wilson's denunciation of this disloyal propaganda must be interpreted in the light of the fact that some months earlier he had found it necessary to insist on the recall of the Austrian Ambassador, and that, at the moment he spoke, the naval and military attachés of the German Embassy were under sentence of a similar expulsion.

It was only natural that, when the war broke out, the leading German-Americans should wish to make the German case effectively heard in the babel of eager argument on the pros and cons of the struggle. The passionate interest aroused among citizens of German parentage gave a new lease of life to the large number of American journals published in the German language. The most influential of them, the *New York Staats-Zeitung*, whose editor and chief proprietor, Mr. Herman Ridder, had been prominent in the councils of the Democratic Party, had just before been contemplating publication in English instead of German, but the sudden revival of ardent pro-German sentiment among its readers caused the abandonment of this plan. No variety of "Zeitung," however, could be expected to reach the

great mass of English-speaking Americans whom it was important to conciliate. Accordingly, Mr. George Sylvester Viereck, a German-American, of some reputation as a journalist, poet, and playwright, started a propagandist weekly entitled *The Fatherland*. As opportunity offered, the work of influencing neutral opinion was assisted by a group of persons of academic distinction, such as Prof. Hugo Münsterberg, who had been called from Freiburg in 1892 to fill a chair of psychology at Harvard. Another leading propagandist was Congressman Richard Bartholdt, of Missouri, the President of the "Inter-parliamentary Union for the Promotion of International Arbitration." Later in the war he cleverly exploited the President's exhortation to neutrality by establishing a "Neutrality League," in order, professedly, "to re-establish genuine American neutrality and uphold it free from commercial, financial, and political subservience to foreign Powers."

It was obviously impossible for Count Bernstorff, the German Ambassador at Washington, to join the ranks of pro-German "spellbinders." A distinguished substitute was found in Herr Bernhard Dernburg, who, after making a great reputation in the financial and industrial world, had been chosen by Kaiser Wilhelm to promote his imperial policy in the capacity of Colonial Minister. He had received part of his business training in the United States, and the knowledge he had thereby gained of American ideas and methods was expected to prove a valuable asset. Herr Dernburg spent several months on an informal diplomatic mission to the American people, interviewing and being interviewed, writing articles and letters to the papers, accepting invitations to speak at dinners and debating societies, and, in general, leaving no stone unturned except the rock of offence that had been set up by German "frightfulness," and that his efforts were powerless to remove. His ultimate withdrawal was fully justified by his failure, and was reported

to have been hastened by hints from official quarters in Washington that this kind of proselytising by a subject of a foreign Power was not desirable. It is worth noting that the most zealous activities, exercised in person on the spot, of even so eminent a man as Herr Dernburg have had far less influence upon American opinion than the mere report, sent from a distance, of the judgment of Lord Bryce. "It is the misfortune of the German system of statecraft," the *Springfield Republican* aptly remarked, "that Germany has no public man whose word commands equal weight with neutrals."

THE STEGLER CASE.

If the ardour of pro-German sympathisers in America had expressed itself only in writing and speaking it is unlikely that adequate occasion would have arisen for President Wilson's rebuke. Early in 1915 indications began to appear of an activity that could justly be described as malign. In some instances the criminal deeds perpetrated were apparently no more than the irresponsible acts of half-crazy fanatics; as, for instance, the attempt to dynamite a railway bridge on the Canadian border, the placing of a bomb in the Capitol at Washington, and the murderous assault on Mr. Pierpont Morgan. Graver issues were raised when R. P. Stegler, a German naval reservist, declared in a confession that Captain Boy-Ed, the German naval attaché at Washington, was at the head of a German Secret Service organisation in America, one of whose objects was to get German reservists into England as spies by supplying them with false passports from the United States Department of State. Stegler and several other defendants were tried in March for conspiring to obtain fraudulent passports, and were convicted. Before Stegler was condemned to imprisonment for his share in these frauds, his counsel regretted

that "the arch-conspirator in this matter" was a representative of the German Government, and therefore,



Count Bernstorff, the German Ambassador in New York. [Record Press.]



Dr. Dumba, the dismissed Austrian Ambassador, and his wife. [Topical Press.]

under the Federal laws affecting diplomatic officers, was immune from arrest. The State Department subsequently made a formal protest to Berlin against the fraudulent use and forging of American passports by German spies, and requested, it is believed, an assurance that the abuse would be promptly ended.

Suspicion became presently aroused that virtual breaches of neutrality were being committed by means of wireless communications. At the beginning of the war there were two wireless stations in America in German ownership, one at Tuckerton, New Jersey, and the other at Sayville, Long Island. In September, 1914, the Tuckerton station was taken over by the American Government, in pursuance of an executive order by the President. The Sayville station continued to be worked by agents of its German owners, but under a restriction prohibiting the sending of cipher messages unless code books were deposited with the naval censors. The object of the censorship was to prevent communication by wireless with belligerent ships at sea, which would be a violation of the international law forbidding the use of neutral territory as a base of military operations. In June, 1915, charges were made in various newspapers that messages from Sayville, ostensibly commercial, were so framed as to convey information to Germany regarding the movement of vessels carrying war supplies to the Allies from America. It was also alleged that in the temporary absence of the censors, if only for a few minutes at a time, the Sayville operators contrived to communicate by a secret code with the German Admiralty and with German submarines. While the Government was still hesitating, through the lack of evidence definite enough to justify its intervention, the difficulty solved itself. The Sayville proprietors had set up a new plant since the war began. As the



Captain Von Papon, Germany's military attaché in the United States. [Topical.]



Captain Boy-Ed, Germany's naval attaché, who was dismissed, together with Von Papon, by the United States Government. [Topical.]

change made it technically a new station, it was necessary for them to apply to the Secretary of Commerce for a licence to operate it. This was refused, on the ground that it would be an unneutral act to license a new station erected in war time by a company in close relations with the German Government. The company filed formal protests with the Navy Department, and the Washington authorities took over the station, placing it under the control of American naval officers.

Meanwhile, a much more serious cause of trouble had been developing. As early as October, 1914, it became known that American manufacturers had received from the Allies large orders for munitions and other war supplies. By the aid of his paper, *The Fatherland*, Mr. Viereck started an agitation for securing a Government prohibition of such exports as unneutral. In December he went so far as to declare that it was within the power of America to bring about peace in sixty days by shutting off the supply. International law and precedent turned out to be fatal to Mr. Viereck's argument, as was shown by Mr. Bryan in his replies to a letter from Senator Stone and to a memorandum of Count Bernstorff. Presently there was reported a strange epidemic of strikes and labour difficulties in factories engaged on orders for the Allies. It would be absurd to suppose that all these troubles were the result of German or pro-German intrigue. In normal times the strike is by no means a rare industrial weapon in America, and the rush of well-paid orders to be executed at high pressure gave the workmen an opportunity which many of them would have been keen enough to seize without any alien instigation.

DR. ALBERT'S MISADVENTURE.

It was some time before public suspicion could be based upon anything more than unsubstantial rumour.



Robert Fay (on the left) and his two accomplices photographed in court when they were charged with plotting to place bombs on ships bearing munitions to the Allies. [Topical.]

In August, 1915, the *New York World* caused a sensation by publishing a number of confidential papers that made it desirable for the official representatives of Germany to offer some explanation. There is a distinctly Sherlock Holmes atmosphere about the story of how these documents got into the hands of the *World*. The revelation seems to have been due, in part, to the ill-judged parsimony of Dr. Heinrich Albert, an Imperial German Privy Councillor, who has been the chief financial agent of the German Government in the United States. A taxi-cab in New York costs thirty cents for the first half-mile and ten cents for each quarter-mile thereafter, but it would have been cheaper in the long run for Dr. Albert to get about the city by that means, instead of trusting himself to the five-cent Elevated Railroad. The Elevated cars are apt to be congested with strap-hangers, and it was probably in some such crowd of passengers that Dr. Albert was robbed of a "thick portfolio of papers"—by English Secret Service men, so it was afterwards alleged by his friend Captain von Papen.

One group of letters in the Albert portfolio brought to light attempts made by the Embassy to assist the German cause through the Press, the lecture platform, and the picture palace, by means of financial subventions, or, in the case of the kinemas, by the offer of free films illustrating the war. Another batch revealed a carefully planned scheme to corner supplies that would otherwise be available for the Allies—by buying up, for instance, the whole American production of liquid chlorine, and thus hindering a retaliatory use of "poison gas"; by securing the Wright patents in order to hamper the

output of flying machines; by obtaining control of the output of the Aetna Powder Company, and so on. The plans of the intriguers included even the bold stroke of establishing a new munition-making firm, the Bridgeport Projectile Company, with the express object of obtaining orders from the Allies and then causing delays by their non-fulfilment. In its effect upon American opinion, perhaps the most damaging item in this revelation was the correspondence relating to the fomenting of strikes in factories making munitions for the Allies. In view of the general suspicion that recent labour troubles were not due to purely industrial difficulties, it was significant to find in the Albert portfolio a letter from a Mr. McLane offering the Embassy "a plan for precipitating a strike of automobile workers," and suggesting that, for about \$50,000, a strike could be brought about in the munitions factories of Detroit, Cleveland, and Cincinnati.

Some surprise has been expressed in this country that the United States Government did not lay Dr. Albert by the heels when the *World* published these letters. The explanation of its inaction is that the Department of Justice, after carefully weighing the evidence, came to the conclusion that it would not justify a prosecution. An objector to this decision might reasonably be asked to suggest under what statutes Dr. Albert or his assistants should have been brought to trial. We must remember that during the war America has not been living under any code of emergency legislation, but under the ordinary law. Further, under the American constitutional system, the enforcement of the main body of criminal law, as well as its enactment, is a matter

not of Federal but of State jurisdiction, with regard to which the Washington authorities have no voice. For example, even if there were adequate legal proof that an outsider had organised a strike in a munition factory, the question of a prosecution would depend upon whether the laws of the State in which that factory was situated had made the use of such influence a penal offence. In his message to Congress in December, President Wilson expressly deplored the inefficiency of the means at the disposal of the Federal authorities for punishing the offences of the "creatures of passion, disloyalty, and anarchy." "We are without adequate Federal laws," he declared, to deal with "the ugly and incredible thing" that has happened. "I urge you," he continued, "to enact such laws at the earliest possible moment." How futile would have been any attempt to prosecute on the basis of the *World* revelations is evident from the adroit reply which Dr. Albert communicated to the Press. The correspondence about strikes in munition factories, for instance, was entirely one-sided. It was inevitable, said Dr. Albert, that all sorts of wild and irresponsible proposals should be addressed from every quarter to the accredited agents of a great be ligerent Power. The receipt of such vagrant offers proved nothing against the receiver. There was nothing to show that these suggestions were approved by the Embassy. On the whole, the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the *World's* disclosures was that of the *New York Evening Post*—that, while they gave no adequate evidence of "a conspiracy against the United States," they did provide fresh proof of "the extraordinary stupidity with which the pro-German campaign has been conducted from the beginning," and that they brought to light extra-diplomatic activities which, on the moral and political side, all loyal Americans must resent.

THE ARCHIBALD PAPERS.

While these matters were still a topic of lively discussion, events were rapidly moving towards a denouement which was to supply the Washington Government with valid and ample ground for action. One of


the letters in the stolen portfolio had to do with an agreement by which the Austro-Hungarian Consulate was to supply Mr. J. F. J. Archibald with a quantity of moving-picture films to illustrate his lectures on the war. Mr. Archibald is an American journalist and magazine writer, with long and varied experience as a war correspondent—in Cuba, in the Soudan, in the Transvaal, in Venezuela, in the Philippines, in Manchuria, in Morocco, in Albania, and elsewhere. He had practised his adventurous calling at the beginning of the present war at the German and Austrian front, and had returned from the field to give American audiences the benefit of his observations. Almost immediately after the publication of the *World's* disclosures he went abroad again. The

vessel in which he was a passenger was intercepted by a British cruiser, and taken to Falmouth, where Mr. Archibald's cabin trunks were searched. The documents in his possession subsequently formed the text of a White Paper (Cd. 8012). They included confidential communications of the highest interest which Mr. Archibald was bearing from the German and Austrian Embassies to Berlin and Vienna. One of them was a despatch from Dr. Constantin T. Dumba, the Austrian Ambassador, to Baron de Burian, the Austrian Foreign Minister, giving His Excellency's private opinion of Mr. Woodrow Wilson's attitude and character. He advised against any renewal of the protest against the manufacture of munitions in America


for the Allies, advising that a return to the question would not only be useless, "but even, having regard to the somewhat self-willed temperament of the President, harmful." "The President has broken all the bridges behind him, and has made his point of view so definite that it is impossible for him to retreat from this position." Dr. Dumba further saw ground for encouragement in the prospect that the Chicago packers would respond to England's "arbitrary acts" by refusing to export meat to England in any circumstances. "If England stood face to face with the danger of not being able to get any meat from the United States of America, or the Argentine, she would soon give in." Captain von



A factory fire in Brooklyn, the result, it was suspected, of a pro-German plot. [Topical.]



The hut in the woods near Fort Lee, New Jersey, where Robert Fay and his accomplices kept some of their explosives and carried out their tests. *[Topical.]*



A motor boat owned by Fay, by means of which he hoped to approach vessels lying in New York harbour and attach infernal machines to their rudders just before they left port. *[Topical.]*



The fire at the Bethlehem Steel Works on November 15th, 1915.

[Topical Press.]

Papen, the German military attaché at Washington, was also a contributor to this curious miscellany. He was sending to the Ministry of War a statement intended to reassure the home authorities respecting the effect upon American opinion of the publication of the Albert portfolio. "From a business point of view," the only damage it had done was that the Russian and English Commission had broken off negotiations with the Bridgeport Projectile Company, "and accordingly our prospects of preventing other firms here from embarking on the supply of war material by the undertaking and the non-delivery of a shrapnel contract have come to nothing." At the same time the attaché wrote an entirely unofficial letter to his wife, enclosing in it a few newspaper cuttings that he thought would amuse her. The theft of documents from "our good Albert" was unfortunate, "but things like that must occur." In the same optimistic vein he continued: "How splendid on the Eastern front. I always say to these idiotic Yankees they had better hold their tongues—it's better to look at all this heroism full of admiration."

DR. DUMBA'S RECALL.

But perhaps the most notable document in Mr. Archibald's luggage was an autograph letter from Dr. Dumba to the Austrian Foreign Minister, dated August 20th. The Americans would certainly have deserved Captain von Papen's epithet if they had passed this over with indifference. His Excellency enclosed a memorandum from the editor of *Szabadsag*, a Hungarian paper published in the United States. This suggested methods by which strikes might be brought about at Mr. Schwab's steel

and munition factories at Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, as well as in the Middle West. Dr. Dumba added, on his own account:—

"I take this rare and safe opportunity of warmly recommending the proposals to your Excellency's favourable consideration. It is my impression that we can disorganise and hold up for months, if not entirely prevent, the manufacture of munitions in Bethlehem and the Middle West, which, in the opinion of the German military attaché, is of great importance, and amply outweighs the comparatively small expenditure of money involved."

Dr. Dumba believed that, even if these projected labour troubles came to nothing, it would be possible to compel, under pressure of the crisis, favourable working conditions for the poor "white slaves" employed at Bethlehem. Provision was to be made forthwith for the exit of German skilled workmen at present employed there, and a private registry office had already been established to find them work elsewhere. The Austrian Embassy intended to take similar steps. The Foreign Minister was asked to reply by wireless as to whether he approved the suggestions of this letter.

Some day, perhaps, the world will know how our Government came to suspect that it would be worth while to overhaul the luggage of a private passenger like Mr. Archibald. Here, again, there appears to be material for a Sherlock Holmes story. The discovery was made on August 30th. The White Paper was issued on September 21st. Long before the latter date our Foreign Office had advised the American Government, through our representative at Washington, of what it had found. There could be no two opinions as to the course

to be adopted by President Wilson. It was announced on September 9th that the American Ambassador at Vienna had been instructed to deliver to the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister a Note briefly summarising the essential facts, and continuing:—

"By reason of the admitted purpose and intent of Mr. Dumba to conspire to cripple legitimate industries of the people of the United States, and to interrupt their legitimate trade, and by reason of the flagrant violation of diplomatic propriety in employing an American citizen, protected by an American passport, as a secret bearer of official despatches through the lines of the enemy of Austria-Hungary, the President directs me to inform your Excellency that Mr. Dumba is no longer acceptable to the Government of the United States as the Ambassador of his Imperial Majesty at Washington."

The Austrian Government accepted the inevitable, and the recall of the too-zealous Ambassador gave the finishing touch to one of the most curious episodes in the history of diplomacy.

Dr. Dumba's punishment proved to be no deterrent to the pro-German faction in America. It may have inspired a temporary caution in some quarters, but there was no real cessation of the plots to hamper the provision of supplies for the Allies. They became, indeed, even more malevolent than before. One began to hear of mysterious explosions and fires in munitions factories, and of the discovery of bombs among the cargoes of vessels carrying the supplies. The "dynamite squad" of the New York police accordingly set on foot a careful scrutiny of every place in the city where high explosives were manufactured, stored, or sold, and followed up every man who had transactions with these establishments. The vigilance of the detectives was rewarded in October, in the case of two Germans who had been making purchases of picric acid, and who, when tracked to their lodgings, were found to be in possession not only of high explosives, but of various papers of interest to the Secret Service officers. One of these men, who gave the name of

Robert Fay—it was afterwards found that he had represented himself to prominent German-Americans under

the more typical German names of Frey, Frehe, and Freihe—made a confession which there was reason to believe was very close to the truth. According to his own story, he was a lieutenant in the Sixteenth Provisional Regiment of Prussian Infantry. On his own initiative he had received a commission from the Intelligence Office in the Wilhelmstrasse to visit the United States and carry out plans for stopping shipments of munitions to the Allies. He had worked out an idea of his own for attaching clockwork mines to ships. The mechanism was started by a cable attached to the rudder of the boat, which connected with a lever operating a ratchet wheel inside the mine. Every time the rudder was moved the cable was pulled, the lever was jerked up, and one cog in the wheel slipped down. After a certain number of cogs had slipped past the end of the lever, a hammer was released which struck on the cap of a cartridge and fired the mine. Thus the time at which the mine was fired would depend on the frequency with which the rudder was moved during the voyage. Fay estimated that it would be from one to four days. He had experimented with an empty mine, which he attached to a ship in New York harbour, and had thereby found that it would take about ten minutes to fasten the mines on. He had communicated his invention, he said, to Captain von Papen and Captain Boy-Ed, but they had refused to lend him any aid unless he went to Canada and operated from the other side of the border.

THE CONFESSION OF FAY.

The original charge against Fay, which was of conspiracy against the United States, was changed to an indictment for conspiracy to commit murder. Before


it came on for hearing the United States District Court at New York was occupied with an important trial for



A chest containing an infernal machine seized in Fay's house by the police. *Topical.*



One of seven large bombs seized by the police in a raid on a house in East 78th Street, New York. *Topical.*



Sing-Sing Prison, New York State.

[Record Press.]

conspiracy against the United States and violations of the Customs Laws. The defendants were Karl Buenz, managing director of the Hamburg-American line, and three officers and agents of that company. The facts alleged by the prosecution were fully admitted by the counsel for the defence. Early in the war, Buenz and his accomplices had supplied cargoes of coal and food to German cruisers, by causing the communicating vessels to be provided with false clearing papers and manifests. The plea of the defendants was that this constituted no offence against the United States, and that the false papers were made solely with a view to deceiving the enemies of Germany, of which country they were subjects. The hearing began on November 22nd, and concluded on December 4th, with conviction and sentences of imprisonment. It was proved that this conspiracy stretched from coast to coast, and had ramifications in Philadelphia, Newport News, New Orleans, and San Francisco. Seventeen or eighteen boats were chartered from neutral shipping lines, and loaded as fast as possible with provisions and coal. Each boat carried a supercargo, whose instructions were to be followed by the captain. As soon as these vessels got outside the three-mile limit, the supercargoes would tell the captains they were to make for some other destination than the port for which they had cleared. One of the most interesting witnesses was Captain Falkenburg, master of the American steamship *Berwind*, which had cleared for Buenos Aires. His supercargo instructed him to make for a point off Trinidad. In this neighbourhood they steamed to and fro for about thirty-six hours. Then they met five German war vessels.

They spent sixteen days with this fleet, discharging cargo meanwhile into the *Cap Trafalgar* and the *Eleanor Wäurmer*. The task was completed on September 13th. While the *Berwind* was taking on some fresh water from one of the German vessels, the British cruiser *Carmania* appeared. Captain Falkenburg thus became an eye-witness of the naval engagement in which the *Cap Trafalgar* went down. The *Berwind* then proceeded to Rio, and there obtained a cargo for New York.

Less exciting, but more amusing, was an adventure of the *Maria Quesada*. At Pernambuco the customs officials demanded her clearance papers. Her captain had good reason for not wanting them inspected, so he put them in a leather case and dropped them overboard. Some time afterwards, the crew of a Brazilian warship in the harbour caught a shark, and, upon cutting it open, found the papers in its stomach.

In one instance the judgment of the conspirators was sadly at fault. Captain Emil Olsen, master of the *Unita*, told how, after sailing from Philadelphia, ostensibly for Cadiz, he was instructed by the supercargo to meet German warships on the high seas. He refused to change his course, in spite of the offer of a bribe of \$500, raised three days later to \$10,000. "Nothing doing," Olsen told him; "not for a million dollars." The disgusted supercargo was then invited to inspect Olsen's naturalisation papers, which showed that, a native of Norway, he had become a British subject in Canada. So he sailed the *Unita* to Cadiz, and, on arriving there, sold his cargo, and then looked up the British Consul.

It is important to notice—for the point has been

misunderstood in some quarters—that the Hamburg-American officials were not charged with any violation of the neutrality laws. There was no attempt to prove that they had made, or sought to make, American ports a base for naval operations. The evidence was confined to the question of false manifests and deceptive clearance papers. The trial, however, had an indirect result of considerable importance. It came out during the hearing that Captain Boy-Ed had supplied the money by which the Hamburg-American conspiracy was financed. He had sent as much as \$600,000 to San Francisco for the chartering and equipment of vessels to carry coal and

food to the *Leipsic* and *Dresden*, and had also given similar assistance to vessels sailing from Philadelphia. This evidence was recognised by the American Government as affording adequate ground for informing the German Government that its naval attaché at Washington had rendered himself a *persona non grata*. At the same time it was stated that the "improper activities" of his military colleague, Captain von Papen, had made him also no longer acceptable. The recall of these two diligent conspirators early in December brought to an end an illuminating chapter in the history of German diplomacy in America.



The Manhattan Bridge, New York.

[Half-tones Ltd.]



A recruiting tramcar in the streets of Dublin.

[Chancellor, Dublin.]

CHAPTER XXX.

IRELAND AND THE WAR.

O'CONNELL'S DICTUM: "ENGLAND'S DIFFICULTY IS IRELAND'S OPPORTUNITY"—THE CHANGE IN THIS WAR—ITS CAUSES—IRELAND'S SYMPATHY WITH FRANCE AND BELGIUM—MR. REDMOND'S POLICY—RECRUITING—SOME CROSS-CURRENTS—IRISH ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE WAR—A TYPICAL SCENE.

THE Great War has marked a turning point in Irish history, the end of an era and a tradition. Hitherto, in the crucial wars of England or the Empire, "the weak spot at the heart," to use Macaulay's phrase, had been a source of anxiety and embarrassment. Throughout the eighteenth century, in all the wars that followed the Revolution, the "Wild Geese" were to be found in the ranks of the Continental enemy. At Fontenoy Cumberland's conquering column was broken by the Irish Brigade. George II.'s imprecation—"Accursed be the laws that deprive me of such subjects"—enshrines the moral of the tragedy. In the American War of Independence the Presbyterian emigrants from Ulster, indignant victims of bad agrarian laws at home, lined the armies of Washington; and the Irish Protestant Volunteers wrung from England's weakness freedom of Irish trade and the independence of the Irish Parliament.

I. 2 - VOL. III.

Throughout the epoch of the French Revolution, and in the life-and-death struggle with Napoleon, the forces of discontent in Ireland were in close alliance with the French Republic and Empire. Two successful revolts, encouraged by two French raids and an invasion that penetrated to the heart of the island, only just too late to make a formidable reinforcement of the Peasant Rising of 1798, embarrassed the hands of Pitt. In the Mutiny of the Nore the pressed Irish sailors made the leaven of the dangerous ferment. The Army of Boulogne was watched with sympathetic eyes in Revolutionary Ireland. The philosophy of popular political action in Ireland throughout the preceding century and a half was summed up later in the Constitutionalist O'Connell's aphorism, "England's difficulty is Ireland's opportunity." The Fenian movement concentrated the sentiment, and carried it on to the third decade of the nineteenth century. Even as late as the South African War,



The march past at a review of Irish Volunteers in Phoenix Park, Dublin.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



The band of the Irish Guards on a recruiting march through Cork.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

though the feeling was one rather of sympathy with the South African Republics than of antagonism to the Empire, the popular sentiment of Ireland was with the Republics.

The present war is, in fact, the first in British and Irish history in which the mass sentiment of Ireland has gone with Great Britain in her battles; it is the first in which Irishmen, who hold strongly to the popular political creed of their country, have enrolled themselves freely and enthusiastically, and in great numbers, in British armies. True it is, no doubt, that in all the wars of the nineteenth century gallant Irish regiments, representative of all the elements of the Irish population, fought on England's side with all the courage of their race. In the Peninsula and at Waterloo Wellington never lacked support from the valour of his own countrymen. An Irish regiment rode in the Charge of the Light Brigade. In the Mutiny the Irish battalions that from the first had been part of the Indian army increased their store of Indian blazons. "The Blue Caps" fought up to Colenso and back again, and led Buller's army into Ladysmith. But those were regiments enlisted on the old system—moved by the mere love of adventure, or driven by necessity in seasons of unemployment. They were not stirred by the call of kin, or country, or Empire, or a compelling sense of duty to a noble cause. And bravely though they fought, they were not always wholly trusted when storms were brewing or blowing in Ireland. It is significant that two regiments that "accomplished the impossible" in the landing at Sedd-el-Bahr, the Dublins and the Munsters, are two old regiments of John Company that had not even a nominal place in the home armies until a couple of decades ago. The story of the Dublins begins at Arcot, and they were known in Mr. Atkins's dictionary as "the Hundred and Last Bombay Bombardiers." But the Southern Irish Divisions to-day are inspired by a new spirit, and fight with even freer hearts. They go forth proudly, supported by the goodwill and pride of the great majority of their fellow-countrymen, as soldiers of freedom and citizens of the Empire and the civilised European country. Ireland has "taken her place among the nations" in a manner that Robert Emmet never dreamed, but which, it is safe to say, his spirit would have approved.

IRISH UNREST BEFORE THE WAR.


Yet on the eve of the European conflagration no careful prophet would have ventured to forecast such a transformation in Ireland. In truth, there was no country in Europe apparently so unready for a great and united effort in war as was Ireland in July, 1914. The previous two years had been years of great political and social unrest. Her people had been sharply divided by the Home Rule controversy, which became only more bitter as it moved to a decision. The minority had organised themselves for resistance, and threatened civil war. They had powerful and wealthy friends, and had drilled and armed themselves despite official prohibitions. Responsible statesmen openly countenanced their action. Distinguished officers of the King's army manifested their sympathy, and declared their determination to resign their commissions rather than take part in any measures of coercion. They demanded and secured from the highest military authority an assent to their conditions. Even the Royal Name was bandied in the controversy. Foreign Embassies watched the situation, and military attachés attended the reviews

of the citizen army. Berlin, as the Belgian Grey Book reveals, took a keen interest in the situation. On the other side the majority organised a military defence. The Ulster Volunteers were imitated by the Irish Volunteers. Slow of progress at first, the movement spread rapidly after the military demonstration at the Curragh in March, 1914, and its sequel at the War Office. Never was the British army more unpopular in Ireland than in those critical days. Townsman and peasant were drilling and arming throughout the south and west, and even in the very heart of the strongholds of the Ulster Volunteers. Arms found their way into the hands of the Southern Volunteers. Popular subscriptions took the place of millionaire support. In one Ulster parish the chaplain of an Irish Volunteer regiment received two thousand pounds within a fortnight to buy arms for the men. Machine-guns mysteriously made their appearance. Meantime, the permanent officers of the Executive, who had been quiescent while rifles were pouring into Ulster, suddenly woke to activity. A landing of rifles took place at Howth, and the march of the Volunteers into Dublin was challenged by the police, illegally, as the Judges on the Commission of Inquiry have since declared. The military were called out to support this action. A riot ensued on their return, and on the very eve of the outbreak of war Irishmen and Irishwomen were shot down in the streets of the Capital.

In the newspapers of Berlin "the Battle of Dublin" was recorded with flare headings and German statistics. It was the second time within a year that almost on the same spot citizens of Dublin lost their lives in conflict with the forces of the Crown. Social bitterness had been added to the venom of political strife. Throughout the preceding autumn and winter the Irish capital lay under siege, the theatre of the fiercest industrial conflict that Southern Ireland had ever experienced. Beaten and defeated, the workers were left sullen and discontented. No wonder that the condition of Ireland should have figured largely in the calculations of the war conspirators, or that their conclusion should have been that, even more than in the past, the country was likely to prove a source of weakness to Great Britain in the struggle that her enemies were preparing. The King himself, in his invitation to the abortive conference in the Royal Palace on Home Rule, openly expressed apprehension of civil war, and urged the necessity of avoiding the disaster.

IRELAND'S SYMPATHY WITH FRANCE AND BELGIUM.

Yet, paradoxically, when Sir Edward Grey came, on August 3rd, to review the European situation and its dangers, to take estimate of the position in which the Empire was placed and of its ability to fulfil its obligations, he was able to say: "We must take very carefully into our consideration the risk which we take of sending an expeditionary force out of the country until we know how we stand. One thing I would say, the one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation is Ireland. The general feeling throughout Ireland—and I would like this to be clearly understood abroad—does not make that a consideration that we have to take into account." The Foreign Secretary did not speak without knowledge. Even if Ireland's domestic troubles had been greater and her outlook darker, it is almost certain the preponderant goodwill of Ireland would have gone with the Allied cause. In the war of 1870-71 there was no mistaking where the sympathies of Ireland lay. MacMahon filled Joffre's place in those days in the Irish



A "Pais" battalion of the Royal Irish Regiment leaving Dublin.

[Chancellor, Dublin.]



A review of the Ulster Division in Belfast: The march past the saluting base.

[Central News.]


popular gallery. Irish Volunteers found their way into the French ranks, and an Irish National Ambulance rendered important service to the medical organisation of the French armies. When peace was restored M. Denys Cochin, who organised the reception of the Irish Deputation to Paris in May, 1915, came to Dublin to convey the thanks of the French nation to Ireland. Sympathy with France has, in fact, been a tradition with the majority of the Irish people. The menace to Belgium was also certain to stir Irish indignation. In the days when Irish Catholics were denied education at home, the schools and universities of Belgium had been freely opened to the exiled Irish student, and its towns to the Irish trader. Louvain had shared with Paris and Salamanca the task of educating the Irish priests. Not a collegiate town in little Belgium but has some monument to an Irish scholar. Belgian foundations still support Irish students. And in more recent days Belgium had become the grand exemplar for Irish patriots. Her progress under a national Government, her growth in population and industry, and her intellectual uprising had come to be quoted by Irish Home Rulers as the final and crowning proof of what self-rule might effect in the restoration and rejuvenation of a people that had persevered in its love of freedom. Naturally, Ireland in any circumstances could not have witnessed unmoved the overthrow of Belgium's independence by the weight of German militarism.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE HOME RULE BILL.

But these considerations had not had time to make their influence felt when Sir Edward Grey spoke. He had in his mind reasons more intimate to Ireland itself. In face of all difficulties the representatives of the British democracy had persevered in their work of conciliation. They had gone on in trust of Irish pledges that if once the rights of Ireland were fairly recognised the old tradition of Irish patriotism would be abandoned, and Ireland take her place beside the free nations of the Empire in every danger and in every difficulty. The Home Rule Bill was not yet an Act of Parliament. Statesmen had

not yet abandoned the hope of finding a *modus vivendi* with the representatives of Ulster. But the work was all but done, and the moment had come, suddenly and unexpectedly, and before Nationalist Ireland could enter into the full fruition of its hopes, to test the good faith of the Irish people. Europe was not to be left long in doubt as to where the representatives of Ireland and the leaders of its political opinion stood. In the story of Ireland, August 3rd, 1914, will remain a memorable day. Mr. Redmond brought Ireland back to the Grattan standpoint. He seized the opportunity of Sir Edward Grey's statement to make clear at once the position of Nationalist

Ireland. Having recalled that in times past the sympathy of Irish Nationalists had been estranged, the reasons for which were found deep down in Irish history, he declared that the policy of recent years had changed all that. The democracy of Great Britain had proved its friendship. The democracy of Ireland would now turn with the utmost anxiety and sympathy to their Allies in every trial and in every danger that might overtake them. There was, he declared, the possibility of history repeating itself. In 1772 a body of a hundred thousand Irish Volunteers sprang into existence to defend her shores, when the power of the Empire was at its lowest ebb. Though the Volunteers were all Protestants at



The Ulster Division marching through Belfast.

[Central News.]

first, the Catholics of the south and west subscribed money to arm them. Ideas widened, and Catholics were enrolled with their Protestant fellow-countrymen. Might not history repeat itself? There were now two large bodies of Volunteers in Ireland. "I say to the Government," he concluded, "that they may to-morrow withdraw every one of their troops from Ireland. I say that the coast of Ireland will be defended from foreign invasion by her armed sons, and for this purpose armed Nationalists in the south will be only too glad to join arms with the armed Protestant Ulstermen in the north."

The effect of this declaration in Ireland itself was profound. Throughout the whole south and west Protestant Unionists, led by the Unionist gentry, began to join the ranks of the Irish Volunteers. At Athlone, the



A recruiting campaign in rural Ireland: Recruiting party marching through an Irish village.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



A recruiting meeting in Co. Louth.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

cradle of the Southern Volunteer movement, the young Protestant men of the town assembled in their parochial hall and marched in a body to the Volunteer ground. Not since the days of Grattan was Irish patriotic sentiment of every colour so united outside the four or five northern counties, where apprehension of Home Rule was still strong. Divisions that have since grown up through factious propaganda and the evidences of political intrigue were then practically non-existent.

MR. REDMOND'S EXHORTATION.

Unfortunately, a political interlude had to succeed. Home Rule was not yet an Act of Parliament, and upon the Ministry devolved the task of securing some agreement by which, without prejudice to the projects and interests of any political party, a union of parties in the national defence could be secured. For six weeks uncertainty hung over the fate of the Ministry's Irish Measure. During this period the foes of Anglo-Irish friendship were busy sowing doubts and hinting dangers. They laboured industriously to alarm Ireland about the uncertainties of her own future. And when the Home Rule Act, with its suspensory sequel, had been placed upon the Statute Book, they continued to suggest that when the war was over Irish fidelity would be repaid by infidelity, and Ireland's trust would be betrayed. Mr. Redmond was not daunted. He had set out upon a path which demanded courage and candour, and had neither exaggerated nor underrated the difficulties that might beset his policy. His task was nothing less than the breaking down and abandonment of the old tradition of Irish Nationalist politics, the giving of a new meaning to O'Connell's phrase that England's difficulty was Ireland's opportunity. The Irish people had to be made at once to realise that with the achievement of their own rights there were born new loyalties, responsibilities, and duties. His offer on August 2nd was an offer for home defence. But with the British navy clearing the seas through August and the early days of September, that offer had lost its meaning. The danger was not upon the Irish coasts, but in the fields of Flanders, where at Etreuix one of the old Irish regiments had gone down, fighting to the last cartridge, alone and unsupported, in the sweeping rush of the Germans. The six weeks interval had been an anxious time for the Irish Leader. But on September 20th he returned to Ireland, having succeeded in getting the Home Rule Act passed into law. That justified a further advance in his demand upon Ireland. On his way home through Wicklow he met the East Wicklow Brigade of the Irish Volunteers in the Vale of Avoca. He addressed them in a little speech of about five hundred words, in which he struck a note that, amidst many minor discords, has been ringing throughout the Irish world since. The duty of Irish manhood in the war, he declared, was twofold. There was, first, the duty of Irish defence. But another had arisen. "The interests of Ireland, the whole of Ireland," he said, "are at stake in this war. The war is undertaken in defence of the highest principles of religion, and morality, and right; and it would be a disgrace for ever to our country, and a reproach to her manhood and a denial of the lessons of history, if young Ireland confined their efforts to defending the shores of Ireland from an unlikely invasion, and shrank from the duty of proving on the field of battle that gallantry and courage which has distinguished our race through its history. I say to you—Go on drilling, and make yourselves efficient for the work, and then account yourselves as men, not only in Ireland itself, but where-

ever the firing line extends, in defence of right, of freedom, and religion, in this war."

CRITICISM AND CROSS-CURRENTS.

Thus the policy of the Irish Leader was defined without possibility of doubt. It was immediately exposed to the criticism of a group of dissentients, who, in the union of all the Nationalist sections that followed the Curragh incident, had secured representation on the Executive of the Volunteers. Though a minority, they proceeded to expel Mr. Redmond and his supporters. They were careful to limit their indictment. They have since been described by their critics as "pro-Germans" and "Separatists," and they have certainly accepted the countenance and support of the organised irreconcilables among the Irish of America. But the opposition to Mr. Redmond was based upon the ground that the Irish Volunteers had been organised to defend the Home Rule cause from unconstitutional attack, that that was their sole and proper purpose, and that Mr. Redmond was not entitled to invite them to join the forces of the Empire engaged upon the Continent. Mr. John M'Neill, the Vice-President of the Gallic League, who was elected as their President, hotly repudiated the charge of pro-Germanism, declared that "an anti-enlistment campaign was unthinkable," but claimed that the Irish Volunteers must be kept together to safeguard Irish rights. He pointed out that Mr. Redmond's offer of co-operation with Ulster had secured no response, and argued that his policy of co-operation in the war might be equally barren. There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Mr. M'Neill's repudiation of sympathy with Germany; but there are many elements in the organisation of which he is the elected President. And it is out of the activities of the extremists that whatever trouble there has been for the Executive in Ireland since the war began have sprung. The official position of the dissentients is, however, instructive, even if it be regarded as merely tactical. It shows that even in the judgment of the most extreme the open profession of sympathy with Germany, or the repudiation of the Constitutional Settlement, is regarded as likely to be dangerously provocative of Irish resentment against the propagandists.

Minor cross-currents of Irish opinion also revealed themselves. There were people, north and south, who thought they saw high religious interests seriously prejudiced by the national policy. Protestant bishops in Ulster had to rebuke the Protestantism that regarded an alliance with France and Belgium against Prussia as a betrayal of the Catholic cause. In the south pro-Austrian feeling showed itself in some narrow ecclesiastical quarters, which think the future of Catholicity dependent upon the strength of the Hapsburgs. Skilful attempts were made to exploit these prejudices, but they had no serious audience among the masses of Irishmen. More serious was the question raised as to how far Ireland could spare a war contribution strictly proportionate to its population. The fact that Ireland's population is abnormally and artificially low undoubtedly restrained many supporters of the Allied cause from being as strenuously active as they would otherwise have been. In the ten years preceding the war at least four army corps of young Irishmen of military age had emigrated, though, significantly enough, the war almost stopped Irish emigration. At once its figures fell by sixty per cent on the lowest statistics previously recorded, and over ten thousand Irishmen who would otherwise have emigrated have either found their places in the firing



London's welcome to an Irish V.C. The procession in honour of Sergeant O'Leary passing through Trafalgar Square. *[Newspaper Illustrations.]*



The same procession entering Hyde Park.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

line or occupation in the vacant places of the brave lads who had gone. Another difficulty in Mr. Redmond's path was the fact that the population of Ireland is preponderantly rural. Only twenty-five per cent of the population is found in the urban districts, which are usually the most fruitful places for the work of the recruiter. This difficulty has been experienced as widely in Ulster as in Munster, and is independent of political or religious prepossession. Indeed, it is universal and rooted in the peasant psychology. The Irish peasant, like the English peasant and the peasant of the Continent, dislikes military service. He is no more lacking in courage than his countryman of the towns. Probably it is that the idea of barrack life, of association with crowds, and of regimenting is repellent to the man of isolated life and rustic associations. His reluctance on this occasion was increased by the appeal to the agricultural classes to break up more land and produce more food. There was a real shortage of labour in some districts. For the dislike of soldiering vanishes as you touch even the remotest Irish country village, and the scattered villages of the east and south made extraordinary contributions to the Irish corps. In many quite thirty per cent of the hamlet enlisted, and villages might be found in which not one man of military age was left. Finally, the Irish rally was hampered by the remnant of the strike passion. James Larkin missed his opportunity, and failed to realise the truth that made itself so manifest to the Socialists of France, Belgium, and England, and even to many a pacifist. He set himself against the current and was borne away. An interview with the General Officer Commanding in Ireland was followed by the Labour Leader's departure for America, where even the German-Americans have found no use for him.

IRISH DIFFICULTIES WITH THE WAR OFFICE.

But these displays of sectional prejudice could not seriously have hampered the Irish Leader's policy. In fact opposition came from no quarter from which the Democratic Nationalist movement for reform within the Constitution had not been encountered and overthrown during the previous five and thirty years. Mr. Redmond's most serious difficulties were due to a certain lack of appreciation in the War Office itself. The War Office appeared to have formed an extraordinarily low estimate of the value of Mr. Redmond's assistance in the raising of the new armies. Speaking in presence of the Irish Viceroy, at Waterford, on December 3rd, 1915, Mr. Redmond described his interview with the Secretary for War after the declaration of hostilities. Lord Kitchener asked "Can you guarantee to me five thousand men from Ireland; if you can, I will say 'thank you.' If you can guarantee me twelve thousand, I will say 'I am deeply obliged.'" With such an idea of the possibilities in Ireland, it is not surprising that little deference was paid for a time to Irish advice and Irish opinion in the enlistment campaign. First, there was a difficulty about chaplains. The War Office had a strong objection to the increase of the number of non-combatants. That non-combatants of the type of some of the Irish chaplains, who have given their lives for their men in the war, may have their war value has, probably, become by this time the official opinion. But in the beginning the refusal to appoint a chaplain for each Irish battalion kept thousands away from the recruiting offices.

Mr. Redmond's own plan for getting the best out of Ireland consisted of two parts. First, he recommended that the Volunteers should be enrolled on similar lines to

the Territorial units in England, and with similar obligations. Second, he suggested that a National Committee should be formed to raise a distinctly Irish Division or Army Corps, to be called, despite technicalities, "The Irish Brigade," for the sake of historical associations. The first recommendation was never adopted, apparently on the ground that it would interfere with recruiting, though sound judges in Ireland held the contrary view. Many months passed before the second suggestion was accepted. Military reasons were offered for the delay. The opinion was held in high quarters, it was said, that the best regiments are composite ones, and that the Irish leaven should be spread rather than gathered in one mass. Another damper upon recruiting was the difficulty young Irish Nationalists met with in obtaining commissions. The routine way of securing a nomination from a commanding officer was not generally easy to follow in their case. Their friends among commanding officers were few. In some districts what looked like differential treatment in this matter as between young Unionists and young Nationalists was so unpleasantly evident that serious injury was done to the campaign. Mr. Redmond's suggested National Committee never came into existence. Reliance was placed upon the ordinary committees brought together by the Lords Lieutenant of Counties, but with the best will in the world these Committees found it difficult to attune their propaganda to popular sympathy and opinion. Many of the orators engaged were Unionist election agents out of employment. Jingo sentiment and threats of conscription took the place of a reasoned revelation of Ireland's own self-interest in the war, and an appeal to what the Italian statesman described as "*il sano egotismo*." Mr. Redmond's theme that "this was Ireland's war" found few exponents.


GOVERNMENT PROSECUTIONS.

The domestic tranquillity of Ireland has remained practically unbroken. A wiser Executive would have ignored some of the offences that have been prosecuted under the Defence of the Realm Act. The prosecution of Mr. Sheehy-Skeffington, an anti-Austrian pacifist, because of his rather barren efforts to preach the doctrine of non-resistance in a shindy-loving land, was a bad example of the lack of wisdom. The incriminated words amounted to no more than a parody of Sir Edward Carson's "We will not have Home Rule," in a declaration that we should resist conscription. A magisterial sneer at the possibility of the Home Rule Act ever coming into operation and a rather savage sentence of six months' imprisonment did more harm to recruiting than Mr. Sheehy-Skeffington's oratory, intensely convinced as it was, could have effected. The prisoner starved himself out of jail in less than a week, and the majesty of the law looked less majestic than before. More interest was attracted to the cases of the Sinn Féin organisers, who were ordered by General Friend to expatriate themselves and live outside Ireland. The reasons for the Order have not been disclosed. Sentences of three months' imprisonment punished disobedience to the Order, and the persons incriminated served their term and remained in Ireland. Another group of cases was made up of prosecutions for speeches hostile to enlistment. The language indicted usually consisted of arguments to prove the necessity of Irishmen staying at home to defend the rights of the Irish people against Ulster aggression after the war, or of reasons urged against the further depopulation of an artificially depopulated country. It was remarkable how completely absent from these speeches



The King inspecting infantry of the Ulster Division in training at Aldershot.

[Topical.



Irish cyclists and transport marching past the King.

[Topical Press.



Irish artillery marching past.

[Topical.

were the notes of pro-Germanism, or of hostility to Great Britain. The orators were in fact prudent. They were evidently of opinion that an appeal to either of these sentiments would be detrimental to their interests. The Sinn Fein cause, in fact, never recovered from the publication of the Clan-na-Gael manifesto by *The Freeman's Journal* in the early days of the war. The organ of orthodox Nationalism could not, in fact, have more effectually spiked the Sinn Fein artillery; for the manifesto of the irreconcilables, signed by John Devey, the life-long critic of Davitt and Parnell, who had never forgiven "the new departure" effected by them in Irish politics, was directed even more fiercely against the Irish Constitutional leaders and the Home Rule Act than against Great Britain and the Empire. Magisterial severity cooked the only sympathy won by the band of dissentients. The Government itself was wiser in its measures. The distrust of the Registration Act as a preliminary to conscription was so widespread that it was not applied in Ireland except in limited districts by Viceregal Order in Council. An extra-legal issue of forms by the police authorities merely served to prove, by its negative results, the popular antagonism to compulsion. It had the unfortunate effect of assisting the alarmists, who were using the conscription cry to hamper the efforts of the political leaders in making voluntary enlistment a thorough success.

Nevertheless, steadily, if gradually, Ireland's appreciation of the interests at stake and her enthusiasm for the Allied cause grew in volume. The defence of Liège roused admiration, the burning of Louvain indignation, the sinking of the *Lusitania* horror. The fighting instinct of the Celt manifested itself. The first Irish Division of the New Army to come under fire, the heroic Tenth, rallied independently of all preceding organisations and all political and religious predilections. It was the first to be ready for the field, and represented Ireland fully, north and south, Protestant and Catholic, in all the complexities of race, belief, and political opinion. Its enlistment began in August, 1914; it was landing at Suvla Bay and attempting the heights of Anafarta and Anzac in August, 1915, without apprenticeship in trenches or seasoning under shells. Ireland has no reason to be ashamed of the valour of the "raw lads" thrown away at Suvla Bay, or of the remnants of them that covered the retreat round Lake Doiran. Sir Bryan Mahon was the organiser and general of this division.

THE TRAINING AND ACHIEVEMENT OF IRISH ARMY.

Ulster's first muster was soon made. Sir Edward Carson issued his appeal to the Ulster Volunteers, and very speedily a special Ulster Division under General Powell was in training. Unfortunately, the condition was imposed by its organiser that a sectarian and political test should be applied in its regiments. While the Tenth Division was being enrolled without respect to "creed or clan," advertisements were being published in the Dublin Unionist Press for recruits for some of the Ulster regiments, with the addition "only Protestants and Unionists will be accepted." The equipment of this division was considerably delayed, with the result that though composed of men who had been under training for a couple of years as Volunteers, it was not ready for the front until several months after the Tenth Division set sail for Gallipoli. The enemies of Mr. Redmond's policy began to whisper that the Ulster Division was not seriously meant, and was being preserved intact for political reasons. The Irish Leader, when this calumny was made public, immediately stamped

it out. Meantime, after needless delay, the suggestion of Mr. Redmond for the enrolment of "an Irish Brigade," which, rightly translated, meant four brigades, was undertaken under Sir Laurence Parsons. The enrolment proceeded outside the ordinary recruiting agencies, and the ranks steadily filled with recruits from the Irish National Volunteers, who continued their support of their leader. Drafts to assist the speedier preparation of the Tenth Division retarded the work of the Sixteenth. But the men are now in the trenches, under the command of General Hickie, with the Ulster Division not far away. While these divisions were being organised, the recruiting offices were busy with the reserves for the old regiments. They needed a steady flow of men. The Second Munsters perished at Etreux, on the 27th of August, 1914, isolated through the delay, unblamable, of a despatch rider. On the 22nd of the following December a new Second Munsters formed part of the brigade that attempted the recapture of the trenches at Festubert, and lost eleven officers and a hundred and ninety-two men. On May 9th, 1915, they were again at work at Rue du Bois. Their losses numbered 379 men of all ranks. The battalion, according to the G.O.C., "was the only one in the brigade whose men succeeded in storming the enemy's breast-works." Similar gaps had to be filled in the other brave regiments, the Irish Guards, the Royal Irish Regiment, the Dublin Fusiliers, the Inniskillings, the Connaughts, the Royal Irish Rifles, and the Royal Irish Fusiliers. Altogether in Ireland by December, 1915, according to the statement of the Irish Lord Lieutenant, over a hundred thousand men had been recruited for the several Irish Divisions and the reserves of the old regiments. The rejections were nearly as many. So that upwards of two hundred thousand Irishmen answered from Ireland itself to the call of duty in this war. Nor is the muster yet complete, as the present formation of new Irish Battalions proves.

IRISH ENLISTMENTS IN ENGLAND AND ABROAD.

The action of Ireland and its leaders had important results throughout the countries where emigrant Irishmen have found a home. In Great Britain, from London, from Tyneside, from the banks of the Mersey and the Clyde, from the coalfields, from all the centres of industry Irishmen have enlisted in numbers which credible estimates have placed as high as the number that enlisted in the home country. Throughout the Dominions Irishmen and men of Irish descent have been in enthusiastic agreement with their kinsmen. The Irish contribution to the Canadian contingents, as every resident in an Irish town has seen, is very large. On the first troopship that sailed from New Zealand there were four hundred Irishmen. The Anzacs included hundreds of men not merely Irish in blood and name, but of Irish birth. Even from the United States there has been a steady return. Groups of young Irishmen have clubbed and come home from places as distant as San Francisco. Young Irish-American girls have, as nurses, accompanied the American Medical units to France. When a nation moves, its movement is uncontrollable by the ordinary machinery of political sects and factions. The pro-German propaganda among Irishmen in the United States has been noisy but ineffective. The silent masses of Irish-Americans, especially in the Eastern States, where their numbers and influence are greatest, are one in sentiment with the Motherland, and with the nations of Europe that cherish the ideals of free government and a non-militarist civilisation. The Motherland is a new Ireland.

IN A MUNSTER VILLAGE.

In a little town in Munster, on the day that the King's Assent was given to the Home Rule Act, there had been a meeting in the afternoon of the District Council, where a resolution, supported by the Unionist gentlemen present, was passed congratulating Mr. Redmond on the event. At night the little town was illuminated, its streets ablaze with tar-barrels and the cabin windows with candle-light. A public meeting was held. The town is in a valley that had witnessed many of the tragedies of Ireland's history. There Henry II. held his council, and John Lackland had plucked the beards of the Irish Chiefs. Roger le Gros lies in an island down the river. Raleigh had owned the territory before he went to the Tower, and under one of the yew trees, which they point to still, he had conned with Spenser the first books of the Faerie Queene. Up the western ridge stand the charred walls of the castle whence the poet fled to die in London. Over the northern mountains the Butlers, led by "Black Tom," had marched to the destruction of the Desmonds. The Great Earl of Cork had succeeded Raleigh, and the Cavendishes had inherited his wealth and power. But "the meek shall inherit the earth," and only the townsmen and peasant proprietors that are now masters of the blood-soaked and devastated soil were there to meet in England's great emergency. All the influences represented by the Raleighs and the Boyles, the Butlers and the Desmonds, and the Cavendishes, were in England's hour of need as if they had never been. The orators of the occasion were the elect of the "old Irish ennemie"—the Chairman of the County Council, Gaelic in name; the

Clerk of the Council, a "criminal" of the Land War days, Gaelic too; the Dispensary Doctor, one of Parnell's guards in the days of Parnell's disaster. The event of the morning, the associations of the past, the contrast between the old order and the new, seemed to be the likely topics of the occasion. But no. There was only a passing reference to the Home Rule Act, to thank those Unionists who had been so gracious, and to emphasise the Irish Leader's offer of goodwill to Ulster. For the rest there was only one business. "I never thought that I'd be a 'listing sergeant,'" said the "criminal" of old days. He struck the keynote. Since then three hundred lads have gone from the little town. Fifty years ago their Fenian fathers used to meet in caves over the river to do musket drill for "the day" that never came. Their old muskets were unearthed only just a few years ago by the constabulary, who discovered the plot forty years after. Now the sons are in the firing line. Naturally, Ireland's overmastering thought in the great war is that the principles which have worked this miracle in Ireland itself in our time must not go down before the menace of reaction. Nor, whatever politicians may say or do, is Ulster feeling unmoved. A young officer of the Covenanters, back with honour from the trenches, has expressed the sentiment that is growing when he said, "the situation that existed in Ulster before the war should never have arisen; it must never be allowed to rise again." Catastrophic as Ireland's history has been, it is incredible that the country should ever be thrown back upon the old antagonisms which have been shattered in the great trial of civilisation.



The Irish Guards recruiting in Dublin: The reception of the band outside the Mansion House, Dublin.

[Chancellor, Dublin.]



Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Henderson at a meeting of trade union members at Newcastle.

[Central News.]

CHAPTER XXXI.

HOME POLITICS IN THE SUMMER OF 1915.

REASONS FOR THE FORMATION OF THE COALITION MINISTRY—MR. LLOYD GEORGE'S POSITION—THE MUNITIONS ACT—THE NATIONAL REGISTER—THE AGITATION FOR COMPULSION—"SINGLE MEN FIRST."

OUR last chapter on the reactions of the war on domestic politics closed with the first great political event, the formation of a Coalition Ministry. The suddenness of this step on Mr. Asquith's part was a mystery to the majority of politicians at the time. The Ministry was formed towards the end of May, 1915, and as late as July 1st Mr. Redmond could say at Dublin: "I do not like the Coalition Government. To this day I do not really understand why it was necessary to form that Government." The Ministry became less of a mystery month by month as the demand for compulsion became more and more insistent. Behind it all we constantly find the powerful personality of Mr. Lloyd George. So much secret history has since become an open secret that it would be impossible to tell a true story of the political events from May, 1915, to October, 1915, without at some points departing from the strict orthodoxy of official versions of events.

What we may call the semi-official explanation of the crisis which demanded the formation of the Coalition was simple. The public revelation of the shortage of shells at Neuve Chapelle, and the resignation of Lord

Fisher on the policy of the Dardanelles Expedition, would have brought about a debate in the House of Commons which would have destroyed the Government. The only alternative was a Party Coalition. We shall see that this explanation is not in itself adequate.

It is important to note that the new Government was as nearly as possible a mathematically exact coalition of parties. Offices were distributed almost in mathematical proportion to the strength of parties. Thus the Liberal and Labour Parties retained a majority in the Cabinet. Even the minor offices of the Ministry were fairly distributed, and all question or quarrel about the distribution of emoluments was removed by a curious private arrangement for pooling the salaries of all Cabinet Ministers except that of the Prime Minister, and dividing them equally, giving to each Minister a salary of something over £4,000 a year. Mr. Henderson, the Leader of the Labour Party, entered the Cabinet as the official representative of a pledge-bound party, and Mr. Brace and Mr. Roberts joined the Administration in minor posts on the same terms. Eight months later, as things turned out, they were to leave the Ministry, not because any policy was adopted that they individually disapproved,

but because their party withdrew them when the Cabinet adopted the principle of compulsion. The Irish Nationalists, though pressed to have a representative in the Cabinet, refused the offer (though they continued their full support of the Government and the war), because the Coalition Government would not give completely satisfactory guarantees as to Home Rule.

The Conservatives entered the Ministry with obvious reluctance. If they had had their debate in the House of Commons the Government would no doubt have fallen, and the Conservatives would either have come into office in its stead, or have entered a coalition on much better terms. In all probability a General Election would have taken place, and a Unionist majority would have been returned. As it was, the Unionist leaders were invited by the Prime Minister to forego their criticisms and enter the Government. A meeting of the Unionist Parliamentary Party was held at the Carlton Club on May 26th, at which the speeches of the leaders plainly showed that they were conscious of making a sacrifice. Mr. Bonar Law, who is above all things an honest and frank-speaking man, put it most clearly. "There is not one of us," he said at the party meeting, "who is entering the Coalition who would not rather stay out of it. There is not one of us who does not realise, if he thinks of his political career at all, that the chances are that it will be ruined." Lord Lansdowne, at the same meeting, referred to the problems of munitions and soldiers. "There has been something amiss in the material organisation of the country," he said; "as to men we are not sure that we have got enough, or that we are getting enough. But," he added, "Mr. Bonar Law and I felt that we could not do otherwise than accept the overtures that were made by the Government."

It was freely said by partisan Liberals at the time that the Unionists had "blackmailed" themselves into the Cabinet. That was a false reading of the situation. The Unionists had the power to place themselves in Office. That they did not do so, but became instead political partners of the Liberal leaders, is significant. They may have been thinking, and Mr. Bonar Law's speech indicates it, not only of the mistakes of the past but of the problems of the future. They may have foreseen the situation to come in which measures would have to be taken which it was expected could only be taken by a united national Government supported by a union of party machinery for the guidance of public opinion in the country. For example, suppose conscription, military or industrial, or both, to have been foreseen as a likely necessity of the future, it would also be foreseen that a Unionist Government, faced by a Liberal Opposition in the House of Commons and in the country, would not be able to carry it.

The crisis which led to the formation of the Coalition was immediately precipitated by a message from the Military Correspondent of the *Times* on the shortage of shells at the Battle of Neuve Chapelle. It has already been pointed out in a previous chapter (Vol. II. p. 315) that this message was not the first to be heard of the shortage of shells. It had already been frankly announced in despatches, and in the speeches of responsible Ministers, as a cause of military failure, and a large part of the blame had been publicly laid to the count of Labour difficulties and Trade Union restrictions. The *Times* message came simply as the signal for the crisis. The resignation of Lord Fisher from the post of First Sea Lord on an

entirely different issue would seem to have fallen at the same time by a mere coincidence. It must also be remembered that for many weeks before this crisis, as we have shown in the former chapter, Mr. Lloyd George had been greatly exercised about Labour difficulties in the production of munitions and the drink evil among munition workers.

THE MINISTRY OF MUNITIONS.

An event of equal importance with the formation of the Coalition Ministry was the creation of a new Cabinet Office and Government Department, the Ministry of Munitions. Mr. Lloyd George gave up the Chancellorship of the Exchequer to become Minister of Munitions. The first act of the new Ministry was to introduce the Ministry of Munitions Bill on June 3rd, a few days after the formation of the Coalition Government. The Bill was passed, and received Royal Assent on June 9th. In the meantime, in several speeches to employers and workers, Mr. Lloyd George in the first days of June had publicly indicated that his mind was working on the lines of industrial compulsion for war purposes. It is an open secret that he had already at that time thought out a definite scheme. In a public speech at Manchester, on June 4th, he gave significant indications of his attitude towards both industrial and military conscription. He said: "I can only say this, that to introduce compulsion as an important element in organising the nation's resources of skilled industry and trade does not necessarily mean conscription in the ordinary sense of the term. Conscription means raising by compulsory methods armies to fight Britain's enemies abroad. Even that is a question not of principle but of necessity. If the necessity arose I am certain no man of any party would protest. But pray do not talk about it as if it were anti-democratic. We won and saved our liberties in this land on more than one occasion by compulsory service."

THE MUNITIONS ACT.

The Munitions of War Act was not carried without a great deal of Labour opposition. There were repeated conferences and negotiations between the Minister and various Trade Union representatives. The Act in its final form did not by any means satisfy its Labour critics. It provided for compulsory arbitration and the prohibition of strikes and lock-outs in nearly all trades. It also brought under the control of the Ministry any factory or workshop in which munition work was carried on. In these controlled establishments all profits above a certain maximum rate were to be paid into the Exchequer.

The object of this provision was, of course, to remove from the minds of workmen the idea that they were being put under coercion for the private profit of the employer. The workmen in controlled establishments, on their part, were subjected to various restrictions. In particular, they could not leave their employment without a leaving certificate from the employer, on pain of a heavy fine. The Ministry took power to regulate rates of wages in controlled establishments, to determine workshop discipline, and to overrule any trade union rule or custom which tended to restrict output. Disputes on many of these points were to be referred for settlement to Munitions Tribunals which were set up by the Act. A Tribunal consisted of an Arbitrator appointed by the Ministry, with advisers or assessors from a panel representing employers and employed. Two important

trades, the miners and the cotton workers, resisted inclusion in the Act, and carried their point. They were expressly excluded, but the right was reserved in the Act to bring them in by Royal Proclamation.

A very few weeks after the passing of the Act a serious strike broke out in the South Wales coalfields (p. 113). The mining industry was thereupon proclaimed under the Act. This prompt and vigorous measure, however, failed. The dispute was only brought to an end when Mr. Lloyd George went to the spot himself and obtained for the men practically all that they came out for. In short, this first attempt to use the Act as a coercive measure against a powerfully-organised trade was abandoned as soon as it was begun. The dispute, however, had been about outstanding demands put forward long before the war, and since the settlement there has been no further trouble in South Wales. Nor has the compulsory arbitration section of the Act needed to be enforced for other trades. There have been few strikes, or none of any consequence.

Nevertheless, the Ministry of Munitions continued to feel itself hampered in its work by trade union rules and customs tending to restrict output. This difficulty remained the subject of frequent complaint and appeal from the Minister. In particular he urged the importance of using unskilled labour and the labour of women in violation of the old trade union rules, in order to eke out the labour of skilled men and multiply the output of war supplies. To this policy he evidently felt that some resistance was still being offered by many trade unions.

A subsidiary measure for helping the output of munitions was taken under a Defence of the Realm Act. The liquor traffic in scheduled munition areas was put entirely in the hands of a Central Control Board. The Board was composed of men politically and socially representative. They were left to work out the problem in their own way, and eventually settled down to a uniform policy of the restriction of drinking hours in both public houses and clubs. Sunday hours for every day is a roughly accurate

summary of the system which was soon applied to all scheduled munition areas. These areas cover the greater part of the country and include much the greater part of its population. The opposition from the liquor trade was weak, and the Central Control Board overruled, without difficulty and without compensation, one of the greatest vested interests in the country.

We have seen that Mr. Lloyd George had already canvassed the idea of industrial compulsion early in June, and had indicated a new attitude on the subject of conscription for military service. In the following weeks it soon became generally known that Mr. Lloyd George was, in fact, converted to a belief in the need for compulsory military service. In the meantime a

strong agitation was conducted in one section of the Press, led by the *Times* and *Morning Post*, for immediate compulsion, and a counter-agitation in some of the London Liberal papers against it. About the middle of September it became known among politicians that a large section of the Cabinet, though still a minority, were in favour of compulsion, among them being Mr. Lloyd George and perhaps another Liberal Minister. It was said that a small group of extreme Compulsionist Ministers, with whom Mr. Lloyd George associated himself, was putting strong pressure upon the Cabinet to proceed to immediate compulsion. A London Liberal paper publicly stated this in what was believed to be an inspired communication



Watching the arrival of Ministers at Downing Street during a time of political crisis.

[Central News.]

from its political correspondent. The disclosure apparently had a restraining effect upon the compulsionist movement for the time being. At all events, a great deal less was heard of it.

THE CENSUS BILL.

In the meantime, one school of publicists had taken a middle line. Even among voluntaryists there were some who urged that the attempt should be made to combine the highest degree of national organisation with the voluntary principle. The *Manchester Guardian*, among others, advocated the formation of a national register, which when drawn up could be used as the

basis of a personal appeal to every man freely to give his service either in the army or in war work at home. A Bill to give effect to this idea was one of the earliest measures of the Coalition Government. It was introduced in the House of Commons on June 29th by Mr. Walter Long, the President of the Local Government Board, and received Royal Assent on July 15th. The Bill was described as a Census Bill, and it provided that every man and woman between the ages of 15 and 65 should be required to state, for the purpose of the register, his or her address, age, occupation, employer, and condition as to marriage and dependants. Every registration card sent out also required a statement of special skill in any second occupation which might be of value in war work, and an expression of willingness or unwillingness to exercise it in the service of the State.

The Bill was regarded with deep suspicion by opponents to compulsion in the House of Commons. In spite of all assurances, a small minority persisted in regarding it as the preliminary to a measure of conscription and voted against it to the end. It was indeed obvious that the measure could be used to facilitate conscription, but assurances were given by the Prime Minister that no such action as forced labour or conscription was in contemplation by the Government with respect to the Bill. It was significant that the Irish Nationalist members would not permit the Bill to be applied to Ireland in any serious sense. By private negotiation, while the Bill was drafting, it was arranged that though a register might be made in any area of Ireland by order of the Lord Lieutenant, no registration cards should be issued, and the necessary information should be compiled from particulars supplied by the Constabulary, or by the County Councils if willing.

When the Bill was safely through the House of Commons Lord Lansdowne, in introducing it in the House of Lords, was franker. He said "I do not believe that voluntary service, with its present injustices and anomalies, will be tolerated very much longer by the country, and that if the voluntary system is to be given a chance at all it must obtain that chance under the provisions of this Bill. . . . But, in another sense, I frankly admit that this Bill does bring us nearer to compulsory service. If compulsory service ever comes this register will, beyond all question, greatly assist us in introducing it, because it will shorten the interval which would have to elapse between our decision to resort to compulsion and the actual application of the measure."

AN UNDERCURRENT OF AGITATION.

From about this time to the rising of Parliament the political story is not one of measures or Parliamentary Acts but of personalities, and a turbulent agitation in the group of papers headed by the *Times* and *Daily Mail*, supported in the House of Commons by a little band of members, among whom Sir Henry Dalziel was the most conspicuous and assiduous. On July 1st a very late sitting of the House of Commons was brought about by this group. In the course of an extraordinary speech on the Munitions Bill Sir Henry Dalziel made an attack on the head of the Ordnance Department, Colonel Von Donop, and demanded that we should "scrap Von Donop." Mr. Lloyd George, in his reply, made no defence either of the Ordnance Department or of Colonel Von Donop. On the contrary, he said "there had been serious mistakes," and declared that

if he were hampered he would at once come to the House for support. This incident did not quite end there. Lord Haldane made a defence of Colonel Von Donop a day or two later, and the report of his speech was immediately followed by a contradiction on behalf of Mr. Lloyd George, issued through the Press Bureau.

The Press campaign at this stage was coupled with a systematic pessimism and decrying of the effort that this country was putting forth. The beginning of the pessimism was in connection with the Dardanelles expedition. There were constant more or less open attacks on Mr. Asquith, and his phrase "Wait and see" became the favourite gibe of the Press campaigners. Mingled with these criticisms and attacks was a more and more insistent demand for conscription. At first there was a shyness of the name of conscription. "National service" was the word. A speech by Lord

Davenport in the House of Lords, referring to the cost of the dependants of married men, had suggested a new line of approach to conscription, and one that the event showed was ingeniously chosen. On July 2nd it came out with the famous watchword "Single men first." Parliament rose at the end of July for a six weeks' recess. There were protests from the same group of papers and the same group of members against the length of the adjournment. The belief evidently was that the delay might weaken the agitation and prevent the storming of the position.

On July 30th, in a speech at the Opera House, which was described in some newspapers as a trumpet call, Mr. Lloyd George publicly identified himself both with the pessimism and with the conscription campaign. The great German drive in Russia was then beginning. Mr. Lloyd George referred to events in the Eastern



Mr. Asquith leaving the War Office after paying a morning call there.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

theatre as meaning "a larger share on Britain." That larger share to him meant compulsion was shown by other phrases of the speech. "Freedom," he declared, "implies the right to shirk—the right for you to enjoy and for others to defend. Is that fair?" Still in pursuit of the "Single men first" policy, the *Daily Mail* asserted that there were in the country "1,750,000 unmarried men of military age not in the firing line." August had few political events. All eyes were on the tremendous events in the Eastern theatre of war, which then were at their worst. It was not till the beginning of September that politics were resumed. In the meantime the National Register Census had been taken on August 15th. The Trade Union Congress took note of the conscription agitation, and passed a temperate resolution to the effect that "there was no reliable evidence that the voluntary system would not provide all the men that were wanted." But a more significant sign was a great scene of enthusiasm when Mr. Smillie, the Chairman of the Miners' Federation, made an impassioned speech against conscription. Mr. Lloyd George's prestige as a tribune of the people still held good, for the next day he was attending the Congress to address them at their own invitation. He complained again that trade union rules were a serious obstacle, and appealed for their suspension. His reception, however, was not altogether cordial.


"Pessimist" and "optimist" were by now in everyone's mouth as terms of mutual reproach. Mr. Lloyd George identified himself still more closely with the pessimists in a remarkable preface to a volume of his speeches ("Through Terror to Triumph") which was issued to the Press (see p. 191.). It was, in fact, a manifesto

of pessimism, and it was issued just on the eve of the reassembly of Parliament. Mr. Lloyd George declared that "The nation was slouching into disaster along the ordinary paths of peace." Here for the first time, too, Mr. Lloyd George used the phrase "Too late," which he was to use with still more sensational effect at a later stage in his campaign. When Parliament reassembled it was seen that conscription was to be the only subject. Since the middle of August there had been talk of the Cabinet being divided into two parties. In the course of a debate in the Commons Mr. Asquith openly admitted that the subject of compulsion was under the consideration of the Cabinet. On September 14th Mr. Lloyd George made it plainer still, in a telegram to the *Pall Mall Gazette*, saying, "I cannot make any statement on national service until the Cabinet comes to a decision." Two days later Mr. J. H. Thomas, the Leader of the Railwaymen, made a speech in the House of Commons which took the compulsionists aback for a moment. He threatened a general strike of railwaymen if conscription were forced. It was now clear that organised labour was likely to make a stand. Mr. Lloyd George evidently feared that he was soon to break with a powerful section of the democracy. This feeling he expressed through the device—unusual for him, though usual enough in politics—of a letter to a constituent. Its purpose, he said, was "to sound a note of alarm." "Nothing but the exertion of our whole strength," he said, would win the war. He meant to go on his course "without regard to the effect on my political fortunes." Throwing a glance into the future, he added, "If for any reason I fail, it will be a sorry comfort later on to taunt with their mistake those who now abuse me."



Filling up the National Register Forms in a common lodging house.

Newspaper Illustrations.



The blockade in operation: British patrol vessels on the watch in the North Sea during rough weather.

[Central News.]

CHAPTER XXXII.

THE LAW AND THE COURTS.

THE LAWYER IN ENGLISH POLITICS—HIS GREAT SERVICES TO CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY—HIS TEMPERAMENTAL DEFECTS—SOME LEGAL CASES ON THE WAR.

LAW has played a much greater part in English politics than in those of any other country in the world. In other countries it may be true that war supersedes the law—*inter arma silent leges*—but not in England, where the Courts are independent of the Executive, and have often shown themselves more effectual critics of the Government than Parliament itself. This continuance of legal conceptions in the midst of the clash of arms, and at discord if not with the policy of the Government at any rate with popular passion, strengthened the prejudice that had been growing for some time in England against Government by lawyers. A certain impatience with the forms of law manifested itself, and it was even argued that there was something in the profession of the law that unfitted a man for executive or administrative office, and that many of our misfortunes in the war were attributable to this cause. This mood was more than a passing phase of thought, and it may be worth a short examination before we pass on to notice a few events in that difficult borderland between politics and law.

One of the weaknesses of the English legal temperament is its reluctance to choose between two alternatives. It can never resist the temptation to postpone a decision as long as possible, and if action must be taken to try to combine two courses which may in reality be irreconcilable. This desire to avoid being committed a moment before it is necessary to any decided course of action, this cultivated and critical opportunism, may be the result of practice in courts. But it is also inherent in English law, which avoids a general principle admitting of no exceptions as nature is said to avoid a vacuum, and undoubtedly there have been times in this war when the lawyer's lack of enterprise, his habit of halting as long as possible between two opinions, his reticence and lack of frankness and candour, have shown to great disadvantage by the side of the brutal and decisive logic of the German. But it must, on the other side, be remembered how much this country owes in its politics to the conceptions of law. In other countries—notably France—the foundations of liberty are to be found in some general far-reaching political principle, which

reformers have set themselves to apply in all its complications. Not so in England. Here constitutional liberties are based on documents which rather resemble a pleading in a Common Law action in their studious avoidance of any statement of general principle. Compare the Petition of Right with a State document of Revolutionary France, and the difference is seen to be fundamental. The lawyer-like habit of British politics is no modern development, but goes back right to the beginning of constitutional government. English political life in fact, for good and evil, is rooted not in a philosophy or a set of principles, but in the Common Law. The beginnings of English Parliamentary liberty may be regarded as the triumph of Common Law over Chancery, which, in the hands of Bacon, became an instrument of despotism which would crush out the rights of the individual in the interests, real or supposed, of the State. And if this be the principle for which Germany stands in modern politics, then the war between England and Germany is capable of being regarded as a repetition, in a wider theatre, of the old struggle between Parliament and the Stuarts, between individual right and the prerogative of the State. So far as this view is sound, and the war is not a clash of rival ambitions, the lawyer-politicians of England in this war might, with justice, claim that they are on ground that was at any rate familiar to them, and on which their past services were not inglorious.

LAW AND THE NAVAL BLOCKADE.

Considerable space has already been given in this History to the questions of naval law to which this war gave rise (Vol. II., Chapters XI, XII., and Chapter XXII. of this volume). There can be little doubt that Germany in the position of England would never have signed either the Declaration of Paris or the Declaration of London, which between them made any effective blockade of Germany impossible, inasmuch as she could always import whatever she needed through neutral countries. Had Germany, in her infatuation, not countenanced the plan of the submarine blockade, it is doubtful whether we could have used our full naval power against her. As it was, her crimes at sea enabled us to establish a blockade by retaliation, which, if not absolute, was as stringent in the North Sea as any blockade of a whole country known in history. Even then, there remained the difficulty of enforcing this blockade without driving neutrals to desperation, or at any rate forfeiting the moral position which we took up in resisting the invasion of Belgium. If it was characteristic of English lack of foresight to

have blundered at the outset into a position under which it was impossible to use our full naval power, very English, too, was the skill with which we extricated ourselves, and that without serious offence to neutrals. This result was accomplished by several means. One was a system of guarantees made between our Government and groups of merchants in neutral countries, by which these bound themselves that goods consigned to them should not leave the country. Of these groups the Netherlands Oversea Trust was the type. The fact that goods for a neutral country were not consigned to these trusts at once raised the presumption that they were destined for the enemy, and was thus of great assistance to the fleet in conducting its examination. Another practice that was devised in the war was that of agreement with shipping lines, by which they engaged to meet our

requirements in return for an undertaking that their ships would be delayed for as short a time as possible for examination in British ports. A third plan was to refuse bunker coal in our ports except to ships who accepted conditions designed to stop the carriage of cargo destined for re-export to Germany. And yet a fourth plan was that of rationing, under which the imports of certain articles into neutral countries adjacent to Germany are limited to the amount of their domestic requirements. It is just that the Government, which was attacked for the state of the code of international law at sea at the beginning of the war, should also have the credit for this extremely astute reversal of the position. It was no small feat to convert a situation in which we could not use our naval power against Germany into an extremely stringent blockade, and though the crimes of Germany helped us, great ability was shown in taking advantage of them, and in obtaining so considerable a measure

of co-operation from neutral countries. Part of the credit is to be given to the lawyers. The impossibility of establishing an effective blockade of Germany under the rules laid down by the Declaration of London, or even of Paris, must have been foreseen, but it is not easy to imagine how these rules could have been altered without causing widespread suspicion and offence either before the war or before Germany's misconduct at sea justified us in bringing forward a new policy as a measure of retaliation.

WAR A RELATION BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS.

There have within the last two hundred years been two opposing theories of the nature of war. According to one it is a relation between Governments but not necessarily between their subjects. That was the view of



Lord Reading.

[J. Russell and Sons.

Rousseau, it was strongly put forward by M. Portalis in opening the French Prize Court in 1801, and since then has obtained a considerable measure of support from Continental jurists. The other, and more conservative view, is that war is a personal relationship between the individuals of the States at war, and on this is founded the prohibition of trading with the enemy. Indeed, Lord Justice Pickford, in a judgment delivered on May 7th, 1915, declared that the prohibition of intercourse at Common Law with the enemy was not limited to commercial intercourse. It logically followed from this prohibition that a State at war had the right to treat as enemies all enemy subjects within its borders on the outbreak of war, but the usual practice had been to allow them to leave, and even to remain during good behaviour. Napoleon's detention of the English in France in 1803 was regarded at the time as an atrocity. The milder practice that had grown up lends some small support to the view that war did not necessarily imply a hostile relationship between individuals, and in the middle of the last century it seemed not unlikely that this view might prevail. Two facts, however, have in this war revived the older and more stringent view. One is conscription on the Continent, the other the growing power of the State and its continued encroachment, carried much further in Germany than elsewhere, on personal rights. The German theory of the State made every subject its servant, even though he was not actually engaged in the operation of war. It became impossible to distinguish between a combatant and a non-combatant German; and though in its treatment of Germans resident in this country the Government tried to keep up the distinction as long as possible, the distinction, owing to the German State theory that has already been described, broke down completely in the agitation that followed the sinking of the *Lusitania*.

The distinction between conditional and unconditional contraband which had such a prominent place in the Declaration of London broke down for the same reasons. In a Prize Court case tried in September Sir Samuel Evans held that in a modern conscriptionist country like Germany, in which a large part of the population is either serving in the army or under the control of the Government, the presumption must be, unless the contrary is proved, that all imported commodities are in reality intended for the Government or its armed forces. Thus one by one the elaborate guarantees that had been built up on the principle that private citizens were as far as possible to be exempted from the operations of war fell into ruins. Owing to the misconduct of the Germans, and their outrages on non-combatants, the weakening of such guarantees on our side appeared as a measure of reprisal. Yet it may be doubted whether it was not part of the wicked logic of Continental conscription and of German militarism that the distinction between the State and the individual in war-time and between combatant and non-combatant should disappear. What is important to remember is that if the German doctrine added to her offensive strength, it greatly weakened her power of defence. It was the British navy that discovered the joints in the logical armour of German militarism.

SOME CASES IN COURT.

The rule that war is a relationship between subjects and not between their Governments alone ought, strictly interpreted, to deny all rights in the Courts to Germans as Germans. The Courts, however, have not taken that view. In the case of *Porter v. Freudenberg* (1915, I. K.B., 857) Lord Reading delivered a very interesting

judgment on the rights of alien enemies to appear and be heard in the British Courts. "The test of an alien enemy," he said, "was not his nationality but the place of carrying on his business."

"When considering the enforcement of civil rights a person might be treated as a subject of an enemy State notwithstanding that he was in fact a subject of the British Crown or of a neutral State. Conversely, a person might be treated as a subject of the Crown notwithstanding that he was, in fact, the subject of an enemy State. Professor Dicey, in his *Treatise on Parties to an Action*, at page 3, stated the law accurately in the following proposition: 'Under the term alien enemies not only the subjects of any State at war with us, but also any British subjects or the subjects of any neutral State voluntarily resident in a hostile country.'"

If an Englishman resident in Germany in war-time could be held to be an alien enemy because of his place of residence, it followed that under some conditions a German resident in England might be an alien friend in the eyes of the law. A German subject who, with the express permission of the Crown, carries on his business in this country is not an alien enemy but an alien friend, and has the right to sue and be sued in English Courts. Even an alien enemy can be sued, because, as Mr. Justice Bailhache pointed out, any other view would be "to turn a disability into a form of relief." Whether he can sue is more doubtful, but he can appeal against judgment in an action brought against him, because he is entitled to have his case decided according to law, and if an erroneous judgment has been delivered, to have the error rectified in a higher Court.

A case which attracted a great deal of attention was that of the *Continental Tyre and Rubber Company Limited v. Daimler Company Limited* heard before a full Court of Appeal (1915, I. K.B., 893). The plaintiffs in this case were a limited liability company registered in London, formed for the purpose of selling tyres made by a company registered in Germany. All the shares were held by subjects of the German Empire, and the question was whether they could sue on a bill of exchange. Five of the six judges held that the plaintiff company was a separate entity created by statute, and being an English company did not cease to be that because its shareholders were alien enemies. The sixth Judge, Lord Justice Buckley, in dissenting, argued that though the action was brought in the name of the English company it was really brought by the German directors. "The artificial legal entity had no independent power of motion: it was moved by the corporators. It was the German corporator who under the corporate name, but still German for the relevant purpose of friendliness or enmity, came. Although British in form, he was German in fact."

The Trading with the Enemy Act, 1914, provided, amongst other things, that an official called the Custodian (who in England was the Public Trustee) should collect any dividends or shares of profits due to enemy aliens from English companies and hold them till the end of the war, when they will be dealt with in such manner as the King shall direct. Whatever the enemy's right to sue, therefore, no sums recovered in judgment could find their way to Germany, or assist the enemy in the prosecution of the war. Lord Reading, in *Porter v. Freudenberg*, already cited, reminded the Court that under the Common Law "debts and goods found in this realm belonging to alien enemies belonged to the King, and must be seized by him."

"Whether the right of the Sovereign to confiscate any of the alien enemies' goods in this realm was ever exercised or not, there could be no doubt about its existence. Chief Justice Gibbs, in *Antoine v. Morshead*, affirmed the principle that the Crown during the war might lay hands on debts due to the alien enemy, but if it did not, then on the return of peace the rights of the contracting alien were restored, and he might himself sue to recover the debts. The right of confiscation was only of importance to trace the history and foundation of the Common Law, since there was manifestly no question of exercising this right."

Two other cases of importance were decided in December of 1915, one of which broke the German monopoly of the production of spelter from Australia,

and the other (though the judgment may be appealed against) decided that the appointment before the war, to the Privy Council of two naturalised Germans, Sir Ernest Cassel and Sir Edgar Speyer, was good in spite of the prohibition of membership to all but British-born subjects made by the Act of Settlement.

In all the cases decided by the High Courts during the war there has been a remarkable freedom from passion and prejudice, and a single desire to administer impartially the law of the land. This detachment of mind provoked some criticism, but when the passions of the war have subsided will be remembered to the credit of the English Courts and of the English legal system.




The opening of the Law Courts: Sir Stanley Buckmaster heading the procession of Judges leaving Westminster Abbey.

[Central News.]



A general view of the town of Aden.

[E.N.A.]



A general view of the harbour, Aden.

[E.N.A.]



A view of the Creek at Basra.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

THE MESOPOTAMIAN EXPEDITION.

REASONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN—OUR FORCE AND "FLEET"—THE CAPTURE OF BASRA—THE BATTLE OF SHAIBA—AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE—SECURING THE EUPHRATES—THE ADVANCE TO KUT-EL-AMARA—TURKEY AND OUR EASTERN OUTPOSTS.

ON the outbreak of war with Turkey several considerations, political as well as military, dictated the wisdom of striking at the Ottoman Empire from the head of the Persian Gulf. For one thing, it would have the obviously useful effect of withdrawing Turkish troops from Egypt, the Caucasus, and other fronts, and would at least give us a useful vantage point from which to bargain with Turkey when an ultimate settlement came to be discussed. Secondly, we had in our Indian troops a force which could be readily used for the purpose, and which would be campaigning under conditions familiar to it, since the climate and features of Mesopotamia reproduce those of much of India. The political considerations were much wider. The Government of India had long looked to the rich plains of Southern Mesopotamia as an ideal outlet for India's surplus population. It was recalled that in Mesopotamia the Turk was an interloper, and that under his rule not only had the civilisation and learning of the Arab crumbled, but the development and irrigation of a land as rich as the Punjab—and once the world's greatest granary—had so decayed that alternate drought and flood now devastated large tracts of it. Statesmen with vision thought

of the glories of ancient Chaldea revived under an industrious peasant people directed by a progressive Government; of the choked canals and ruined embankments of the wise old caliphs cleared and restored; and of the traditional seat of the Garden of Eden coming again into its own.

These, no doubt, were remote considerations. More practical was the thought of menace to our communications with India of any hostile control of the Persian Gulf littoral. We had long recognised that the security of India, no less than the fact that 75 per cent of the trade on the Tigris and Euphrates was in British hands, made our naval dominance of the Gulf imperative; and by such arrangements as that with the Sheikh of Kuwait, which gave us command of the best port on the Gulf, we had resolutely pursued that end. Its importance greatly increased when the Admiralty, realising the value of oil fuel, decided to rely for an important part of its supply upon the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, whose pipe line had its terminus and works near Mohammera, on the confluence of the Euphrates and Tigris, at the head of the Gulf. The safeguarding of these vital interests had already brought us into diplomatic conflict with Germany. The con-

struction of a railway from Constantinople to Bagdad and beyond had been entrusted by Turkey to a German company; and the defeat of Turkey in the Balkan Wars gave ground for a fear that Germany, profiting by the weakness of the Ottoman Empire, might emerge dominant at the head of the Gulf. For our protection we claimed a voice in the construction of the line south of Bagdad, insisted that it should end at Basra, seventy miles from the waters of the Gulf proper, and asked that if we so desired we should be allowed to build a line linking Basra and Koweit. The Bagdad Railway question was the subject of prolonged negotiations, but in 1914 a solution had been reached. By an ironic chance Sir Edward Grey, in the same speech in July, 1914, in which he deplored the murder of the Archduke of Austria at Sarajevo, stated that agreement on the lines for which we had contended had been reached, both with Turkey and with Germany, as to conflicting interests in Mesopotamia.

The strategy of the advance was simple. The immense plain of Mesopotamia stretches in a north-westerly direction from the Persian Gulf, and is bisected at its southern end by the Shat-el-Arab—a broad waterway formed by the confluence above Basra of the Tigris and Euphrates. For some distance the eastern bank of the Shat-el-Arab is Persian, and, as we have seen, includes, at Mohammera, the terminus and offices of the Anglo-Persian oil-pipe line. Above Mohammera the Persian frontier runs due north, leaving both the Tigris and Euphrates in Turkish territory. The capture of Basra, therefore, would give us command of the whole of the river communication of Mesopotamia with the Gulf, would help to ensure the safety of the all-important pipe line, and would provide us with the best base for a further land and water advance should that be contemplated. It would, moreover, be a salutary blow to Turkish prestige in the eyes of the Arabs, for Basra, with its population of 50,000, is the chief port of Turkish Arabia, and, in the noble days of the Arab civilisation that went down before Turkish dominance, had been a notable seat of learning and poetry. The most famous of the Arab caliphs—Haroun-el-Raschid—founded a university there, and it was the port from which the famous Sinbad was said to have set out on his remarkable travels. Basra, then, was our first objective.

OUR FORCE AND "FLEET."

Soon after the outbreak of the great war, and several weeks before Turkey joined Germany, the Indian Government, with a prescience that did not distinguish our strategy elsewhere, had despatched a complete brigade to Bahrein Island, in the Persian Gulf. This force reached the mouth of the Shat-el-Arab on November 7th, only a week after the declaration of war on Turkey, and at once attacked the Turkish fortress of Fao, which guards the mouth of the river, and is the terminus of the submarine cable from India. The attack was made by a landing party covered by two small gunboats. A few well-directed shots silenced the fort and put the garrison to flight, and the place was secured with trifling losses.

The main Indian Expeditionary Force, under command of Brigadier-General Delamain, reached the mouth of the Shat-el-Arab on November 13th, 1914. The force included the Second Dorset Regiment, the Second Norfolk Regiment, and one or two batteries of the Royal Field Artillery; but was in the main composed of Indian troops. They proved particularly well suited

to their task. Their commander, writing of them after they had routed a superior Turkish force in a vital engagement, said:—

"The races from which the portion of the Southern Army engaged here are drawn have shown in the stiffest fight which has fallen to their lot for years a steadfastness and gallantry worthy of all praise. Mahrattas, Dekhani Mahometans, men from Rajputana, Gujars, and Mers have earned for themselves in these operations a proud reputation. They vied with their British comrades in this field—the Royal Artillery, the Norfolks, the Dorsets—in spirit and resolution, and have added lustre to their former traditions."

In a land where success depended on command of the great rivers and of innumerable cuts and canals, a fleet was as important as an army; and since vessels of any considerable draught could not thread the treacherous shifting sandbanks that menaced the waterways, a host of unlikely craft were turned to war uses. The ships of the Tigris and Euphrates Navigation Company proved especially valuable; craft belonging to the Irrawaddy Flotilla Company were brought from Burmah, and a fleet was evolved of paddle boats, armed tugs, launches, and barges, which, in the words of Sir Mark Sykes, who observed it at work, acted as "cavalry screen, advance guard, rear guard, flank guard, railway, general headquarters, heavy artillery, line of communication, supply depôt, police force, field ambulance, aerial hangar, and base of supply of the Mesopotamian expedition."

THE CAPTURE OF BASRA.

On November 14th the expedition steamed up the Shat-el-Arab, between dead level plains, whose monotony was broken only by date palms and native huts. They met no opposition, and next day disembarked between the Anglo-Persian Oil Works and Basra. The river here takes a westerly bend to Basra, and the Turks had endeavoured to block the stream by sinking in it the 5,000-ton German ship *Ekbatalna*, and a smaller Turkish vessel. They had also constructed a strong entrenched position, manned by some 5,000 men with twelve guns, to the south-east of Basra, to block a direct land advance across the plain. A difficult disembarkation on a treacherous waterlogged foreshore was successfully made, and a spirited advance took place on November 15th-17th. The enemy were dominated by our artillery, and, despite the absence of all cover for the attack, were turned out of their trenches and pursued. Thereupon they abandoned Basra, and news that the Arabs were looting the town led to a hasty advance being made by water. The obstructions in the river were removed, and the town was occupied by both our naval and land forces on November 21st. Our casualties in these operations were some 400. The enemy left about 2,000 wounded and eight guns, including three dismantled Krupps. A ceremonial march was made through the town, a proclamation announcing our friendly intentions towards the Arabs was issued, and a British Military Governor set up his court at the German consulate in the name of the King-Emperor. The Arab soldiery mobilised by the Turks, but left behind in their retreat, showed a characteristic anxiety to side with the winners by returning to their homes and discarding their equipment.

The occupation of Basra, in addition to securing the safety of the oil-pipe terminus and providing us with a base, gave us control of the whole south-western Turkish province of El-Hasa, which it dominates, and incidentally put in our hands the projected terminus of the Bagdad

railway, whose construction and control had, as we have seen, been a chief source of friction in Anglo-German relations in the Far East. It was a notable achievement, carried out with a speed and skill that disconcerted the enemy; but he had clearly not opposed us with a tithe of the maximum strength he could, given time, bring to bear. No further substantial advance, moreover, could be made until both our flanks and our base were secured. A glance at the map will show that the arrangement of the waterways in Mesopotamia made our left flank particularly open to danger. It would be possible for an enemy force sailing down stream from Bagdad to leave the Tigris at Kut-el-Amara, take the Shat-el-Hai channel which joins the Tigris at that point to the Euphrates at Nasrie, and by a desert march to cut off our force on the Tigris, or perhaps to retake Basra itself. Our right flank, too, was exposed to attack from the Arab tribes under Turkish dominion in the wild territories of Arabistan to the east of the Tigris. Any advance up the Tigris on Bagdad had, therefore, to be coupled with the subjugation of the country to the east of that river and with the dominance of the waterways to the west.

The most notable battles of the early part of the campaign were fought in pursuance of these ends, and not on the direct line of advance up the Tigris. Before, however, the flank engagements were entered upon it was thought safe to advance up the Tigris as far as Kurnah, a town fifty miles above Basra, 117 miles from the Gulf, and some 450 miles below Bagdad by water. The enemy were found in possession of Masera, on the opposite bank from Kurnah. With the help of the fleet they were driven from their positions, a bridge was flung across the river above Kurnah, and, on December 9th, the town was carried from the north. The Turkish commander, the former Vali of Basra, surrendered unconditionally with 1,100 men and nine guns, after a stout resistance. Our casualties were slight. The Turks thereupon collected their forces on low hills to the north of the town, and for some weeks harassed us with a fitful bombardment. Their guns were old, and their gunnery indifferent. Some of their shells were noted to be of

the old segment pattern discarded by the British army and sold to Turkey after the South African War, and they did little damage. But even had it been possible to make a further advance on the Tigris without securing our flanks and base, the enemy's position was not immediately assailable, for the whole country for miles to the north of Kurnah, except the hillocks occupied by the Turks, was covered to a depth of several feet by the annual floods caused by the melting of the snows in the mountains hundreds of miles to the north, where the head streams of the Tigris rise.


THE BATTLE OF SHAIBA.

Meanwhile, the centre of interest had shifted again to Basra, which the enemy now made a determined effort to recapture. They had no large force nearer than Bagdad, and our occupation of Kurnah prevented them from sailing down the 500 mile stretch of the Tigris. They took, therefore, the alternative route already described. Leaving the Tigris at Kut-el-Amara (220 miles below Bagdad), their flotilla proceeded along the Shat-el-Hai to Nasrie, on the Euphrates, 115 miles north-west of Basra. Thence they marched, 15,000 strong, across the desert to Shaiba, ten miles south-west of Basra, and here was fought, on April 12th-14th, one of the most important battles in the campaign. The enemy massed their forces—augmented by several thousand irregular Arab troops—in a semi-circle to the west of Basra,



Mounted native troops in the desert.

and prepared to close in. Sir John Nixon, who, on April 9th, had taken over the chief command, ordered Major-General Meliss, V.C., to proceed from Basra with the Thirtieth Brigade to relieve the troops under command of Sir John Fry, who were garrisoning Shaiba. The land between Basra and Shaiba was flooded, and an attempt to cross by wading had to be abandoned. Recourse was then had to the native boats, known as "ballums," which are punted by two men, and carry about ten. Only about eighty of these were available, and the native boatmen refused to man them. The Twentieth Punjabis, however, readily acted as crews, and between 4 and 10 p.m. on April 12th the hard task



FROM THE PERSIAN GULF TO BAGDAD.




Indian troops disembarking at Bushire.

of transporting the relieving force in open boats under fire was accomplished. The troops now under command of Major-General Meliss at Shaiba were considerably outnumbered by the Turks, but he determined on an offensive. After resisting continuous attacks for twenty-four hours, thanks to the admirable defences arranged by Sir John Fry, he was able to advance, first northward, where he drove the Turks from the rising ground they had occupied, and afterwards in a westward direction, rolling up their line. The enemy made their final stand at Barjisiya, to the west of Basra, on a strong line of almost invisible trenches protected by a glacis-like slope. "It is impossible to conceive," wrote Major-General Meliss in his report of the battle, "a more exposed tract of ground than the plain, devoid of cover, over which our infantry had to attack. . . . Splendid dash, combined with resolute courage, alone carried our men across that bullet-swept glacis. It was a sheer, dogged, soldier's fight." He added that he hoped the corps engaged—Norfolks, Dorsets, Punjabis, and Mahrattas—would be allowed to inscribe "Barjisiya" on their battle honours.

Our casualties in this decisive engagement were nearly 1,000. The enemy lost 2,500, and abandoned large quantities of ammunition and equipment. From prisoners' statements it became clear that they had collected for the recapture of Basra a force of not less than 23,000 troops Turkish, Arab, and Kurdish with thirty-two guns. They were completely demoralised by their defeat, and fled rapidly along the line of the Euphrates, harassed by our flotilla and by their former allies, the Arabs. Their total casualties from April 12th to 15th

approached 6,000. Sir John Nixon's report states that the Turkish Commander was so stricken by his defeat that, after denouncing the faithlessness of the Arabs, he shot himself in the presence of his staff. By April 23rd there were no enemy forces within ninety miles of Basra. The ultimate effect of the victory was, as we shall see, to open the way to Nasrie and the command of the Euphrates and the Shat-el-Hai, as well as the Tigris. Meanwhile, however, events of some importance were taking place on our other fronts.

We have noted the danger to the right flank of the expedition and to the Anglo-Persian oil-pipe line from the Arab tribesmen inhabiting the unruly district to the east of the badly delimited Turko-Persian frontier. The pipe line follows roughly the course of the Karun river (*see* Map), and, some seventy miles from its terminal works on the Shat-el-Arab, passes through the town of Ahwaz. Here we had placed as strong a garrison as we could spare. By March its reconnaissances had revealed the presence in the district of three regiments of Turkish troops, supported by both Turkish and Persian branches of the Beni Lamu and other tribesmen, making in all a force of over 12,000. The garrison of Ahwaz, by a sally on March 3rd, was able to inflict heavy losses on the enemy, including several Arab sheikhs, and his offensive was stayed. The news of his utter failure at Shaiba further dismayed him in the Ahwaz region, and the Turkish regiments were withdrawn northwards to Amara, on the Tigris, thus evacuating Persian territory. In the absence of the Turks, no great difficulty was found in punishing and bringing to terms the Arab tribes and completing the security of our right flank.



Turkish troops intended for the Mesopotamian campaign, drilling in Syria.

[E.N.A.]



A Turkish camp near Kut-el-Amara.

[E.N.A.]

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE.

Another part of the reinforcements which Turkey brought forward in April, and the main body of which was so disastrously defeated at Shaiba, were used in attacks, on April 11th, on our forward position on the Tigris at Kurnah. To an ineffectual long-range bombardment we replied with a damaging fire upon the small boats in which the enemy were approaching, and the attack was abandoned. On May 31st we took the offensive. The interval had been spent in perfecting our men in the use of the native craft, for here, as at Shaiba, the advance had to be made over land flooded to a depth of six feet. A whole brigade moved forward in boats, punted or paddled, and holding about ten men each. The guns were mounted on yoked pairs of boats, and from the Tigris two naval sloops and the Indian Marine steamer *Lawrence* bombarded the enemy's positions. Most of the flooded area to be crossed was choked with reeds, and had the enemy been well supplied with artillery they could have done much damage during our slow progress. As it was, our bombardment drove them from six of their seven positions, and a bayonet charge cleared them from the last. They retreated up the Tigris in great confusion, having sunk several barges to obstruct the pursuit. In a few hours we had cleared the obstructions, and were at their heels. On June 3rd we occupied Amara, eighty-seven miles above Kurnah, without opposition. This town is the most important place on the Tigris between Bagdad, 370 miles above it, and Basra, 130 miles below. Our advance guard, which reached it on a river steamer, was quite insignificant; but it secured the surrender of the whole garrison of over 1,000, and, later, accepted the surrender also of a Turkish column retreating from the vain attack on our right flank at Ahwaz. By June 4th, in these operations, we had captured about eighty officers, 2,000 men, seven field-guns, several river steamers and barges, and a quantity of ammunition. Of six German officers with the Turks, three were taken prisoners and two killed by the Arabs. Our own casualties during the four days' advance were only twenty-one.

The enemy at Kurnah had certainly made a poor fight. His equipment was scanty and his artillery weak, and he was put to great disadvantage in reconnaissance work by our use of an aeroplane—the first, as might be supposed, ever seen in these parts. But the utmost credit is due to our own troops for the skill and energy with which they carried out their work in a constant shade temperature of well over 100 degrees of damp heat, and in conditions which necessitated a kind of amphibious warfare to which they were quite new.

The great Turkish offensive planned for the spring of 1915 against our forces at Basra, Kurnah, and Ahwaz had thus met disaster at all points, and been countered by advances. It had been advertised for weeks in the German Press, by photographs of Turkish reinforcements training in Syria, "to drive the British from Mesopotamia." It had included upwards of 30,000 Turkish troops, with a sprinkling of German officers, and an uncounted number of Arab and Kurdish supporters, the whole under command of a general, Suleiman Askeri, on whom high hopes were based. By the end of it the Turkish troops had been routed at Shaiba, and cleared from the whole Tigris valley south of Amara; and Suleiman was dead by his own hand.

SECURING THE EUPHRATES VALLEY.

Our next step was to follow up the victory at Shaiba by securing the valley of the Euphrates and the Shat-el-Hai. The Turks had retreated upon Nasrie, which stands at

the junction of the Euphrates and the Shat-el-Hai, some seventy miles west of Kurnah by water. They had entrenched themselves in a series of positions on both banks of the Euphrates covering the junction, and had attempted to seal the Euphrates with obstructions and mines between Hamar Lake and Sukh-es-Sheyukh (*see Map*).

Early in July an advance was made from Kurnah along the Euphrates. The hot season was now at its height, and the conditions extremely trying. Letters from officers described the strain of enduring continuous damp heat and a plague of mosquitoes, of maintaining a constant guard against Arab treachery, as well as Turkish attacks, and of conducting operations in mud which "made it impossible to tell where man began and mule ended, turned guns into waggons, and waggons into mud forts, and so caked the Indian troops that you could not tell them from white." Every effort was made to minimise these hardships. The troops had been provided with spine protectors and goggles, mosquito nets and veils, ice, mineral waters, and fresh vegetables from Bombay. There was ample hospital accommodation, and it had even been found possible to give some men a holiday in India. The general health of the force was good, and deaths from enteric comparatively few.

Our flotilla proceeded cautiously along the Euphrates, compelled at times, by shallows and thick date groves, to drag the boats overland. By the middle of the month the river had been cleared of obstructions, and the enemy dislodged from Sukh-es-Sheyukh at the expense of some 400 casualties. On July 24th, at 4 a.m., an advance was made on his main positions covering Nasrie and the junction. He had constructed successive lines of strong entrenchments on both banks of the river immediately to the east of Nasrie. We opposed him with two brigades on the right, or west, bank and one on the east, holding a fourth in reserve, while our flotilla kept up a constant bombardment from the river. General Gorringe was in command. The honours of the battle rested on the West Kents, who were here mentioned for the first time as participating in the Mesopotamian campaign. Advancing without cover under a heavy fire on the left bank, they turned the enemy from trench after trench in hand-to-hand fighting. On the right bank the Turks yielded to similar tactics, and by 9-30 a.m. had been forced back to the junction of the Euphrates and the Shat-el-Hai. Two improvised gunboats with armed barges in tow then sailed up stream to the junction and opened fire, while the brigades on both banks advanced under the cover thus afforded. At 5-30 p.m. the leading gunboat rounded the corner of the junction, and shortly afterwards the enemy was in full retreat towards Kut-el-Amara, and his camp and positions were occupied. He lost 2,500 killed, wounded, and prisoners, and one forty-pounder, twelve field, two mountain and many machine guns, together with 1,000 rounds of artillery and 300,000 of small-arms ammunition. Our casualties were 564. The victory put our base at Basra out of danger, secured our left flank from further attack, gave us command of the Euphrates valley, and opened to us the southern end of the Shat-el-Hai, which forms the alternative route from Basra to Bagdad.

THE ADVANCE TO KUT-EL-AMARA.

It remained for us now to capture and fortify the northern terminus of the Shat-el-Hai at Kut-el-Amara, 158 miles above Amara (which they had, as we have seen, reached in June), and 220 miles by water below Bagdad.



The port of Bahrun.



Indian troops going ashore in the Persian Gulf.

In September, when the terrific heat of late summer had lessened, brigades under command of Generals Fry and Delamain sailed for Kut. The Turks had here constructed a more elaborate defence than any we had yet attacked. As at Nasrie, it lay on both sides of the river, stretching some six miles from the banks. The Turkish commander, Nur-ed-Din, had at his disposal 10,000 regular troops, excluding Arabs, and had entrenched them in positions commanding a perfectly open field of fire. The approach by river was protected by sunken scows and barges interlaced with wire, and by guns cleverly concealed in holes in the river banks. Our plan was to make a feint against the enemy on the right bank, and under cover of this to fall in force on his left. On the 27th, therefore, our troops on the right bank developed a heavy artillery fire, while those on the left, under General Fry, entrenched themselves opposite the enemy's left centre. At night on the 27th all the troops on the right bank, except a small body left as a mask, crossed the river by a bridge of boats. They were commanded by General Delamain. The greater part of them executed a circuitous night march to enable them to fall upon the enemy's extreme left flank. The remainder co-operated with General Fry's men. Marshy ground delayed the flank attacks, and for a while the position of the greatly inferior force fronting the enemy was serious. The Dorsets and Mahrattas, however, advanced with great gallantry, and maintained their offensive until the arrival of the flanking party decided the day, and the enemy retired, dislodged from their defences trench by trench. General Delamain, with the flanking troops, continued his encircling movement, and in doing so met and defeated Turkish reinforcements. On the morning of the 29th he was ready to fall upon the Turks' second position from the rear, but an aeroplane reconnaissance showed that the enemy were already in flight by river and road towards Bagdad. The pursuit was entrusted to a brigade of infantry on steamers, under General Delamain, and we set to work to fortify Kut as a new base.

With the occupation of Kut-el-Amara we completed

our hold on Lower Mesopotamia. A line drawn through Kut westward to the site of ancient Babylon on the Euphrates would form a natural frontier between the upper and the lower provinces. To the south of it would lie the old Chaldea, which we had now secured by occupying the cardinal points on the great triangle of waterways which dominate it. North of such a line had been the ancient Assyria, a land differing from the southern portion in its physical features, and in looking rather to the Mediterranean than the Gulf for its outlet. Bagdad would belong to the northern rather than the southern territory on such a division; but as the converging point of the great trade routes from the north, and as the key to the lower province, its tenure by a hostile power could not be contemplated by the holders of the Tigris valley. The prestige, moreover, which its ancient glory would bring to its possessors made it a goal which we could not neglect; but an account of the important events to which these considerations led must be deferred till a later chapter.

TURKEY AND OUR EASTERN OUTPOSTS.

At several isolated points it was in Turkey's power, with Arab help, to menace our Eastern outposts. For the safeguarding of our trade routes and our communications with India we had from time to time made treaties with Arab rulers on the southern and south-eastern coasts of Arabia. The Sultan of Muscat, monarch of the indepen-



A mountain gun detachment in the desert.

dent State of Oman, with a 1,500 mile coast line on the Gulf of Oman, which joins the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean, was in receipt of an imperial subsidy and of help from Indian forces against insurgent tribes in his hinterland. In return he pledged himself not to cede territory to any Power except Britain, and a British Commissioner and Political Agent were in residence at Muscat. The port is only some 200 miles from the coast of India, and is linked with the Indo-European telegraph system. In January, 1915, a tribal rising which had engaged the Sultan of Muscat since 1913 came to a head in an attack on his outposts by a large Arab force. The lines were held by the Ninety-fifth Infantry and

the 102nd Grenadiers—both Indian regiments. Smart bayonet work inflicted 500 casualties on the rebels, and secured the safety of the port.

Much more vital to us was the safety of Aden, which had grown, since our occupation of it in 1839, to be a town of 50,000 inhabitants and a port of call for two and a half million tons of shipping annually. The town itself, and the important coal stores, stand upon a peninsula, commanded by fortifications built on a group of precipitous hills, which are separated from the mainland by a flat isthmus. From the land Aden itself is as nearly impregnable as a position can be. But behind it are some 9,000 square miles over which we had declared a protectorate, and this was more vulnerable. On the western fringe of the protectorate, between Aden and the narrow southern mouth of the Red Sea, and commanding the latter, stands the Turkish fortress of Sheik Said. Like Aden, it consists of a peninsula of rocky heights joined to the body of Arabia by a low neck. Early in November, 1914, the powerful armoured cruiser *Duke of Edinburgh* bombarded and silenced the Turkish forts at Sheik Said. Under cover of her guns three battalions of Indian troops were landed and the forts occupied. Some of the garrison escaped across the isthmus on camels or in boats, but the majority were made prisoners, and the menace of Sheik Said as a base for enemy attacks on shipping passing through the Straits of Babel Mandeb, or for operations

against the Aden protectorate, was removed. The protectorate, however, was not to escape unscathed, for in July, 1915, a Turkish and Arab force of several thousands from the Yemen, with twenty machine-guns, crossed the frontier and advanced on Lahej, some twenty-five miles inland from Aden. The Aden Camel Corps and a portion of the Aden Movable Column, though greatly outnumbered, defended Lahej until they were in danger of being outflanked. Their difficulties were further increased by lack of water and by the desertion of their Arab transport followers, and the force fell back in good order upon Aden. The enemy did not continue their advance.

With the Government of India rests the credit for all the operations described in this chapter. They had transported to Mesopotamia, and there supplied and directed, a force which had been able to advance over 300 miles from its base, and at the same time to secure its flanks. They had extemporised from nothing a fleet for its conveyance up capricious and shifting waterways, and had trained it to wage with success an amphibious kind of warfare of extreme difficulty. They had met with strength and tact the constant treachery and vacillation of the Arabs, and had struck a deadly blow at Turkish prestige and dominion in a land full of promise for a more progressive people, and they had done this without weakening their defence of the outposts of the Empire for which they were responsible.



The Mesopotamian campaign. British troops on the march across the desert. [Record Press.]



Allied commanders in the Dardanelles: Left to right, Vice-Admiral Boue de Lapeyrere, General Sir Ian Hamilton, Vice-Admiral de Robeck, and General Bailloud.


CHAPTER XXXIV.

ANZAC AND SUVLA.

CRITICISM OF DARDANELLES OPERATIONS CONSIDERED—SIR IAN HAMILTON'S NEW PLANS—THE PREPARATIONS FOR ATTACK—THE ASSAULTS FROM ANZAC—THE TRAGEDY OF THE SOUTH LANCASHIRES—THE FAILURE AT SUVLA AND ITS CAUSES—RENEWED ATTACKS ON THE ANAFARTA RIDGE—BREAKDOWN OF THE OPERATIONS IN GALLIPOLI.

IN three early chapters of this volume (pp. II-45) the story of the Gallipoli expedition has been brought down to the middle of July, when the attempt to obtain control of the Narrows by frontal attack had unmistakably failed. The general scheme of the Turkish defences on the peninsula was as simple as their detail was complicated. They were, roughly, in the form of two crescents placed back to back (see plan, p. 37). One crescent had Achi Baba for its star and Krithia for one of its horns. The other, and more northerly crescent, had Sari Bair and the Narrows for its tips. Up to the middle of July the active offensive operations had been directed against the Achi Baba crescent. They had been in some ways the most brilliant operations that the British army had ever conducted. The landings on the peninsula in the face of opposition—which the Turks after long notice had had ample time to prepare—will become the classic model for all such joint operations of army and fleet. Nor had the later attacks been in any sense failures. The attack of June 4th had, it is true, failed to carry Krithia, but it had made a fair advance, and another

general attack would almost certainly have given us Krithia itself. Unfortunately, Krithia had ceased to be the key to Achi Baba, for the Turks had built an entirely new system of defences on the western slope of Achi Baba, which would have enabled them to hold the hill even after Krithia had fallen into our hands. The delays after the landing, inevitable under the circumstances, had been fatal to the chances of success for the original plan. The alternatives that confronted General Hamilton after he had secured his footing on the peninsula were painful. He had either to attack at once, in insufficient strength and with insufficient supplies of ammunition, or to wait and allow the Turks to strengthen their defences. He chose the first, and narrowly failed to carry Krithia, which, at the end of April, was the key of Achi Baba. It is eloquent of the value of time in military operations that the first attempt, made as it was with insufficient resources, came nearer to decisive success than the second attempt on Achi Baba in June. The Turkish preparedness for defence outstripped the growth in the strength of the attack. By July, General Hamilton had formed new plans for the attack, which was now to be directed



A view of Achi Baba.



Morto Bay, De Tott's Battery, and the Asiatic coast.

no longer against the southern crescent of the Turkish defences but against the northern.

THE DIFFICULTIES AT SEDDIL-BAHR.

Meanwhile, the difficulties had been steadily growing. The ground slopes more gently to the sea on the southern side of Achi Baba than elsewhere on the peninsula, and there is a certain amount of space. But this very fact, though it doubtless influenced General Hamilton's choice of landing-places, made some difficulties after he had landed. He had landed on the toes of the peninsula, and Achi Baba was the instep. The whole of his positions were under observation from the crest of Achi Baba, behind which the enemy's guns were posted. Even worse was the cross-fire from the forts and batteries on the Asiatic side of the Straits. It was one of the commonplaces of soldiers' experience in France that by far the worst place in the field was the reserve trenches. In the front line there was the protection of a strong parapet, and when the battle was joined it was unsafe for either side to fire on the fighters for fear of hitting its own men. The "curtain of fire," mentioned so often in official despatches, descended not on the fighting line but on the area in which the reserve trenches were situated. The whole of our army at Seddil-Bahr behind the firing line was permanently in the position of men waiting in the reserve trenches, only with this difference, that they could not remain under cover, but had constantly to be going about work which in areas where the space is not so confined would have been done at the advanced base, usually at a point a little beyond the range of the enemy's artillery.

"At intervals, generally about three or four times a day, the enemy turns on an outburst of 'hate.' Shells come howling through the air from Achi Baba's insalubrious acclivity (as the album poet would have called it), or across the Strait from 'Asia.' One soon gets to know the sound not only of the gun but of the howling shell itself, and can judge its destination fairly well as it passes overhead. But if it is passing, not overhead, but at your head, you have no time to decide exactly where it is going, and before the increasing howl of its approach has died upon your ears it is you who have died. That is the terrible and always surprising part of it all. You sit working, let us suppose, in some tent upon a landing beach. The accustomed noontide 'hate' begins. One after another with fair regularity you hear the shells approaching, passing, bursting. Some fall into the sea, and you are interested enough to look out and watch the splash. 'A near thing for that trawler,' you say, and return to work. Then comes a horrible crash, and before you can think what is happening to the tent and your comrades this world has ceased to exist for you.

"It happens. It may happen to almost anyone here at almost any moment. But on the whole the escapes are stranger than the destruction, and space is mercifully wide.

"On the whole I think the firing line is about the safest place. One day after another I have been along pretty nearly the whole of it now, except in the French section, where the English are not allowed. The trenches cut deep and narrow, the carefully piled sandbags, the entanglements and screens afford almost complete protection to the men holding the front in their turn. Here and there a point of danger is marked, and one has to spurt across. And, of course, in moments of assault or of violent bombardment preceding an attack the scene is very different. But on ordinary days like the present there is not much to fear beyond the persistent sniper and an occasional bomb thrown by hand (and sometimes fielded and thrown back again before it can burst, so proud rumour tells). By curious devices of the periscope and other means you may contemplate the Turkish labyrinths of trench and sandbag only a few yards ahead, and sometimes see a Turkish shovel throwing up earth over the top. That is about all we see of the enemy just now, or the enemy of us.

"The worst part of life in the firing-line on days like these is the intense heat in narrow and winding trenches where no

breeze can penetrate. Even where a man can lie almost naked under a little edge of shadow, the heat is almost intolerable between 11 and 4, and to myself, at all events, it seems much worse to lie still than to run about; but in the firing-line there is no running about. Further back, among the second line or the so-called 'rest camps' in the centre, there is perhaps greater danger from shell, but also greater freedom of movement and a little more chance of shade."*


At Anzac the conditions were somewhat different. Here the first trenches, being nearer to the heart of the enemy's positions, were more exposed to constant attack, and the fighting with bombers and snipers was more continuous; but behind the firing line the steep cliffs gave more security than was to be had at Seddil-Bahr, nor was there the cross-fire from the Asiatic shore.

CRITICISM OF GENERAL HAMILTON.

It was natural, especially after the exaggerated hopes which the success of the early naval bombardments had excited, that the failure to achieve any striking advance, the growing casualty lists, and the descriptions of life and conditions that came in soldiers' letters, should give rise to doubts and criticism. The apparent inactivity in Gallipoli coincided with the great German offensive in Galicia, and all through the summer the popular mind was being attuned to gloom. Much the ablest of these critics was Mr. Ashmead Bartlett, a newspaper correspondent, who, believing as some others did at the front that the people at home could not know all the facts, came home and criticised the conduct of the expedition. He argued that it was a mistake to attempt landing on the peninsula, and that the best plan would have been to land on Thrace and occupy the lines of Bulair, which run across the neck of Gallipoli. The landing at Anzac, again, was in his view a wasteful dispersion of force, and if the Australians had been used to reinforce the troops at Seddil-Bahr the Turkish positions at Achi Baba might have been captured in April. After the failure to capture Krithia, he held that we should either have sent a very large army to Gallipoli and broken through, whatever the cost, or else have withdrawn at once and cut our losses. Instead, we did neither the one nor the other, but continued to make frontal attacks on Achi Baba which never had much prospect of success. In his opinion, false optimism was responsible for much useless bloodshed. It encouraged us to hold on in the hope that the enemy's resistance would collapse, whereas, in fact, the Turks were all the time growing stronger. Some support was given to these views by Greek criticism. The Greek General Staff had given a great deal of study to the question, and they were understood to favour an advance from Enos, in Thrace, and an attack against the Bulair lines.

This criticism is weighty, but cannot be said to have established itself as sound. Whereas in the Greek plans the functions of the fleet were subsidiary to those of the army, it should not be forgotten that with us the whole idea of a military expedition arose out of the failure of the fleet to force its way through the Straits. The problem, as it presented itself to us, was not one of conquering Turkey in Europe, or even occupying Constantinople, but of enabling our fleet to open the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus for the passage of corn and munitions. A mere blockade of Constantinople would have sufficed for our purposes. For this reason the military problem was conceived not as a separate campaign, but as a mere appendix to the failure of the attack of March 18th, which Sir Ian Hamilton had witnessed. It was not so much a

* Mr. H. W. Nevinson.



The Gallipoli Peninsula.

campaign against Turkey or for Constantinople, but a campaign for the possession of Kilid Bahr. This limited object, further, might it was thought be secured by a comparatively small army; in fact, it is not unlikely that the Government may have impressed upon Sir Ian Hamilton before his departure that we had no desire to embark on ambitious land operations that would require a great expenditure of military strength. There was no

reason when the military operations in Gallipoli were first decided upon to think that the peninsula was held in great military strength; indeed, at the beginning of March, 10,000 men could have gone from end to end of the peninsula. Some help, too, was expected from the Russians, who had hoped to co-operate across the Black Sea, but the defeats in Galicia knocked all that on the head. It is just to Sir Ian Hamilton to acknowledge that he

was not slow to realise that the Gallipoli expedition was developing into a great land campaign. He asked for two fresh divisions on May 10th, and again on May 17th. He got one, and by the time it reached him the Russians had given up all idea of land operations against Turkey, and the Turkish divisions which had been watching the Black Sea coast were free to go to the Dardanelles. The result was that in spite of the reinforcements we were relatively no stronger when the action of June 4th was fought than we had been in May. In June, in response to further requests, he was promised three Regular divisions and the infantry of two Territorial divisions; but the first of these reinforcements did not reach Mudros till July 10th. There was slowness at home in shaking off the old idea of a limited campaign on land and in meeting the new demands; but Sir Ian Hamilton is not justly blamed for that. It would, however, have been better if he had asked for two army corps in May instead of in June.

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED.

There were, as Sir Ian Hamilton has pointed out, two alternatives to the plan of landing at the tip of the peninsula. He might, as Mr. Bartlett has argued, have landed men for an attack on the Bulair lines. This alternative was discussed with Admiral de Robeck, and rejected on account of difficulties of transport. As it was, owing to the appearance of German submarines, all supplies and reinforcements had to be brought up by night in fleet sweepers and trawlers. A landing at Bulair would have added another fifty miles to their course, which it was thought was more than the flotilla could manage. Further, there is no good beach near Bulair, and Enos is so far away that the enemy would have had time to organise a formidable opposition before the Bulair lines could be reached. Besides, was it certain that the Turkish army in the Narrows could be forced to surrender by our occupation of the Bulair lines? Would it not be possible for them to transport supplies across the Narrows from Chanak? The second alternative, namely, to land on the Asiatic coast and seize Chanak, attracted the British Commander-in-Chief. He had had it in his mind

in April, when the French landed there, but was much too weak to maintain itself. Anzac and Kum Kale were evidently to be the two wings of the main force at Seddil-Bahr. He decided against the revival of the project, though for reasons which, on the assumption that the supply of troops was strictly limited, are quite convincing.

"Although much of the Asiatic coast had now been wired and entrenched, the project was still attractive. Thereby the Turkish forces on the peninsula would be weakened; our beaches at Cape Helles would be freed from Asiatic shells; the threat to the enemy's sea communications was obvious. But when I descended into detail I found that the expected reinforcements could not run to a double operation. I mean that unless I could make a thorough whole-hearted attack on the enemy on the peninsula I should reap no advantage

in that theatre from the transference of the Turkish peninsula troops to reinforce Asia, whereas if the British forces landed in Asia were not strong enough in themselves seriously to threaten Chanak, the Turks for their part would not seriously relax their grip upon the peninsula."

It is evident from this passage that if he had had troops enough he would have liked to attack the Narrows forts from the Asiatic as well as from the European side. There is no evidence that he asked for more troops than he received; but there is some evidence that he thought he could not have got more if he had asked.

THE NEW PLANS.

Accordingly, Sir Ian Hamilton having rejected the alternatives of attack on Chanak and the Bulair lines, was left with a plan of attack from Anzac. It will be remembered (p. 25) that the point at which the Australians had landed was a mile north of that which had been intended. The result was that, instead of being on the tip of the southern or Achi Baba crescent, they were just within the Sari Bair crescent, and since April there had been no real co-operation between the Anzacs and the Seddil-Bahr army. Sir Ian Hamilton now proposed to transfer his attack to the Sari Bair crescent, to capture Sari Bair from Anzac, and at the same time to land a strong force further up the coast near Suvla, in the hope of confusing the enemy as to the main point of attack.

Sir Ian Hamilton had apparently adopted this plan



Admiral de Robeck and General Sir Ian Hamilton on board H.M.S. Triad on the afternoon of the General's departure for England.



A view in Anzac Cove.

[*Topical Press.*]



Another view in the Anzac region.

soon after the attack of June 4th. Until his reinforcements should arrive, his main object, apart from maintaining the *moral* of his troops, was to keep the enemy's eyes fixed upon Helles rather than Anzac. The fighting at the end of June (p. 43) in the Gully Ravine had given us possession of the Saghir Dere up to a point just south of Krithia; and on July 12th and 13th a similar attempt was made from the Kereves Dere, on the eastern shore of the peninsula. The operations were fairly successful, and the Allied lines, which at the end of June were across the Maidos road (plan, p. 43), were extended down the Kereves Dere to the sea. The newly-arrived Fifty-second (Territorial) Division took part in the action with the French on their right. Unfortunately, the Scottish troops pressed on too impetuously, and after carrying the third line of trenches began to charge up the hill—the south-eastern slopes of Achi Baba—where the 4th King's Own Scottish Borderers came under the "curtain of fire" (*feu de barrage*) of the French artillery, and lost very heavily. The same thing happened on the next day, and at the same place, to the Portsmouth Battalion of the Naval Division.

This was the last formal attack made in the direction of Achi Baba, for later movements were feints to distract the enemy's attention from some other part of the front which mattered more; and its results must have convinced Sir Ian Hamilton that there was nothing to gain by persistence at the Seddil Bahr end. The first of his promised reinforcements had now arrived, and he was now full of his preparations for the coming attack on the Sari Bair front. There was fighting at Anzac at the end of July, but its purpose was defensive. The extension of a Turkish trench threatened the extreme right of the Anzac line at Tasmania Post, and the Eleventh Australian Regiment was detailed to capture it. This was successfully done. The attack was delivered in four columns of fifty men, to each of which a specified length of the trench had been assigned. By this time most of the reinforcements had arrived, and the date for the new attack on Sari Bair had been fixed for the morning of August 7th. The problems of organising the new attack were many, but three stood out above all the rest—secrecy and surprise, transport, and water; and the last was to turn out the greatest of all. To all Sir Ian Hamilton gave much careful forethought.

General Hamilton has described in detail the difficulties which were made by the narrowness of his foothold on Gallipoli; and it is so easy and would be so unjust to overlook the work done by the Navy in these operations, that the passage is worth quoting:—

"Within the narrow confines of the positions I held on the peninsula it was impossible to concentrate even as much as one-third of the fresh troops about to be launched to the attack. Nor could Mudros and Imbros absorb the whole of the remainder. The strategic concentration which precedes a normal battle had in my case to be a very wide dispersion. Thus of the forces destined for my offensive, on the day before the battle, part were at Anzac, part at Imbros, part at Mudros, and part at Mitylene. These last three detachments were separated respectively by fourteen, sixty, and 120 miles of sea from the area in which they were simultaneously to appear. To ensure the punctual arrival of all these masses of inexperienced troops at the right moment and spot, together with their material, munitions, stores, supplies, water, animals and vehicles, was a prodigious undertaking, demanding not only competence but self-confidence; and I will say for my General Staff that I believe the clearness and completeness of their orders for this concentration and landing will hereafter be studied as models in military academies. The need for economy in sea transport, the awkwardness and restriction of open beaches, the impossibility of landing guns, animals, or vehicles rapidly—all these made it necessary to create a special separate

organisation for every single unit taking part in the adventure. A pack mule corps to supply 80,000 men had also to be organised for that specific purpose until such time as other transport could be landed."

As many as 3,700 mules (in addition to the 950 mules already at Anzac) were supplied for transport. The problem of water supply gave even more trouble. Our information, which turned out to be accurate, was that there were good wells and springs in the Anafarta Valley and on Suvla Plain; but it was decided to leave nothing to chance. As early as June 17th (the date is interesting as showing how early the plans for the new movement had taken shape) the War Office was asked to supply water receptacles for pack transport with each reinforcing division; and when the War Office was unable to supply as many as were wanted, the balance was obtained from India and Egypt. At Anzac a high-level reservoir was constructed, with a capacity of 30,000 gallons, and fitted with pipes and distribution tanks, and an engine was brought over from Egypt to fill the reservoir. Enormous quantities of petroleum tins were fitted with handles for transport. These arrangements were to break down very badly, and to contribute more than any other single cause to the breakdown of the attack; but the failure of supply was certainly not due to any lack of forethought on the part of General Hamilton and his Staff. Nor was the danger overlooked of throwing fresh troops immediately into the firing line. The Thirteenth Division, the first of the reinforcements to arrive, was put into the trenches in place of the famous Twenty-ninth Division, which was withdrawn for a rest. At the same time, General Sir Frederick Stopford, who was in command of the reinforcements, was appointed to temporary command at Helles, in order to gain experience of local conditions. General Hamilton would no doubt have wished that all the reinforcements should have the same breaking-in as the Thirteenth Division, but this, unfortunately, was impossible. It was necessary for the success of the attack that it should be made when there was no moon. That fixed the date about the 6th of the month. The two last reinforcements—the Fifty-third and Fifty-fourth Divisions—were due to arrive a couple of days before that; and to give them some experience of the conditions before committing them to the attack would have meant a delay of another month. General Hamilton decided against further delay.

THE BRITISH FORCES.

It is not possible to give the complete composition of the British forces in Gallipoli, but the following details are obtainable from the published despatches, and may, therefore, be legitimately set forth. The new troops are indicated by italics; but it should be noted that they did not all arrive at the same time. The Fifty-second Division, for example, seems to have arrived late in May; the Thirteenth, the Tenth, and Eleventh Divisions in July; while the Fifty-third and Fifty-fourth Divisions were not in action until the 11th and 12th of August.

A. THE SEDDIL-BAHR SECTION

(General Davies).

29th Division (*see* p. 25)

(Till August 20th).

42nd Division.—General Douglas.

(Lancashire Territorials.)

13th Division.—General Shaw.

(Five battalions only after August 6th.)

Naval Division.

French Troops.

(Extreme right.)



A consultation of officers at Suvla Bay before going into action.

[Central Press.]



Men waiting, in the cover of small beach in the Suvla Bay region, for the order to attack.

[Central Press.]

B. THE ANZAC SECTION
(General Birdwood).

Australian Division.
New Zealand and Australian Division.
13th Division.

(After August 6th, less five battalions in Seddil-Bahr section.)
20th Indian Infantry Brigade.
10th Division, 20th Brigade.
In all, 37,000 rifles.

C. THE SUVLA SECTION
(General Stopford).

10th (Irish) Division.
30th Brigade. 31st Brigade.
11th Division.—General Hammersley.

32nd Brigade. 33rd Brigade. 34th Brigade.
53rd Division. General Lindley.
54th Division.
29th Division
(After August 20th).

THE DIVERSIONS.

General Hamilton's plans for the attack that was now to begin were, in his own words, these:—

(1) To break out with a rush from Anzac and cut off the bulk of the Turkish army from land communication with Constantinople.

(2) To gain such a command for big artillery as to cut off the bulk of the Turkish army from sea traffic, whether with Constantinople or with Asia.

(3) Incidentally, to secure Suvla Bay as a winter base for Anzac and all the troops operating in the northern theatre.

From Anzac, it will be observed, was to be delivered the main attack, and that from Suvla Bay was only secondary. In order the better to direct the enemy's attention from his main objective, he ordered two subsidiary attacks, one from Seddil-Bahr, the other at the southern end of Anzac. The results of the attack from Seddil-Bahr were disappointing. It so happened that the enemy at the moment when our attack was launched was himself preparing to attack us. His front trenches and communication trenches were packed with troops, and at no point had any progress been made by us by nightfall on the first day (August 6th). Sir Ian Hamilton was disappointed at the stout resistance of the enemy, which he attributed partly to the unfortunate coincidence that we attacked just at the moment when they were preparing to attack us, and were therefore in great strength; but also to the immunity from attack which they had enjoyed for a month, and to the news that they had had of the German successes over Russia. In June, and the beginning of July, all ranks had felt "as an army feels, instinctively, yet with certitude, that they had fairly got the upper hand of the enemy, and that, given the wherewithal, they could have gone on steadily advancing. Now that selfsame half-broken enemy were again making as stout a resistance as they had offered us at our original landing." It is difficult to reconcile this view of the prospects of success in attack on this southern section with the decision which we know had been taken two months before to deliver his next great attack elsewhere. He persisted, however, in his attacks on the following day (August 7th), and the enemy in his counter-attacks. We held our own, and at some points temporarily gained ground. The Sixth and Seventh Lancashire Fusiliers and the Fourth East Lancshires in particular distinguished themselves in the fighting

for possession of a vineyard west of the Krithia road, and it was here that Lieutenant Forshaw, V.C., performed a feat of endurance and tenacity which has few parallels in war. With his section he captured a Turkish trench, blocked up the end of the communication trench leading into it, defended it against repeated attacks, shot with his revolver three Turks who forced an entry, and, in spite of the loss of six men killed and twenty wounded, held it until he was relieved forty-one hours later, bombing almost without intermission the whole time.

THE ATTACK ON LONE PINE.

The other subsidiary attack developed into so fierce and prolonged a struggle that to call it a diversion, as it was in intention, would seem ironic. Near the extreme south of Anzac is a sandy plateau, covered with heather, of which the Australians held the western and the Turks the eastern end. The two sides had burrowed through the sand until their trenches were not more than one hundred yards apart. A solitary pine, which had long since lost its leaves, marked the centre of the Turkish position. It was a place of importance to the enemy, as it commanded some good springs. The engagement opened in the afternoon of August 6th with a heavy bombardment from H.M.S. *Bacchante* and a monitor, and the infantry attack was delivered by the First Australian Brigade (New South Wales). In the face of a heavy fire they surmounted the wire entanglements on to the Turkish parapets. There they stood, strung on the ledge as men might string along a kerb when they run up to see a street procession. "Those," writes Captain Bean, "who came up behind poked along among their comrades until they found a place, and they stood there, too, obviously puzzled.

"As a matter of fact they had found themselves looking down not into a trench but upon a very solid roof, made of logs, with withered boughs and earth spread over them. Some of those timbers were nine by six, and there was no more chance of pushing them down than of pushing in the roof of a church. We possess a powerful and effective bomb which used to explode in the enemy's trench with a peculiarly formidable crunch, and the Turks were driven to cover in their trenches as a protection against it. They made no mistake about that protection, and our bombardment, though it probably put out of action a good number of Turks, made no perceptible difference to this headcover. The men knew there would be some parts of the trench covered, but there appeared to be scarcely any of it uncovered. The Turks were shooting through the loopholes between their feet.

"This is what in military parlance may be called a check. The first two lines were stopped there, puzzled what to do. Shrapnel had begun to rain by this time, machine-guns were spitting from the trenches to right and left, the Turks at their feet were firing through the loopholes—but the one thing that no man seemed to dream of doing was to come back. Some fired down into the loopholes, some who happened to find small gaps in the line of headcover in front of them jumped down there and began to work into the dark shelters under the headcover where the Turks were—others went on over the first trench and even over the second trench, and into communication trenches which had no headcover over them, but through which the Turks were fleeing—for prisoners say, and there is no doubt of it, that the Turks are afraid of the Australians. Others noticed that in the solid roof in front of them, near the edge where the loopholes are, there were man-holes left at intervals, apparently to allow the listening patrols to creep at night. They were just large enough to allow a man to wriggle through, and that was enough for the First Brigade. They wriggled down into them, feet foremost, as a burglar might wriggle into a skylight.

"It was a deed for which, if it were a solitary instance, any man might get a Victoria Cross. What could the Turks do with a brigade like that? Once they got into the trench the thing was a foregone conclusion.



The problem of water supply at the Dardanelles: Filtered water being stored in cans. Even petrol cans, as shown in the photograph, were cleaned and used for this purpose.



A fine spring of clear water was discovered in this rock, and was promptly carefully guarded and used.

"I never saw the least sign of hesitation in making that crossing, nor a single unwounded man, except a messenger, turn back. They were even anxious for a place on the fire step, so as to get an early start. 'Is there any room up there?' I heard a man in the trench ask of those who were crouching under the parapet. One of the men on the fire step looked down, 'I dare say we could make room for one,' he said, 'Shift along, you blokes—we can squeeze in a little one.' The man in the trench was clearly relieved. 'I want to get up here along with Jim,' he said. 'Him and me are mates.' I have often hoped that the two mates arrived at the end of that perilous trip together.

"It was a quarter of an hour before the last of the men who had lined the parapet of the enemy's trench disappeared into it. Many of them had lain down there firing over it into the communication trenches beyond. Lots of them over on the right lay there still lining that parapet for an hour after the first charge, and we wondered what was keeping them there until we realised that they were not moving, and that they would never move again."

But the fighting at Lone Pine was only just beginning with the capture of the Turkish trenches. The enemy in the evening made a desperate counter-attack, which was repeated at intervals through the night and all the next afternoon. It was not until August 12th that the enemy, after suffering extremely heavy losses, gave up the position as lost.

THE SARI BAIR HILLS.

Sir Ian Hamilton had decided to deliver his main attack from the extreme northern end of Anzac. From the Lone Pine the front trenches followed the line of the cliffs, at a distance of half to three-quarters of a mile from the sea, to Fisherman's Hut, just north of the Ari Burnu promontory. Here the range of the Sari Bair comes down from the north-east almost to the sea, leaving just enough room for a force marching north to squeeze past along the beach. Past this point the main range gradually recedes from the sea, leaving a plain three miles across round Suvla Bay, but as it recedes it sends a number of spurs down to the coast, like waves from the bow of a ship. The sides of these spurs are very steep, and at the bottom there is a watercourse, which in August was quite dry. The names of these watercourses from south to north are Sazli Beit, Chailak, Aghyl, and (at a considerably longer interval) Asmak; and they all lead down from the main chain of the Sari Bair. This chain does not form a continuous plateau, but is a succession of heights, Chunuk Bair, Hill Q, and Koja Chemen Tepe, with shoulders between. From the southern shoulder of Chunuk Bair the Sazli Beit makes its way to the sea by the southern side of Rhododendron Spur; the Chailak, rising near the Sazli Beit, goes by the northern side of Rhododendron Spur past a round-topped precipitous

hill, named Table Top from its shape. On the shoulder between Chunuk Bair and Hill Q rises Aghyl, and between Hill Q and Koja Chemen there is another steep clough which joins on to the Aghyl on the north side of Bauchop's Hill. Between Aghyl and Asmak, again, there is a lower hill called Damakjelic Bair. (See Map, p. 369.)

The Turks did not occupy the sea shore north of Ari Burnu except with isolated sentry posts, and were content to occupy the ends of the spurs running down from Sari Bair. Sir Ian Hamilton's plan of attack was to move north along the sea-shore from Anzac and strike up the cloughs leading up to Chunuk Bair and Koja Chemen Tepe. These heights gained, he hoped—and with good reason—to force his way to the Narrows, cut off the Turkish forces on Achi Baba, and open up the passage of the Straits to the fleet. His first anxiety was to protect the flanks of the assaulting columns, for to get to the

points which he now proposed to attack he had had to leave the Anzac positions behind him, and to march round the seaward shoulder of Sari Bair. Accordingly, he arranged that the assaulting columns should be protected by two covering columns. The right covering column was to seize Table Top and the foothills; the left covering column to march along the shore for a mile further north and occupy Damakjelic Bair, between Asmak Dere and Aghyl. The assaulting columns were to march up the cloughs of Chailak and Aghyl, then to Sari Bair, the left column to Koja, the right to Chunuk Bair. The composition of these columns has been given by Sir Ian Hamilton as follows:—

"The whole of this big attack was placed under the command of Major-General Sir A. J. Godley, General Officer Commanding New Zealand and Australian Division. The two covering and the two assaulting columns were organised as follows:—

"Right Covering Column, under Brigadier-General A. H. Russell.—New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, the Otago

Mounted Rifles Regiment, the Maori Contingent and New Zealand Field Troop.

"Right Assaulting Column, under Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston.—New Zealand Infantry Brigade, Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), one Company New Zealand Engineers.

"Left Covering Column, under Brigadier-General J. H. Travers.—Headquarters Fortieth Brigade, half the Seventy-second Field Company, Fourth Battalion South Wales Borderers, and Fifth Battalion Wiltshire Regiment.

"Left Assaulting Column, under Brigadier-General (now Major-General) H. V. Cox.—Twenty-ninth Indian Infantry Brigade, Fourth Australian Infantry Brigade, Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), one Company New Zealand Engineers.

"Divisional Reserve.—Sixth Battalion South Lancashire Regiment, and Eighth Battalion Welsh Regiment (Pioneers) at Chailak Dere, and the Thirty-ninth Infantry Brigade and half Seventy-second Field Company at Aghyl Dere.



General Birdwood.

[Elliott and Fry Ltd.]



A busy scene at Suvla Bay.



The office of the commandant of the advanced base, Suvla Bay.

Little or no communication was possible between the various columns, and the attack inevitably resolved itself into as many separate actions as there were columns. The columns left in succession at nightfall on August 6th, and marched along the beach in dead silence, each turning off in succession as it reached its appointed place. The right covering column had good success. No. 3 Post, half way to Sazli Beit, was captured by stratagem. H.M.S. *Colne* for several nights, at 9 p.m. precisely, threw her searchlight on the fort and opened fire for ten minutes, repeating the experiment before 9-30. In this way it had educated the Turks to leave their posts when the searchlight was turned on. The trick worked excellently, and by 11 o'clock the whole of the entrenchments here were won. Bauchop's Hill was also carried by surprise, and though the force ascending the Chailak Dere had great difficulty at the entrance with the wire entanglements, they, too, succeeded in opening a passage into the clough for the assaulting column soon after midnight. About the same time Table Top was stormed by the New Zealanders, in spite of its precipitous slopes. It was one of the finest feats of the campaign. Far away to the north the left covering column had captured the Damakjelik Hill soon after midnight. Affairs were in good train.

THE HELLESPONT SIGHTED.

The right assaulting column entered the Sazli Beit and Chailak soon after midnight and seized the seaward end of Rhododendron Spur. The left assaulting column had further to go, but made even greater progress. The greatest difficulty was not the opposition of the enemy, who were taken by surprise, but the darkness and the extraordinary difficulty of marching through the rough scrub with which the sides of the cloughs were covered. At dawn, we were just not on the crest. On the right we held the crest of Rhododendron Spur, a quarter of a mile from Chunuk Bair; the Gurkhas were a similar distance from Chunuk on the north-east side; and away to the left the Fourth Australian Brigade and a battalion of Sikhs were moving to the attack on Koja. By this time the Turks, who had been expecting attack from the south, were moving along the Sari Bair chain to form front to the new attack from the north and west. The chance of complete surprise had been lost, and our men waited for the approach of night, when the attack could be renewed. The second attack was delivered just before dawn in three columns. The centre and left made no progress; the right, a fresh column under Brigadier-General Johnston, consisting of New Zealanders, Eighth Welsh Pioneers, and the Seventh Gloucesters, stormed Chunuk Bair. Every single officer of the Gloucesters was killed by midday, but the battalion fought on and the position was held. Away on the left the Australians had made a desperate effort to reach Koja by a flanking attack round by the north, but had failed after suffering heavy losses. It was in order to assist such a movement that Sir Ian Hamilton had arranged for the attack from Suvla Bay. What was happening there?

The attack was again renewed after midnight, again in three columns, one of which was now commanded by Brigadier-General Baldwin, the other two as before by Brigadier-Generals Johnston and Cox. General Cox's column—whose attack was directed against Hill Q—succeeded, and had General Baldwin's column been in its place the whole ridge would certainly have been ours. Unfortunately, the column lost its way, and did not arrive until too late. As it was, the Sixth Gurkhas and

the Sixth South Lancashires not only reached the crest of Hill Q, but some of them, excited by the view that now spread below them of the waters of the Hellespont and of Asia beyond, began charging down the slope. It was the supreme moment of the whole campaign.

"It was well after daylight when the guns of the warships and of the artillery, which had been landing shell after shell on to the crest line, abruptly ceased their bombardment. The Fifth Gurkhas, with the South Lancashires in line with them, advanced up the ridge. The low scrub made it impossible to run—you could only force your way through it waist high as a man wades through the surf. They came nearer and nearer to the top, losing very few men. Before them, through the scrub, ran a shallow newly-dug Turkish trench. They jumped on to the low earth parapet. And there below them there spread itself out a new world.

"In the foreground the top of the ridge fell away from them, one or two fairly gentle folds before it dipped into the ravine. Down the nearer of these folds, hopping, jumping, clambering through the scrub, was the Turkish company about two hundred men, which had held the trench over which the Gurkhas were standing. They had clearly retired from the trench, and were waiting down the slope of the hill until that bombardment ended; and as soon as the heads of our men appeared over the rise they had run. Further down the slope was another two hundred or so, obviously the supports, who had not been unnerved by the bombardment, and were waiting a little below the firing line. And away and beyond them all was the view that had been hidden from the Australians and New Zealanders all these long months. There it was, all spread out below them like a map—the long white thread of the main road down the peninsula, with the traffic of a large army coming and going along it—motor cars, waggons, traffic of all sorts. And over beyond it all, glistening in the light of the morning, the long ribbon of the Dardanelles.

"As they stood and looked a shower of high-explosive shell descended on the trench on whose edge they were standing. Missile after missile rushed down upon it, and blew great showers of earth and men into the air. The line of men on the parapet wavered and fell back. A few brave officers and one or two men remained. But the Turkish supports below had seen the check. They pushed on up the hill. And before the line could be rallied the Turks were up again in their old trench. General Baldwin's column of British troops had been delayed in the tangled country—General Baldwin was killed as he led his column—and the attack for that day was ended."

Neither Sir Ian Hamilton nor any of the correspondents has said from where came this "unexpected salvo" which blotted out the promised land as soon as it had been descried. In the following night a further misfortune followed. The crest of Chunuk Bair was lost owing to a misapplication of the experience of the South African War. The practice there was to occupy not the actual crest but a little way below it, as being more secure from gun-fire. This was sound against Boer skirmishers, but against massed attacks it was dangerous, for the power of collecting overwhelming numbers at very close quarters rested with whichever side held the sky-line in force. But though the Turks drove our men from the crest they could not stay there themselves, and it remained neutral ground, with the opposing armies some little way down on either side. The New Zealanders on Chunuk Bair were relieved by the Sixth Loyal North Lancashires and Fifth Wiltshires, and on the next day—August 10th—the Turks, now in great strength, began a series of massed attacks. The Loyal North Lancashires were crushed by weight of numbers; the Wiltshires were annihilated; the Hampshires and General Baldwin's column were outflanked; and now followed the most terrific hand-to-hand fighting in the whole campaign. Generals fought in the ranks, and men dropped their weapons and caught one another by the throats. Thanks in no small measure to the fire of the fleet, which decimated the Turkish lines as they



The fighting at Anafarta: Infantry advancing under fire across the shores of Salt Lake. [Alfieri Picture Service.]



The bombardment of Anafarta across the Salt Lake. [Alfieri Picture Service.]



Red Cross waggons waiting on the edge of the Salt Lake. [Alfieri Picture Service.]

poured over the crest, there was not a single Turk alive on our side of the hill by morning. But no advance was possible for us either.

At the end of the four days' fighting General Birdwood's losses, out of a strength of not less than 30,000 men in all, amounted to 12,000. The Thirteenth Division had lost 6,000 out of 10,500. The Warwicks and Worcesters had lost every one of their officers, and both the Thirteenth and the Twenty-ninth Brigades (Tenth Division) had lost twice the number that the accepted German calculation recognised as the limit of human endurance. Both sides had now fought themselves to a standstill; and as we were attacking, that meant for us that the battle was lost unless success in some other part of the field brought relief.

THE LANDING AT SUVLA.

It is time now to turn to our fortunes on the left, where a strong force had been launched against Suvla Bay. In arranging his plans, Sir Ian Hamilton had hoped that General Stopford would by daybreak on the 7th have been in possession of the foothills of the Anafarta ridge, and had this hope been fulfilled, even by the morning following, the whole course of events in the Anzac attack would have been altered to our advantage.

Suvla Bay forms a semi-circle about 3,000 yards across from north to south. The tips of the semi-circle are both rocky, with little hills which the Turks had fortified—Ghazi Baba at the north end and Lala Baba at the south; but between these two the shores of the bay are sandy and flat, and make a narrow causeway which separates the sea from the Salt Lake, waterless in summer, but always impassable. On the north side of the plain the shore hills, Karakol Dag and Kiretch Tepe Sirt, are high as at Anzac, and run parallel with the shore to Ejelmer Bay, which is some five or six miles up the coast; and south of the bay the coast is again flat as far as the hills near Asmak Dere. The whole district is like the stage of a great amphitheatre, formed by the hills extending round from near Suvla Point through the two Anafartas to the hills in which the Anzacs had been fighting so desperately. Between the Anafartas there is a gap in the semi-circle of hills, but this gap is flanked on both sides by two spurs running down towards the sea, the northern spur beaded with heights—the Yilghin Burnu (Chocolate Hill), Scimitar Hill, and Green Hill—and a southern spur, of which the principal height is Ismail Oglu Tepe (Hill 100). The key position is Hill 100, for it flanks Koja on the north side, with only the Azmak ravine in between; and with this hill in our possession it is probable that the attack by the Australians on Koja

could have been renewed with material prospect of success.

The landing of the Eleventh Division in Suvla Bay was successfully accomplished in the dark in the early hours of August 7th, and the Turks were completely taken by surprise. Snipers from the Lala Baba and Ghazi Baba positions gave some trouble, and even succeeded, knowing every inch of the ground, in getting in the midst of our troops in the darkness. But they were few in numbers and soon despatched; and at daybreak the Ninth West Yorks and Sixth Yorkshire Regiments stormed Lala Baba. At the north end of the bay some confusion and loss was caused by our own misdirected fire—it was still dark—but the Eleventh Manchesters did fine work in clearing the Turks from the Karakol Dag.

As dawn broke, the Tenth Division came into the bay, and were landed, some at Ghazi Baba, others, for an unexplained reason, south of Nibrunesi Point, where they were far from the main action. The Turks now began to shell the troops who had marched round to the east side of the Salt Lake, and whether by accident or design the heather and gorse caught fire, thus increasing the confusion inseparable from the landing of large bodies of troops on an open beach.* It was a hot day, and although, as has been seen, very elaborate arrangements had been made for the supply of water, these, for reasons which will be discussed later, had gone wrong, and the troops were tortured with thirst. Thirst and the bush fires—not the opposition of the enemy, who were very weak in numbers—were the reasons why the troops made such little progress in the course of the day. By evening, however, General Hammersley had seized Chocolate Hill, after an engagement in which the Sixth Lincolns and the



General Mahon.

[Elliott and Fry Ltd.]

Sixth Border Regiment distinguished themselves, but, owing to the exhaustion of his troops, was unable to advance further to Ismail Oglu Tepe, which can hardly have been strongly held, and the capture of which would probably have decided the battle in our favour. Away on the left wing, General Mahon had by the same evening secured the flank of the operations by firmly occupying Karakol Dag and the coast range. After nightfall the Turks withdrew their artillery.

FATAL INACTIVITY.

On the next day—the 8th—nothing at all seems to have been done. The Turks were now very heavily


* Sir Ian Hamilton dismisses this fire very briefly, but it seems to have been important. Chocolate Hill got its name from the colour after the bush fires had died down, and the same fires gave Scimitar Hill its other name of Burnt Hill. Green Hill was so called presumably because it escaped the fire.



A French siege gun being fired on a Turkish battery on the Asiatic coast.



An Indian battery under cover in Gallipoli.



The Sari Bair Hills.

engaged at Seddil-Bahr, Lone Pine, and in Sari Bair, and were certainly not in a position to resist an attack had it been made. The cause of this inaction was again the exhaustion of the troops due to lack of water. General Hamilton admits that these pleas were well-founded, but complains that it was overlooked that the half-defeated Turks in front were equally exhausted and disorganised, and that an advance was the simplest and swiftest way of settling all troubles.

"Be this as it may, the objections overbore the corps commander's resolution. He had now got ashore three batteries (three of them mountain batteries), and the great guns of the ships were ready to speak at his request. But it was lack of artillery support which finally decided him to acquiesce in a policy of going slow, which, by the time it reached the troops, became translated into a period of inaction. The divisional generals were, in fact, informed that 'in view of the inadequate artillery support' General Stopford did not wish them to make frontal attacks on entrenched positions, but desired them, so far as was possible, to try and turn any trenches which were met with. Within the terms of this instruction lies the root of our failure to make use of the priceless daylight hours of the 8th of August."


At five in the morning of August 8th, though the fighting on Sari Bair was approaching its most critical stage, General Hamilton himself went to Suvla.

At an interview with General Stopford, Sir Ian Hamilton urged that the Eleventh Division even now should make an attack. The difficulties of the morning had been overcome, and the men had been watered and rested. By dawn the Turks would be in strength on the hills. Accordingly, General Hamilton issued an order for an attack. The Thirty-second Brigade was in the first position to move, but even it was unable to start

until four o'clock the next morning. The attack made good progress at first, but later was taken in flank and broke down. Attacks by the other brigades at dawn had no better success, though some leading troops did actually reach the top of Ismail Oglu Tepe. During the night the Fifty-third Division arrived, and two nights afterwards the Fifty-fourth. In an attack towards Anafarta on the 12th, the colonel of a Norfolk Battalion, Sir H. Beauchamp, with some sixteen officers and 250 men, pressed onwards through a wood on the hillside, driving the Turks before him. "Nothing more was ever seen or heard of any of them. They charged into the forest and were lost to sight and sound. Not one of them ever came back."

On the 15th General Stopford handed over the command of the Ninth Corps to General de Lisle. Sir Ian Hamilton now calculated that the Turks had in front of Suvla some 20,000 men against our 30,000, in Seddil-Bahr 35,000 against the British and French 40,000, and in Anzac 75,000 against our 23,000. He believed that with another 50,000 men he could still carry the Turkish positions and win his way to the Narrows; and he asked for them. They were refused, the reason doubtless being that we were now committed to the offensive at Loos, which took place at the end of September. Sir Ian Hamilton decided to mass every man that he could lay his hands on in a final attempt to carry Ismail Oglu Tepe. The famous Twenty-ninth Division was brought round from Seddil-Bahr, and the attack was delivered on August 21st.

The difficulty of carrying the hill, now that the Turks had had time to entrench themselves and bring up artillery,



Suvla Bay.

was that the approaches to it were without cover and enfiladed from the Turkish positions on the Scimitar and neighbouring hills. One brigade of the Twenty-ninth Division carried the Scimitar Hill, but was unable to advance further owing to the failure of the Thirty-second Brigade of the Eleventh Division to advance on the left. Another brigade of the Twenty-ninth Division was checked by a forest fire that broke out on their front. After the failure of the Eleventh Division, the Second South Midland Brigade moved out from behind Chocolate Hill, and, advancing slowly through the bush fires, seized a knoll south of Scimitar Hill, which it was thought at first to be Ismail Oglu Tepe. It was not, and the ground had to be abandoned. Our losses in this last action were 5,000, most of which fell on the war-worn Twenty-ninth Division. This last defeat, if the War Office refusal to furnish more troops still held, meant the failure of the Gallipoli expedition.

COMMENTS.

The decision of the Government not to send the reinforcements for which Sir Ian Hamilton asked was probably a mistake. It may be that 50,000 men would still have been insufficient to carry the Turkish positions, and that before they had arrived the Turks would have been reinforced by greater numbers still. It may be, too, that the Government felt that having given General Hamilton all the troops that he had asked for, if not at

the time for which he had asked them, they had exhausted the chances of the Gallipoli expedition and were not justified in staking any more. Yet the probability is that the decisive reason for the refusal was the projected offensive in France. As between the chances in France and the chances in the Dardanelles, there is no doubt that their choice ought to have fallen otherwise than it did. However good the prospects in France—and, as it turned out, they were not to be realised—it is hard to believe that 50,000 men could possibly have so much effect in turning the scale there as they would probably have in Gallipoli; or that the Government had thought out the consequences of abandoning the offensive in Gallipoli. It is a sound rule in war that effort should not be dispersed but concentrated, but the right time to invoke that rule against the Dardanelles expedition was before it was launched, and not after our military credit had been committed and thousands of casualties suffered. Having once begun the land campaign, it was our duty to carry it through to a successful conclusion, unless it threatened to imperil graver interests elsewhere. This duty, as ought to have been foreseen, might also impose upon us the necessity of suspending the offensive in France, and, as it turned out, we should have been the gainers by bowing to this necessity. The vast bulk of the British armies was wasted throughout 1915, so far as practical results went. Very different would have been the results if one half of this effort had

been put forward in Gallipoli. When full allowance had been made for the magnitude of our reverses in Gallipoli in August, the fact remained that at the end of them all we were still in a better position to inflict a blow on Turkey by the expenditure of a given amount of energy than we were ever likely to be later in any other conditions. Besides, although the strategic centre of the war might be in France, it must never be forgotten that the chief cause of the war was Germany's ambitions in the Near East.

The Battles of Anzac and Suvla present many difficult problems of detail which will not be cleared up satisfactorily until after the end of the war, but their main outline is clear enough. The plan was good, and ought to have succeeded; that it came so near to success as it did disposes of the view very widely held that the whole enterprise was a mistake, and that if any attempt had to be made to force the Narrows it should have been in some one of a dozen different ways from that actually attempted. But good as the plan was, it had its defects. It is not clear whether the vital importance of the Suvla operations to the success of the attack on Sari Bair was as clearly grasped as it should have been. Was it understood by everyone in important command at Suvla that so much depended on the seizure of Ismail Oglu Tepe? Or how widespread was the idea that these operations at Suvla were not in the strict sense offensive so much as a defensive covering of the Anzac attacks? To answer that question fairly, and to decide how far if such an erroneous idea existed it had warrant, one would need to see all the orders that were issued. But if it was understood that the whole success of the Anzac operations depended on the capture by the Suvla Bay army of certain positions within a certain time, the delay on August 7th, and still more on August 8th, seems quite inexplicable. One cannot quite get rid of the impression that there must have been some misunderstanding of the real military motives of the Suvla landing to explain the delays. The importance of time ought not, one would think, to have depended on the military instinct of the commanders, but to have been a question of obedience or disobedience to orders. It has been said in defence of General Stopford that if he was helpless in face of his Divisional Commanders' opposition, so also was General Hamilton when he went to Suvla; but that is not just. It took him some hours to interview General Stopford, and to take all the bearings of the situation, but long before midnight he had given orders to which no disobedience was possible. Unfortunately, he was too late in arriving.

Much has been made of the rawness and inexperience of the troops at Anzac, and of the way in which they were thrown into the battle-line without any experience of the conditions of fighting in the country. There is some suspicion that something of the same kind happened at the Battle of Loos, and was the cause of the failure of the Reserves at a critical moment. In this case, however, the facts are admitted, and details have been made public on official authority. Much the frankest statement on the condition of the troops in the first few days at Suvla is that given by Colonel F. E. Freemantle, the Deputy Assistant Director of Medical Services:

"These were fresh troops, straight out from a life of healthy training at home, but with no experience of war. From two to three weeks they had spent on the sea, cooped up on board ship, where, with the best will and discipline in the world, athletic fitness could not be maintained. They were suddenly landed in almost tropical heat, and thrown straight into action in a very sparsely cultivated country: and that a new line without trenches and with little cover

"There were few local wells, giving little water, and that of variable, mostly inferior, quality. The mules that brought food and water up by night were heavily shelled. The difficulties of distribution were great, the heat and strain severe, the casualties many. If in England, as is officially taught, a soldier loses a quart of water in marching seven and a half miles, what must have been his water-needs under these conditions? And yet often he could not get even the pint of water allowed him at that time for all purposes in the twenty-four hours.

"Hunger, thirst, fatigue, strain, continued day and night (inevitable under the circumstances), were bound to tell on the troops. They would have told even on the hardened veterans of Helles and Anzac. It was a severe military baptism for Territorials. The effect was a general weakening of bodily resistance to the microscopic foes which fight impartially against both sides in every campaign, and which it is the peculiar privilege and most difficult task of the medical service to resist.

"In the Suvla Bay fighting during the week after landing the regimental medical officer, like the combatants, had to do what he could and how he could. Like them, he was advancing in darkness under fire through unknown, roadless, broken country, rock and scrub (thick bushes), hillocks and gullies, affording little cover, and no opportunity of taking any long or broad views of his battalion or of his work. For some time he could not establish any one regimental aid-post; he crawled about bandaging wounds, with his stretcher-bearers and himself helping to bring in the wounded, sometimes by day, mostly by night.

"The strain was intense, and four strong, healthy, mature regimental medical officers out of the twelve in the division succumbed to it in the first few days. One had dysenteric diarrhoea as his main symptom; one was suffering from exhaustion capped by a shell explosion within a few feet; the third, a jolly young giant from a prosperous suburban practice, finally succumbed to the shock of being called to attend four of his best pals laid out by a single shell. The fourth had lost his brother in the action, a combatant officer in the same regiment, and was brought down on a stretcher as if moribund. With the utmost pluck he pulled himself together in twenty-four hours and set out again for the trenches, but fainted on the way up, and was packed off on a hospital ship. If such was the result of strain on the medical officers, it may be imagined what its effects were on the troops."*

General Hamilton argues with much force that the most elaborate preparations had been made for the supply of water to the troops at Suvla, and some figures have already been quoted (p. 359) of his transport arrangements. But whether or not sufficient water was brought in the ships, it is quite clear that it was not distributed to where it was wanted. No doubt General Hamilton is justified in blaming the officers of the Suvla force for the failure in distribution; the arrangements for filling a reservoir in Anzac also went wrong, but, says Sir Ian Hamilton, "It was not with folded arms that the officers there met their difficulties." Undoubtedly some of the officers at Suvla, especially in the higher ranks, failed very miserably to rise to a great opportunity. General Stopford, in particular, was quite unequal to the emergency. Yet he had been selected for the command at this most important part of the front by General Hamilton himself, and unless the accounts given by General Hamilton of his conduct does him grave injustice, it is strange that his unfitness had not shown itself before.

General Hamilton throughout these luckless operations in Gallipoli showed that he had one of the best minds of the army. He had clearness of strategic vision, great energy, as well as capacity for detail. It is not easy to suggest the name of anyone in the army who would have done the work better, and a great deal of the criticism passed on his plans strikes one as unjust. He had every quality of the general except that of being lucky, which

* The *Lancet*, Jan. 14th, 1916.

Napoleon—perhaps not wholly unreasonably—insisted was indispensable in his generals. It may have been that he was inclined to pay too much deference to the opinions of others, and lacked the remorselessness of military logic, or perhaps his tactical combinations were too subtle and presented too many openings for the wrecking of chance. But that the luck was always against General Hamilton is evident. This, the gravest charge that can fairly be brought against him, may to some seem so light as to do no more than establish a claim to sympathy. It amounts, however, to rather more than

that, for, as Napoleon thought, the absence of luck may be symptomatic of very real faults.

Suvla was the worst defeat a British army has ever suffered, and it had the gravest consequences on the course of the war. Followed, as it was, by the refusal of the Government to despatch reinforcements, it meant the failure of the Gallipoli expedition. The three great events of the war up to the present have been the Marne, Gorlice, and Suvla; and of these three, the two last, both heavy defeats, have fallen to the volume that is now closing under the darkest clouds since the beginning of the war.



At an Allied base in the Dardanelles: Mudros, with French soldiers in the foreground.

[All the illustrations in this chapter, save where specific acknowledgment is made to another source, are from official photographs of the Dardanelles Campaign circulated on behalf of the Press Bureau.]

A RETROSPECT.

IN the third volume of this History a great decline in the military fortunes of the Allies has taken place. At the beginning of spring Russian armies were hammering at the gates of the Carpathians, and Constantinople was in panic over the British attempts to force the Dardanelles. It looked as though the south-east of Europe might soon be lost to Germany, with Russian armies on the Hungarian plains and a British fleet off Constantinople; and though this eastern bastion was less important to Germany than the bastion which she had made in front of Westphalia in Belgium, it was certain that, shut off from the East and exposed to the rigours of British sea-power on the West, the end of her resistance could not be very long postponed. Before summer was over, all was changed. Russia had lost all Galicia except a small corner east of Lemberg, all Poland, and most of the Baltic Provinces. Instead of menacing East Prussia and Cracow, Russia was anxious for the safety of Riga, Minsk, and even Kieff. Between the most westerly point reached by her advance and her new lines in the Pripet Marshes was a distance of more than three hundred miles; and though the front of the Russian army was still intact, and irretrievable disaster had been averted, every milestone in the retreat had taken toll of a legion from the strength of Russia. By August, too, we were beaten in Gallipoli, and Turkish national spirit ran higher than it had done for a century. Nor were there any successes in the West to compensate for these disasters and reverses in the East. At Ypres, we were harder pressed in the spring than we had been in the previous autumn, and the perimeter of our defences had had to be greatly contracted. The expected general attack on the German lines talked of for the spring was postponed till the autumn, and then, though it shook the confidence of the enemy, and inflicted heavy loss on him, it both failed in its main object and was exceedingly costly. In the Battle of Loos we had twice as many casualties as Napoleon at Borodino, the type of the bloody and indecisive battle. The prospect at the end of the summer was black indeed, nor did it bring any consolation to reflect that it was not so bad as had seemed likely when Brest-Litowsk fell. There was abundant reason to fear that they were right who held that some of the worst consequences of this disastrous success were yet to come.

The causes of the Russian reverses have already been discussed. There was no inferiority in the quality of the troops; indeed, one of the saddest lessons of this war is that individual valour is the cheapest and most widespread of military virtues. Nor, though some of his subordinates were badly at fault, was the Grand Duke outgeneralled by Hindenburg. The chief cause was the marked inferiority of the Russians on the mechanical side of war, the poorer equipment of her forces, their lack of good communications, and especially of railways, and in too many instances it must be added the lack of honesty in the supply services. It has already been noted that all through the first autumn and winter the

Russians but rarely outnumbered their enemies, and were oftener outnumbered. It needed no genius, but only competence, good organisation, and heavy reinforcements of men and material, for the Germans to turn the tables on this front. There were two ways in which this danger of German concentration against Russia could be met. One was by vigorous attack on the West, and it was to anticipate such movement that the Germans made their gas attacks north of Ypres. The other way was by forcing the Dardanelles. The British Government tried both ways, and failed in both; but it is obvious enough now that one-half of the effort vainly spent in forcing the German lines in the West would, if it had been applied early in the Dardanelles, have put this country in a winning position by the end of the year. The just censures on the mismanagement of the Gallipoli expedition have redounded quite unjustly to the discredit of the whole enterprise. In reality, the attack on the Dardanelles, considered as a piece of strategy, was one of the two examples of real military insight that the war had yet produced from the British side. The other example was Sir John French's transference of the British army into Flanders, which, combined with the occupation of Ypres by General Rawlinson's Division, saved France in a sense in which neither British valour in the retreat from Mons nor the Battle of the Marne can be said to have done.

Of two alternatives, one: Either the Dardanelles enterprise was a mistake from the beginning, and we ought to have cut ourselves from it at the earliest possible moment, or, having begun it, our wisest policy was to employ such force as would have ensured success. The second alternative was surely the sounder. It was most unfortunate that the attack was delivered by the fleet alone before an army was ready to co-operate. There was no need for hurry; and had the attacks been deferred until an army had been collected, the probability is that the Turks would have been no more prepared to meet them then than they were when the first naval attacks were made. Twenty thousand men in March or April could have done more than three times their number three months later or than six times six months later. It would appear that Sir Ian Hamilton was given as many troops as he asked for, though not always as soon as he asked for them, or of the seasoned quality that the exceptional difficulty of the ground required, and when the attack described in the last chapter was delivered there was a very confident expectation both there and at home that it would succeed. Mr. Asquith has described his deep disappointment. But when an enterprise comes so near to success and fails after all, it is evident that its plan has left too little margin for accidents. The art of directing war is, first, to determine which is the decisive area in the war, and secondly, having determined, to establish such a superiority in that field that nothing is left to chance and victory is, humanly speaking, certain.

If this standard be applied, the Government, obviously, did not regard Gallipoli as the decisive area, but France.

It was to France that the greater part of the British reinforcements were directed in the summer, and no doubt it was true that in the long run France was the decisive field for us. The error lay in mistiming the moment at which we could attack in the West with a probability of victory. After the failure in spring the attack in the West was postponed till autumn; but even that was too early to obtain the desired results. There were evidently serious miscalculations of the problem in the West, which not only cost us dear there, but, also—by diverting our energies—prevented us from exerting them in the area where success could have been made morally certain. It is fair to censure the blunders of the Gallipoli campaign; but it must also be remembered that miscalculations about the West helped to make those blunders possible.

The miscalculations were these. In the first place, we underestimated the strength of field entrenchments, and the superiority both of men and material necessary to carry them. Yet we had had some warning. The British army held Ypres against numbers frequently three times as great as their own, and a superiority in artillery which was greater still; and, even allowing for the fact that the defenders of Ypres were British long-service soldiers—probably the best ever seen on the continent of Europe—it was reasonable to suppose that to win a victory over defences that had been elaborated for a year at least, that superiority would be required over the Germans. At the opening of Neuve Chapelle, and in some passages of the action at Loos, the attack probably reached and even exceeded this excess of strength over the enemy. But greater numbers in the attack were only one factor out of many necessary to secure success. Others that were even more important were superiority in guns, and in high-explosive shell, which alone could break down the elaborate works; good staff work to meet the enemy's counter-attacks; and, generally, the highest possible efficiency in the commissioned ranks. A great deal of work had been done towards the first of these objects, thanks to the restless energy of the Minister of Munitions. But the problems of command were much more difficult. An army is more than the sum of the men

who are in it; it is more even than the machine. It is a collective intelligence. Brilliant as the British gift of extemporisation is, it cannot extemporise the trained military mind. The British army had at the outset of the war many exceedingly competent and a few brilliant leaders, and a good General Staff. But their numbers were only proportionate to the size of the army. When that army came to be multiplied by five and ten a very real shortage of trained military thinkers began to show itself. That this deficiency should exist reflected no discredit on the army; but it was strange that it was not recognised earlier and more generally. Had it been, there would have been less tragic waste of the young minds of the country in the ranks of the junior subalterns.

It was natural that the disappointments of the year should have their reflection in politics, and the political events of the summer added not a few to the discomforts of war time. Home politics are not seen at their best in war, and Parliament, which should have taken the lead in rational and healthy criticism—never more valuable to a Government than in war—rarely rose to the occasion. After the Coalition, again, a real Opposition party (which after all is as necessary to the Government of the country as the Government itself) became impossible, and the extreme reticence of the Government did not make rational appreciation of the facts of the war any easier. Such opposition as there was was transferred to the newspapers. Politics seemed singularly unreal for the most part, and discussion had a difficulty in fastening on the true points at issue. There was much intrigue, and perhaps even more rumours of intrigue. The main result was an unsettlement of the popular mind, and the creation of a political atmosphere strangely electrical, in which men had the constant feeling of great impending change.

Amid these uncertainties and disappointments the resolution of the country never changed except to harden. Through all the perplexities of the military situation it was sustained by confidence in the fleet, which was never more brilliantly justified than when the military prospects were most clouded.



British staff officers questioning captured Turkish officers on the field of battle.

APPENDICES.

GENERAL HAMILTON'S DESPATCHES

I.—THE LANDING.

From the General Commanding the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

To the Secretary of State for War, War Office, London, S.W.

General Headquarters,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force,
20th May, 1915.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to submit my report on the operations in the Gallipoli Peninsula up to and including the 5th May.

The covering force of the Twenty-ninth Division left Mudros Harbour on the evening of 23rd April for the five beaches, S, V, W, X, and Y.* Of these, V, W, and X were to be main landings, the landings at S and Y being made mainly to protect the flanks, to disseminate the forces of the enemy, and to interrupt the arrival of his reinforcements. The landings at S and Y were to take place at dawn, whilst it was planned that the first troops for V, W, and X beaches should reach the shore simultaneously at 5-30 a.m. after half an hour's bombardment from the fleet.

The transports conveying the covering force arrived off Tenedos on the morning of the 24th, and during the afternoon the troops were transferred to the warships and fleet-sweepers in which they were to approach the shore. About midnight, these ships, each towing a number of cutters and other small boats, silently slipped their cables and, escorted by the Third Squadron of the Fleet, steamed slowly towards their final rendezvous at Cape Helles. The rendezvous was reached just before dawn on the 25th. The morning was absolutely still; there was no sign of life on the shore; a thin veil of mist hung motionless over the promontory; the surface of the sea was as smooth as glass. The four battleships and four cruisers which formed the Third Squadron at once took up the positions that had been allotted to them, and at 5 a.m., it being then light enough to fire, a violent bombardment of the enemy's defences was begun. Meanwhile, the troops were being rapidly transferred to the small boats in which they were to be towed ashore. Not a move on the part of the enemy; except for shells thrown from the Asiatic side of the Straits the guns of the Fleet remained unanswered.

(After describing the landings on S and Y beach, the despatch proceeds.)

The landing-place known as X beach consists of a strip of sand some 200 yards long by eight yards wide at the foot of a low cliff. The troops to be landed here were the First Royal Fusiliers, who were to be towed ashore from H.M.S. *Implacable* in two parties, half a battalion at a time, together with a beach working party found by the Anson Battalion, Royal Naval Division. About 6 a.m. H.M.S. *Implacable*, with a boldness much admired by the army, stood quite close in to the beach, firing very rapidly with every gun she could bring to bear. Thus seconded, the Royal Fusiliers made good their landing with but little loss. The battalion then advanced to attack the Turkish trenches on the Hill 114, situated between V and W beaches, but were heavily counter-attacked and forced to give ground. Two more battalions of the Eighty-seventh Brigade soon followed them, and by evening the troops had established themselves in an entrenched position extending from half a mile round the landing-place and as far south as Hill 114. Here they were in touch with the Lancashire Fusiliers, who had landed on W beach. Brigadier-General Marshall, commanding the Eighty-seventh Brigade, had been wounded during the day's fighting, but continued in command of the brigade.

The landing on V beach had been planned to take place on the following lines:—

As soon as the enemy's defences had been heavily bombarded by the fleet,

three companies of the Dublin Fusiliers were to be towed ashore. They were to be closely followed by the collier *River Clyde* (Commander Unwin, R.N.), carrying between decks the balance of the Dublin Fusiliers, the Munster Fusiliers, half a battalion of the Hampshire Regiment, the West Riding Field Company, and other details.

The *River Clyde* had been specially prepared for the rapid disembarkation of her complement, and large openings for the exit of the troops had been cut in her sides, giving on to a wide gang-plank by which the men could pass rapidly into lighters which she had in tow. As soon as the first tows had reached land the *River Clyde* was to be run straight ashore. Her lighters were to be placed in position to form a gangway between the ship and the beach, and by this means it was hoped that 2,000 men could be thrown ashore with the utmost rapidity. Further, to assist in covering the landing, a battery of machine guns, protected by sandbags, had been mounted in her bows.

The remainder of the covering force detailed for this beach was then to follow in tows from the attendant battleships.

V beach is situated immediately to the west of Seddil-Bahr. Between the bluff on which stands Seddil-Bahr village and that which is crowned by No. 1 Fort the ground forms a very regular amphitheatre of three or four hundred yards radius. The slopes down to the beach are slightly concave, so that the whole area contained within the limits of this natural amphitheatre, whose grassy terraces rise gently to a height of a hundred feet above the shore, can be swept by the fire of a defender. The beach itself is a sandy strip some 10 yards wide and 350 yards long, backed along almost the whole of its length by a low sandy escarpment about four feet high, where the ground falls nearly sheer down to the beach. The slight shelter afforded by this escarpment played no small part in the operations of the succeeding thirty-two hours.

At the south-eastern extremity of the beach, between the shore and the village, stands the old fort of Seddil-Bahr, a battered ruin with wide breaches in its walls, and mounds of fallen masonry within and around it. On the ridge to the north, overlooking the amphitheatre, stands a ruined barrack. Both of these buildings, as well as No. 1 Fort, had been long bombarded by the fleet, and the guns of the forts had been put out of action; but their crumbled walls and the ruined outskirts of the village afforded cover for riflemen, while from the terraced slopes already described the defenders were able to command the open beach, as a stage is overlooked from the balconies of a theatre. On the very margin of the beach a strong barbed-wire entanglement, made of heavier metal and longer barbs than I have ever seen elsewhere, ran right across from the old fort of Seddil-Bahr to the foot of the north-western headland. Two-thirds of the way up the ridge a second and even stronger entanglement crossed the amphitheatre, passing in front of the old barrack and ending in the outskirts of the village. A third transverse entanglement, joining these two, ran up the hill near the eastern end of the beach, and almost at right angles to it. Above the upper entanglement the ground was scored with the enemy's trenches, in one of which four pom-poms were emplaced; in others were dummy pom-poms to draw fire, while the debris of the shattered buildings on either flank afforded cover and concealment for a number of machine-guns, which brought a cross-fire to bear on the ground already swept by rifle fire from the ridge.

Needless to say, the difficulties in the way of previous reconnaissance had rendered it impossible to obtain detailed information with regard either to the locality or to the enemy's preparations.

As often happens in war, the actual course of events did not quite correspond

with the intentions of the Commander. The *River Clyde* came into position off Seddil-Bahr in advance of the tows, and, just as the latter reached the shore, Commander Unwin beached his ship also. Whilst the boats and the collier were approaching the landing place the Turks made no sign. Up to the very last moment it appeared as if the landing was to be unopposed. But the moment the first boat touched bottom the storm broke. A tornado of fire swept over the beach, the incoming boats, and the collier. The Dublin Fusiliers and the naval boats' crews suffered exceedingly heavy losses while still in the boats. Those who succeeded in landing and in crossing the strip of sand managed to gain some cover when they reached the low escarpment on the further side. None of the boats, however, were able to get off again, and they and their crews were destroyed upon the beach.

Now came the moment for the *River Clyde* to pour forth her living freight; but grievous delay was caused here by the difficulty of placing the lighters in position between the ship and the shore. A strong current hindered the work, and the enemy's fire was so intense that almost every man engaged upon it was immediately shot. Owing, however, to the splendid gallantry of the naval working party, the lighters were eventually placed in position, and then the disembarkation began.

A company of the Munster Fusiliers led the way, but, short as was the distance, few of the men ever reached the farther side of the beach through the hail of bullets which poured down upon them from both flanks and the front. As the second company followed, the extemporised pier of lighters gave way in the current. The end nearest to the shore drifted into deep water, and many men who had escaped being shot were drowned by the weight of their equipment in trying to swim from the lighter to the beach. Undaunted workers were still forthcoming, the lighters were again brought into position, and the third company of the Munster Fusiliers rushed ashore, suffering heaviest loss this time from shrapnel, as well as from rifle, pom-pom, and machine-gun fire.

For a space the attempt to land was discontinued. When it was resumed the lighters again drifted into deep water, with Brigadier-General Napier, Captain Costeker, his Brigade Major, and a number of men of the Hampshire Regiment on board. There was nothing for them all but to lie down on the lighters, and it was here that General Napier and Captain Costeker were killed. At this time, between 10 and 11 a.m., about 1,000 men had left the collier, and of these nearly half had been killed or wounded before they could reach the little cover afforded by the steep, sandy bank at the top of the beach. Further attempts to disembark were now given up. Had the troops all been in open boats but few of them would have lived to tell the tale. But, most fortunately, the collier was so constructed as to afford fairly efficient protection to the men who were still on board, and, so long as they made no attempt to land, they suffered comparatively little loss.

Throughout the remainder of the day there was practically no change in the position of affairs. The situation was probably saved by the machine-guns on the *River Clyde*, which did valuable service in keeping down the enemy's fire and in preventing any attempt on their part to launch a counter-attack. One half-company of the Dublin Fusiliers, which had been landed at a cumber just east of Seddil-Bahr village, was unable to work its way across to V beach, and by mid-day had only twenty-five men left. It was proposed to divert to V beach that part of the main body which had been intended to land on V beach; but this would have involved considerable delay owing to the distance, and the main body was diverted to W beach, where the Lancashire Fusiliers had already effected a landing.

*See Map, p. 27.

Late in the afternoon part of the Worcestershire Regiment and the Lancashire Fusiliers worked across the high ground from W beach, and seemed likely to relieve the situation by taking the defenders of V beach in flank. The pressure on their own front, however, and the numerous barbed-wire entanglements which intervened, checked this advance, and at nightfall the Turkish garrison still held their ground. Just before dark some small parties of our men made their way along the shore to the outer walls of the Old Fort, and when night had fallen the remainder of the infantry from the collier were landed. A good force was now available for attack, but our troops were at such a cruel disadvantage as to position, and the fire of the enemy was still so accurate in the bright moonlight, that all attempts to clear the fort and the outskirts of the village during the night failed one after the other. The wounded who were able to do so without support returned to the collier under cover of darkness; but otherwise the situation at daybreak on the 26th was the same as it had been on the previous day, except that the troops first landed were becoming very exhausted.

Twenty-four hours after the disembarkation began there were ashore on V beach the survivors of the Dublin and Munster Fusiliers and of two companies of the Hampshire Regiment. The Brigadier and his Brigade-Major had been killed; Lieutenant-Colonel Carrington Smith, commanding the Hampshire Regiment, had been killed, and the Adjutant had been wounded. The Adjutant of the Munster Fusiliers was wounded, and the great majority of the senior officers were either wounded or killed. The remnant of the landing-party still crouched on the beach beneath the shelter of the sandy escarpment which had saved so many lives. With them were two officers of my General Staff—Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty-Wylie and Lieutenant-Colonel Williams. These two officers, who had landed from the *River Clyde*, had been striving, with conspicuous contempt for danger, to keep all their comrades in good heart during this day and night of ceaseless imminent peril.

Now that it was daylight once more, Lieutenant-Colonels Doughty-Wylie and Williams set to work to organise an attack on the hill above the beach. Any soldier who has endeavoured to pull scattered units together after they have been dominated for many consecutive hours by close and continuous fire will be able to take the measure of their difficulties. Fortunately, General Hunter Weston had arranged with Rear-Admiral Wemyss about this same time for a heavy bombardment to be opened by the ships upon the Old Fort, Seddil-Bahr village, the Old Castle north of the village, and on the ground leading up from the beach. Under cover of this bombardment, and led by Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty-Wylie and Captain Walford, Brigade-Major R.A., the troops gained a footing in the village by 10 a.m. They encountered a most stubborn opposition, and suffered heavy losses from the fire of well-concealed riflemen and machine-guns. Undeterred by the resistance, and supported by the naval gunfire, they pushed forward, and soon after midday they penetrated to the northern edge of the village, whence they were in a position to attack the Old Castle and Hill 141. During this advance Captain Walford was killed. Lieutenant-Colonel Doughty-Wylie had most gallantly led the attack all the way up from the beach through the west side of the village, under galling fire. And now, when, owing so largely to his own inspiring example and intrepid courage, the position had almost been gained, he was killed while leading the last assault. But the attack was pushed forward without wavering, and, fighting their way across the open with great dash, the troops gained the summit and occupied the Old Castle and Hill 141 before 2 p.m.

W beach consists of a strip of deep, powdery sand some 350 yards long and from fifteen to forty yards wide, situated immediately south of Tekke Burnu, where a small gully running down to the sea opens out a break in the cliffs. On either flank of the beach the ground rises precipitously but, in the centre, a number of sand dunes

afford a more gradual access to the ridge overlooking the sea. Much time and ingenuity had been employed by the Turks in turning this landing place into a death trap. Close to the water's edge a broad wire entanglement extended the whole length of the shore, and a supplementary barbed network lay concealed under the surface of the sea in the shallows. Land mines and sea mines had been laid. The high ground overlooking the beach was strongly fortified with trenches to which the gully afforded a natural covered approach. A number of machine-guns were also cunningly tucked away into holes in the cliff so as to be immune from a naval bombardment whilst they were converging their fire on the wire entanglements. The crest of the hill overlooking the beach was in its turn commanded by high ground to the north-west and south-east, and especially by two strong infantry redoubts near point 138. Both these redoubts were protected by wire entanglements about twenty feet broad, and could be approached only by a bare glacis-like slope leading up from the high ground above W beach or from the Cape Helles lighthouse. In addition, another separate entanglement ran down from these two redoubts to the edge of the cliff near the lighthouse, making the intercommunication between V and W beaches impossible until these redoubts had been captured.

So strong, in fact, were the defences of W beach that the Turks may well have considered them impregnable, and it is my firm conviction that no finer feat of arms has ever been achieved by the British soldier or any other soldier than the storming of these trenches from open boats on the morning of 25th April.

The landing at W had been entrusted to the First Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers (Major Bishop), and it was to the complete lack of the senses of danger or of fear of this daring battalion that we owed our astonishing success. As in the case of the landing at X, the disembarkation had been delayed for half an hour, but at 6 a.m. the whole battalion approached the shore together, towed by eight picket boats in line abreast, each picket boat pulling four ship's cutters. As soon as shallow water was reached, the tows were cast off and the boats were at once rowed to the shore. Three companies headed for the beach, and a company on the left of the line made for a small ledge of rock immediately under the cliff at Tekke Burnu. Brigadier-General Hare, commanding the Eighty-eighth Brigade, accompanied this latter party, which escaped the cross-fire brought to bear upon the beach, and was also in a better position than the rest of the battalion to turn the wire entanglements.

While the troops were approaching the shore no shot had been fired from the enemy's trenches, but as soon as the first boat touched the ground a hurricane of lead swept over the battalion. Gallantly led by their officers, the Fusiliers literally hurled themselves ashore and, fired at from right, left, and centre, commenced hacking their way through the wire. A long line of men was at once mown down as by a scythe, but the remainder were not to be denied. Covered by the fire of the warships, which had now closed right in to the shore, and helped by the flanking fire of the company on the extreme left, they broke through the entanglements and collected under the cliffs on either side of the beach. Here the companies were rapidly re-formed, and set forth to storm the enemy's entrenchments wherever they could find them.

In making these attacks the bulk of the battalion moved up towards Hill 114, whilst a small party worked down towards the trenches on the Cape Helles side of the landing-place.

Several land mines were exploded by the Turks during the advance, but the determination of the troops was in no way affected. By 10 a.m. three lines of hostile trenches were in our hands, and our hold on the beach was assured.

About 9-30 a.m. more infantry had begun to disembark, and two hours later a junction was effected on Hill 114 with the troops who had landed on X beach.

On the right, owing to the strength of the redoubt on Hill 138, little progress could be made. The small party of Lancashire Fusiliers which had advanced in this direction succeeded in reaching the edge of the wire entanglements, but were not strong enough to do more, and it was here that Major Frankland, Brigade Major of the Eighty-sixth Infantry Brigade, who had gone forward to make a personal reconnaissance, was unfortunately killed. Brigadier-General Hare had been wounded earlier in the day, and Colonel Woolly-Dod, General Staff 20th Division, was now sent ashore to take command at W beach and organise a further advance.

At 2 p.m., after the ground near Hill 138 had been subjected to a heavy bombardment, the Worcester Regiment advanced to the assault. Several men of this battalion rushed forward with great spirit to cut passages through the entanglement; some were killed, others persevered, and by 4 p.m. the hill and redoubt were captured.

An attempt was now made to join hands with the troops on V beach, who could make no headway at all against the dominating defences of the enemy. To help them out, the Eighty-sixth Brigade pushed forward in an easterly direction along the cliff. There is a limit, however, to the storming of barbed-wire entanglements. More of these barred the way. Again the heroic wire-cutters came out. Through glasses they could be seen quietly snipping away under a hellish fire as if they were pruning a vineyard. Again some of them fell. The fire pouring out of No. 1 Fort grew hotter and hotter, until the troops, now thoroughly exhausted by a sleepless night and by the long day's fighting under a hot sun, had to rest on their laurels for a while.

When night fell the British position in front of W beach extended from just east of Cape Helles lighthouse, through Hill 138, to Hill 114. Practically every man had to be thrown into the trenches to hold this line, and the only available reserves on this part of our front were the Second London Field Company R.E. and a platoon of the Anson Battalion, which had been landed as a beach working party.

During the night several strong and determined counter-attacks were made, all successfully repulsed without loss of ground. Meanwhile, the disembarkation of the remainder of the division was proceeding on W and X beaches.

The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps sailed out of Mudros Bay on the afternoon of April 24th, escorted by the Second Squadron of the Fleet, under Rear-Admiral Thursby. The rendezvous was reached just after half-past one in the morning of the 25th, and there the 1,500 men who had been placed on board H.M. ships before leaving Mudros were transferred to their boats. This operation was carried out with remarkable expedition, and in absolute silence. Simultaneously the remaining 2,500 men of the covering force were transferred from their transports to six destroyers. At 2-30 a.m. H.M. ships, together with the tows and the destroyers, proceeded to within some four miles of the coast, H.M.S. *Queen* (flying Rear-Admiral Thursby's flag) directing on a point about a mile north of Kaba Tepe. At 3-30 a.m. orders to go ahead and land were given to the tows, and at 4-10 a.m. the destroyers were ordered to follow.

All these arrangements worked without a hitch, and were carried out in complete orderliness and silence. No breath of wind ruffled the surface of the sea, and every condition was favourable save for the moon, which, sinking behind the ships, may have silhouetted them against its orb, betraying them thus to watchers on the shore.

A rugged and difficult part of the coast had been selected for the landing, so difficult and rugged that I considered the Turks were not at all likely to anticipate such a descent. Indeed, owing to the tows having failed to maintain their exact direction the actual point of disembarkation was rather more than a mile north of that which I had selected, and was more closely overhung by steeper cliffs. Although this accident increased the initial difficulty of driving the enemy off the heights inland, it has since proved itself to have been a blessing in disguise, inasmuch as the actual base of

the force of occupation has been much better defiladed from shell fire.

The beach on which the landing was actually effected is a very narrow strip of sand, about 1,000 yards in length, bounded on the north and the south by two small promontories. At its southern extremity a deep ravine, with exceedingly steep, scrub-clad sides, runs inland in a north-easterly direction. Near the northern end of the beach a small but steep gully runs up into the hills at right angles to the shore. Between the ravine and the gully the whole of the beach is backed by the seaward face of the spur which forms the north-western side of the ravine. From the top of the spur the ground falls almost sheer, except near the southern limit of the beach, where gentler slopes give access to the mouth of the ravine behind. Further inland lie in a tangled knot the under features of Sari Bair, separated by deep ravines, which take a most confusing diversity of direction. Sharp spurs, covered with dense scrub, and falling away in many places in precipitous sandy cliffs, radiate from the principal mass of the mountain, from which they run north-west, west, south-west, and south to the coast.

The boats approached the land in the silence and the darkness, and they were close to the shore before the enemy stirred. Then about one battalion of Turks was seen running along the beach to intercept the lines of boats. At this so critical a moment the conduct of all ranks was most praiseworthy. Not a word was spoken—everyone remained perfectly orderly and quiet awaiting the enemy's fire, which sure enough opened, causing many casualties. The moment the boats touched land the Australians' turn had come. Like lightning they leapt ashore, and each man as he did so went straight as his bayonet at the enemy. So vigorous was the onslaught that the Turks made no attempt to withstand it, and fled from ridge to ridge pursued by the Australian infantry.

This attack was carried out by the Third Australian Brigade, under Major (temporary Colonel) Sinclair MacLagan, D.S.O. The first and second Brigades followed promptly, and were all disembarked by 2 p.m., by which time 12,000 men and two batteries of Indian Mountain Artillery had been landed. The disembarkation of further artillery was delayed owing to the fact that the enemy's heavy guns opened on the anchorage and forced the transports, which had been subjected to continuous shelling from his field-guns, to stand further out to sea.

The broken ground, the thick scrub, the necessity for sending any formed detachments post-haste as they landed to the critical point of the moment, the headlong valour of scattered groups of the men who had pressed far further into the peninsula than had been intended—all these led to confusion and mixing up of units. Eventually the mixed crowd of fighting men, some advancing from the beach, others falling back before the oncoming Turkish supports, solidified into a semi-circular position, with its right about a mile north of Kaba Tepe and its left on the high ground over Fisherman's Hut. During this period parties of the Ninth and Tenth Battalions charged and put out of action three of the enemy's Krupp guns. During this period also the disembarkation of the Australian Division was being followed by that of the New Zealand and Australian Division (two brigades only).

From 11 a.m. to 3 p.m. the enemy, now reinforced to a strength of 20,000 men, attacked the whole line, making a specially strong effort against the Third Brigade and the left of the Second Brigade. This counter-attack was, however, handsomely repulsed with the help of the guns of H.M. ships. Between 5 and 6-30 p.m. a third most determined counter-attack was made against the Third Brigade, who held their ground with more than equivalent stubbornness. During the night again the Turks made constant attacks, and the Eighth Battalion repelled a bayonet charge; but in spite of all the line held firm. The troops had had practically no rest on the night of the 24th-25th; they had been fighting hard all day over most difficult country, and

they had been subjected to heavy shrapnel fire in the open. Their casualties had been deplorably heavy. But, despite their losses and in spite of their fatigue, the morning of the 26th found them still in good heart and as full of fight as ever.

It is a consolation to know that the Turks suffered still more seriously. Several times our machine-guns got on to them in close formation, and the whole surrounding country is still strewn with their dead of this date.

The reorganisation of units and formations was impossible during the 26th and 27th owing to persistent attacks. An advance was impossible until a reorganisation could be effected, and it only remained to entrench the position gained and to perfect the arrangements for bringing up ammunition, water, and supplies to the ridges in itself a most difficult undertaking. Four battalions of the Royal Naval Division was sent up to reinforce the Army Corps on the 28th and 29th April.

Throughout the events I have chronicled the Royal Navy has been father and mother to the Army. Not one of us but realises how much he owes to Vice-Admiral de Robeck; to the warships, French and British; to the destroyers, mine sweepers, picket boats, and to all their dauntless crews, who took no thought of themselves, but risked everything to give their soldier comrades a fair run in at the enemy.

Throughout these preparations and operations Monsieur le Général d'Amade has given me the benefit of his wide experiences of war, and has afforded me, always, the most loyal and energetic support. The landing of Kum Kale, planned by me as a mere diversion to distract the attention of the enemy, was transformed by the Commander of the Corps Expéditionnaire de l'Orient into a brilliant operation, which secured some substantial results. During the fighting which followed the landing of the French Division at Seddil-Bahr no troops could have acquitted themselves more creditably under very trying circumstances, and under very heavy losses, than those working under the orders of Monsieur le Général d'Amade.

Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood, K.C.S.I., C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O., was in command of the detached landing of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps above Kaba Tepe, as well as during the subsequent fighting. The fact of his having been responsible for the execution of these difficult and hazardous operations—operations which were crowned with a very remarkable success—speaks, I think, for itself.

Major-General A. G. Hunter-Weston, C.B., D.S.O., was tried very highly, not only during the landings, but more especially in the day and night attacks and counter-attacks which ensued. Untiring, resourceful, and ever more cheerful as the outlook (on occasion) grew darker, he possesses, in my opinion, very special qualifications as a commander of troops in the field.

Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, C.B., is the best Chief of the General Staff it has ever been my fortune to encounter in war. I will not pile epithets upon him. I can say no more than what I have said, and I can certainly say no less.

I have many other names to bring to notice for the period under review, and these will form the subject of a separate report at an early date.

I have the honour to be,
Your Lordship's most obedient servant,
IAN HAMILTON,
General Commanding Mediterranean
Expeditionary Force.

II.—THE BATTLE OF JUNE 4th.

I now return to the southern zone and to the battle of the 4th June.

From 25th May onwards the troops had been trying to work up within rushing distance of the enemy's front trenches. On the 25th May the Royal Naval and Forty-second Divisions crept 100 yards nearer to the Turks, and on the night of 28th-29th May the whole of the British line made a further small advance. On that night the French Corps Expéditionnaire was successful

in capturing a small redoubt on the extreme Turkish left west of the Kereves Dere. All Turkish counter-attacks during 29th May were repulsed. On the night of 30th May two of their many assaults effected temporary lodgment, but on both occasions they were driven out again with the bayonet. On every subsequent night up to that of the 3rd-4th June assaults were made upon the redoubt and upon our line, but at the end of that period our position remained intact.

This brings the narrative up to the day of the general attack upon the enemy's front line of trenches, which ran from the west of the Kereves Dere in a northerly direction to the sea.

24,000 MEN ENGAGED.

Taking our line of battle from right to left, the troops were deployed in the following order:—The Corps Expéditionnaire, the Royal Naval Division, the Forty-second (East Lancashire) Division, and the Twenty-ninth Division.

The length of the front, so far as the British troops were concerned, was rather over 4,000 yards, and the total infantry available amounted to 24,000 men, which permitted the General Officer Commanding Eighth Army Corps to form a corps reserve of 7,000 men.

My general headquarters for the day were at the command post on the peninsula. At 8 a.m. on 4th June our heavy artillery opened with a deliberate bombardment, which continued till 10-30 a.m. At 11 a.m. the bombardment recommenced, and continued till 11-20 a.m., when a feint attack was made, which successfully drew heavy fire from the enemy's guns and rifles. At 11-30 a.m. all our guns opened fire, and continued with increasing intensity till noon.

On the stroke of noon the artillery increased their range, and along the whole line the infantry fixed bayonets and advanced. The assault was immediately successful. On the extreme right the French First Division carried a line of trench, whilst the French Second Division, with the greatest dash and gallantry, captured a strong redoubt called the "Haricot," for which they had already had three desperate contests. Only the extreme left of the French was unable to gain any ground, a feature destined to have an unfortunate effect upon the final issue.

The Second Naval Brigade of the Royal Naval Division rushed with great dash; the Anson Battalion captured the southern face of a Turkish redoubt, which formed a salient in the enemy's line; the Howe and Hood Battalions captured trenches fronting them, and by 12-15 p.m. the whole Turkish line forming their first objective was in their hands. Their consolidating party went forward at 12-25 p.m.

The Manchester Brigade of the Forty-second Division advanced magnificently. In five minutes the first line of Turkish trenches were captured, and by 12-30 p.m. the brigade had carried with a rush the line forming their second objective, having made an advance of 600 yards in all. The working parties got to work without incident, and the position here could not possibly have been better.

On the left, the 29th Division met with more difficulty. All along the section of the Eighty-eighth Brigade the troops jumped out of their trenches at noon and charged across the open at the nearest Turkish trench. In most places the enemy crossed bayonets with our men, and inflicted severe loss upon us. But the Eighty-eighth Brigade was not to be denied. The Worcester Regiment was the first to capture trenches, and the remainder of the Eighty-eighth Brigade, though at first held up by flanking as well as fronting fire, also pushed on doggedly until they had fairly made good the whole of the Turkish first line.

Only on the extreme left did we sustain a check. Here the Turkish front trench was so sited as to have escaped damage from our artillery bombardment, and the barbed-wire obstacle was intact. The result was that, although the Fourteenth Sikhs, on the right flank, pushed on despite losses amounting to three-fourths of their effectives, the centre of the brigade could make

no headway. A company of the Sixth Gurkhas, on the left, skilfully led along the cliffs by its commander, actually forced its way into a Turkish work, but the failure of the rest of the brigade threatened isolation, and it was as skilfully withdrawn under fire. Reinforcements were therefore sent to the left, so that if possible a fresh attack might be organised.

Meanwhile, on the right of the line, the gains of the morning were being compromised. A very heavy counter-attack had developed against the "Haricot." The Turks poured in masses of men through prepared communication trenches, and under cover of accurate shell-fire were able to recapture that redoubt. The French, forced to fall back, uncovered in so doing the right flank of the Royal Naval Division. Shortly before 1 p.m. the right of the Second Naval Brigade had to retire with very heavy loss from the redoubt they had captured, thus exposing in their turn the Howe and Hood Battalions to enfilade, so that they, too, had nothing for it but to retreat across the open under exceedingly heavy machine-gun and musketry fire.

By 1-30 p.m. the whole of the captured trenches in this section had been lost again, and the brigade was back in its original position, the Collingwood Battalion, which had gone forward in support, having been practically destroyed.

The question was now whether this rolling up of the newly-captured line from the right would continue until the whole of our gains were wiped out. It looked very like it, for now the enfilade fire of the Turks began to fall upon the Manchester Brigade of the Forty-second Division, which was firmly consolidating the furthest distant line of trenches it had so brilliantly won. After 1-30 p.m. it became increasingly difficult for this gallant brigade to hold its ground. Heavy casualties occurred; the brigadier and many other officers were wounded or killed. Yet it continued to hold out with the greatest tenacity and grit. Every effort was made to sustain the brigade in its position. Its right flank was thrown back to make face against the enfilade fire, and reinforcements were sent to try to fill the diagonal gap between it and the Royal Naval Division. But ere long it became clear that unless the right of our line could advance again it would be impossible for the Manchesters to maintain the very pronounced salient in which they now found themselves.

Orders were issued, therefore, that the Royal Naval Division should co-operate with the French Corps in a fresh attack, and reinforcements were despatched to this end. The attack, timed for 3 p.m., was twice postponed at the request of General Gouraud, who finally reported that he would be unable to advance again that day with any prospect of success.

By 6-30 p.m., therefore, the Forty-second Division had to be extricated with loss from the second-line Turkish trenches, and had to content themselves with consolidating on the first line, which they had captured within five minutes of commencing the attack. Such was the spirit displayed by this brigade, that there was great difficulty in persuading the men to fall back. Had their flanks been covered, nothing would have made them loosen their grip.

No further progress had been found possible in front of the Eighty-eighth Brigade and Indian Brigade. Attempts were made by their reserve battalions to advance on the right and left flanks respectively, but in both cases heavy fire drove them back. At 4 p.m., under support of our artillery, the Royal Fusiliers were able to advance beyond the first line of captured trenches, but the fact that the left flank was held back made the attempt to hold any isolated position in advance inadvisable.

As the reserves had been largely depleted by the despatch of reinforcements to various parts of the line, and information was to hand of the approach of strong reinforcements of fresh troops to the enemy, orders were issued for the consolidation of the line then held.

Although we had been forced to abandon so much of the ground gained in the first rush, the net result of the day's operations was considerable—namely, an advance of 200 to 400 yards along the whole of our

centre, a front of nearly three miles. That the enemy suffered severely was indicated not only by subsequent information, but by the fact of his attempting no counter-attack during the night except upon the trench captured by the French First Division on the extreme right. Here two counter-attacks were repulsed with loss.

The prisoners taken during the day amounted to 400, including eleven officers; amongst these were five Germans, the remains of a volunteer machine-gun detachment from the *Goeben*. Their commanding officer was killed and the machine-gun destroyed. The majority of these captures were made by the Forty-second Division, under Major-General W. Douglas.

In addition to its normal duties, the Signal Service, under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel H. G. E. Bowman-Manifold, director of army signals, has provided the connecting link between the Royal Navy and the Army in their combined operations, and as rapidly readjusted itself to amphibious methods. All demands made on it by sudden expansion of the fighting forces or by the movement of General Headquarters have been rapidly and effectively met. The working of the telegraphs, telephones, and repair of lines, often under heavy fire, has been beyond praise. Casualties have been unusually high, but the best traditions of the Corps of Royal Engineers have inspired the whole of their work. As an instance, the Central Telegraph Office at Cape Helles (a dug-out) was recently struck by a high-explosive shell. The officer on duty and twelve other ranks were killed or wounded, and the office entirely demolished. But No. 72003, Corporal G. A. Walker, Royal Engineers, although much shaken, repaired the damage, collected men, and within thirty-nine minutes reopened communication by apologising for the incident and by saying he required no assistance.

The Royal Army Medical Service have had to face unusual and very trying conditions. There are no roads, and the wounded who are unable to walk must be carried from the firing line to the shore. They and their attendants may be shelled on their way to the beaches, at the beaches, on the jetties, and again, though I believe by inadvertence, on their way out in lighters to the hospital ships. Under shell fire it is not as easy as some of the critically disposed seem to imagine to keep all arrangements in apple-pie order. Here I can only express my own opinion that efficiency, method, and even a certain quiet heroism have characterised the evacuations of the many thousands of our wounded.

In my three commanders of corps I have indeed been thrice fortunate.

General Gouraud brought a great reputation to our help from the battlefields of the Argonne, and in so doing he has added to its lustre. A happy mixture of daring in danger and of calm in crisis, full of energy and resource, he has worked hand in glove with his British comrades in arms, and has earned their affection and respect.

Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Birdwood has been the soul of Anzac. Not for one single day has he ever quitted his post. Cheery and full of human sympathy, he has spent many hours of each twenty-four inspiring the defenders of the front trenches, and if he does not know every soldier in his force, at least every soldier in the force believes he is known to his chief.

Lieutenant-General A. G. Hunter Weston possesses a genius for war. I know no more resolute commander. Calls for reinforcements, appeals based on exhaustion or upon imminent counter-attacks are powerless to divert him from his aim. And this aim, in so far as he may be responsible for it, is worked out with insight, accuracy, and that wisdom which comes from close study in peace combined with long experience in the field.

In my first despatch I tried to express my indebtedness to Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, and I must now again, however inadequately, place on record the untiring loyal assistance he has continued to render to me ever since.

The thanks of everyone serving in the peninsula are due to Lieutenant-General

Sir John Maxwell. All the resources of Egypt and all of his own remarkable administrative abilities have been ungrudgingly placed at our disposal.

Finally, if my despatch is in any way to reflect the feelings of this force, I must refer to the shadow cast over the whole of our adventure by the loss of so many of our gallant and true-hearted comrades. Some of them we shall never see again; some have had the mark of the Dardanelles set upon them for life; but others, and, thank God, by far the greater proportion, will be back in due course at the front.

I have the honour to be your Lordship's most obedient servant,

IAN HAMILTON,
General Commanding Mediterranean
Expeditionary Force.

III.—THE ANZAC BATTLE.

The first step in the real push—the step which above all others was to count—was the night attack on the summits of the Sari Bair ridge. The crest line of this lofty mountain range runs parallel to the sea, dominating the underfeatures contained within the Anzac position, although these fortunately defile the actual landing-place. From the main ridge a series of spurs run down towards the level beach, and are separated from one another by deep, jagged gullies choked up with dense jungle. Two of these leading up to Chunuk Bair are called Chailak Dere and Sazli Beit Dere; another deep ravine runs up to Koja Chemen Tepe (Hill 305), the topmost peak of the whole ridge, and is called the Aghyl Dere.

It was our object to effect a lodgment along the crest of the high main ridge with two columns of troops, but, seeing the nature of the ground and the dispositions of the enemy, the effort had to be made by stages. We were bound, in fact, to undertake a double subsidiary operation before we could hope to launch these attacks with any real prospect of success.

(1) The right covering force was to seize Table Top, as well as all other enemy positions commanding the foothills between the Chailak Dere and the Sazli Beit Dere ravines. If this enterprise succeeded it would open up the ravines for the assaulting columns, whilst at the same time interposing between the right flank of the left covering force and the enemy holding the Sari Bair main ridge.

(2) The left covering force was to march northwards along the beach to seize a hill called Damakjelik Bair, some 1,400 yards north of Table Top. If successful it would be able to hold out a hand to the Ninth Corps as it landed south of Nibrunesi Point, whilst at the same time protecting the left flank of the left assaulting column against enemy troops from the Anafarta valley during its climb up the Aghyl Dere ravine.

(3) The right assaulting column was to move up the Chailak Dere and Sazli Beit Dere ravines to the storm of the ridge of Chunuk Bair.

(4) The left assaulting column was to work up the Aghyl Dere and prolong the line of the right assaulting column by storming Hill 305 (Koja Chemen Tepe), the summit of the whole range of hills.

To recapitulate, the two assaulting columns, which were to work up three ravines to the storm of the high ridge, were to be preceded by two covering columns. One of these was to capture the enemy's positions commanding the foothills, first to open the mouths of the ravines, secondly to cover the right flank of another covering force whilst it marched along the beach. The other covering column was to strike far out to the north until, from a hill called Damakjelik Bair, it could at the same time facilitate the landing of the Ninth Corps at Nibrunesi Point, and guard the left flank of the column assaulting Sari Bair from any forces of the enemy which might be assembled in the Anafarta valley.

The whole of this big attack was placed under the command of Major-General Sir A. J. Godley, General Officer Commanding New Zealand and Australian Division. The two covering and the two assaulting columns were organised as follows:—

Right Covering Column, under Brigadier-General A. H. Russell.—New Zealand

Mounted Rifles Brigade, the Otago Mounted Rifles Regiment, the Maori Contingent and New Zealand Field Troop.

Right Assaulting Column, under Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston.—New Zealand Infantry Brigade, Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), one Company New Zealand Engineers.

Left Covering Column, under Brigadier-General J. H. Travers.—Headquarters Fortieth Brigade, half the Seventy-second Field Company, Fourth Battalion South Wales Borderers, and Fifth Battalion Wiltshire Regiment.

Left Assaulting Column, under Brigadier-General (now Major-General) H. V. Cox.—Twenty-ninth Indian Infantry Brigade, Fourth Australian Infantry Brigade, Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), one Company New Zealand Engineers.

Divisional Reserve.—Sixth Battalion South Lancashire Regiment and Eighth Battalion Welsh Regiment (Pioneers) at Chailak Dere, and the Thirty-ninth Infantry Brigade and half Seventy-second Field Company at Aghyl Dere.

The right covering column, it will be remembered, had to gain command of the Sazli Beit Dere and the Aghyl Dere ravines, so as to let the assaulting column arrive intact within striking distance of the Chunuk Bair ridge. To achieve this object it had to clear the Turks off from their right flank positions upon Old No. 3 Post and Table Top.

Old No. 3 Post, connected with Table Top by a razor back, formed the apex of a triangular piece of hill sloping gradually down to our No. 2 and No. 3 outposts. Since its recapture from us by the Turks on 30th May working parties had done their best with unstinted material to convert this commanding point into an impregnable redoubt. Two lines of fire trench, very heavily entangled, protected its southern face—the only one accessible to us—and, with its head cover of solid timber baulks and its strongly revetted outworks, it dominated the approaches of both the Chailak Dere and the Sazli Beit Dere.

Table Top is a steep-sided, flat-topped hill, close on 400 feet above sea level. The sides of the hill are mostly sheer and quite impracticable, but here and there a ravine, choked with scrub, and under fire of enemy trenches, gives precarious foothold up the precipitous cliffs. The small plateau on the summit was honeycombed with trenches, which were connected by a communication alley with that underfeature of Sari Bair known as Rhododendron Spur.

Amongst other stratagems the Anzac troops, assisted by H.M.S. *Colne*, had long and carefully been educating the Turks how they should lose Old No. 3 Post, which could hardly have been rushed by simple force of arms. Every night, exactly at 9 p.m., H.M.S. *Colne* threw the beams of her searchlight on to the redoubt, and opened fire upon it for exactly ten minutes. Then, after a ten minutes' interval, came a second illumination and bombardment, commencing always at 9.20 and ending precisely at 9.30 p.m.

The idea was that, after successive nights of such practice, the enemy would get into the habit of taking the searchlight as a hint to clear out until the shelling was at an end. But on the eventful night of the 6th, the sound of their footsteps drowned by the loud cannonade, unseen as they crept along in that darkest shadow which fringes the searchlight's beam, came the right covering column. At 9.30 the light switched off, and instantly our men poured out of the scrub jungle and into the empty redoubt. By 11 p.m. the whole series of surrounding entrenchments were ours.

Once the capture of Old No. 3 Post was fairly under way, the remainder of the right covering column carried on their attack upon Bauchop's Hill and the Chailak Dere. By 10 p.m. the northernmost point, with its machine-gun, was captured, and by 1 o'clock in the morning the whole of Bauchop's Hill, a maze of ridge and ravine, everywhere entrenched, was fairly in our hands.

The attack along the Chailak Dere was not so cleanly carried out—made, indeed, just about as ugly a start as any enemy could wish. Pressing eagerly forward through the night, the little column of stormers found

themselves held up by a barbed-wire erection of unexampled height, depth, and solidity, which completely closed the river bed—that is to say, the only practicable entrance to the ravine. The entanglement was flanked by a strongly-held enemy trench running right across the opening of the Chailak Dere. Here that splendid body of men, the Otago Mounted Rifles, lost some of their bravest and their best, but in the end, when things were beginning to seem desperate, a passage was forced through the stubborn obstacle with most conspicuous and cool courage by Captain Shera and a party of New Zealand Engineers, supported by the Maoris, who showed themselves worthy descendants of the warriors of the Gate Pahi. Thus was the mouth of the Chailak Dere opened in time to admit of the unopposed entry of the right assaulting column.

Simultaneously the attack on Table Top had been launched under cover of a heavy bombardment from H.M.S. *Colne*. No General on peace manoeuvres would ask troops to attempt so break-neck an enterprise. The flanks of Table Top are so steep that the height gives an impression of a mushroom shape—of the summit bulging out over its stem. But just as faith moves mountains, so valour can carry them. The Turks fought bravely. The angle of Table Top's ascent is recognised in our regulations as "impracticable for infantry." But neither Turks nor angles of ascent were destined to stop Russell or his New Zealanders that night. There are moments during battle when life becomes intensified, when men become supermen, when the impossible becomes simple—and this was one of those moments. The scarped heights were scaled, the plateau was carried by midnight. With this brilliant feat the task of the right covering force was at an end. Its attacks had been made with the bayonet and bomb only; magazines were empty by order; hardly a rifle shot had been fired. Some 150 prisoners were captured, as well as many rifles and much equipment, ammunition and stores. No words can do justice to the achievement of Brigadier-General Russell and his men. There are exploits which must be seen to be realised.

The right assaulting column had entered the two southerly ravines—Sazli Beit Dere and Chailak Dere—by midnight. At 1.30 a.m. began a hotly-contested fight for the trenches on the lower part of Rhododendron Spur, whilst the Chailak Dere column pressed steadily up the valley against the enemy.

The left covering column, under Brigadier-General Travers, after marching along the beach to No. 3 Outpost, resumed its northerly advance as soon as the attack on Bauchop's Hill had developed. Once the Chailak Dere was cleared the column moved by the mouth of the Aghyl Dere, disregarding the enfilade fire from sections of Bauchop's Hill still uncaptured. The rapid success of this movement was largely due to Lieutenant-Colonel Gillespie, a very fine man, who commanded the advance guard, consisting of his own regiment, the Fourth South Wales Borderers, a corps worthy of such a leader. Every trench encountered was instantly rushed by the Borderers, until, having reached the predetermined spot, the whole column was unhesitatingly launched at Damakjelik Bair. Several Turkish trenches were captured at the bayonet's point, and by 1.30 a.m. the whole of the hill was occupied, thus safeguarding the left rear of the whole of the Anzac attack.

Here was an encouraging sample of what the New Army, under good auspices, could accomplish. Nothing more trying to inexperienced troops can be imagined than a long night march, exposed to flanking fire, through a strange country, winding up at the end with a bayonet charge against a height, formless and still in the starlight, garrisoned by those spectres of the imagination, worst enemies of the soldier.

The left assaulting column crossed the Chailak Dere at 12.30 a.m., and entered the Aghyl Dere at the heels of the left covering column. The surprise, on this side, was complete. Two Turkish officers were caught in their pyjamas; enemy arms and ammunition were scattered in every direction.

The grand attack was now in full swing, but the country gave new sensations in cliff

climbing even to officers and men who had graduated over the goat tracks of Anzac. The darkness of the night, the density of the scrub, hands and knees progress up the spurs, sheer physical fatigue, exhaustion of the spirit caused by repeated hairbreadth escapes from the hail of random bullets—all these combined to take the edge of the energies of our troops. At last, after advancing some distance up the Aghyl Dere, the column split up into two parts. The Fourth Australian Brigade struggled, fighting hard as they went, up to the north of the northern fork of the Aghyl Dere, making for Hill 305 (Koja Chemen Tepe). The Twenty-ninth Indian Infantry Brigade scrambled up the southern fork of the Aghyl Dere and the spurs north of it to the attack of a portion of the Sari Bair ridge known as Hill Q.

Dawn broke, and the crest line was not yet in our hands, although, considering all things, the left assaulting column had made a marvellous advance. The Fourth Australian Infantry Brigade was on the line of the Asmak Dere (the next ravine north of the Aghyl Dere) and the Twenty-ninth Indian Infantry Brigade held the ridge west of the farm below Chunuk Bair and along the spurs to the north-east. The enemy had been flung back from ridge to ridge; an excellent line for the renewal of the attack had been secured, and (except for the exhaustion of the troops) the auspices were propitious.

Turning to the right assaulting column, one battalion, the Canterbury Infantry Battalion, clambered slowly up the Sazli Beit Dere. The remainder of the force, led by the Otago Battalion, wound their way amongst the pitfalls and forced their passage through the scrub of the Chailak Dere, where fierce opposition forced them ere long to deploy. Here, too, the hopeless country was the main hindrance, and it was not until 5.45 a.m. that the bulk of the column joined the Canterbury Battalion on the lower slopes of Rhododendron Spur. The whole force then moved up the spur, gaining touch with the left assaulting column by means of the Tenth Gurkhas, in face of very heavy fire and frequent bayonet charges. Eventually they entrenched on the top of Rhododendron Spur, a quarter of a mile short of Chunuk Bair—i.e., of victory.

At 7 a.m., the Fifth and Sixth Gurkhas, belonging to the left assaulting column, had approached the main ridge north-east of Chunuk Bair, whilst, on their left, the Fourteenth Sikhs had got into touch with the Fourth Australian Brigade on the southern watershed of the Asmak Dere. The Fourth Australian Brigade now received orders to leave half a battalion to hold the spur, and, with the rest of its strength, plus the Fourteenth Sikhs, to assault Hill 305 (Koja Chemen Tepe). But by this time the enemy's opposition had hardened, and his reserves were moving up from the direction of Battleship Hill. Artillery support was asked for and given, yet by 9 a.m. the attack of the right assaulting column on Chunuk Bair was checked, and any idea of a further advance on Koja Chemen Tepe had to be, for the moment, suspended. The most that could be done was to hold fast to the Asmak Dere watershed whilst attacking the ridge north-east of Chunuk Bair, an attack to be supported by a fresh assault launched against Chunuk Bair itself.

At 9.30 a.m. the two assaulting columns pressed forward whilst our guns pounded the enemy moving along the Battleship Hill spurs. But in spite of all their efforts their increasing exhaustion, as opposed to the gathering strength of the enemy's fresh troops, began to tell—they had shot their bolt. So all day they clung to what they had captured, and strove to make ready for the night. At 11 a.m. three battalions of the Thirty-ninth Infantry Brigade were sent up from the general reserve to be at hand when needed, and, at the same hour, one more battalion of the reserve was despatched to the First Australian Division to meet the drain caused by all the desperate Lone Pine fighting.

By the afternoon the position of the two assaulting columns was unchanged. The right covering force were in occupation of Table Top, Old No. 3 Post and Bauchop Hill, which General Russell had been ordered to maintain with two regiments of Mounted

Rifles, so that he might have two other regiments and the Maori Contingent available to move as required. The left covering force held Damakjek Bair. The forces which had attacked along the front of the original Anzac line were back again in their own trenches. The Lone Pine work was being furiously disputed. All had suffered heavily, and all were very tired.

So ended the first phase of the fighting for the Chunuk Bair ridge. Our aims had not fully been attained, and the help we had hoped for from Suvla had not been forthcoming. Yet I fully endorse the words of General Birdwood when he says: "The troops had performed a feat which is without parallel."

Great kudos is due to Major-Generals Godley and Shaw for their arrangements; to Generals Russell, Johnston, Cox, and Travers for their leading; but most of all, as every one of these officers will gladly admit, to the rank and file for their fighting. Nor may I omit to add that the true destroyer spirit with which H.M.S. *Colne* (Commander Claude Seymour, R.N.) and H.M.S. *Chelmer* (Commander Hugh T. England, R.N.) backed us up will live in the grateful memories of the army.

In the course of this afternoon (7th August) reconnaissances of Sari Bair were carried out, and the troops were got into shape for a fresh advance in three columns, to take place in the early morning.

The columns were composed as follows:—
Right Column, Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston.—Twenty-sixth Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), Auckland Mounted Rifles, New Zealand Infantry Brigade, two battalions Thirteenth Division, and the Maori Contingent.

Centre and Left Columns, Major-General H. V. Cox. Twenty-first Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), Fourth Australian Brigade, Thirty-ninth Infantry Brigade (less one battalion), with Sixth Battalion South Lancashire Regiment attached, and the Twenty-ninth Indian Infantry Brigade.

The right column was to climb up the Chunuk Bair ridge; the left column was to make for the prolongation of the ridge north-east to Kojia Chemen Tepe, the topmost peak of the range.

The attack was timed for 4-15 a.m. At the first faint glimmer of dawn observers saw figures moving against the sky-line of Chunuk Bair. Were they our own men, or were they the Turks? Telescopes were anxiously adjusted; the light grew stronger; men were seen climbing up from our side of the ridge; they were our own fellows—the topmost summit was ours.

On the right, General Johnston's column, headed by the Wellington Battalion and supported by the Seventh Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment, the Auckland Mounted Rifles Regiment, the Eighth Welsh Pioneers, and the Maori Contingent, the whole most gallantly led by Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Malone, had raced one another up the steep. Nothing could check them. On they went, until, with a last determined rush, they fixed themselves firmly on the south-western slopes and crest of the main knoll known as the height of Chunuk Bair. With deep regret I have to add that the brave Lieutenant-Colonel Malone fell mortally wounded as he was marking out the line to be held. The Seventh Gloucesters suffered terrible losses here.

The fire was so hot that they never got a chance to dig their trenches deeper than some six inches, and there they had to withstand attack after attack. In the course of these fights every single officer, company sergeant-major, or company quartermaster-sergeant, was either killed or wounded, and the battalion by midday consisted of small groups of men commanded by junior non-commissioned officers or privates. Chapter and verse may be quoted for the view that the rank and file of an army cannot long endure the strain of close hand-to-hand fighting unless they are given confidence by the example of good officers. Yet here is at least one instance where a battalion of the New Army fought right on, from midday till sunset, without any officers.

In the centre the Thirty-ninth Infantry Brigade and the Twenty-ninth Indian Brigade moved along the gullies leading up to the Sari Bair ridge, the right moving south of the farm on Chunuk Bair, the left

up the spurs to the north-east of the farm against a portion of the main ridge north-east of Chunuk Bair and the col to the north of it. So murderous was the enemy's fire that little progress could be made, though some ground was gained on the spurs to the north-east of the farm.

On the left the Fourth Australian Brigade advanced from the Asmak Dere against the lower slopes of Abdul Rahman Bair (a spur running due north from Kojia Chemen Tepe) with the intention of wheeling to its right and advancing up the spur. Cunningly placed Turkish machine-guns and a strong entrenched body of infantry were ready for this move, and the Brigade were unable to get on. At last, on the approach of heavy columns of the enemy, the Australians, virtually surrounded, and having already suffered losses of over 1,000, were withdrawn to their original position. Here they stood at bay, and, though the men were by now half dead with thirst and with fatigue, they bloodily repulsed attack after attack delivered by heavy columns of Turks.

So matters stood at noon. Enough had been done for honour, and much ground had everywhere been gained. The expected support from Suvla hung fire, but the capture of Chunuk Bair was a presage of victory; even the troops who had been repulsed were quite undefeated—quite full of fight—and so it was decided to hold hard as we were till nightfall, and then to essay one more grand attack, wherein the footing gained on Chunuk Bair would this time be used as a pivot.

In the afternoon the battle slackened, excepting always at Lone Pine, where the enemy were still coming on in mass, and being mown down by our fire. Elsewhere the troops were busy digging and getting up water and food, no child's play, with their wretched lines of communication running within musketry range of the enemy.

That evening the New Zealand Brigade, with two regiments of New Zealand Mounted Rifles, and the Maoris, held Rhododendron Spur and the south-western slopes of the main knoll of Chunuk Bair. The front line was prolonged by the columns of General Cox and General Monash (with the Fourth Australian Brigade). Behind the New Zealanders were the Thirty-eighth Brigade in reserve, and in rear of General Monash two battalions of the Fortieth Brigade. The inner line was held as before, and the Twenty-ninth Brigade (less two battalions) had been sent up from the general reserve, and remained still further in rear.

The columns for the renewed attack were composed as follows:—

No. 1 Column, Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston.—Twenty-sixth Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), the Auckland and Wellington Mounted Rifles Regiments, the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, and two Battalions of the Thirteenth Division.

No. 2 Column, Major-General H. V. Cox.—Twenty-first Indian Mountain Battery (less one section), Fourth Australian Brigade, Thirty-ninth Brigade (less the Seventh Gloucesters, relieved), with the Sixth Battalion South Lancashire Regiment attached, and the Indian Infantry Brigade.

No. 3 Column, Brigadier-General A. H. Baldwin, Commanding Thirty-eighth Infantry Brigade. Two battalions each from the Thirty-eighth and Twenty-ninth Brigades, and one from the Fortieth Brigade.

No. 1 column was to hold and consolidate the ground gained on the 6th, and, in co-operation with the other columns, to gain the whole of Chunuk Bair, and extend to the south-east. No. 2 column was to attack Hill Q on the Chunuk Bair ridge, and No. 3 column was to move from the Chailak Dere, also on Hill Q. This last column was to make the main attack, and the others were to co-operate with it.

COLUMNS WHICH LOST THEIR WAY.

At 4-30 a.m. on August 8th, the Chunuk Bair ridge and Hill Q were heavily shelled. The naval guns, all the guns on the left flank, and as many as possible from the right flank (whence the enemy's advance could be enfiladed) took part in this cannonade, which rose to its climax at 5-15 a.m., when the whole ridge seemed a mass of flame and smoke, whence huge clouds of dust drifted slowly upwards in strange patterns on to

the sky. At 5-16 a.m. this tremendous bombardment was to be switched off on to the flanks and reverse slopes of the heights.

General Baldwin's column had assembled in the Chailak Dere, and was moving up towards General Johnston's headquarters. Our plan contemplated the massing of this column immediately behind the trenches held by the New Zealand Infantry Brigade. Thence it was intended to launch the battalions in successive lines, keeping them as much as possible on the high ground. Infinite trouble had been taken to ensure that the narrow track should be kept clear, guides also were provided; but in spite of all precautions the darkness, the rough scrub-covered country, its sheer steepness, so delayed the column that they were unable to take full advantage of the configuration of the ground, and, inclining to the left, did not reach the line of the Farm—Chunuk Bair till 5-15 a.m. In plain English, Baldwin, owing to the darkness and the awful country, lost his way through no fault of his own. The mischance was due to the fact that time did not admit of the detailed careful reconnaissance of routes which is so essential where operations are to be carried out by night.

And now, under that fine leader, Major C. G. L. Allanson, the Sixth Gurkhas of the 20th Indian Infantry Brigade pressed up the slopes of Sari Bair, crowned the heights of the col between Chunuk Bair and Hill Q, viewed far beneath them the waters of the Hellespont, viewed the Asiatic shores along which motor transport was bringing supplies to the lighters. Not only did this battalion, as well as some of the Sixth South Lancashire Regiment, reach the crest, but they began to attack down the far side of it, firing as they went at the fast-retreating enemy. But the fortune of war was against us. At this supreme moment Baldwin's column was still a long way from our trenches on the crest of Chunuk Bair, whence they should even now have been sweeping out towards Q along the whole ridge of the mountain. And instead of Baldwin's support came suddenly a salvo of heavy shell.

These falling so unexpectedly among the stormers threw them into terrible confusion. The Turkish commander saw his chance. Instantly his troops were rallied and brought back in a counter-charge, and the South Lancashires and Gurkhas, who had seen the promised land, and had seemed for a moment to have held victory in their grasp, were forced backwards over the crest, and on to the lower slopes whence they had first started.

But where was the main attack—where was Baldwin? When that bold but unlucky commander found he could not possibly reach our trenches on the top of Chunuk Bair in time to take effective part in the fight, he deployed for attack where he stood, i.e., at the farm to the left of the New Zealand Brigade's trenches on Rhododendron Spur. Now his men were coming on in fine style, and, just as the Turks topped the ridge with shouts of elation, two companies of the Sixth East Lancashire Regiment, together with the Tenth Hampshire Regiment, charged up our side of the slope with the bayonet. They had gained the high ground immediately below the commanding knoll on Chunuk Bair, and a few minutes earlier would have joined hands with the Gurkhas and South Lancashires, and, combined with them, would have carried all before them. But the Turks by this time were lining the whole of the high crest in overwhelming numbers.

The New Army troops attacked with a fine audacity, but they were flung back from the height and then pressed still further down the slope, until General Baldwin had to withdraw his command to the vicinity of the Farm, whilst the enemy, much encouraged, turned their attention to the New Zealand troops and the two New Army battalions of No. 1 Column still holding the south-west half of the main knoll of Chunuk Bair. Constant attacks, urged with fanatical persistence, were met here with a sterner resolution, and although, at the end of the day, our troops were greatly exhausted, they still kept their footing on the summit. And if that summit meant much to us, it meant even more to the Turks. For the ridge covered our landing places, it is true, but it covered not only the Turkish beaches at Kilia Leman and

Maidos, but also the Narrows themselves, and the roads leading northward to Bulair and Constantinople.

That evening our line ran along Rhohodendron Spur up to the crest of Chunuk Bair, where about 200 yards were occupied and held by some 800 men. Slight trenches had hastily been dug, but the fatigue of the New Zealanders and the fire of the enemy had prevented solid work been done. The trenches in many places were not more than a few inches deep. They were not protected by wire. Also many officers are of opinion that they had not been well sited in the first instance. On the South African system the main line was withdrawn some twenty-five yards from the crest instead of being actually on the crest line itself, and there were not even look-out posts along the summit. Boer skirmishers would thus have had to show themselves against the sky-line before they could annoy. But here we were faced by regulars taught to attack in mass with bayonet or bomb. And the power of collecting overwhelming numbers at very close quarters rested with whichever side held the true sky-line in force.

From Chunuk Bair the line ran down to the Farm and almost due north to the Asmak Dere southern watershed, whence it continued westward to the sea near Asmak Kuyu. On the right the Australian Division was still holding its line, and Lone Pine was still being furiously attacked. The First Australian Brigade was now reduced from 2,000 to 1,000, and the total casualties up to 8 p.m. on the 9th amounted to about 8,500. But the troops were still in extraordinarily good heart, and nothing could damp their keenness. The only discontent shown was by men who were kept in reserve.

During the night of the 9th-10th the New Zealand and New Army troops on Chunuk Bair were relieved. For three days and three nights they had been ceaselessly fighting. They were half dead with fatigue. Their lines of communication started from sea level, ran across trackless ridges and ravines to an altitude of 800 feet, and were exposed all the way to snipers' fire and artillery bombardment. It had become imperative, therefore, to get them enough food, water, and rest; and for this purpose it was imperative also to withdraw them. Chunuk Bair, which they had so magnificently held, was now handed over to two battalions of the Thirteenth Division, which were connected by the Tenth Hampshire Regiment with the troops at the Farm. General Sir William Birdwood is emphatic on the point that the nature of the ground is such that there was no room on the crest for more than this body of 800 to 1,000 rifles.

The two battalions of the New Army chosen to hold Chunuk Bair were the Sixth Loyal North Lancashire Regiment and the Fifth Wiltshire Regiment. The first of these arrived in good time and occupied the trenches. Even in the darkness their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Levinge, recognised how dangerously these trenches were sited, and he began at once to dig observation posts on the actual crest and to strengthen the defences where he could. But he had not time given him to do much. The second battalion, the Wiltshires, were delayed by the intricate country. They did not reach the edge of the entrenchment until 4 a.m., and were then told to lie down in what was believed, erroneously, to be a covered position.

At daybreak on Tuesday, 10th August, the Turks delivered a grand attack from the line Chunuk Bair Hill Q against these two battalions, already weakened in numbers, though not in spirit, by previous fighting. First our men were shelled by every enemy gun, and then, at 5.30 a.m., were assaulted by a huge column, consisting of no less than a full division plus a regiment of three battalions. The North Lancashire men were simply overwhelmed in their shallow trenches by sheer weight of numbers, whilst the Wilts, who were caught out in the open, were literally almost annihilated. The ponderous masses of the enemy swept over the crest, turned the right flank of our line below, swarmed round the Hampshires and General Baldwin's column, which had to give ground, and were only extricated with great difficulty and very heavy losses.

Now it was our turn. The warships and

the New Zealand and Australian Artillery, the Indian Mounted Artillery Brigade, and the Sixty-ninth Brigade Royal Field Artillery were getting the chance of a lifetime. As the successive solid lines of Turks topped the crest of the ridge gaps were torn through their formation, and an iron rain fell on them as they tried to re-form in the gullies.

Not here only did the Turks pay dearly for their recapture of the vital crest. Enemy reinforcements continued to move up Battleship Hill under heavy and accurate fire from our guns, and still they kept topping the ridges and pouring down the western slopes of the Chunuk Bair as if determined to regain everything they had lost. But once they were over the crest they became exposed not only to the full blast of the guns, naval and military, but also to a battery of ten machine-guns belonging to the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, which played upon their straggled ranks at close range until the barrels were red-hot. Enormous losses were inflicted, especially by these ten machine-guns; and of the swarms which had once fairly crossed the crest line only the merest handful ever straggled back to their own side of Chunuk Bair.

At this same time strong forces of the enemy (forces which I had reckoned would have been held back to meet our advance from Suvla Bay) were hurled against the Farm and the spurs to the north-east, where there arose a conflict so deadly that it may be considered as the climax of the four days' fighting for the ridge. Portions of our line were pierced and the troops driven clean down the hill. At the foot of the hill the men were rallied by Staff Captain Street, who was there supervising the transport of food and water. Without a word, unhesitatingly, they followed him back to the Farm, where they plunged again into the midst of that series of struggles in which generals fought in the ranks and men dropped their scientific weapons and caught one another by the throat. So desperate a battle cannot be described. The Turks came on again and again, fighting magnificently, calling upon the name of God. Our men stood to it, and maintained, by many a deed of daring, the old traditions of their race. There was no flinching. They died in the ranks where they stood.

Here Generals Cayley, Baldwin, and Cooper and all their gallant men achieved great glory. On this bloody field fell Brigadier-General Baldwin, who earned his first laurels on Caesar's Camp at Ladysmith. There, too, fell Brigadier-General Cooper, badly wounded; and there, too, fell Lieutenant-Colonel M. H. Nunn, commanding the Ninth Worcestershire Regiment; Lieutenant-Colonel H. G. Levinge, commanding the Sixth Loyal North Lancashire Regiment; and Lieutenant-Colonel J. Carden, commanding the Fifth Wiltshire Regiment.

Towards this supreme struggle the absolute last two battalions from the General Reserve were now hurried, but by 10 a.m. the effort of the enemy was spent. Soon their shattered remnants began to trickle back, leaving a track of corpses behind them, and by night, except prisoners or wounded, no live Turk was left upon our side of the slope.

That same day, 10th August, two attacks, one in the morning and the other in the afternoon, were delivered on our positions along the Asmak Dere and Damakjelik Bair. Both were repulsed with heavy loss by the Fourth Australian Brigade and the Fourth South Wales Borderers, the men of the New Army showing all the steadiness of veterans. Sad to say, the Borderers lost their intrepid leader, Lieutenant-Colonel Gillespie, in the course of this affair.

By evening the total casualties of General Birdwood's force had reached 12,000, and included a very large proportion of officers. The Thirteenth Division of the New Army, under Major-General Shaw, had alone lost 6,000 out of a grand total of 10,500. Baldwin was gone, and all his staff. Ten commanding officers out of thirteen had disappeared from the fighting effectives. The Warwicks and the Worcesters had lost literally every single officer. The old German notion that no unit would stand a loss of more than 25 per cent had been

completely falsified. The Thirteenth Division and the Twenty-ninth Brigade of the Tenth (Irish) Division had lost more than twice that proportion, and, in spirit, were game for as much more fighting as might be required. But physically, though Birdwood's forces were prepared to hold all they had got, they were now too exhausted to attack—at least until they had rested and reorganised. So far they had held on to all they had gained, excepting only the footholds on the ridge between Chunuk Bair and Hill Q, momentarily carried by the Gurkhas, and the salient of Chunuk Bair itself, which they had retained for forty-eight hours. Unfortunately, these two pieces of ground, small and worthless as they seemed, were worth, according to the ethics of war, 10,000 lives, for by their loss or retention they just marked the difference between an important success and a signal victory.

At times I had thought of throwing my reserves into this stubborn central battle, where probably they would have turned the scale. But each time the water trouble made me give up the idea, all ranks at Anzac being reduced to one pint a day. True thirst is a sensation unknown to the dwellers in cool, well-watered England. But at Anzac, when mules with water "pakhsals" arrived at the front, the men would rush up to them in swarms, just to lick the moisture that had exuded through the canvas bags. It will be understood, then, that until wells had been discovered under the freshly-won hills, the reinforcing of Anzac by even so much as a brigade was unthinkable.

The grand coup had not come off. The Narrows were still out of sight and beyond field-gun range. But this was not the fault of Lieutenant-General Birdwood or any of the officers and men under his command. No mortal can command success; Lieutenant-General Birdwood had done all that mortal man can do to deserve it. The way in which he worked out his instructions into practical arrangements and dispositions upon the terrain reflect high credit upon his military capacity. I also wish to bring to your Lordship's notice the valuable services of Major-General Godley, commanding the New Zealand and Australian Division. He had under him at one time a force amounting to two divisions, which he handled with conspicuous ability. Major-General F. C. Shaw, commanding Thirteenth Division, also rose superior to all the trials and tests of these trying days. His calm and sound judgment proved to be of the greatest value throughout the arduous fighting I have recorded.

As for the troops, the joyous alacrity with which they faced danger, wounds and death, as if they were some new form of exciting recreation, has astonished me—old campaigner as I am. I will say no more, leaving Major-General Godley to speak for what happened under his eyes: "I cannot close my report," he says, "without placing on record my unbounded admiration of the work performed, and the gallantry displayed, by the troops and their leaders during the severe fighting involved in these operations. Though the Australian, New Zealand, and Indian units had been confined to trench duty in a cramped space for some four months, and though the troops of the New Armies had only just landed from a sea voyage, and many of them had not been previously under fire, I do not believe that any troops in the world could have accomplished more. All ranks vied with one another in the performance of gallant deeds, and more than worthily upheld the best traditions of the British Army."

Although the Sari Bair ridge was the key to the whole of my tactical conception, and although the temptation to view this vital Anzac battle at closer quarters was very hard to resist, there was nothing in its course or conduct to call for my personal intervention.

IV.—THE LANDING AT SUVLA.

The conduct of the operations which were to be based upon Suvla Bay was entrusted to Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir F. Stopford. At his disposal was placed the Ninth Army Corps, less the Thirteenth

Division and the Twenty-ninth Brigade of the Tenth Division.

We believed that the Turks were still unsuspecting about Suvla, and that their only defences near that part of the coast were a girdle of trenches round Lala Baba, and a few unconnected lengths of fire trench on Hill 10 and on the hills forming the northern arm of the bay. There was no wire. Inland a small work had been constructed on Yilghin Burnu (locally known as Chocolate Hills), and a few guns had been placed upon these hills, as well as upon Ismail Oglu Tepe, whence they could be brought into action either against the beaches of Suvla Bay or against any attempt from Anzac to break out northwards and attack Chunuk Bair.

The numbers of the enemy allotted for the defence of the Suvla and Ejelmer areas (including the troops in the Anafarta villages, but exclusive of the general reserves in rear of the Sari Bair) were supposed to be under 4,000. Until the Turkish version of these events is in our hands it is not possible to be certain of the accuracy of this estimate. All that can be said at present is that my Intelligence Department were wonderfully exact in their figures as a rule, and that, in the case in question, events, the reports made by prisoners, &c., &c., seem to show that the forecast was correct.

Arrangements for the landing of the Ninth Corps at Suvla were worked out in minute detail by my General Headquarters Staff in collaboration with the staff of Vice-Admiral de Robeck, and every precaution was taken to ensure that the destination of the troops was kept secret up to the last moment.

Whilst concentrated at the island of Imbros the spirit and physique of the Eleventh Division had impressed me very favourably. They were to lead off the landing. From Imbros they were to be ferried over to the peninsula in destroyers and motor-lighters. Disembarkation was to begin at 10-30 p.m., half-an-hour later than the attack on the Turkish outposts on the northern flank of Anzac, and I was sanguine enough to hope that the elaborate plan we had worked out would enable three complete brigades of infantry to be set ashore by daylight. Originally it had been intended that all three brigades should land on the beach immediately south of Nibrunesi Point, but in deference to the representations of the Corps Commander I agreed, unfortunately, as it turned out, to one brigade being landed inside the bay.

The first task of the Ninth Corps was to seize and hold the Chocolate and Ismail Oglu Hills, together with the high ground on the north and east of Suvla Bay. If the landing went off smoothly, and if my information regarding the strength of the enemy were correct, I hoped that these hills, with their guns, might be well in our possession before daybreak. In that case I hoped, further, that the first division which landed would be strong enough to picket and hold all the important heights within artillery range of the bay, when General Stopford would be able to direct the remainder of his force, as it became available, through the Anafartas to the east of the Sari Bair, where it should soon smash the mainspring of the Turkish opposition to Anzac.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE LANDING.

On the 22nd July I issued secret instructions and tables showing the number of craft available for the Ninth Corps Commander, their capacity, and the points whereat the troops could be disembarked; also what numbers of troops, animals, vehicles, and stores could be landed simultaneously. The allocation of troops to the ships and boats was left to General Stopford's own discretion, subject only to naval exigencies, otherwise the order of the disembarkation might not have tallied with the order of his operations.

The factors governing the hour of landing were: First, that no craft could quit Cephalos Bay before dark (about 9 p.m.); secondly, that nothing could be done which would attract the attention of the enemy before 10 p.m., the moment when the outposts on the left flank of the Anzac position were to be rushed.

General Stopford next framed his orders

on these secret instructions, and after they had received my complete approval he proceeded to expound them to the general officer commanding the Eleventh Division, and general officer commanding the Tenth Division, who came over from Mudros for the purpose.

As in the original landing, the luck of calm weather favoured us, and all the embarkation arrangements at Cephalos were carried out by the Royal Navy in their usual ship-shape style. The Eleventh Division were to be landed at three places, designated and shown on the map as A, B, and C. Destroyers were told off for these landing places, each destroyer towing a steam lighter and picket-boat. Every light was to be dowsed, and as they neared the shore the destroyers were to slip their motor-lighters and picket-boats, which would then take the beach and discharge direct on to it. The motor-lighters were new acquisitions since the first landing, and were to prove of the greatest possible assistance. They moved five knots an hour under their own engines, and carried 500 men, as well as stores of ammunition and water. After landing their passengers they were to return to the destroyers, and in one trip would empty them also. Ketches with service launches and transport life-boats were to follow the destroyers and anchor at the entrance of the bay, so that in case of accidents or delays to any one of the motor-lighters a picket-boat could be sent at once to a ketch to pick up a tow of lifeboats and take the place of a disabled motor-lighter. These ketches and tows were afterwards to be used for evacuating the wounded.

H.M.S. *Endymion* and H.M.S. *Theseus*, each carrying a thousand men, were also to sail from Imbros, after the destroyers, and, lying off the beach, were to discharge their troops directly the motor-lighters—three to each ship—were ready to convey the men to the shore, i.e., after they had finished disembarking their own loads and those of the destroyers. When this was done—i.e., after three trips—the motor-lighters would be free to go on transporting guns, stores, mules, &c.

The following craft brought up the rear:

- (1) Two ketches, each towing four horse-boats carrying four 18-pounder guns and twenty-four horses.
- (2) One ketch, towing horse-boats with forty horses.
- (3) The sloop *Aster*, with 500 men, towing a lighter containing eight mountain guns.
- (4) Three ketches, towing horse-boats, containing eight 18-pounder guns and seventy-six horses.

Water-lighters, towed by a tank steamer, were also timed to arrive at A beach at daylight. When they had been emptied they were to return at once to Cephalos to refill from the parent water-ship.

A specially fitted-out steamer, the *Prah*, with stores (shown by our experience of 25th April to be most necessary) i.e., water-pumps, hose, tanks, troughs, entrenching tools, and all ordnance stores requisite for the prompt development of wells or springs, was also sent to Suvla.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUPPLY.

When originally I conceived the idea of these operations, one of the first points to be weighed was that of the water supply in the Biyuk Anafarta valley and the Suvla plain. Experience at Anzac had shown quite clearly that the whole plan must be given up unless a certain amount of water could be counted upon, and, fortunately, the information I received was reassuring. But, in case of accidents, and to be on the safe side, so long ago as June had I begun to take steps to counter the chance that we might, from one cause or another, find difficulty in developing the wells. Having got from the War Office all that they could give me, I addressed myself to India and Egypt, and eventually from these three sources I managed to secure portable receptacles for 100,000 gallons, including petrol tins, milk cans, camel tanks, water bags and pakhlals.

Supplementing these were lighters and water ships, all under naval control. Indeed, by arrangement with the Admiral, the responsibility of the army was confined to the emptying of the lighters and the

distribution of the water to the troops, the navy undertaking to bring the full lighters to the shore to replace the empty ones, thus providing a continuous supply.

Finally, 3,700 mules, together with 1,750 water carts, were provided for Anzac and Suvla this in addition to 950 mules already at Anzac. Representatives of the Director of Supplies and Transport at Suvla and Anzac were sent to allot the transport which was to be used for carrying up whatever was most needed by units ashore, whether water, food, or ammunition.

This statement, though necessarily brief, will, I hope, suffice to throw some light upon the complexity of the arrangements thought out beforehand in order, so far as was humanly possible, to combat the disorganisation, the hunger, and the thirst which lie in wait for troops landing on a hostile beach.

On the evening of 6th August the 11th Division sailed on its short journey from Imbros (Cephalos) to Suvla Bay, and, meeting with no mischance, the landing took place, the brigades of the Eleventh Division getting ashore practically simultaneously: the Thirty-second and Thirty-third Brigades at B and C beaches, the Thirty-fourth at A beach.

The surprise of the Turks was complete. At B and C the beaches were found to be admirably suited to our purpose, and there was no opposition. The landing at A was more difficult, both because of the shoal water and because there the Turkish pickets and sentries—the normal guardians of the coast—were on the alert and active. Some of the lighters grounded a good way from the shore, and men had to struggle towards the beach in as much as four feet six inches of water. Ropes in several instances were carried from the lighters to the shore to help to sustain the heavily-accoutred infantry. To add to the difficulties of the Thirty-fourth Brigade the lighters came under flanking rifle fire from the Turkish outposts at Lala Baba and Ghazi Baba. The enemy even, knowing every inch of the ground, crept down in the very dark night on to the beach itself, mingling with our troops and getting between our firing line and its supports.

Fortunately, the number of these enterprising foes was but few, and an end was soon put to their activity on the actual beaches by the sudden storming of Lala Baba from the south. This attack was carried out by the Ninth West Yorkshire Regiment and the Sixth Yorkshire Regiment, both of the Thirty-second Brigade, which had landed at B beach and marched up along the coast. The assault succeeded at once, and without much loss, but both battalions deserve great credit for the way it was delivered in the inky darkness of the night.

The Thirty-second Brigade was now pushed on to the support of the Thirty-fourth Brigade, which was held up by another outpost of the enemy on Hill 10 (117 R. and S.), and it is feared that some of the losses which occurred here were due to misdirected fire. While this fighting was still in progress the Eleventh Battalion Manchester Regiment, of the Thirty-fourth Brigade, was advancing northwards in very fine style, driving the enemy opposed to them back along the ridge of the Karakol Dagh towards the Kiretch Tepe Sirt. Beyond doubt, these Lancashire men earned much distinction, fighting with great pluck and grit against an enemy not very numerous perhaps, but having an immense advantage in knowledge of the ground.

As they got level with Hill 10 it grew light enough to see, and the enemy began to shell. No one seems to have been present who could take hold of the two brigades, the Thirty-second and Thirty-fourth, and launch them in a concerted and cohesive attack. Consequently there was confusion and hesitation, increased by gorse fires lit by hostile shell, but redeemed, I am proud to report, by the conspicuously fine, soldierly conduct of several individual battalions. The whole of the Turks locally available were by now in the field, and they were encouraged to counter-attack by the signs of hesitation, but the Ninth Lancashire Fusiliers and the Eleventh Manchester Regiment took them on with the bayonet, and fairly drove them back in disorder over the flaming Hill 10.

As the infantry were thus making good, the two Highland Mountain batteries and one battery, Fifty-ninth Brigade, Royal Field Artillery, were landed at B beach. Day was now breaking, and with the dawn sailed into the bay six battalions of the Tenth Division, under Brigadier-General Hill, from Mitylene.

Here, perhaps, I may be allowed to express my gratitude to the Royal Navy for their share in this remarkable achievement, as well as a very natural pride at staff arrangements, which resulted in the infantry of a whole division and three batteries being landed during a single night on a hostile shore, whilst the arrival of the first troops of the supporting division, from another base distant 120 miles, took place at the very psychological moment when support was most needed, namely, at break of dawn.

The intention of the Corps Commander was to keep the Tenth Division on the left, and with it to push on as far forward as possible along the Kiretch Tepe Sirt towards the heights above Ejelmer Bay. He wished, therefore, to land these six battalions of the Tenth Division at A beach, and, seeing Brigadier-General Hill, he told him that as the left of the Thirty-fourth Brigade was being hard pressed he should get into touch with General Officer Commanding Eleventh Division, and work in support of his left until the arrival of his own Divisional General. But the Naval authorities, so General Stopford reports, were unwilling, for some reason not specified, to land these troops at A beach, so that they had to be sent in lighters to C beach, whence they marched by Lala Baba to Hill 10, under fire. Hence were caused loss, delay, and fatigue. Also the angle of direction from which these fresh troops entered the fight was not nearly so effective.

The remainder of the Tenth Division, three battalions (from Mudros) and with them the G.O.C., Lieutenant-General Sir B. Mahon, began to arrive, and the Naval authorities having discovered a suitable landing place near Ghazi Baba, these battalions were landed there, together with one battalion of the Thirty-first Brigade, which had not yet been sent round to C beach. By this means it was hoped that both the brigades of the Tenth Division would be able to rendezvous about a mile to the north-west of Hill 10.

After the defeat of the enemy round and about Hill 10, they retreated in an easterly direction towards Sulajik and Kuchuk Anafarta Ova, followed by the Thirty-fourth and Thirty-second Brigades of the Eleventh Division, and by the Thirty-first Brigade of the Tenth Division, which had entered into the fight, not, as the Corps Commander had intended, on the left of the Eleventh Division, but between Hill 10 and the Salt Lake. I have failed in my endeavours to get some live human detail about the fighting which followed, but I understand from the Corps Commander that the brunt of it fell upon the Thirty-first Brigade of the Tenth (Irish) Division which, consisted of the Sixth Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, the Sixth Royal Irish Fusiliers, and the Sixth Royal Dublin Fusiliers, the last-named battalion being attached to the Thirty-first Brigade.

By the evening General Hammersley had seized Yilghin Burnu (Chocolate Hills) after a fight for which he specially commends the Sixth Lincoln Regiment and the Sixth Border Regiment. At the same time he reported that he was unable to make any further progress towards the vital point, Ismail Oglu Tepe. At nightfall his brigade and the Thirty-first Brigade were extended from about Hetman Chair through Chocolate Hills, Sulajik, to near Kuchuk Anafarta Ova.

This same day Sir B. Mahon delivered a spirited attack along the Kiretch Tepe Sirt ridge, in support of the Eleventh Battalion Manchester Regiment, and, taking some small trenches *en route*, secured and established himself on a position extending from the sea about 135 p., through the high ground about the p. of Kiretch Tepe Sirt, to about 135 Z. 8. In front of him, on the ridge, he reported the enemy to be strongly entrenched. The Sixth Royal Munster Fusiliers have been named as winning special distinction here. The whole advance was well carried out by the Irishmen over difficult ground against an enemy—500 to

700 Gendarmerie—favoured by the lie of the land.

The weather was very hot, and the new troops suffered much from want of water. Except at the southernmost extremity of the Kiretch Tepe Sirt ridge, there was no water in that part of the field, and although it existed in some abundance throughout the area over which the Eleventh Division was operating, the Corps Commander reports that there was no time to develop its resources. Partly this seems to have been owing to the enemy's fire; partly to a want of that *nous* which stands by as second nature to the old campaigner; partly it was inevitable. Anyway, for as long as such a state of things lasted, the troops became dependent on the lighters and upon the water brought to the beaches in tins, pakhals, &c.

Undoubtedly, the distribution of this water to the advancing troops was a matter of great difficulty, and one which required not only well-worked-out schemes from Corps and Divisional Staffs, but also energy and experience on the part of those who had to put them into practice. As it turned out, and judging merely by results, I regret to say that the measures actually taken in regard to the distribution proved to be inadequate, and that suffering and disorganisation ensued. The disembarkation of artillery horses was therefore at once, and rightly, postponed by the Corps Commander, in order that mules might be landed to carry up water.

And now General Stopford, recollecting the vast issues which hung upon his success in forestalling the enemy, urged his Divisional Commanders to push on. Otherwise, as he saw, all the advantages of the surprise landing must be nullified. But the Divisional Commanders believed themselves, it seems, to be unable to move. Their men, they said, were exhausted by their efforts of the night of the 6th-7th, and by the action of the 7th. The want of water had told on the new troops. The distribution from the beaches had not worked smoothly.

In some cases the hose had been pierced by individuals wishing to fill their own bottles; in others, lighters had grounded so far from the beach that men swam out to fill batches of water-bottles. All this had added to the disorganisation inevitable after a night landing, followed by fights here and there with an enemy scattered over a country to us unknown. These pleas for delay were perfectly well founded. But it seems to have been overlooked that the half-defeated Turks in front of us were equally exhausted and disorganised, and that an advance was the simplest and swiftest method of solving the water trouble and every other sort of trouble. Be this as it may, the objections overbore the Corps Commander's resolution. He had now got ashore three batteries (two of them mountain batteries), and the great guns of the ships were ready to speak at his request. But it was lack of artillery support which finally decided him to acquiesce in a policy of going slow, which, by the time it reached the troops, became translated into a period of inaction. The Divisional Generals were, in fact, informed that, "in view of the inadequate artillery support," General Stopford did not wish them to make frontal attacks on entrenched positions, but desired them, as far as was possible, to try and turn any trenches which were met with. Within the terms of this instruction lies the root of our failure to make use of the priceless daylight hours of the 8th of August.

Normally, it may be correct to say that in modern warfare infantry cannot be expected to advance without artillery preparation. But in a landing on a hostile shore the order has to be inverted. The infantry must advance and seize a suitable position to cover the landing and to provide artillery positions for the main thrust. The very existence of the force, its water supply, its facilities for munitions and supplies, its power to reinforce, must absolutely depend on the infantry being able instantly to make good sufficient ground without the aid of the artillery other than can be supplied for the purpose by *floating* batteries.

This is not a condition that should take the commander of a covering force by surprise. It is one already foreseen. Driv-

ing power was required, and even a certain ruthlessness, to brush aside pleas for a respite for tired troops. The one fatal error was inertia. And inertia prevailed.

Late in the evening of the 7th the enemy had withdrawn the few guns which had been in action during the day. Beyond half-a-dozen shells dropped from very long range into the bay in the early morning of the 8th, no enemy artillery fired that day in the Suvla area. The guns had evidently been moved back, lest they should be captured when we pushed forward. As for the entrenched positions, these, in the ordinary acceptance of the term, were non-existent. The General Staff Officer whom I had sent on to Suvla early in the morning of the 8th reported by telegraph the absence of hostile gun-fire, the small amount of rifle fire, and the enemy's apparent weakness. He also drew attention to the inaction of our own troops, and to the fact that golden opportunities were being missed. Before this message arrived at General Headquarters I had made up my mind, from the Corps Commander's own reports, that all was not well at Suvla. There was risk in cutting myself adrift, even temporarily, from touch with the operations at Anzac and Helles; but I did my best to provide against any sudden call by leaving Major-General W. P. Braithwaite, my Chief of the General Staff, in charge, with instructions to keep me closely informed of events at the other two fronts; and, having done this, I took ship and set out for Suvla.

On arrival at about 5 p.m. I boarded H.M.S. *Jonquil*, where I found corps headquarters, and where General Stopford informed me that the General Officer commanding Eleventh Division was confident of success in an attack he was to make at dawn the next morning (the 9th). I felt no such confidence. Beyond a small advance by a part of the Eleventh Division between the Chocolate Hills and Ismail Oglu Tepe, and some further progress along the Kiretch Tepe Sirt ridge by the Tenth Division, the day of the 8th had been lost. The commander of the Eleventh Division had, it seems, ordered strong patrols to be pushed forward so as to make good all the strong positions in advance which could be occupied without serious fighting; but, as he afterwards reported, "little was done in this respect." Thus a priceless twelve hours had already gone to help the chances of the Turkish reinforcements which were, I knew, both from naval and aerial sources, actually on the march for Suvla. But when I urged that even now, at the eleventh hour, the Eleventh Division should make a concerted attack upon the hills, I was met by a *non possumus*. The objections of the morning were no longer valid; the men were now well rested, watered, and fed. But the Divisional Commanders disliked the idea of an advance by night, and General Stopford did not care, it seemed, to force their hands.

So it came about that I was driven to see whether I could not, myself, put concentration of effort and purpose into the direction of the large number of men ashore. The Corps Commander made no objection. He declared himself to be as eager as I could be to advance. The representations made by the Divisional Commanders had seemed to him insuperable. If I could see my way to get over them no one would be more pleased than himself.

Accompanied by Commodore Roger Keyes and Lieutenant-Colonel Aspinall, of the Headquarters General Staff, I landed on the beach, where all seemed quiet and peaceful, and saw the Commander of the Eleventh Division, Major-General Hammersley. I warned him the sands were running out fast, and that by dawn the high ground to his front might very likely be occupied in force by the enemy. He saw the danger, but declared it was a physical impossibility at so late an hour (6 p.m.) to get out orders for a night attack, the troops being very much scattered. There was no other difficulty now, but this was insuperable; he could not recast his orders or get them round to his troops in time. But one brigade, the Thirty-second, was, so General Hammersley admitted, more or less concentrated, and ready to move. The General Staff Officer of the Division, Colonel Neil Malcolm, a soldier of experience, on whose

opinion I set much value, was consulted. He agreed that the Thirty-second Brigade was now in a position to act. I, therefore, issued a direct order that, even if it were only with this Thirty-second Brigade, the advance should begin at the earliest possible moment, so that a portion at least of the Eleventh Division should anticipate the Turkish reinforcements on the heights and dig themselves in there upon some good tactical point.

In taking upon myself the serious responsibility of thus dealing with a detail of divisional tactics I was careful to limit the scope of the interference. Beyond directing that the one brigade which was reported ready to move at once should try and make good the heights before the enemy got on to them I did nothing, and said not a word calculated to modify or in any way affect the attack already planned for the morning. Out of the thirteen battalions which were to have advanced against the heights at dawn, four were now to anticipate that movement by trying to make good the key of the enemy's position at once and under cover of darkness.

I have not been able to get a clear and coherent account of the doings of the Thirty-second Brigade: but I have established the fact that it did not actually commence its advance till 4 a.m. on the 9th of August. The reason given is that the units of the brigade were scattered. In General Stopford's despatch he says that, "One company of the Sixth East Yorks, Pioneer Battalion succeeded in getting to the top of the hill north of Anafarta Sagir, but the rest of the battalion and the Thirty-second Brigade were attacked from both flanks during their advance, and fell back to a line north and south of Sulajik. Very few of the leading company or of the Royal Engineers who accompanied it got back, and that evening the strength of the battalion was nine officers and 380 men."

After their retirement from the hill north of Anafarta Sagir (which commanded the whole battlefield) this Thirty-second Brigade then still marked the high-water level of the advance made at dawn by the rest of the division. When their first retirement was completed they had to fall back further, so as to come into line with the most forward of their comrades. The inference seems clear. Just as the Thirty-second Brigade in their advance met with markedly less opposition than the troops who attacked an hour and a half later, so, had they themselves started earlier, they would probably have experienced less opposition. Further, it seems reasonable to suppose that had the complete division started at 4 a.m. on the 9th, or, better still, at 10 p.m. on the 8th, they would have made good the whole of the heights in front of them.

That night I stayed at Suvla, preferring to drop direct cable contact with my operations as a whole to losing touch with a corps battle which seemed to be going wrong.

At dawn on the 9th I watched General Hammersley's attack, and very soon realised, by the well-sustained artillery fire of the enemy (so silent the previous day) and by the volume of the musketry, that Turkish reinforcements had arrived; that with the renewed confidence caused by our long delay the guns had been brought back; and that, after all, we were forestalled. This was a bad moment. Our attack failed; our losses were very serious. The enemy's enfilading shrapnel fire seemed to be specially destructive and demoralising, the shell bursting low and all along our line. Time after time it threw back our attack just as it seemed upon the point of making good. The Thirty-third Brigade at first made most hopeful progress in its attempt to seize Ismail Oglu Tepe. Some of the leading troops gained the summit, and were able to look over on to the other side. Many Turks were killed here. Then the centre seemed to give way.

Whether this was the result of the shrapnel fire or whether, as some say, an order to retire came up from the rear, the result was equally fatal to success. As the centre fell back the steady, gallant behaviour of the Sixth Battalion Border Regiment and the Sixth Battalion Lincoln Regiment

on either flank was especially noteworthy. Scrub fires on Hill 70 did much to harass and hamper our troops. When the Thirty-second Brigade fell back before attacks from the slopes of the hill north of Anafarta Sagir and from the direction of Abrijka they took up the line north and south through Sulajik. Here their left was protected by two battalions of the Thirty-fourth Brigade, which came up to their support. The line was later on prolonged by the remainder of the Thirty-fourth Brigade and two battalions of the 150th Brigade of the Fifty-third Division. Their right was connected with the Chocolate Hills by the Thirty-third Brigade on the position to which they had returned after their repulse from the upper slopes of Ismail Oglu Tepe.

Some of the units which took part in this engagement acquitted themselves very bravely. I regret I have not had sufficient detail given me to enable me to mention them by name. The Divisional Commander speaks with appreciation of one freshly-landed battalion of the Fifty-third Division, a Hereford battalion, presumably the 1/1st Herefordshire, which attacked with impetuosity and courage between Hetman Chair and Kaslar Chair, about Azmak Dere, on the extreme right of his line.

During the night of the 8th-9th and early morning of the 9th, the whole of the Fifty-third (Territorial) Division (my general reserve) had arrived and disembarked. I had ordered it up to Suvla, hoping that by adding its strength to the Ninth Corps General Stopford might still be enabled to secure the commanding ground round the bay. The infantry brigades of the Fifty-third Division (no artillery had accompanied it from England) reinforced the Eleventh Division.

On August 10th the Corps Commander decided to make another attempt to take the Anafarta ridge. The Eleventh Division were not sufficiently rested to play a prominent part in the operation, but the Fifty-third Division, under General Lindley, was to attack, supported by General Hammersley. On the Tenth there were one brigade of Royal Field Artillery ashore, with two mountain batteries, and all the ships' guns were available to co-operate. But the attack failed, though the Corps Commander considers that seasoned troops would have succeeded, especially as the enemy were showing signs of being shaken by our artillery fire. General Stopford points out, however, and rightly so, that the attack was delivered over very difficult country, and that it was a high trial for troops who had never been in action before, and with no regulars to set a standard.

Many of the battalions fought with great gallantry, and were led forward with much devotion by their officers. At a moment when things were looking dangerous two battalions of the Eleventh Division (not specified by the Corps Commander) rendered very good service on the left of the Territorials. At the end of the day our troops occupied the line hill east of Chocolate Hill - Sulajik, whilst the enemy who had been ably commanded throughout were still receiving reinforcements, and, apart from their artillery, were three times as strong as they had been on the 7th August.

Orders were issued to the General Officer Commanding Ninth Corps to take up and entrench a line across the whole front from near the Azmak Dere, through the knoll east of the Chocolate Hill, to the ground held by the Tenth Division about Kiretch Tepe Sirt. General Stopford took advantage of this opportunity to reorganise the divisions, and, as there was a gap in the line between the left of the Fifty-third Division and the right of the Tenth Division, gave orders for the preparation of certain strong points to enable it to be held.

The Fifty-fourth Division (infantry only) arrived, and were disembarked on August 11th and placed in reserve. On the following day August 12th I proposed that the Fifty-fourth Division should make a night march in order to attack, at dawn on the 13th, the heights Kavak Tepe - Teke Tepe. The Corps Commander, having reason to believe that the enclosed country about Kuchuk Anafarta Ova and the north of it

was held by the enemy, ordered one brigade to move forward in advance, and make good Kuchuk Anafarta Ova, so as to ensure an unopposed march for the remainder of the division as far as that place. So that afternoon the 163rd Brigade moved off, and, in spite of serious opposition, established itself about the A of Anafarta (118m. 4 and 7), in difficult and enclosed country.

In the course of the fight, creditable in all respects to the 163rd Brigade, there happened a very mysterious thing. The 15th Norfolk were on the right of the line, and found themselves for a moment less strongly opposed than the rest of the brigade. Against the yielding forces of the enemy Colonel Sir H. Beauchamp, a bold, self-confident officer, eagerly pressed forward, followed by the best part of the battalion. The fighting grew hotter, and the ground became more wooded and broken. At this stage many men were wounded or grew exhausted with thirst. These found their way back to camp during the night. But the Colonel, with sixteen officers and 250 men, still kept pushing on, driving the enemy before him. Amongst these ardent souls was part of a fine company enlisted from the King's Sandringham estates. Nothing more was ever seen or heard of any of them. They charged into the forest, and were lost to sight or sound. Not one of them ever came back.

The night march and projected attack were now abandoned, owing to the Corps Commander's representations as to the difficulties of keeping the division supplied with food, water, &c., even should they gain the height. General Birdwood had hoped he would soon be able to make a fresh attack on Sari Bair, provided that he might reckon on a corresponding vigorous advance to be made by the Eleventh and Fifty-fourth Divisions on Ismail Oglu Tepe. On August 13th I so informed General Stopford. But when it came to business, General Birdwood found he could not yet carry out his new attack on Sari Bair, and, indeed, could only help the Ninth Corps with one brigade from Damakjelik Bair. I was obliged, therefore, to abandon this project for the nonce, and directed General Stopford to confine his attention to strengthening his line across his present front. To straighten out the left of this line General Stopford ordered the General Officer Commanding the Tenth Division to advance on the following day (15th August), so as to gain possession of the crest of the Kiretch Tepe Sirt, the Fifty-fourth Division to co-operate.

The Thirtieth and Thirty-first Infantry Brigades of the Tenth Irish Division were to attack frontally along the high ridge. The 162nd Infantry Brigade of the Fifty-fourth Division were to support on the right. The infantry were to be seconded by a machine gun detachment of the Royal Naval Air Service, by the guns of H.M.S. *Grampus* and H.M.S. *Foxhound* from the Gulf of Saros, by the Argyll Mountain Battery, the Fifteenth Heavy Battery, and the Fifty-eighth Field Battery. After several hours of indecisive artillery and musketry fighting, the Sixth Royal Dublin Fusiliers charged forward with loud cheers, and captured the whole ridge, together with eighteen prisoners. The vigorous support rendered by the naval guns was a feature of this operation. Unfortunately, the point of the ridge was hard to hold, and means for maintaining the forward trenches had not been well thought out. Casualties became very heavy, the Fifth Royal Irish Fusiliers having only one officer left, and the Fifth Inniskilling Fusiliers also losing heavily in officers. Reinforcements were promised, but before they could arrive the officer left in command decided to evacuate the front trenches. The strength of the Turks opposed to us was steadily rising, and had now reached 20,000.

I have the honour to be your Lordship's most obedient servant,

IAN HAMILTON,
General Commander-in-Chief
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

INDEX.

- ACHI BABA, Turkish position at, 35, 43, 353-5, 361; *maps*, 37, 39, 43.
- ADEN, operations near, 352.
- ADIGE, Valley of, 141.
- AE 2, 39.
- Agamemnon, *H.M.S.*, 19.
- AGHVI DERE (Anzac), 363.
- AHMED RIZA, on Armenian massacres, 224.
- AIR SERVICE—BRITISH:—*Military* (Royal Flying Corps): early supremacy of, 8. *Naval*: Raids on Zeebrugge and Belgian coast, 1-5; successes against Zeppelins, 7.
- FRENCH: raid on Ghisteltes, 3.
- GERMAN: policy of air-raids, 119; new aeroplane types, 9; airships lost in Belgium, 7; duel with British submarines, 5.
- ALBERT, Dr., 313.
- Albion, *H.M.S.*, 19.
- ALEXIEFF, General, 259; *portrait*, 75.
- ALIENS, position and legal rights, 340-1.
- AMADE, General d', 23; *portrait*, 26.
- AMARA (Tigris), 349.
- AMERICA, United States of: Allies' war loan, 102; mercantile marine, 209; failure of diplomacy with Germany, 231-3; protests against British blockade policy, 241-2; favours "freedom of the seas," 238, 242; German intrigues in, 312; German outrages and corruption, 312, 317, 319; Hamburg-America line trial, 319; dismissal of Dr. Dumba, 317.
- ANAFARTA (Suvla), 367.
- Ancona, The, sinking of, 236.
- ANDREAE, Flight-Lieutenant, 5.
- Anglo-Californian, The, escape of, 229.
- ANGLO-PERSIAN Oil Company, pipe line, 343.
- ANTIOCH, resistance of Armenians to Turks, 223.
- ANTWERP: raid on Cockerill's shipyard, 5; the relief expedition, 155.
- ANZAC: Australians land at, 27; early fighting at, 41; battle of, 357-365; *map*, 369.
- Arabic, The, 233.
- ARCHIBALD, Mr. J., 315.
- Ark Royal, *H.M.S.*, 3.
- ARMENIANS: relations with Russia, 219; the pro-Turkish party, 219; Turkish policy and its excuses, 221; the massacres, 221-4; *map*, 218.
- ARMENTIERES, 271.
- ARTILLERY: types of, 173; *diagrams*, 169, 171, 172; British bombardment at Loos, 275; French 75's in Champagne, 287.
- ARMY, AUSTRALIAN. *See* British Army and Anzac.
- AUSTRIAN: estimate of quality, 63; casualties, 185. *Operations*: in the Carpathians, 47; recapture of Przemyśl and Lemberg, 47-64; dispositions in middle of May, 55; in Russian Poland, 65-79; east of Lemberg, 261; in Pripet Marshes, 267.
- ARMY, BRITISH: old and new theory of its use, 152; early strategy in war, 153; contrast between professional and new citizen army, 193-205; rivalry between eastern and western theatres, 271, 373; criticism of staff-work, 278; pensions and allowances, 289-292; casualties, 176-180. *The New Army*: recruiting of, 195-7; agitation for compulsory enlistment, 335-7. *Operations*: in Gallipoli, 23-45, 353-372; at Ypres, 273; Battle of Loos, 269-278; *map*, 270; dispositions before Loos, 275; in Mesopotamia, 343-351.
- FRENCH: Training and weapons before September offensive, 281-2; reconnaissance work, 283; artillery, 287. *Operations*: round Souchez, 271; on British right at Loos, 276-7; in Champagne, 279-288; *map*, 280.
- GERMAN: casualties in first year, 181-5. *Operations—East*: strategy and tactics in Galicia, 48-50; victory on the Danajec, 51-2; enveloping movement against Warsaw, 69-71; at Przasnysz, 73-4; occupation of Warsaw, 81; line of the rivers forced, 247-253; in Courland, 255; failure from Wilna, 265; *maps*, 53, 61, 69, 71, 82, 250, 265, 266. *West*: defeats near Lens and in Champagne, 271-288; counter-attacks near Lens, 276-7, and in Champagne, 288.
- ITALIAN: strength and dispositions, 139. *Operations*: in Trentino and on Isonzo front, 147-9; *map*, 147.
- RUSSIAN: causes of defeats in spring, 47-48, 83-85; changes in commands, 257-8; scandals, 130; generalship in retreat, 253. *Operations*: defeat on the Danajec, 52; loss of Galicia, 52-64; successes at Jaroslav, 55, at Krasnik, 72, and at Przasnysz, 75; on Lublin line, 79; evacuation of Warsaw, 81-83; new line of defence, 244; Kovno, Novo-Georgievsk and Brest-Litowsk lost, 251-3; in Courland, 255; successes in Galicia, 261; Wilna campaign, 265-6; retreat stayed, 267.
- TURKISH: high quality of, 37. *Operations*: in Gallipoli, 23-44; in Mesopotamia, 344-352.
- ASHMEAD-BARTLETT, Mr., criticism of the Gallipoli campaign, 355.
- ASKWITH, Sir George, 111; *portrait*, 107.
- ASMAK DERE (Anzac), 363.
- ASQUITH, Mr., attacks on, 336.
- AUBERS, 271.
- Bacchante, *H.M.S.*, 361.
- BACHMAN, Admiral, superseded, 233.
- BAGDAD Railway, 344.
- BAHREIN Island occupied, 344.
- BAILLIACHE, Mr. Justice, 340.
- BALDWIN, Brigadier-General, 365.
- BALEFOUR, Mr.: succeeds Mr. Churchill at the Admiralty, 21; on the submarine blockade, 233.
- BALLIN, Herr, on freedom of the seas, 209; *portrait*, 213.
- BALKANS, German losses in, 125.
- BALTIC, Naval operations in, 235-7.
- BARK, M., 102.
- BATTLES, Engagements, &c.: Achi Baba (June 4th), 43; Anzac (Gaba Tepe), 26-7, 41, 357-65; Basra, 344; Bois Grenier, 273; Borgo, 147; Dukla Pass, 53; Champagne, 279; Dunajec, 51-3; Grodek, 63; Gully Ravine, 44; Iwangrod, 79; Kereves Dere, 43, 359; Kovno, 251; Kowel, 219; Krasnik, 72; Krithia, 32; Kut-el-Amara, 351; The Labyrinth, 271; Lone Pine, 361; Loos, 275; Monfalcone, 148; Monte Nero, 148; Nasrie, 349; Plava, 148; Przasnysz, 73; Pruch, 55; Przemyśl, 56; Sasun, 223; Seddil-Bahr Landings, 27-29; Sereth, 261; Shaiba, 345; Suvla Bay, 367-71; Swentziany, 265; Zurawno, 62.
- NAVAL: Dardanelles forts, 17; Dardanelles (March 18th), 19; Gulf of Riga, 235, 255; Smyrna, 19.
- BASSERMANN, Herr, 122.
- BASRA, Capture of, 344.
- BAUCHOP'S Hill, 363.
- BAVARIA, King of, speech, 122.
- BEAUCHAMP, Colonel Sir H., 369.
- B 11 torpedoes *Messudiveh*, 21.
- BELLEWAARDE Farm, 273.
- BEWECKE, Admiral, suspended, 233.
- Berliner Tageblatt, 119, 125, 273, 275.
- BERNSTEIN, Herr, 123.
- BERNSTORFF, Count, 229, 239, 313; *portrait*, 312.
- Berwind, The, 319.
- BETHMANN-HOLLWEG, Count von (German Chancellor), on "Freedom of the Seas," 242; on German policy, 122-123.
- BLOCKADE, effect on British commerce, 207; British policy discussed, 239-43; arrangements with neutrals, 339.
- BLONIE, Russians evacuate, 79.
- BOBRINSKY, Count, 135.
- BOEHM-ERMOLLI, General, on the Dniester, 59, 62.
- BOIS GRENIER, 273.
- BORGIO, Austrians evacuate, 147.
- Bouvet, The, 19.
- BOWLES, Mr. Gibson, 139, 243.
- BOY-ED, Captain, 312, 318, 320.
- BRACE, Mr., 333.
- BREST-LITOWSK, evacuated by Russians, 253.
- BRYAN, Mr., 313.
- BRYCE, Lord, on Armenian massacres, 222, 312.
- BUENZ, Herr Karl, trial, 319.
- BULAIR Isthmus, 357.
- BURIAN, Baron de, 315.
- BZURA, lines evacuated by Russians, 79.

- CADETS (Russian party), policy of, 133.
 CADORNA, General, strategy discussed, 143-4.
 CAMP DE CHALONS, 281.
Canopus, H.M.S., 19.
 CAPITAL, effect of war on, 213.
Cap Trafalgar, The, 319.
 CARDEN, Admiral, attacks Dardanelles forts, 19, 236.
 CARENCY, 21.
Carmania, The, 319.
 CARNIC Alps, 141.
 CARSON, Sir F., 329.
 CARSO Plateau, 141.
 CASSEL, Sir Ernest, 341.
 CASTELNAU, General, commands attack in Champagne, 279.
 CASUALTIES: British, 176-180; "The Black May," in Dardanelles (August), 179, 367; French and Russian, 181; German and Austrian, 181-5.
 CENSORSHIP in England, effects of, 187.
 CENSUS (Registration) Bill, 335; and Ireland, 331.
 CENTRAL (Liquor) Control Board, 335.
 CHAILAK DERE (Anzac), 363.
 CHALLENGE Junction (Champagne), 279, 281.
 CHAMPAGNE: French offensive in, 279; description of country, 281-3; map, 280.
 CHANAK (Dardanelles), project of attacking, 357.
Chateaubriand, The, 229.
 CHOCOLATE HILL (Suvla), 367.
 CHUNUK BAIR, fighting on, 365.
 CHURCHILL, Mr. Winston: leaves the Admiralty, 21, 87; policy in Antwerp expedition, 155, and in Dardanelles, 15, 159; defends his administration, 236-7.
 CITE ST. ELIE, 276.
City of Cambridge, The, 229.
 COALITION MINISTRY, formation of, 333-5.
Colne, H.M.S., 365.
 COMPULSION: for industry, mooted, 335; for army, 191, 336-7.
Cornwallis, H.M.S., 19.
 COMMON LAW, The English, 339.
 COTTON declared contraband, 240.
 COURTNEY, Squad-Commander, 5.
 COX, Brigadier-General, 363.
 CROWN PRINCE (German), 287.
 CUTHBERT, Capt., D.S.O., 277.
- Daily Mail*, The, 336-7.
Daisy (trawler), 227.
 DALZIEL, Sir H., 336.
 DAMAKJELIK BAIR, 363.
 DARDANELLES: reasons of campaign, 11-13; criticisms considered, 14-17; naval bombardment of outer forts, 17; attack on the Narrows, 19-21; description of Straits, 16, 17. (See Gallipoli.)
 DAVIES, R. B., Commander, 1.
 DELAMAIN, General, 344, 351.
 DERNBURG, HERR, 123, 312.
 DIMITRIEFF, General, defeated at Dunajec, 52.
 DNIESTER, Austrians cross, 63.
 DONOP, von, Colonel, 336.
 DOUBLE CRASSIER, The, 277.
 DUBNO, occupied by Germans, 261.
Duke of Edinburgh, H.M.S., 352.
 DUMBA, Dr. (Austrian Ambassador), recalled, 317.
 DUNAJEC, Battle of, 48-52; effects of in Russia, 131.
 DWINSK, 266.
- E 9, 235.
 E 13, 236.
 E 14, 37.
 E 15, 39.
 EGERTON, Colonel (Coldstream Guards), 277.
 EICHORN, General von, 73; 247; storms Kovno, 251; portrait, 83.
Ekbatana, The, sunk in the Shat-el-Arab, 344.
Eleanor Waurmer, The, 319.
Evening Mail (New York), on British naval blockade, 242 (footnote).
 EVERE, airship shed, 7.
 EVERT, General, 259; portrait, 261.
 EXPLOSIVES, various kinds of, 163-166.
- FAO, 344.
 FAY, confession of, 318.
 FENIANISM, 321.
Fermo (trawler), 229.
 FINANCE: Allies co-operation, 102; problem of exchange, 102; American loan, 102.
 — British: estimates of cost of war, 97-98, 213; second war loan, 99; Mr McKenna's Budget, 99-100.
 — French, 101.
 — German, 102-3.
 — Russian, 102.
 FISHER, Lord: opposes naval attack on Dardanelles, 15, 236; resignation, 21; chairman of Inventions Committee, 235.
 FOOD prices, 111, 117, 208.
 FORSHAW, Lieutenant, V.C., 361.
 FOSSE 8, 276.
 "FREEDOM OF THE SEAS": meaning of phrase, 238; Herr Ballin on, 209; Sir E. Grey on, 242; discussed, 110, 238-243; Captain Persius' views, 110; Kaiser on, 122.
Freeman's Journal, The, 331.
 FREMANTLE, Colonel F. E., quoted, 371.
 FREIGHT RATES, increase of, 200.
 FRENCH, Sir J., conferences with General Joffre, 273, 373.
 FRY, Sir John, 345.
 FRIEND, General, 329.
- GABA TEPE, 25.
 GAEDKE, Colonel, 84, 259.
 GALICIA, firing of the oil-fields, 63. See ARMIES.
 GALLIPOLI: landing on, 23-31; attacks on Achi Baba, 32-45; battle of Anzac and Suvla Bay, 353-369; campaign discussed, 15, 159, 236-7, 355-7, 373.
 GALLWITZ, General von, operations on Narew, 73, 75, 247; portrait, 79.
 GARIBALDI, 141.
 GAS ATTACKS, British, 275.
 GERMANY: finance in, 102-103; the problem of food, 117; attitude towards submarine blockade, 119; discussion of peace terms, 121-123; party views on annexation, 122-123; phases of opinion, 125-128; two schools of war policy, 122, 233; division of Socialist party, 123; overtures to Russia after fall of Warsaw, 247.
 GHAZI BABA (Suvla), 367.
 GHISTELLES, French air raid on aerodrome, 3.
 GIBB, Sir George, 111.
 GIUDICARIA VALLEY, 141.
 GODLEY, Major-General, Sir A., 363.
Goeben, The, 39.
Goliath, H.M.S., sunk by Turkish destroyer, 29.
 GOREMYKIN, M., Russian Premier, portrait, 130; 134-137.
- GORIZIA, Italian attacks on, 147.
 GOUTCHKOFF, M. (leader of Octobrists in Russia), 135; portrait, 130; speech at Zemstvo congress, 137.
 GREAT BRITAIN: principles of defence, 152-153; the censorship, 187; "optimists and pessimists," 186-192; her break with past military traditions, 186, 193-195; home politics, 333-390.
 GREEN HILL, 367.
 GRODEK, Russian lines forced at, 62.
 GULLY RAVINE (Dardanelles), capture of, 44.
- HALDANE, Lord, on the reserves at Loos, 278, 336.
 HAMBURG-AMERICAN LINE, misconduct in New York, 319.
 HAMILTON, Sir Ian: plans of attack on Gallipoli, 25; excellence of his despatches, 25; attacks on Achi Baba, 39-44; chapter 34; despatches, Appendix.
 HAROUN-EL-RASCHID, 344.
 HELFFERICH, Dr.: statement to Reichstag, 102; on indemnities, 125.
 HENDERSON, Mr. Arthur, on the causes of industrial unrest, 109; at Cardiff, 114, 333.
Hesperian, The, 119.
 HICKIE, General, 331.
 HILL Q, 365.
 HILL, Sir Norman, on our losses from submarines, 229.
 HILL 70, 276.
 HILL 193, 287.
 HILL 192. See Tahure, Butte de.
 HILL 191, 288.
 HINDENBURG, General von, strategy and plans, 71, 247-249, 263.
 HOHENZOLLERN REDOUBT, 275, 276, 277.
 HOLTZENDORFF, Admiral von, 233.
 HOME RULE (Ireland) Bill, 325-7.
 HOPWOOD, Sir F., 111.
 HOOGE, 273.
 HORTON, Commander (E 9), 235.
 HULLUCH, 275, 276.
 HURD, Mr. Archibald, 15, 227.
 "HYMN OF HATE," 127.
- Implacable Landing*, 29.
India, H.M.S., 227.
Inflexible, H.M.S., 19.
 INGENOHL, Admiral, suspended, 233.
 INVENTIONS, Board of, 235.
 IRELAND: sympathies in past British wars and in this, 321; achievements of Irish troops, 323, 327, 331; relations with Belgium and France, 323; unrest before war, 323; the Home Rule Bill, 325-7; recruiting, 329; prosecutions, 329-331; Census (Registration) Act, 331; dislike of compulsion, 331.
Irresistible H.M.S., 19.
 ISMAIL OGLU TEPE (Suvla), 368-71.
 ISONZO, valley, features of, 141; operations in, 148.
 ITALY, frontiers of, 140; problems of defence and attack, 143; fear of Germany, 145.
 IVANOFF, General, 52, 259, 261.
 IWANGROD, captured by von Kovess, 81.
- JACKSON, Sir Henry, 236.
 JAGOW, Herr von, 231.
 JAROSLAV, Russian successes near, 56.
 JELICOE, Admiral Sir John, 227.
 JOHNSTON, Brigadier-General, 365.
 JOSEPH, FERDINAND, Archduke, 55.

- KAISER, The: war conference at Posen, 59; speech on duration of war, 121.
 KARAKOL DAGH, 367.
 KARUN, River, 347.
 KARAHISSAR, defended by Armenians, 223.
 KELLERMANN, Herr (German war correspondent), quoted, 273, 275.
 KEREVES DERE, 43, 359.
 KIPLING, Mr., quoted, 193, 195.
 KIRETCH TEPE SIRT, 367.
 KITE BALLOONS, 5.
 KOCH, Admiral von, 233.
 KOJA CHEMEN TEPE (Anzac), 363-365.
 Königsberg, The, destroyed, 5.
 Kōreetz, The, 255.
 KORNILOFF, General, 53.
 KOVSS, General von, occupies Iwangrod, 79.
 KOVNO, fall of, 252-253.
 KOWEIT, 344.
 KRASNIK, Austrian defeat at, 72.
 KRITHIA, British attack on, 31, 353.
 KUHN, von, operations in Trentino, 141.
 KUM KALE, French landing at, 27, 357.
 KURNAH, 345.
 KUT-EL-AMARA (Tigris), Turkish positions at, 351.
 LABOUR: unrest before the war, 105; decline of unemployment, 107; transference of, 214; disputes and their causes, 109-111; war bonuses, 111; strikes on Clyde and in South Wales, 113-114; attitude to compulsory arbitration; sacrifices in the war, 115. See munitions.
 LABYRINTH, The, 271.
 LALA BABA, 367.
 LANCASHIRE LANDING, 31.
 LANSLOWNE, Lord, 336.
 LARKIN, Mr. James, 329.
 LAW, Mr. Bonar, on Pensions Committee, 291; in the Coalition, 334.
 LAW AND LAWYERS: services to English liberties, 338-9; and the naval blockade, 339; cases, 340-1.
 LEMBERG, recovery of, 56.
 LENS, German salient at, 271, 273; its defences, 275.
 LEOPOLD OF BAVARIA, Prince, enters Warsaw, 81; *portrait*, 71.
 LIEBNECHT, Dr., 123.
 Lightning, *H.M.S.*, 227.
 LILLE, strategic importance of, 271.
 LINSINGEN, General von, in Eastern Galicia, 53, 55, 60, 62, 68; *portrait*, 67.
 LISLE, General de, 369.
 LISSAUER, Herr, "Hymn of Hate," 127.
 LLOYD GEORGE, Mr.: Minister of Munitions, 334-5; South Wales coal strike, 114, 335; "Through Terror to Triumph" 191, 337; favours industrial compulsion, 335; and compulsion for army, 335.
 London, *H.M.S.*, 25.
 LONDON, Declaration of, 159, 239, 339.
 LONE PINE (Anzac), 361.
 LONG, Mr. Walter, 336.
 LOOS, Battle of, 273-277; comments on, 277-278.
 Lord Nelson, *H.M.S.*, 19.
 LUBLIN occupied by Germans, 79.
 LVOFF, Prince, 139.
 MACARA, Sir C., relief scheme adopted, 293.
 MACKENSEN, General von, in Battle of Dunajec.
 Magdeburg, The, 235.
 MAHON, General, 367.
 MAIN DE MASSIGES, Le, 283-285-8.
 Majestic, *H.M.S.*, 19, 25, 27.
 MAKIAKOFF, M. (Russian Minister of Interior), dismissal, 133.
 MALBORGHETTO, Italian operations against, 139.
 Manchester Guardian, The, 335.
 Maori, *H.M.S.*, 227.
 MARCHAND, General, 287.
 MARKOFF, M., 135.
 Maria Quesade, The, 319.
 MCKENNA, Mr., Chancellor of the Exchequer, 99.
 Medjidieh, The, 39.
 Megantic, The, 229.
 MELISS, Major-General, 345.
 MESNIT-LES-HURUS, 288.
 Messudiyeh, The, torpedoed, 21.
 Meteor, The, 227.
 Mikolajow, The, 60.
 MILLS, Flight-Lieutenant, 7.
 MILIUKOFF, M. (leader of Russian Cadets), policy of, 133; *portrait*, 131.
 MINSK, 265.
 MOHAMMERAH, 343.
 MOIR, Mr. E. W., 285.
 MOLODETSKO, German cavalry raid on, 265.
 Moltke, The, torpedoed by *Eg*, 237, 255.
 MONFALCONE, 141; re-occupied by Italians, 147.
 MONTE NERO, 141.
 MORATORIUM for rent suggested, 209.
 MORGAN, Mr. Pierpont, 312.
 MORGENTHAU, Mr., on Armenian massacres, 221, 224.
 MOULIN DE PIETRE, 273.
 MUDROS, 357.
 MUNITIONS ACT, working of, 114, 211, 215, 334-5.
 MUSCAT, Sultan of, 351.
 NARROWS, The (Gallipoli), naval attack on, 19.
 NASRIE, 345; battle of, 349.
 NAVARIN FARM, 287.
 NAVY, BRITISH: achievement of, 227, blockade policy, 239-240. *Operations*: the Grand Fleet, 227; in Dardanelles, 15-21; against submarines, 233-235; in Baltic, 235-236; blockade of Germany, 227.
 — FRENCH: *Operations*: in Dardanelles, 19-21.
 — GERMAN: evasive cruises in North Sea, 225; changes in submarine policy, 231-2; failures and disaster in Baltic, 235-6.
 — RUSSIAN: in Black Sea, 39.
 — TURKISH: losses, 21, 37, 39.
 NEUTRALS AND NEUTRALITY: German breaches in United States, 311-320; the British blockade, 239-243, 339-340; and German submarine activity, 229-231.
 NEUVILLE, 271.
 NICHOLAS, Grand Duke: conference at headquarters, 67; suppresses corruption in army, 131; relieved of command in Poland, 257; generalship in retreat, 253; estimates of, 259.
 NIXON, General Sir John, 345, 347.
 NOEUX-LES MINES, 276, 278.
 NOGILL, The, 235.
 NORE, mutiny of, 321.
 NOTRE DAME DE LORETTE, 271.
 NOVO GEORGIEVSK, captured by Germans, 251.
 NUR-ED-DIN, 351.
 Ocean, *H.M.S.*, 19.
 O'CONNELL, Daniel, 321.
 OLSEN, Captain, 319.
 O'NEILL, Mr. John (Gaelic League), 327.
 Pallada, The, sunk, 235.
 PAPEN, Captain von, 314, 320.
 PARIS, Declaration of, 239, 243.
 PARSONS, Sir L., 331.
 PATENTS, suspension of enemy, 211.
 PEIRCE, Flight-Lieutenant, 1.
 PENSIONS AND ALLOWANCES, 289-291; table of, 292; Government Bill criticised, 292.
 PERSIUS, Captain, 119.
 PERTHES, 287.
 PFLANZER, General von, defeated on the Pruth, 55.
 PICHON, M., on the Grand Fleet, 227.
 PITT, William, 321.
 PLAVA, Italians occupy, 148.
 PLOCKEN (Monte Croce), 148.
 POHL, Admiral von, succeeds Admiral Ingenohl, 233.
 POLIVANOFF, General, new Minister of War, 67.
 Pommern, The, 235.
 POWELL, General, 331.
 PREDIT PASS, 141.
 PREGASINA, capture by Italians, 147.
 Prince Adalbert, The, 236.
 Prince George, *H.M.S.*, 19.
 Princess Irene, *H.M.S.*, 220.
 Prince of Wales, *H.M.S.*, 25.
 PRIPET MARSHES, 261, 267.
 PRUTH, River, Austrian defeat on, 55.
 PRZASNYSZ, Battle of, 73.
 PRZEMYSL, re-capture of, 55.
 QUADRILATERAL, The, 44.
 Queen, *H.M.S.*, 25, 27.
 Queen Elizabeth, *H.M.S.*, 19, 227.
 QUINN'S POST, 41.
 Ramsay, *H.M.S.*, 227.
 READING, Lord, judgments, 340-1;
 Recruit, *H.M.S.*, 227.
 RECRUITING, voluntary canvass in November, 1914, 196; figures, 197.
 RED CROSS SOCIETY, work of, 297-309.
 REDMOND, Mr., speeches, 325, 327, 329.
 REGIMENTAL, DIVISIONAL, &c., UNITS:
 British: 1st Division, 275; 3rd Cavalry Division, 275; 7th Division, 275; 9th Division, 275; 10th (Irish) Division, 331, 361; 11th Division, 370; 13th Division, 361; 15th Division (Scottish Territorials), 276; 21st Division, 276; 24th Division, 276; 28th Division, 275; 29th Division, 25, 44, 359, 369; 42nd (Lancashire Territorials) Division, 361; 47th Division (London Territorials), 276; 52nd (Lowland Territorial) Division, 361; 53rd Division, 361; 54th Division, 361; 135th Battery F.A., 273; 1st Australian Brigade (N.S.W.), 361; 28th Australian Infantry Regiment; Berkshires, 273; 6th Border Regiment, 367; Coldstream Guards, 277; 2nd Dorset, 341; Dublin Fusiliers, 25, 44, 323; East Lancashire Territorials, 25, 43; Essex Division, 25, 44; 7th Gloucesters, 365; Guards (Hill 70), 276; Hampshires, 25; Indian Cavalry Corps, 275; Inniskillings, 25, 331; King's Own, 25, 27; Lancashire Fusiliers, 25; 6th Loyal North Lancashires, 365; South Lancashires, 361;

REGIMENTAL, &C., UNITS—*continued*.

- 6th and 7th Lancashire Fusiliers, 361; 4th East Lancashires, 361; Lincolns, 273; Marine Brigade, 25; Marine Brigade (Plymouth Battalion), 27; Munsters, 25, 323; 2nd Norfolk, 341; Naval Division, 43; 20th Punjab, 345; 5th Royal Scots, 44; Royal Fusiliers, 25; South Wales Borderers, 25, 27, 363; Ulster Division, 331; Wellington (N.Z.) Mounted Rifles, 41; Worcesters, 25, 44, 367; 6th Lincolns, 367; 11th Manchesters, 367; 5th Norfolk, 369; 6th Gurkhas, 365; Otago Mounted Rifles, 363; 8th Welsh Regiment (Pioneers), 363; 9th West Yorks, 367; 6th Yorks, 367; Warwicks, 367; 5th Wiltshires, 365. *French*: Senegalese, 43; 2nd and 4th French Armies, 279. *German*: 53, 184.
- RELIEF: the National Fund, 203-4; for our Allies and friends, 204-5.
- REVENTLOW, Count, 119, 224.
- RHODODENDRON SPUR, 363.
- RIABUSHINSKY, M., protests against mismanagement of war in Russia, 131.
- RIDDER, Mr. Herman, 311.
- RIFAAT, Colonel, 45.
- RIFLE, mechanism of, 167.
- RIGA, naval operations near, 235-6, 255.
- RITCHIE, Lieutenant Ayres, at Loos, 277.
- RIVA (Trentino), 141.
- River Clyde, H.M.S. ("The Trojan Horse")*, 29.
- ROBECK, Admiral de, plans in Battle of the Narrows, 19-20, 357.
- RODZIANKO, M., President of Duma, 133, 135; *portrait*, 131.
- ROSHER, Flight-Lieutenant, 5.
- ROWNO, Germans fail to capture, 261. *Roxburgh, H.M.S.*, 227.
- ROYAL PATRIOTIC FUND, statutory committee, 292.
- RUNCIMAN, Mr., at Cardiff, 114.
- RUSSIA: work of the Zemstvos, 130; rise of discontent at conduct of war, 132-3; proceedings in the Duma, 133-136; popular agitation of the Duma, 136-7; rejects German overtures for peace, 247.
- RUSZKY, General, 263.
- ST. DAVIDS, Lord, criticises British Headquarters' Staff, 278.
- SARI BAIR HILLS (Anzac), description of, 363; fighting in, 365; *map*, 369.
- SASUN, Armenian resistance in, 223.
- SAZLI BEIT DERE, 363.
- SCHENCK, Baron, 125.
- SCHOLZ, General von, 73, 247; *portrait*, 81.
- SCIMITAR HILL, 370.
- SEA PLANE CARRIERS, 3.
- SEA PLANES AND SUBMARINE MINES, 5.
- SEDDIL-BAHR, landing at, 29.
- SEKETH RIVER, Russian success on, 261.
- SHAIBA, Battle of, 345.
- SIAT-EL-ARAB, 344.
- SIAT-EL-HAI, 345.
- SHEEHY-SKEFFINGTON, Mr., 320.
- SHEIKH-SAID, 352.
- SHEIKH-UL-ISLAM resigns, 224.
- SHELLS, shrapnel and high explosive, 171.
- SHINGAREFF, M., 135, 137.
- "SINGLE MEN FIRST," 337.

SINN FEIN prosecutions, 329-331.


- SHIPS OF WAR: *British*: *AE* 2, 39; *Agamemnon*, 19; *Albion*, 19; *Bacchante*, 361; *B* 11, 21; *Canopus*, 19; *Colne*, 365; *Cornwallis*, 19; *Duke of Edinburgh*, 352; *E* 14, 37; *E* 15, 39; *Goliath*, 29; *Inflexible*, 19; *Invincible*, 19; *London*, 25; *Lord Nelson*, 19; *Majestic*, 19, 25, 27; *Ocean*, 19; *Prince George*, 19; *Prince of Wales*, 25; *Queen*, 25; *Queen Elizabeth*, 19; *River Clyde*, 29; *Swiftsure*, 19; *Triumph*, 25; *Vengeance*, 19.
- *FRENCH*: *The Charlemagne*, 19; *The Gaulois*, 19; *The Bouvet*, 19; *The Suffren*, 19.
- *GERMAN*: *The Goeben*, 39.
- *TURKISH*: *The Medjidieh*, 39; *The Messudiyeh*, 21.
- SHIPPING: effect of war on, 209; diagram of losses, 231.
- Siroutch, The*, 255.
- SMILLIE, Mr. (Miners' Federation), 337.
- SOU'CHEZ, 271.
- SPEYER, Sir Edgar, 341.
- Springfield Republican, The*, 312.
- Stamboul*, transport sunk near *E* 14, 37.
- STEGIER, confession of, 312.
- STOFFORD, General, 369-71.
- STRATEGY: its relations to national policy, 151-2. *British*: Chatham's principles, 153; in Boer War, 153; in Dardanelles expedition, 11-15, 23-24, 32, 35-6, 87-8, 157-9, 236-7, 355-8, 370-2; in France, Sir John French's alternatives, 153-4, 155; at Loos, 272-3; competition between Eastern and Western fronts, 269-70, 373. *French*: early miscalculations, 153; in Champagne, 279. *German*: blunders of, 157; in Russia, 47-9, 68-71, 247-51, 263-5, 267; in Balkans, 125. *Italian*: 443-6. *Russian*, 75-77, 253.
- STRIKES. *See* LABOUR.
- SUBMARINES: fight with airship, 5; activity of British in Dardanelles and in Sea of Marmora, 37; in Baltic, 235-6; German in Mediterranean, 21, 37, 236.
- SUBMARINE BLOCKADE, *The*, incidents of, 229; diagram of British losses, 231; change of German policy, 230; its real causes, 231-3; measures of British navy against, 233-5.
- Suffren*, 19.
- SUGANA (Trentino), valley of, 141, 147.
- SUKH-ES-SHEYUKH, 349.
- SUKHOMLINOFF, Russian Minister of War, resigns, 167, 133; Duma demands impeachment, 135.
- SULEIMAN ASKERI, 349.
- SUVLA BAY, description of, 367; battle of, 367-71; *map*, 370.
- SWENTZIANV, 295.
- Swiftsure, H.M.S.*, 19.
- SYDENHAM, Lord, 278.
- SYKES, Sir Mark, 344.

- TABLE TOP (Anzac), 363.
- TAHURE, Butte de, 287-8.
- TALAAZ BEY, policy in Armenia, 221; *portrait*, 219.
- TARVIS, 141.

TASMANIA POST, 359.

- TCHELNOKOFF, M., Mayor of Moscow, 135, 137.
- THOMAS, Mr. J. H. (Railwaymen), 337.
- Times, The*, 127, 335, 336.
- TIRPITZ, Admiral von, 233; relations with Chancellor, 119.
- TOLMINO, 141.
- TONALE, Pass of, 141.
- TSAR OF RUSSIA: rescript to Duma, 67; takes command of armies, 257; letter to Grand Duke Nicholas, 257-8.
- TRADING TRUSTS in neutral countries, 211.
- TRADE UNIONS. *See* LABOUR.
- TRENCHES, German in Champagne, 283; *map*, 280.
- TRENTINO, description of country, 140. Italian operations in, 147-8.
- Triumph, H.M.S.*, 19, 25.
- U* 29, 119.
- U* 39, 229.
- Unita, The*, 319.
- USZOK PASS, Russian failures at, 47.
- VALL' INFERNO PASS captured by Italians, 148.
- VAN, captured by Armenians, 223.
- Vanika* torpedoed, 229.
- Vaterland, The*, 312.
- VEDEGRANGE, l'Épine de, 287.
- Vengeance, H.M.S.*, 19.
- VENIZELLOS, M., German estimate of, 125.
- VIERECK, Mr., 312.
- VOLKONSKY, Prince, 135.
- WARNEFORD, V.C., Flight-Lieutenant: exploit and death, 7.
- WARSAW: operations against, 55-80; evacuation of, 80-83.
- WEDDIGEN, Commander, 119.
- W BEACH (Gallipoli), landing at, 29.
- WEIHERG, Dr. Hans, 121.
- WILIA, River, 263.
- WILNA, operations near, 265-7.
- WILSON, President: third note on *Lusitania*, 231, 238; his views on "Freedom of the Seas," 238, 242; protests against British blockade, 241; rebukes German intriguers in America, 311.
- WILSON, Flight-Lieutenant, 5, 7.
- Wolverine, H.M.S.*, 44.
- World, The* (New York), 234, 314.
- WOYRSCH, General von, 55, 247; *portrait*, 71, 73.
- YANUSHKEVITCH, General, 257; *portrait*, 263.
- Y BEACH (Gallipoli), attempted landing at, 27-28.
- YEFREMOFF, M., 136.
- Y.M.C.A., work for troops,
- YEMEN, 352.
- YILGHIN BURNU, 367.
- YPRES, fighting round in summer and autumn (1915), 273.
- ZEEBRUGGE, British air raids on, 3, 5.
- ZEMTSVOS, work of in Russia, 130; conference, 137.
- ZEPPELINS. *See* air service (German).
- ZURAWNO, Russian successes at, 12.

END OF VOL. III.—1915.



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